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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Cross-cultural Relationships within New Zealand Agribusinesses Operating in China  
and Their Sociological Underpinnings  
by 
Xiaomeng Kong Sun Lucock 
This research was conducted in response to the importance of China as a destination market for New 
Zealand food products and services, the challenges that New Zealand agribusinesses have 
encountered in their China-related dealings, the absence of research on the overarching sociological 
framework of China’s agri-food environment, and the apparent lack of research on cross-cultural 
business relationships within the food and agribusiness context.  
This research sought to identify social institutions at play within this context, and to understand how 
they came about and interact. In addition, answers were sought as to whether common 
characteristics of agribusinesses − long production cycles, long investment cycles, production 
volatility, price volatility, product perishability, seasonality, food safety concerns, food security 
concerns, and environmental implications – impose particular challenges to building and managing 
cross-cultural business relationships.  
The research adopts an inductive-led theory-building case study methodology and research methods. 
Incidents and behaviours described were elicited from 38 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
New Zealand and Chinese informants, focusing on their cross-cultural business dealings in China, 
including the building and management of business relationships. These were interpreted through 
cultural lenses.  
Drawing on relevant sociological literature, a framework is proposed to describe the self-reinforcing 
Chinese sociological system. In this system, the Chinese world view leads to pragmatism, which is 
then reflected in ‘how it is’ (including hierarchy, ambiguity, flexibility, diversity, opposite that coexist, 
and interconnectedness), ‘what is important’ (including guanxi, trust, face, harmony, survival, and 
win-win), and ‘what they do’ (including avoid conflicts, go with the flow, strive for interdependence, 
eager for quick success, and test everything). All of these factors reinforce the Chinese view of the 
world, resulting in a high-context culture. The proposed framework recognises the fundamental 
differences in world view that Chinese people possess compared to many Westerners, in that 
whereas many Westerners see the world as a place where absolute truth exists, the abstract of 
which is therefore worth searching for, Chinese people see the world as being an intertwined matrix, 
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in which all things are interconnected and therefore situation dependent. This contextual world view, 
which produced, and has been reinforced by, Daoism and Confucianism, has a range of sociological 
implications, all of which have a profound impact on the behaviours of Chinese business people.  
Chinese people maintain a hierarchical social structure encompassing guanxi networks, in which 
family orientation is strong, and harmony and interdependence are fundamental. Chinese people 
adapt to circumstances in order to survive and/or succeed, and they form trust with much caution, 
taking time to establish a trusted relationship. The proposed framework can also be understood 
using Bourdieu’s formula of habitus x capital + field = practice, but it contains additional self-
reinforcing dimensions.  
Drawing on the understanding provided by this system, this research concludes that the unique 
characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector can impose additional challenges in building and 
managing effective cross-cultural business relationships, which derive, in particular, from specific 
uncertainties within this sector and which reinforce Chinese people’s distinctively pragmatic way of 
doing things. 
 
Key words:  cross-cultural business relationships, Chinese world view, pragmatism, Chinese 
sociological system, Chinese social institutions, food and agribusiness, agri-food 
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1.1 Background 
In recent years rapid economic growth and an expanding middle-class population have meant 
that China is increasingly important as a destination market for food products and services from 
New Zealand. In the first quarter of 2013 China overtook Australia and became the largest export 
market for New Zealand, with the main exports being food and agribusiness products (Statistics 
New Zealand, 2013). This dominant position in food and agribusiness products export has been 
maintained ever since, and is reflected in the increased business interactions in this sector 
between the two countries.  
Anecdotal evidence shows that among the many New Zealand agribusiness ventures in China, not 
all have succeeded or even survived, just like many other international businesses in China. Many 
of the international business failures have been attributed to a lack of cultural competence on the 
part of business practitioners (Johnson, Lenartowicz, & Apud, 2006). In a study of the 
management practices of New Zealand expatriates in China, Seak and Enderwick (2008) argue 
that cultural factors within business management in China are of great importance, and that to be 
successful requires expatriates to understand Chinese culture and possess cross-cultural 
competencies when managing in China: 
China has a business culture which relies heavily on relationships – business relationships 
come first and the actual business later. This aspect is contrary to that of the West, where 
business relationships are secondary. (Seak & Enderwick, 2008, p. 1299) 
In doing business, China has a “strikingly different” institutional framework compared with that of 
the US (S. X. Li, Yao, Sue-Chan, & Xi, 2011), which is a country with a typical Western institutional 
framework. Chinese cultural traits such as Confucianism, family-ism, group orientation, ideal of 
life,  and Chinese mind-set have heavily influenced the direction of business practices (Xing, 
1995). In a cross-cultural study that involved Australia and China, Mavondo and Rodrigo (2001) 
concluded that personal relationships are critical to building and enhancing inter-organisational 
relationships. According to Zhu, Nel, and Bhat(2006), to initiate such business relationships, 
Chinese people tend to employ more personal strategies, whereas New Zealanders tend to use 
more impersonal communication strategies. A stronger orientation for long-term relationships in 
Chinese people compared with New Zealanders has also been identified (Zhu et al., 2006).  
These distinct differences between Chinese and Western business practices, and their underlying 
institutional cultures, have encouraged many scholars to make cross-cultural business 
relationships involving China a research focus in recent years. Many of these studies have focused 
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on selected social institutions within Chinese culture, such as guanxi, and have investigated their 
importance, categorisation, and the roles they play, as well as how they affect business dealings in 
China. What appeared to be lacking was a description of the overarching sociological framework, 
showing the reasons for and origins of these social institutions, as well as how they interact.  
Additionally, despite these extensive studies on cross-cultural business relationships in a wide 
commercial context, minimal research has been conducted in the context of food and 
agribusiness. Although many of the principles found in the research on the wider commercial 
context could be applied to the food and agribusiness sector, the unique and defining 
characteristics of this sector may impose additional constraints on business relationships.  
The aforementioned anecdotal evidence of New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs’ 
unsuccessful endeavours in China, the absence of research on a description of the overarching 
sociological framework in China, along with the apparent lack of research on cross-cultural 
business relationship within the food and agribusiness context inspired the conception of this PhD 
research.  
The anecdotal evidence and lack of existing studies have also determined the open questions of 
this PhD study, which set out to investigate cross-cultural business relationships between China 
and New Zealand within the context of food and agribusinesses (or the agri-food context). By 
interpreting, through cultural lenses, the incidents and behaviours within the agribusinesses 
investigated, this research intends to provide a deeper understanding of the underlying 
sociological frameworks (with a focus on the Chinese side) that govern and direct the cross-
cultural business relationships between the people of these two countries in the agri-food 
context, as well as attempts to answer whether or not the unique characteristics of agribusiness 
impose added challenges in building and managing cross-cultural business relationships. 
Having been educated to university level in China, the researcher has spent the last 13 years 
studying, working, and living in New Zealand. Drawing on Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 
1955), where a person makes sense of the world around him or her according to his or her 
personal constructs actively developed through previous life encounters, these life experiences 
and linguistic skills have allowed the researcher to empathise with both cultures, forming the 
lenses through which this study was carried out and helping to inform the interpretation of the 
research results. 
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1.2 Research Context 
Several definitions are required to describe the context of this PhD research, and the unique and 
defining characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector need to be described.  
1.2.1 Definitions 
1.2.1.1 Culture 
Culture includes beliefs, traditions, values and language. It provides the very grounds for human 
communication and interaction, and is also a source of domination. Culture shapes our 
understanding of reality and also helps to establish and maintain social hierarchies. Culture also 
mediates practices by connecting individuals and groups to institutionalised hierarchies (Swartz, 
1997). 
1.2.1.2 Cross-cultural business relationships 
An understanding of cross-cultural business relationships can be derived from the above 
definition of culture. ‘Cross-cultural business relationships’ refers to relationships in the context of 
business, between parties that come from different cultures. These parties are therefore likely to 
have different beliefs, traditions, values, and languages. They will also have a different 
understanding of reality, and may have different institutionalised social hierarchies. 
1.2.1.3 Social institutions 
Social institutions are defined as “webs of interrelated rules and norms that govern social 
relationships, comprise the formal and informal social constraints that shape the choice-set of 
actors”. Social institutions “reduce uncertainty in human relations”, and “specify the limits of 
legitimate action in the way that rules of a game specify the structure within which players are 
free to pursue their strategic moves using pieces that have specific roles and status positions”. 
Norms are “implicit or explicit rules of expected behaviour that embody the interests and 
preferences of members of a close-knit group or a community” (Nee, 1998). 
1.2.1.4 The food and agribusiness sector 
The context of this research is the food and agribusiness sector. Although agricultural products go 
beyond just food (for example, fibre products such as cotton and wool), the focus of this PhD 
study is the sector where food products are the final consumer products. The ‘food and 
agribusiness sector’, as used here, therefore refers to the industries that involve the production, 
procurement, processing, marketing, retailing, and services of food products. 
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1.2.2 Unique characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector 
Although some research has been conducted on cross-cultural consumer perceptions of, and 
behaviours in relation to, food (Eves & Cheng, 2007), little has been done on cross-cultural 
business relationships within the food and agribusiness enterprises. The unique and defining 
characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector may, however, present added challenges that 
can have important influences on cross-cultural business relationships. These characteristics 
include (K. Woodford1, personal communication, 13 Jan 2012): 
1) long production cycles 
2) long investment cycles 
3) production volatility 
4) price volatility 
5) product perishability 
6) seasonality 
7) food safety 
8) food security 
9) environmental implications. 
 
1.3 Research Aim and Research Questions 
There is a need to further study cross-cultural business relationships in a food and agribusiness 
context. China’s increasingly important role as an export destination for New Zealand’s food and 
agribusiness sector has expanded the significance of such a study. This PhD research intends to 
reveal the underlying sociological frameworks that govern and direct cross-cultural business 
relationships between China and New Zealand within the agri-food context, and whether or not 
the unique and defining characteristics of agribusiness impose further challenges on these 
relationships. The researcher’s bilingual advantage allows stories to be heard from both the New 
Zealand and Chinese sides of a business relationship. The statement of research purpose for this 
PhD research therefore is: 
To interpret through cultural lenses the incidents and behaviours within New Zealand 
agribusinesses currently operating in China or exporting to China, in order to, firstly, 
understand the underlying sociological frameworks that govern and direct the cross-
                                                          
1 Professor Keith Woodford, formerly Professor of Farm Management and Agribusiness at Lincoln 
University, New Zealand from 2000 to 2014, and thereafter Honorary Professor of Agri-food Systems at 
Lincoln University. Professor Woodford is the academic supervisor of this thesis. 
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cultural business relationships between China and New Zealand; and, secondly, to 
discover whether the unique and defining characteristics of the food and agribusiness 
sector present additional challenges in building and managing effective cross-cultural 
business relationships. 
More specifically, this study seeks answers to the following research questions. 
1. What are the social institutions at play when New Zealand agribusinesses are operating in 
or exporting to China, particularly from the cross-cultural business relationship 
perspective? 
2. How have these social institutions come about, and how do they interact to form the 
sociological system in China? 
3. Are there any additional challenges imposed by the unique and defining characteristics of 
the food and agribusiness sector in the functionality of these social institutions in building 
and managing cross-cultural business relationships? 
It is worth noting that while the above are the specific questions this PhD research seeks to 
answer, the answers are based on the research results as well as the researcher’s synthesis of 
these results. This is because although informants may be able to describe incidents and 
behaviours, they may not always understand the cultural forces and origins of these incidents and 
behaviours. These research questions therefore do not form the general interview guide used 
during the field work, nor are they the actual questions asked of the interviewees. Rather, a 
general interview guide was constructed based on these research questions, and then 
personalised interview guides were developed for each of the interviewees according to their 
own circumstances.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The focus of this PhD study, as defined by the research questions and the constructivist-
interpretivist paradigm (Bryman, 2012) adopted by the researcher, favoured an inductive-led 
theory-building research methodology, which draws heavily on the work of  Eisenhardt 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). The theory-building approach and 
constructivist ontological perspective of the researcher also influenced the order of appearance of 
the thesis chapters. While the thesis structure still follows the common research logic of first 
identifying research questions, then explaining the research methodology and methods, followed 
by research results, discussion, conclusion and recommendations, the theory-building nature of 
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this research exercise, with its emphasis on emergent insights, has meant that many key aspects 
of the literature are not introduced until the discussion chapter, after the relevant themes have 
been identified in the result chapters. There is therefore no standalone literature review chapter 
within this thesis. Instead, the layout reflects the logic of the research methodology, with 
sensitisation literature and associated sensitisations introduced immediately following 
introduction of the methodology and methods; but with the integrating framework for literature 
synthesis determined by the emergent themes and insights, and therefore delayed through to the 
discussion and theory building chapter, where it can be integrated directly in relation to the 
emergent insights. In essence, prior literature and research data influence the final synthesis. A 
detailed exposition of this approach in relation to PhD studies is provided by Dunne (2011). 
Specifically, the structure of this thesis is as the follows. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter lays out the background of this PhD research, as well as setting the 
research context and aim, and the paradigmatic framework.  
Chapter 2 Research Methodology and Methods 
Chapter 2 presents in detail the philosophical framework (ontology, epistemology and 
methodology) of this PhD study, as well as the consequential research methods. Sensitising 
literature and sensitisations identified by the researcher are laid out. 
Chapter 3 Research Results I: How Things Are 
The empirical findings from the in-depth interviews have been categorised into three results 
chapters. Chapter 3 is dedicated to describing how things are, through the eyes of the informants. 
Chapter 4 Research Results II: Why Things Are the Way They Are 
This second results chapter provides an interpretation, by the informants, of why things are the 
way they are in business dealings in China within the agri-food sector. 
Chapter 5 Research Results III: Agribusiness Pathways in China 
The last results chapter, Chapter 5, presents some practical advice, given by the informants, on 
how New Zealand entrepreneurs should go about venturing into China, particularly in the agri-
food sector. 
Chapter 6 Discussion and Theory Development 
Drawing on the results, the emergent themes, and the literature relating to those themes, a 
sociological framework is developed which encapsulates the inherent Chinese social institutions, 
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and how these institutions interact and mutually reinforce each other. This chapter also addresses 
whether or not the unique and defining characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector impose 
added challenges in building and managing cross-cultural business relationships.  
Chapter 7 Conclusions, Reflections and Recommendations 
The last chapter summarises the entire PhD endeavour, along with the issues and conclusions that 
result from the emergent themes. Consideration is given to the possible implications of the 
researcher’s bilingual and bi-cultural personal constructs on the research outcomes. 
Transferability of the research findings and the associated limitations of this research are 
considered, and recommendations for future research initiatives are provided. 
 
The sequential flow of the thesis is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1 Research Procedure and Corresponding Thesis Structure 
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Research Methodology and Methods 
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2.1 Underpinning Ontology and Epistemology 
Before the specific research methodology and method can be considered, it is essential to 
evaluate the underpinning ontological and epistemological positions of the researcher. 
2.1.1 A constructivist ontological position 
Grix (2002) points out that ontology should be the starting point of all research, after which one’s 
epistemological and methodological positions logically follow. Ontology is traditionally 
understood as the “science or study of being” (Lawson, 2004, p. 1). Blaikei (2007, p. 92) suggests 
that, in the social research context, ontological assumptions are concerned with social reality: 
“These assumptions make claims about what kinds of social phenomena do or can exist, the 
conditions of their existence, and the way in which they are related.” An individual’s ontological 
position is his/her answer to the question “what is the nature of the social and political reality to 
be investigated?” (Hay, 2006, p. 80); it is an assumption that is impossible to refute empirically 
(Hughes & Sharrock, 1997, pp. 5-6). It is only after this question has been asked and answered 
that one can discuss what we can know about this social and political reality that is thought to 
exist (Grix, 2002, p. 177). 
Grix (2002) also notes that ontological positions are contained within the contrasting perspectives 
of ‘objectivism’ and ‘constructivism’. While the former is “an ontological position that asserts that 
social phenomena and their meanings have an existence that is independent of social actors” 
(Bryman, 2012, p. 33), the latter is an alternative ontological position which “asserts that social 
phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies 
that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that 
they are in a constant state of revision” (Bryman, 2012, p. 33). It is this latter, constructivist, 
ontological position that the researcher holds for matters concerning social reality. To put it in the 
context of this particular research, the researcher believes that cross-cultural business 
relationships between New Zealanders and Chinese are continually being accomplished by the 
people involved, and such relationships are produced through their social interaction, which is in 
a constant state of revision. 
2.1.2 An interpretive epistemological position 
Epistemology refers to “the branch of philosophy that deals with what can be counted as 
knowledge, where knowledge is located, and how knowledge increases” (Cunningham & 
Fitzgerald, 1996, p. 36). Grix (2002, p. 177) defines epistemology in the social research context as 
a core branch of philosophy that “is concerned with the theory of knowledge”, especially in 
relation to its methods and validation. Blaikei (2007, p. 92) suggests that an individual’s 
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epistemological assumptions “are concerned with what kinds of knowledge are possible – how we 
can know these things – and with criteria for deciding when knowledge is both adequate and 
legitimate”. There are two contrasting epistemological positions in social science, ‘positivism’ and 
‘interpretivism’ (Grix, 2002). The former, ‘positivism’, is the logical outcome of the ontological 
position of ‘objectivism’. It is an epistemological position that “affirms the importance of imitating 
the natural sciences” (Bryman, 2012, p. 27). In contrast, the constructivist ontological position 
discussed above naturally leads to an ‘interpretivist’ epistemological position, which is where this 
researcher stands. Interpretivism holds that “the subject matter of the social sciences – people 
and their institutions – is fundamentally different from that of the natural sciences. The study of 
the social world therefore requires a different logic of research procedure, one that reflects the 
distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order” (Bryman, 2012, p. 28). In the context of 
this particular research, the researcher’s interpretive epistemological position means that this 
project seeks to interpret, through cultural lenses, the incidents and behaviours within the 
selected agribusinesses, from which deeper insights of a cross-cultural business relationship 
between New Zealanders and Chinese will be attained. 
 
2.2 Research Methodology 
In the past decades scholars have deliberated at length the different types of research 
methodologies and methods within qualitative research (Aliseda, 2006; Blaikei, 2007; Bluhm, 
Harman, Lee, & Mitchell, 2011; Blumer, 1954; Bowen, 2006; Bryman, 2012; Charmaz, 2003, 2006; 
Corbin & Strauss, 2014; Dunne, 2011; Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gilgun, 2007; B. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Barney G. Glaser, 1978; Barney G Glaser, 
1992, 1998; Grix, 2002; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Heath, 2006; Heath & Cowley, 2004; Hughes & 
Sharrock, 1997; N. King & Horrocks, 2010; Mills, Bonner, & Francis, 2008; Mintzberg, 1979; Morse 
& Mitcham, 2002; O'Leary-Kelly & J. Vokurka, 1998; Padgett, 2004; Patton, 2002; Siggelkow, 2007; 
Anselm L Strauss, 1987; Anselm Leonard Strauss & Corbin, 1990; Suddaby, 2006; Yin, 2009). Key 
philosophical issues include: theory-building versus theory-testing; induction versus deduction; 
the role of emergent insights versus prior hypotheses; and scientific rigour, with a particular focus 
on validity, reliability and generalisability. These debates play out across a range of disciplines, 
including both sociology and management science. The debates have been particularly explicit 
within grounded theory (Babchuk, 1996; B. Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Barney G. Glaser, 1978; Barney 
G Glaser, 1992, 1998; Heath & Cowley, 2004; Mills et al., 2008; Anselm L Strauss, 1987; Anselm 
Leonard Strauss & Corbin, 1990). Within case study literature relating to management, the key 
debates are captured by competing philosophies as espoused by Eisenhardt and Yin. Given the 
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case study focus of this PhD research, these two authors are used below to capture the essentials 
of the debates. 
2.2.1 A comparison of Eisenhardt’s and Yin’s methodologies 
Both Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) and Yin (2009) are 
internationally highly respected scholars, whose distinctive research methods are well 
documented and referred to as guiding principles in contemporary social science research. Yin 
(2009) holds the belief that a deductive-led approach, or ‘theory testing’, offers a rigorous 
structure to research, thereby facilitating reliability of the research outcome; in contrast, 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) advocates an inductive-led method, 
or ‘theory building’, because it sets comparatively fewer limitation on the themes emerging out of 
the data. The former believes that the human intellect should direct researchers to a proposition 
or hypothesis using a deductive-led approach, based on knowledge of the existing theory, and the 
data from the field work will testify either for or against the proposition or hypothesis (Yin, 2009). 
The latter, conversely, believes that human cognitive ability should be used to identify themes 
from the data and subsequently draw theory from these themes using an inductive-led approach 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Barney G. Glaser, 1978; Patton, 2002).  
The following synthesis is based on a study of Yin (2009), which systematically addresses the 
specific design and methods − and the logic behind these − of his theory-testing approach; and of 
Eisenhardt (1989), which explains in detail the procedure and reasoning of the theory-building 
approach that she advocates. The researcher’s understanding of the theory-building approach 
also drew on Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), which further illuminated the specific challenges, 
and the techniques that can be used to combat these challenges, when using theory-building case 
study research method. 
In essence, the differences between what will hereafter be referred to as Eisenhardt’s and Yin’s 
methods is largely theory-building versus theory-testing, respectively. One may say that the 
difference also lies in the distinction between an inductive method and a deductive one. 
However, the theory-building process explained by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007) is not entirely an inductive approach: deductive methods are also included. 
Similarly, the theory-testing process described by Yin (2009) can also include inductive reasoning.  
2.2.1.1 Different starting points 
Both Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007)  and Yin (2009) suggest starting 
case study research with a literature review. The difference is that while Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007)  recommends the researcher familiarises him/herself with 
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the existing theoretical constructs within a broad range of topics, to provide a general direction 
for the investigation, Yin (2009) suggests the investigator develop, based on the existing 
theoretical frameworks, a proposition or hypothesis, which can subsequently be tested in the 
investigation. Contrary to the starting point of Yin’s (2009) theory-testing approach, Eisenhardt 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) advocates that theory-building research begin 
“as close as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypotheses to test” (p. 
536).  
2.2.1.2 Using the same logic to produce a strong theory 
In the next stage of case selection, both Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007) and Yin (2009) recommend choosing case(s) based on theoretical rather than statistical 
reasons. Cases may be chosen based on the characteristics they display of the phenomenon under 
study, thereby providing rich data for the building or testing of a theory. In the circumstances 
where multiple cases are chosen, both approaches look to use the logic of replication to build a 
strong theory. That is, if the same construct fits more than one case, or the same 
proposition/hypothesis leads to the same results with more than one case, then the theory 
built/tested is proven to be more applicable and can be regarded as a strong theory. 
2.2.1.3 A possible similarity in data analysis 
The above similarity is also reflected in the next stage of both research processes, data analysis, as 
both methods may involve interchanging inductive and deductive methods during this step of the 
research. On the one hand, Eisenhardt recommends that, after an emergent frame has taken 
shape, a process of iteration be conducted to compare the constructs with data, “so that 
accumulating evidence from diverse sources converges on a single, well-defined construct” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541). This is the first step in shaping hypotheses. The second step is to verify 
that “the emergent relationships between constructs fit with the evidence in each case” 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 542). Although the first step involves using an inductive method to build a 
theory that better fits all cases, the second step involves using a deductive approach to test if the 
theory that has just been built can be validated by each case. If a case turns out to disconfirm the 
construct/theory, then the researcher will need to go back to the data of this case, using an 
inductive method to refine or expand the construct/theory. 
On the other hand, Yin’s (2009) approach is deductive-led theory testing, especially when the 
result of such a theory-testing exercise supports the proposition or hypothesis. When the result of 
the theory-testing practice does not support the proposition or hypothesis, Yin suggests that the 
design of the research should be flexible, so that the theory to be tested can be adjusted (p. 62). 
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Such adjusting would require inductive reasoning, based on the data collected, to come up with a 
revised theory that is more likely to suit the case. This revised theory would then need to be 
tested again, using a deductive method. 
2.2.1.4 Differences and similarities in dealing with validity and reliability issues 
2.2.1.4.1 Construct validity 
Construct validity refers to the confidence in the measures set by the investigator for the 
construct to see if they would sufficiently and truthfully measure the intended concepts (O'Leary-
Kelly & J. Vokurka, 1998; Yin, 2009). Both Eisenhardt’s and Yin’s methods face the same challenge 
of establishing construct validity. Although the starting points of the processes are different, when 
it comes to the point of establishing construct validity, both recommend similar approaches. 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007)  suggests that the sharpening of 
constructs should involve two steps: 
1) “refining the definition of the construct, and 
2) building evidence which measures the construct in each case” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541) . 
A rather similar approach is suggested by Yin (2009): 
1) define “specific concepts (and relate them to the original objectives of the study) and 
2) identify operational measures that match the concepts (preferably citing published 
studies that make the same matches)” (p. 42). 
Both methods require a clear definition of the construct/concept and identification of the 
measures for this construct/concept. The difference is that the inductive-led method of 
Eisenhardt searches for evidence within the data collected to develop the initially loosely 
undefined construct, while the deductive-led method of Yin goes out and collects data with tools 
such as sampling frame and interview questioning techniques, strongly influenced by the already 
hypothesised constructs. 
Despite the different operational directions that both methods have, the tactics for increasing 
construct validity suggested by Yin (2009) are applicable in both processes. These are: use 
multiple sources of evidence, establish a chain of evidence, and have the draft case study report 
reviewed by key informants (p. 42). 
2.2.1.4.2 Internal validity 
While construct validity is concerned with the measures of the construct, internal validity deals 
with the causal relationships within a construct. It reflects the confidence in the totality of the 
possible causes for any inference that a construct claims. The deductive-led nature of Yin’s (2009) 
method makes it particularly challenging to establish internal validity of a case study. This is 
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because deductive reasoning requires a clearly defined premise prior to research, often without 
knowing if the premise will encompass all the related variables. As Yin (2009) states, “the specific 
tactics for achieving this result (internal validity) are difficult to identify” (p. 43). He does, 
however, suggest four tactics to combat this challenge: pattern matching, explanation building, 
addressing rival explanations, and using logic models (p. 43).  
Contrary to Yin’s method, the inductive-led nature of Eisenhardt’s method makes establishing 
internal validity less challenging. The open-mindedness of the researcher prior to data collection 
means that the premise of the research is not limited at the start. Variables will emerge from the 
data, which are therefore more likely to encompass all those that are related to the issue under 
investigation. This comes with its own challenge of the potentially overwhelming volume of data. 
As a result, a prior theoretical sensitisation to provide a general direction becomes necessary. In 
addition to this all-encompassing construct/theory-building procedure, Eisenhardt also suggests 
that rival explanations be considered and eventually ruled out, to give the construct/theory more 
validity (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 548). 
2.2.1.4.3 External validity  
External validity concerns the generalisability of the construct/theory beyond the immediate case 
study (Yin, 2009, p. 43). Both Eisenhardt’s and Yin’s methods face the criticism that “single cases 
offer a poor basis for generalizing” (Yin, 2009, p. 43). Yin (2009) argues that the “analogy to 
sample and universes is incorrect when dealing with case studies”, as “survey research relies on 
statistical generalization, whereas case studies (as with experiments) rely on analytic 
generalization” (p. 43). In other words, instead of generalisation based on the results of a survey 
of randomly selected samples, case studies and experiments rely on identifying the inherent logic 
within each case and experiment, from which a deeper understanding of the phenomenon under 
study can be achieved. In addition, analytic generalisation is about generalising from specific 
contextual situations to fundamental principles, and therefore requires testing in diverse contexts 
before we can be confident that the construct is robust.  
This argument of analytic generalisation instead of statistical generalisation applies to 
Eisenhardt’s methods as well. What case studies strive to achieve, regardless of the methods, is 
building new theory or enriching existing theory. This theory can then be tested for its 
applicability to other contexts that are likely to respond to such theory, therefore moving forward 
human understanding of the complex world.  
It is worth noticing, nevertheless, that Yin (2009) points out that to achieve such analytic 
generalisation, a theory “must be tested by replicating the findings in a second or even a third” 
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case (p. 44), because analytic generalisation can only be achieved with a diversity of cases. Such 
replication logic also applies to Eisenhardt’s method, as discussed previously. 
2.2.1.4.4 Reliability 
Reliability refers to confidence that the research process is free of errors and biases, and 
therefore capable of reaching the same outcome if repeated. To address the reliability issue, Yin 
(2009) suggests that the procedure of a case study be well documented, so that a later 
investigator can follow the same process described by an earlier investigator and conduct the 
same case study all over again. If this later investigator arrives at the same findings and 
conclusions, then one can claim that the initial case study was reliable. Yin emphasises that this is 
to do the same case over again (investigator triangulation), not to replicate the results of one case 
by doing another case study (p. 45). Such a reliability test is possible, because not only has the 
process of an earlier case study been well documented, but also the deductive nature of the 
research has determined relatively confined measures of the data. Yin (2009) argues that the 
“goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study” (p. 45). However, one could 
perhaps argue that because the later investigator has no control over the actual process of the 
research, he/she could be easily influenced by the opinions of the earlier researcher (who actually 
conducted the research), and is therefore more likely to arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. If such an argument stands, then the validity of such a reliability test would be 
questionable, and therefore undermine the reliability of the earlier case study.  
This principle of the reliability test may not apply to Eisenhardt’s method. This is because even if 
all the data has been well recorded, a later investigator, using the same data, may well have a 
dissimilar insight, and discover some distinctive themes that were not uncovered by the earlier 
investigator. This should not be regarded as detrimental to the reliability of the earlier research, 
however. Such later investigation should be welcomed, because it opens up the opportunity to 
further enrich the theory. In a sense, this is equivalent to using multiple investigators to 
triangulate the findings and enhance confidence in achieving an expanded theory. 
Regardless of Eisenhardt’s or Yin’s methods, the reliability of case study research ultimately lies in 
its direct connection with the empirical evidence. If a careful analytical procedure has been 
followed, the evidence supports the theory, the rival theory has been considered, and each step 
of the research process has been well documented for any further investigation, then the 
researcher should have confidence that the theory established through such research is valid. 
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2.2.1.5 Practical implications 
In practice, whether one follows Eisenhardt’s or Yin’s method, or a combination of both within a 
multi-stage framework, is most likely to be determined by the state of the existing literature. If 
little can be found about the topic to be investigated (requiring an exploratory study), or the 
particular aspect of a topic to be studied is mostly unknown (requiring an in-depth study), then it 
is likely that the propositions or hypotheses will lack sophistication. In this situation, Eisenhardt’s 
approach would be more appropriate. As Eisenhardt points out, “building theory from case study 
research is most appropriate in the early stages of research on a topic or to provide freshness in 
perspective to an already researched topic” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 548).  
On the other hand, if a topic has been reasonably well researched but the investigator is looking 
to further deepen understanding of the topic, or to see if an existing theory would apply in 
different circumstances, then it is possible that a proposition or hypothesis could be formed 
based on existing theory. In this situation Yin’s deductive-led approach would be more suitable. 
Another possibility for an in-depth study is to employ a multi-stage framework. One could start 
the research with Eisenhardt’s approach, using an inductive method to build a new theory at the 
first stage of the investigation. Then, in the second stage, one could adopt Yin’s method to test 
the theory that was established in the first stage, to further validate or develop the theory. It is 
worth noticing, however, that at any time during the whole of this multi-stage research process 
one would be using inductive or deductive reasoning, but not both.  
Whether one is using theory-building or theory-testing, so long as a careful analytical procedure 
with a clear logic has been followed, and the findings are supported by empirical evidence, one 
should be confident with the quality and validity of the final theory produced. 
2.2.2 An inductive-led theory-building approach for this research 
There are three reasons why an inductive-led theory-building approach has been chosen as the 
most appropriate approach for this particular research. First, the complex nature of cross-cultural 
business relationships means that an inductive-led theory-building approach is more likely to 
provide an all-encompassing outlook of all the social factors involved in such relationships. 
Secondly, the fact that the context of food and agribusiness is a relatively new territory for 
research on cross-cultural relationships means that an inductive-led theory-building approach will 
allow a better exploration of the likely social factors. In other words, the complexity and novelty 
of the proposed study imply that such an approach will provide better internal validity for the 
theory to be constructed.  
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The third reason for the choice of an inductive-led theory-building approach was determined by 
the constructivist-interpretivist paradigm adopted by the researcher consequential to the 
research questions and context. This is because the constructivist-interpretivist paradigm sees the 
social reality of cross-cultural business relationships as constantly changing due to the active 
interaction of the people involved, such that it is likely to be interpreted differently by people 
from different cultural backgrounds. This nature of constant change and different cultural 
interpretation brings elements of uncertainty of interpretation from the researcher’s perspective. 
Having a pre-existing proposition or hypothesis is therefore likely to limit the capacity of relevant 
themes to emerge from the data. This led to adoption of an inductive-led theory-building 
approach, drawing predominantly from Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007), but also from grounded theory. 
 
2.3 Research Methods 
2.3.1 A case study research method 
Having evaluated the underpinning ontology and epistemology, as well as the potential research 
methodologies that could be applied, it was deemed most suitable to use an inductive-led theory-
building case study research method for this particular study.  
The choice of an inductive-led theory-building research method was explained in 2.2.2 An 
inductive-led theory-building approach for this research above. This choice is further affirmed by 
the literature. As Eisenhardt (1989, pp. 548-549) points out, “given the strengths of this theory-
building approach and its independence from prior literature or past empirical observation, it is 
particularly well-suited to new research areas or research areas for which existing theory seems 
inadequate”. 
Also, Yin (2009, p. 18) defines case study research method as “an empirical inquiry that … 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context”. In the case of 
this particular study, the phenomena under investigation − cross-cultural business relationships − 
are contemporary phenomena, in the real-life context of food and agribusiness, and the 
complexity of cross-cultural business relationships requires in-depth investigation to provide 
meaningful insights. 
2.3.2 Theoretical sensitisation 
Mintzberg (1979, p. 585) notes that “no matter how small our sample or what our interest, we 
have always tried to go into organisations with a well-defined focus – to collect specific kinds of 
data systematically”. Blumer (1954, p. 7) compares definitive concepts with sensitising concepts: 
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A definitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the aid 
of a clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed bench marks. … A sensitizing concept 
lacks such specification of attributes or bench marks and consequently it does not 
enable the user to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it 
gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical 
instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing 
concepts merely suggest directions along which to look. 
Several scholars view sensitising concepts as “interpretive devices and as a starting point for a 
qualitative study” (Barney G. Glaser, 1978; Padgett, 2004; Patton, 2002). Sociologist Charmaz 
(2003, p. 259), writing from a constructivist perspective, refers to sensitising concepts as “those 
background ideas that inform the overall research problem”, and further explains: 
Sensitizing concepts offer ways of seeing, organizing, and understanding experience; 
they are embedded in our disciplinary emphases and perspectival proclivities. Although 
sensitizing concepts may deepen perception, they provide starting points for building 
analysis, not ending points for evading it. We may use sensitizing concepts only as points 
of departure from which to study the data. 
Indeed, one will always have more or less preconceived ideas about the issues under study, given 
that the mere thought of conducting a particular research study requires having some sort of idea 
about what the outcome of such research might be. As Gilgun (2007, p. 7) points out, “research 
usually begins with such concepts, whether researchers state this or not and whether they are 
aware of them or not”. If preconceived ideas cannot be totally avoided, one is better off knowing 
what other opinions are out there rather than being solely influenced by one’s own perception, so 
that appropriate probes can be developed for the field work that is to follow.  
One might argue at this point that theoretical sensitisation is one step closer to the theory-testing 
methodology, and would be seen as a compromise by advocates of pure inductive methodology. 
However, the key issue for this thesis is that sensitising concepts are not used for hypothesis 
development; rather, they are used  “to lay the foundation for the analysis of research data” 
(Bowen, 2006, p. 14), to identify topics, concepts and constructs to explore, and to develop 
probes for the field work.  
The procedure of conducting a theoretical sensitisation for this particular research was 
undertaken by reading a wide range of literature that was considered to be of relevance to this 
study. Given that the purpose of this theoretical sensitisation is to provide guidance for the field 
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work, no synthesis of the literature was conducted at this point. The following table (Table 1) 
shows the topics and literature that were covered in this sensitising exercise, and the 
sensitisations identified through this process. 
Table 1 Research areas and literature related to cross-cultural business relationships between New 
Zealanders and Chinese, and Sensitisation Identified 
Research area Author(s) Title Sensitisation 
Cross-cultural 
business 
relationships 
Johnson et al. 
(2006) 
Cross-cultural competence 
in international business: 
Toward a definition and a 
model 
Cross-cultural 
competence is 
demonstrated by 
behaviours rather than 
knowledge. 
Mavondo & 
Rodrigo (2001) 
The effect of relationship 
dimensions on interpersonal 
and inter-organizational 
commitment in 
organizations conducting 
business between Australia 
and China 
Interpersonal 
commitment is an 
important antecedent to 
inter-organisational 
commitment. 
Seak & Enderwick 
(2008) 
The management of New 
Zealand expatriates in China 
Many New Zealand 
organisations have a 
poor understanding of 
the Chinese business 
system and culture. 
Selmer (1999) 
Culture shock in China?: 
Adjustment pattern of 
western expatriate business 
managers 
Westerners learn to 
adapt their socio-cultural 
behaviours much faster 
than they adapt their 
underlying psychological 
constructs towards 
Chinese culture. 
Shenkar (2012a) 
Beyond cultural distance: 
Switching to a friction lens in 
the study of cultural 
differences 
Culture affects 
theoretical frameworks 
and ways of thinking, as 
well as behaviours. 
Shenkar (2012b) 
Cultural distance revisited: 
Towards a more rigorous 
conceptualization and 
measurement of cultural 
differences 
Cultural differences have 
the potential for both 
synergy and disruption. 
Williams et al. 
(1998) 
A conceptual model and 
study of cross-cultural 
business relationships 
“Knowledge of cultural 
orientation and its 
relationship to the social 
and structural bond that 
exists between partners 
is a key predictor of long-
term commitment in 
cross-national business 
21 
 
relationships” (Williams 
et al., 1998, p. 135). 
Zhu et al. (2006) 
A cross cultural study of 
communication strategies 
for building business 
relationships 
When initiating a 
business relationship, 
Chinese business 
managers tend to employ 
more interpersonal 
strategies. 
Impact of 
cross-cultural 
relationships 
on consumer 
behaviours 
Eves & Cheng 
(2007) 
Cross-cultural evaluation of 
factors driving intention to 
purchase new food products 
– Beijing, China and south-
east England 
Consumer behaviours are 
culturally and 
demographically (age, 
wealth, urban vs. rural) 
dependent, and cannot 
be transferred between 
cultures. 
Chinese culture 
and social 
relationships 
Hall & Ames 
(1987) 
Thinking through Confucius 
Confucian values and 
their profound impact on 
Chinese culture 
Yang (1994) 
Gifts, favors, and banquets: 
The art of social 
relationships in China 
Gifts, favours and 
banquets are the 
lubricant of social 
relationships in China 
Guanxi 
Ai (2006) 
Guanxi networks in China: 
Its importance and future 
trends 
Guanxi network is “an 
evolving cultural and 
social phenomenon” (Ai, 
2006, p. 116). 
Chang (2011) 
A path to understanding 
guanxi in China’s transitional 
economy: Variations on 
network behavior 
Guanxi can take different 
strategic forms: 
accessing, bridging, and 
embedding. 
Chen & Chen 
(2004) 
On the intricacies of the 
Chinese guanxi: A process 
model of guanxi 
development 
The individual is “the 
architect in relationship 
construction.” (X.-P. Chen 
& Chen, 2004, p. 320) 
Fan (2002) 
Questioning guanxi: 
Definition, classification and 
implications 
“The existence of guanxi 
base (special 
relationship) does not 
produce guanxi” (Fan, 
2002, p. 543). 
Luo (1997) 
Guanxi: Principles, 
philosophies, and 
implications 
Chinese and Western 
business people 
approach a new 
relationship from 
opposite ends, and 
guanxi plays a central 
role in affecting business 
conduct and social life in 
the Chinese context. 
Luo, Huang, & 
Wang (2012) 
Guanxi and organizational 
performance: A meta-
analysis 
Business ties “have a 
bigger impact on 
operational performance, 
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whereas government ties 
exert larger effects on 
economic performance” 
(Y. Luo et al., 2012, p. 
139). 
Park & Luo (2001) 
Guanxi and organizational 
dynamics: Organizational 
networking in Chinese firms 
Institutional, strategic, 
and organisational 
factors are critical 
determinants of guanxi.  
Zhang & Zhang 
(2006) 
Guanxi and organizational 
dynamics in China: A link 
between individual and 
organizational levels 
Guanxi can be classified 
into obligatory, 
reciprocal, and utilitarian 
types at the individual 
level. 
Joint ventures 
in China 
Chen & Wilson 
(2003) 
Standardization and 
localization of human 
resource management in 
Sino-foreign joint ventures 
The dialectic of 
standardisation and 
localisation is at the 
heart of negotiating 
successful international 
joint venture practices. 
Kai Ming Au & 
Enderwick (1994) 
Small firms in international 
joint ventures in China: The 
New Zealand experience 
“New Zealand investors 
tend to have a less 
tolerant attitude towards 
most of the operational 
problems in their Chinese 
joint ventures” (Kai Ming 
Au & Enderwick, 1994, p. 
92). 
Reuer, Tyler, 
Tong, & Wu 
(2012) 
Executives’ assessments of 
international joint ventures 
in China: A multi-theoretical 
investigation 
Executives “attach 
greater weight to 
opportunities to access 
resources or growing 
markets rather than risk” 
(Reuer et al., 2012, p. 
331). 
Ying (1996) 
Research on joint ventures 
in China: Progress and 
prognosis 
Cross-cultural 
management should be 
the central theme for 
joint venture research 
involving China. 
M. Cone & 
Everett (2003) 
Information asymmetry and 
management control issues 
in a Sino-French IJV in China 
Control systems can be 
rule-based or context-
dependent, and this links 
to culture and habitus. 
Cultural 
ideologies and 
implied 
managerial 
philosophies in 
China 
Cone (2007) 
Living Chinese philosophy – 
Confucianism and Daoism in 
21st century China 
Pragmatism lies in the 
heart of Chinese 
philosophies. 
Foy (2012) 
Buddhism in China – Fojiao: 
The teaching of Buddha, the 
enlightened one 
Buddhism flourished in 
China because of its 
adoption of some key 
Daoism principles. 
23 
 
Lai (2004) 
Learning from the stones: A 
GO approach to mastering 
China’s strategic concept, 
SHI 
Relying on the propensity 
of things and going with 
the flow is the key for 
Chinese strategic 
thinking. 
McDonald (2012) 
Confucian foundations to 
leadership: A study of 
Chinese business leaders 
across Greater China and 
South-East Asia 
“Confucianism is the 
most dominant 
ideological influence and 
the one that most 
distinguishes the 
fundamentals of Asian 
business leadership from 
those of the West” 
(McDonald, 2012, p. 
465). 
Pan, Rowney, & 
Peterson (2012) 
The structure of Chinese 
cultural traditions: An 
empirical study of business 
employees in China 
Confucianism, 
Buddhism/Daoism, 
Legalism and Art of War 
are key components of 
Chinese cultural 
traditions. 
Sigurðsson (2012) 
Li 禮, ritual and pedagogy: A 
cross-cultural exploration 
Li can be both formal, 
ritualised and informal 
and interpersonal, 
contributing towards the 
ongoing evolution of 
one’s cultural habitat. 
Xing (1995) 
The Chinese cultural system: 
Implications for cross-
cultural management 
“The cultural system is 
influential in all aspects 
of Chinese social lives 
including business 
management” (Xing, 
1995, p. 20). 
Yang (2012) 
Confucianism, socialism, and 
capitalism: A comparison of 
cultural ideologies and 
implied managerial 
philosophies and practices in 
the P. R. China 
Contemporary 
organisational 
behaviours and 
management practices 
are influenced by 
Confucianism, socialism, 
and capitalism. 
H. Zhang & Cone 
(2012) 
Understanding Chinese 
economic development and 
policy in aesthetic order 
Chinese economic 
development and policy 
can be understood in an 
aesthetic order achieved 
via pragmatic means. 
Trust and 
commitment 
Bachmann & 
Inkpen (2011) 
Understanding institutional-
based trust building 
processes in inter-
organizational relationships 
The “influence of 
institutions can be 
particularly conducive to 
building trust” 
(Bachmann & Inkpen, 
2011, p. 281). 
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Blois (1999) 
Trust in business to business 
relationships: An evaluation 
of its status 
There is a difference 
between the fragility and 
the complexity of trust 
between businesses. 
Castaldo, 
Premazzi, & 
Zerbini (2010) 
The meaning(s) of trust. A 
content analysis on the 
diverse conceptualizations 
of trust in scholarly research 
on business relationships 
Trust is “an expectation… 
that a subject 
distinguished by specific 
characteristics… will 
perform future actions 
aimed at producing… 
positive results for the 
trustor… in situations of 
consistent perceived risk 
and vulnerability” 
(Castaldo et al., 2010, pp. 
665-666). 
Jiang, Chua, 
Kotabe, & Murray 
(2011) 
Effects of cultural ethnicity, 
firm size, and firm age on 
senior executives’ trust in 
their overseas business 
partners: Evidence from 
China 
Executives trust their 
overseas partner 
differently, depending on 
the partners’ cultural 
ethnicity, firm size and 
firm age. 
Ndubisi (2011) 
Conflict handling, trust and 
commitment in outsourcing 
relationship: A Chinese and 
Indian study 
The impact of 
compromising conflict 
handling on trust and 
commitment is 
significantly higher for 
the Chinese compared to 
the Indians. 
Welter (2012) 
All you need is trust? A 
critical review of the trust 
and entrepreneurship 
literature 
Trust is diverse, complex 
and context dependent. 
Trust can be both a 
dispositional and a 
behavioural outcome. 
Cai, Jun, & Yang 
(2010) 
Implementing supply chain 
information integration in 
China: The role of 
institutional forces and trust 
Government support and 
importance of guanxi 
significantly affect trust 
between buyers and 
suppliers.  
Chinese 
strategic 
thinking 
Jullien (1999) 
The propensity of things: 
Toward a history of efficacy 
in China 
Chinese strategic thinking 
relies on the position and 
potential of things. 
Jullien (2004) 
A treatise on efficacy: 
Between Western and 
Chinese thinking 
The efficacy of Chinese 
strategic thinking stems 
from their reliance on the 
position and potential of 
things, rather than 
planning (as Westerners 
tend to do). 
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Food safety 
and security in 
China 
Khan, Hanjra, & 
Mu (2009) 
Water management and 
crop production for food 
security in China: A review 
Water and its relations to 
other development-
related sectors will 
determine future food 
security and poverty 
reduction in China. 
Qiao, Guo, & Klein 
(2012) 
Melamine and other food 
safety and health scares in 
China: Comparing 
households with and 
without young children 
The Melamine scandal 
raised Chinese 
consumers’ concern on 
food safety issues, 
particularly for 
households with children. 
Eastern and 
Western world 
views 
Nisbett (2003) 
The geography of thought: 
How Asians and Westerners 
think differently ... and why 
Chinese thinking is 
circumstantial and 
contextual, while 
Western thinking is more 
absolute and abstract. 
Western 
philosophies 
Shand (2002) 
Philosophy and 
philosophers: An 
introduction to Western 
philosophy 
Greek and Judeo-
Christian values have 
significant influence on 
Western philosophies. 
Contemporary 
sociology 
Swartz (1997) 
Culture and power: The 
sociology of Pierre Bourdieu 
“Bourdieu proposes a 
sociology of symbolic 
power that addresses the 
important topic of 
relations between 
culture, social structure 
and action” (1997, p. 6). 
Webb, Schirato, & 
Danaher (2011) 
Understanding Bourdieu 
Definitions of cultural 
field, cultural capital and 
habitus; Bourdieu’s 
contribution to the field 
of sociology. 
Bourdieu (1984) 
Distinction: A social critique 
of judgement of taste 
Habitus x capital + field = 
practice 
Modern 
economics 
Drucker (2006) 
Classic Drucker: Essential 
wisdom of Peter Drucker 
from the pages of Harvard 
Business Review 
Management by 
Objectives is one of many 
contributions that 
Drucker contributed 
towards management 
theory. 
Kennedy (2011) 
Adam Smith and the role of 
the metaphor of an invisible 
hand 
The metaphor of an 
invisible hand meant 
differently in Adam 
Smith’s original texts 
compared to its more 
commonly known 
modern meaning in 
economics. 
Ruffin (2002) 
David Ricardo’s discovery of 
comparative advantage 
What the law of 
comparative advantage 
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is, and how Ricardo 
discovered it. 
Dillard (1984) 
Keynes and Marx: A 
centennial appraisal 
The economic principles 
of Keynes and Marx may 
be described as 
monetary theory of 
production. 
Cross-cultural 
communication 
Leezenberg (n.d.) 
Confucius meets Bourdieu: 
Performative language and 
symbolic power in ancient 
China 
Both Confucius and Laozi 
focus on what Bourdieu 
would call the symbolic 
power involved in socially 
effective language usage. 
Jackson (2008) 
Pierre Bourdieu, the 
‘cultural turn’ and the 
practice of international 
history 
Culture shapes individual 
and collective policy 
decisions, and this is in 
accordance with 
Bourdieu’s social theory. 
He & Liu (2010) 
Barriers of cross cultural 
communication in 
multinational firms: A case 
study of Swedish company 
and its subsidiary in China 
Culture influences 
people’s way of thinking 
and behaving, leading to 
communication barriers.  
Psychology Kelly (1955) 
The psychology of personal 
constructs 
One makes sense of the 
world around him or her 
according to his or her 
personal constructs 
actively developed 
through previous life 
encounters. 
New Zealand 
history 
King (2003) 
The Penguin history of New 
Zealand 
The pioneering nature of 
New Zealand’s 
development from bush 
to farmland gives New 
Zealanders the affinity to 
pragmatic approaches to 
things. 
 
2.3.3 Theoretical sampling 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) points out that for the purpose of 
developing rather than testing theory, theoretical sampling is appropriate for a theory-building 
case study research method. Cases are to be selected “because they are particularly suitable for 
illuminating and extending relationships and logic among constructs” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007, p. 27). In addition, multiple cases are selected in order to enable the comparisons that 
clarify whether an emergent finding is simply idiosyncratic to a single case or consistently 
replicated by several cases (Eisenhardt, 1991). The choice of multiple cases also allows more 
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precise delineation of the constructs and relationships, because “it is easier to determine accurate 
definitions and appropriate levels of construct abstraction” (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007, p. 27). 
Through networks of the researcher’s supervisors, who had been doing China- and/or food and 
agribusiness-related research for over 20 years, some initial informants were contacted, and they 
consented to participate in this research. Despite the extensive research and networks the two 
supervisors have, because China has only become a significant market for New Zealand food and 
agribusiness products and services within the last decade, the choice of cases that could be 
studied was limited. The criteria used for choosing informants were therefore broad, and 
included: 
1) the informant must have worked in the area of food and agribusiness 
2) the informant must have had dealings in his/her professional capacity with China, either 
via exporting New Zealand food and agribusiness products (or services) to China, or 
working in or with the food and agribusiness sector in China. 
From the above-mentioned initial informants, using the snowballing technique 38 informants 
from 25 food and agribusiness firms were eventually contacted. Each informant was asked to 
share his/her own experiences with the researcher in chronological order of actual events, and 
give interpretation of the events based on his/her own paradigm. Each interview therefore took 
its own direction depending on the interviewee’s background and types of businesses involved, 
and for this reason every interview, or the perspectives of each informant, is regarded as one case 
study. The number of cases was based on institutional advice as to the appropriate number for 
PhD research, but was also constrained by time and financial considerations. This number of cases 
(38) was deemed sufficient for this particular study after the 38th interview was completed, as 
the themes emerged from the first stage interviews (Case Nos 1−9 in Table 2 below) were 
reinforced regularly from Case no 10, and no new themes surfaced after Case No. 29. The 
continuation of the case studies allowed further deepening and enrichment of the themes that 
had emerged from the previous interviews, and assisted in triangulating and thereby 
strengthening of the internal validity, external validity and reliability of the emergent theory. This 
approach is also in agreement with the replication logic in the iteration process recommended by 
Eisenhardt (1989), who recommends that “researchers should stop adding cases when theoretical 
saturation is reached” (p. 545). Of course, no claims of total saturation can be made, as the 
possibility of further themes can never be totally discounted. 
All of the 38 informants consented to participate in this study, although three declined to have 
the interviews recorded. A detailed description of the informants (identification details are 
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omitted for confidentiality purposes) can be seen in Table 2 below. Interviews were conducted 
face to face unless otherwise specified. 
Table 2 Description of informants and interviews 
Case 
No. 
Industry 
Operating 
Location 
Ethnicity 
Level of 
Management 
Position or 
Nature of 
Involvement 
Date 
Interviewed 
Location of 
Interview 
1 Food service China European Senior 
Tue, 6 Nov 
2012 
Beijing 
2 Food service China European Senior 
Tue, 6 Nov 
2012 
Beijing 
3 Food service China Chinese Senior 
Tue, 6 Nov 
2012 
Beijing 
4 Food service China Chinese Middle 
Tue, 6 Nov 
2012 
Beijing 
5 Horticulture China Māori Senior 
Tue, 13 Nov 
2012 
Xi’an 
6 Horticulture China Chinese Senior 
Tue, 13 Nov 
2012 
Xi’an 
7 Horticulture China European Senior 
Thu, 15 Nov 
2012 
Kunming 
8 Horticulture China Chinese Senior 
Sat, 16 Nov 
2012 
Kunming 
9 Horticulture China Chinese Senior 
Fri, 16 Nov 
2012 
Kunming 
10 Agritech 
New 
Zealand 
European Consultant 
Tue, 27 Nov 
2012 
Lincoln 
11 Agritech 
New 
Zealand 
Chinese Consultant 
Wed, 10 Apr 
2013 
Lincoln 
12 Kiwifruit China European Senior 
Fri, 12 Apr 
2013 
Wellington 
13 Agritech 
New 
Zealand 
European Consultant 
Mon, 6 May 
2013 
Lincoln 
14 Beef 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Tue, 21 May 
2013 
North 
Canterbury 
15 Government 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
16 Wine 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
17 Wine 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
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18 Wine 
New 
Zealand 
Chinese Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
19 Wine 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
20 Wine 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Mon, 12 Aug 
2013 
Hawke’s Bay 
21 Logistics China European Senior 
Mon, 9 Sep 
2013 
Shanghai 
22 Dairy China European Middle 
Tue, 10 Sep 
2013 
Shanghai 
23 
Business 
consultancy 
China European Consultant 
Wed, 11 Sep 
2013 
Shanghai 
24 
Farming 
supply 
China Chinese Senior 
Thu, 12 Sep 
2013 
Beijing 
25 Dairy China European Senior 
Sat, 14 Sep 
2013 
Beijing 
26 Bio-tech China Chinese Middle 
Sat, 14 Sep 
2013 
Beijing (via 
phone) 
27 Agritech China European Senior 
Sun, 22 Sep 
2013 
Kunming 
28 Agritech China European Consultant 
Tue, 24 Sep 
2013 
Guilin 
29 Horticulture China European Senior 
Tue, 24 Sep 
2013 
Guilin 
30 Dairy China European Senior 
Tue, 15 Oct 
2013 
Lincoln (via 
Skype) 
31 Horticulture China European Senior 
Fri, 18 Oct 
2013 
Lincoln (via 
phone) 
32 Agritech China European Middle 
Tue, 12 Nov 
2013 
Lincoln 
33 
Red meat 
processing 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Tue, 26 Nov 
2013 
Invercargill 
34 
Red meat 
processing 
New 
Zealand 
European Senior 
Tue, 26 Nov 
2013 
Invercargill 
35 Horticulture 
New 
Zealand & 
China 
European Senior 
Mon, 16 Dec 
2013 
Tauranga 
36 Horticulture 
New 
Zealand & 
China 
European Senior 
Mon, 16 Dec 
2013 
Tauranga 
37 Horticulture 
New 
Zealand & 
China 
European Senior 
Mon, 16 Dec 
2013 
Tauranga 
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Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) suggest that a key approach is “using numerous and highly 
knowledgeable informants who view the focal phenomena from diverse perspectives”, and that 
these informants “can include organizational actors from different hierarchical levels, functional 
areas, groups, and geographies, as well as actors from other relevant organizations and outside 
observers” (p. 28). As can be seen in the table above, the researcher tried to achieve this kind of 
diversity of informants to participate in these investigations. Informants for the first stage 
interviews (Case Nos 1−9 in Table 2 above) were all living in China domiciled. This was extended 
to include informants from businesses that export to China, but operate from New Zealand. 
Informants eventually interviewed came from various industries within the food and agribusiness 
sector, as well as from government agencies that facilitate the trade in this sector. These 
informants were also of different ethnicities: European, Māori and Chinese. They offered a variety 
of perspectives in regard to their experience and opinions, which ensured the richness of the data 
collected for further analysis. The diversity of the informants also allowed robustness of the 
analytic generalisations while increasing the chance of ‘surprise findings’ that may help to 
illuminate deeper understanding. Given that the interview context broadened from those who are 
China domiciled to those who are New Zealand domiciled, the later interviews also reinforced, 
and gave the increasing confidence as to the generalisability of the emergent theory. 
Although these diverse informants can be categorised in many ways, the researcher believes it 
aids the analysis, and hence allows a deeper understanding of cross-cultural business 
relationships in the context of food and agribusiness, if the informants are grouped based on the 
length and nature of their involvement with China. Three groups can be clearly identified in this 
manner: 
1) New Zealanders (European and Māori) who had lived or were still living in China at the 
time of interview 
2) New Zealanders (European and Māori) who had visited China for business purposes but 
were based in New Zealand 
3) Chinese who had worked with New Zealanders and/or other Westerners. 
The differences between and similarities among the perspectives of these three groups will be 
identified in the results chapters of this thesis.  
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2.3.4 Bounds of the research 
Most of the past research on cross-cultural business relationships was done either via a surveying 
method, or through case studies, with the location of the businesses not made explicit (Johnson 
et al., 2006; Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001; Williams et al., 1998; Zhu et al., 2006). However, visiting 
different parts of China, it is apparent that most of the international firms have chosen to operate 
along the east coast of China, with many in the major tier-1 cities. Many of these firms are also 
large-scale multinational firms. In contrast, the businesses involved in this particular study are 
spread across various parts of China, and are mostly small to medium enterprises (SMEs). Of the 
25 agribusiness firms involved, only two have over 1,000 employees; one has between 500 and 
1,000 employees, another four have between 200 and 500 employees, while the others have 
fewer than 100 employees, and 13 have fewer than 20 employees. Keeping in mind the 
controversy in relation to the definition of SMEs (Kushnir, 2010), this research is largely limited to 
international SMEs by European standards (companies with fewer than 250 employees, and a 
turnover equal to or less than 50 million euros) (European Commission, 2014), and their success 
stories and challenges from the time of establishing their operation in China or business dealings 
with China. 
2.3.5 Field work 
The interviews with the informants were conducted in either English or Chinese, as appropriate, 
for the purpose of gaining a thorough understanding of the issues under discussion. At the start of 
each interview, each interviewee was presented with an information sheet (see Appendix 1) 
about the research, and a signed consent form (Appendix 2) was obtained.  
All interviews were conducted individually, except for informant nos. 35, 36 and 37. Due to 
logistical reasons at the time of interview, these three informants were interviewed at the same 
time. However, consent forms were signed individually, and the transcribing process of the 
interview has allowed specific quotes to be attributed to each individual if required. 
Eisenhardt (1989) advocates the importance of beginning a theory-building research with as close 
as possible to the ideal of no theory under consideration and no hypothesis to test, as 
“preordained theoretical perspective and propositions may bias and limit the findings” (p. 536). 
Because of this, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that “investigators should formulate a research 
problem and possibly specify some potentially important variables, with some reference to extant 
literature”, but “should avoid thinking about specific relationships between variables and theories 
as much as possible” (p. 536). Under this guidance, and with reference to the literature accessed 
during the exercise of theoretical sensitisation, as well as to the research questions set out in 
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Chapter 1, it was decided that the following queries would be used as a general guideline for each 
interview: 
1. What are the cross-cultural challenges that the business/informant/s has come across? 
2. What are the cultural principles that different informants base their opinions on? 
3. Is there any connection between the differences in cultural principles and some of the 
cross-cultural challenges identified? 
4. If there were such challenges mentioned in question 3, how have these challenges been 
met? 
5. What cross-cultural understandings can be drawn from the above investigation? 
6. Is there a connection between these cross-cultural challenges and the nature of the 
specific agri-food industry(ies) that the business/informant is involved with? If yes, then 
how are they connected? 
This research sought to answer the above questions. However, these were not the questions that 
were directly asked to each interviewee. A customised interview guide was developed for each 
informant prior to the semi-structured interviews, based on the preceding background research 
on the informant, in order to draw insights from their individual experiences. Appendix 3 provides 
an example of an interview guide for one of the interviews conducted (the informant’s name has 
been concealed for confidentiality purposes).  
At the interviews, informants were asked to explain their involvement with China in their 
professional capacity in chronological order, and describe the actual events they had experienced, 
as well as giving their interpretation of these events. This allows the resultant theory from the 
data analysis to be ‘grounded’ by these events. As shown in Appendix 3, all questions were 
intended to be open-ended, to encourage the informants to tell their own ‘stories’. It was then 
the researcher’s interpretation of the themes emerging from these ‘stories’ through cultural 
lenses that provided the answers to the above enquiries, and from these answers new theory was 
developed.  
2.3.6 Data analysis 
With case numbers under 10, Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) 
suggests an iterative process of shaping and verifying (or disconfirming) a hypothesis using the 
evidence from each case, studying one case at a time. However, the sheer volume of data from 38 
case studies makes it not feasible to strictly follow the iterative procedure recommended by 
Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Further, in this thesis the focus is on 
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the themes rather than the specific case studies from which these themes emerge. For this 
reason, the analytic process was undertaken using the following procedure. 
1) All data (interview transcripts and notes) were entered into NVivo 10. 
2) All data were carefully examined, with each idea or topic emerging coded with a node. 
Altogether 225 nodes were identified. 
3) Each node, along with the number of quotes attributed to each node, was then listed in a 
table (Appendix 4), from which an individual piece of paper for each node and the 
number of quotes attributed to it was cut out and placed on a large table. 
4) By moving around and organising these 225 individual node papers into various groups, 
the researcher organised the nodes into a coherent structure, from which those nodes 
with a greater number of quotes attributed to them stand out in telling a stronger story, 
but without missing some of the anecdotal (yet insightful) themes from nodes with a 
smaller number of quotes. These are explained in detail in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. It is worth 
noting that although NVivo 10 offers many other functions for organising the data, due to 
the large volume of data the researcher deliberately chose to operate this step of the 
procedure manually, for the purpose of considering the logical coherence of all the nodes 
but without losing an overall understanding across all aspects of the study. 
5) The synthesis of the emergent themes was then compared with existing theory in 
literature, and the new theory was developed. This discussion is elaborated in Chapter 6. 
One may argue at this point that such a data analysis process is a violation of the iterative 
procedure advocated by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) , whose 
research methodology the researcher has claimed to be drawing from. However, the replication 
logic behind the iterative process recommended by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007) is in fact the very guiding principle in using the coding technique within NVivo 10, 
as every quote attributed to a particular node is a confirmation or disconfirmation of the idea 
enlisted in that node. By further comparing the synthesis of the nodes/themes emerging after 
reorganising the nodes identified through the coding technique, one should have the confidence 
that the resultant theory is parsimonious, testable, and logically coherent – a strong theory, as 
defined by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
In summary, it is emphasised that the open research questions and constructivist-interpretivist 
paradigm have led directly to the specific data analysis framework, which is based on emergent 
themes (rather than analysis of each case separately), with an ongoing interplay between 
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emergence, enrichment and confirmation. As the investigations proceeded, the balance within 
each theme shifted from emergence to enrichment, to refinement, and then confirmation. 
 
2.4 Thesis Structure Revisited 
Having explained the research methodology and methods adopted for this research, the thesis 
structure, explained in Chapter 1 and illustrated in Figure 1, is here revisited.  In particular, it is 
emphasised that the decision to not have a standalone literature review chapter was purposeful. 
It is a direct outcome of the chosen research methodology, suitable for the researcher’s 
constructivist-interpretivist paradigm as adopted in this thesis, and the fact that there was a lack 
of prior research on cross-cultural relationships within New Zealand agribusinesses operating in 
China. These issues led to an emphasis on building theory from emergent insights. This was 
inductive-led, but also with an interplay containing deductive elements that led to theory 
reinforcement. Consequently, the initial exposure to literature was not to develop hypotheses for 
testing, but to sensitise the researcher with the appropriate interview probes that would facilitate 
the emergence of theoretical insights. The results of these interviews subsequently provided the 
contextual framework for determining the relevant literature, together with which the research 
findings were synthesised to bring forth the emergent theory.  Such an approach has been 
discussed in detail and endorsed by previous scholars  (Dunne, 2011; Heath, 2006). It essentially 
uses existing theory as another source of data, so that “existing theory can be used to challenge 
emergent theory and locate the emergent theory within the current body of knowledge”. (Heath, 
2006, p. 527)
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Chapter 3 
 
Research Results I:  
How Things Are 
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3.1 Introduction 
The following three chapters tell the stories, derived from the 38 informants of this PhD research, 
of New Zealanders doing agribusiness in China, or having business dealings with China in the food 
and agribusiness sector. Chapter 3 describes ‘how things are’ from the perspectives of the 
economic, political, social, and business environments, as well as reasons for past failures. 
Chapter 4 explains, through the eyes of the informants, ‘why things are the way they are’, from 
the aspects of world views or ways of thinking and value systems. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides 
recommendations from the informants on ‘agribusiness pathways in China’, in terms of 
addressing market entry, value proposition, relationship building, business negotiation, 
agribusiness operation and understanding the power game. These stories are organised in this 
manner for the purpose of identifying themes to illuminate the theory building.  
These emergent themes have been illustrated using the voices of the informants through 
extensive quotes. The use of these quotes are for the purpose of illustrating the richness of the 
data, which provides confidence in the theoretical construct developed in Chapter 6 (internal 
validity); and breadth of context (i.e. diverse informant experiences) as to generalisability 
(external validity). These direct quotes are also used to demonstrate reliability independent of 
investigator interpretations. Within these quotes, some words in square brackets have been 
added by the researcher for explanatory purposes. Where translation is made from original 
Chinese quotes, the translation is not always verbatim, in order to best convey the message in 
English; but the original Chinese quotes are provided in footnotes. Extended summaries of the 
emergent themes (free of quotes) are provided at the end of each of these three chapters. While 
the organisation of these quotes reflects the researcher’s understanding, the purpose of these 
three chapters is to report, rather than to interpret, the perspectives of the informants. The 
interpretation and integration of these themes with existing theory within literature is left until 
the discussion and theory development chapter (Chapter 6).  
Readers will also notice a mix of past and present tenses within sentences from Chapter 3 
onwards. This is done purposefully to respect the reality that interviews took place in the past, 
but topics under discussion are of contemporary issues, and relevant to the present. 
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As one New Zealand senior manager commented,  
If you come to another country, you have to figure out how to adapt to that country. You 
are not going to make that country adapt to you. I mean, without a doubt, it’s got its 
challenges in terms of how business is done.  
With this in mind, Chapter 3 is dedicated to describing ‘how things are’ from the perspectives of 
the economic, political, social and business environments that New Zealand agribusinesses find 
themselves in − including the challenges they face − when dealing with China. Some insights are 
also shared towards the end of the chapter on what, as perceived by some informants, 
contributed to some failures of New Zealand agribusiness ventures in China. 
 
3.2 Economic Environment 
3.2.1 China is the new economic power 
In March 2013 China overtook Australia to become New Zealand’s largest trading partner. The 
perceived significance of China on the world economic stage by the informants, as well as their 
interpretation of the magnitude of China’s importance to New Zealand, was apparent. As one 
New Zealand general manager said: 
The … economic world power is shifting … it’s going from West to East. With the troubles 
in the EU, and the difficulties in the US, and the exponential growth in China.... They 
probably will be the next economic power house to the world.  
One New Zealand CEO looked at future decades regarding the status of China on the world stage: 
From my personal point of view, China in the next 10 or 15 years is going to go through 
this huge evolutionary step change, and I think China is just going to be, if not already, the 
most dynamic economy in the world, it will certainly become so, as the central 
government makes some fundamental changes, and China becomes more of a global 
leader. I think that this next 10 or 15 years is just going to be [a] very, very exciting period 
of history to China and the world, and the influence of China will have on the world 
economy will be huge.  
Another New Zealand agribusiness consultant said: 
New Zealand and China … our fates are intertwined. China will succeed with or without 
New Zealand. New Zealand’s success will be a function of how well it interacts with 
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China … Wealth is created when people produce things that other people want. And China 
is doing a lot of that, and rest of the world isn’t doing as much of that as they used to. So 
the new wealth is going to be created in China … and there will be a long period of 
Chinese economic dominance. Whether they will leverage that into real hegemony or not 
I don’t know. They say ‘no’. But once you have the power. He who pays the piper calls the 
tune. I think the whole world has to engage with China.  
All of these comments can be summed up by what a director for China market of a New Zealand 
cooperative said: “Anyone who think[s] they can survive in New Zealand and not understand 
China is on the wrong planet.”  
3.2.2 China is fast paced 
To achieve the significance that China enjoys today, the country has undergone rapid 
transformation. As one New Zealand CEO explained: 
If I look back at my time coming in and out of Hong Kong, Taiwan, through to Shenzhen, 
and then to Shanghai from the 80s through to today, it is this just absolutely mind blowing 
change that has moved China from literally the hand cart to a Bentley in the space of 20 
years, and literally a whole city a day is constructed in China.  
Another New Zealand senior manager spoke of the speed of China’s development: “China is an 
incredibly exciting place to be. Very, very fast paced, in terms of what’s happening, and how 
quickly things are changing, but lots of opportunities too.”  
One New Zealand CEO saw this rapid development as being due to the strong leadership of the 
central government of China through lots of capital input: 
I think the issue is the central government. They are like the president. They make the 
decisions. So from a policy point of view, if they want to build a city here, they decide to 
build the city, and then how it’s filled; and how it works is this huge … basically capitalist 
money. Money drives this economy so hard, and the need for money is driven so hard, 
that if you do build a city, it will be filled, and it will work, for better or for worse. It will 
work, because everybody will be looking at opportunities to find a way of making money 
out of that opportunity… so I think it is this really strong direct leadership. For example, if 
they want to put … thousands of kilometres of fast rail into the inland China. … In New 
Zealand, we will talk about this for 5 years. We’ll do a 5-year feasibility study. We’ll do 
another 10 years of environmental study, then we might start building this thing. In China, 
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central government said that we are going to build it. Literally, within 3 years, they would 
have built 10,000km of … high speed rail. 
3.2.3 China is getting westernised 
In this process of speedy development, some see China as inevitably getting westernised, as 
perceived by a Chinese managing director, interviewed in English, from the farming supply 
industry: 
China is getting absolutely westernised, but not voluntarily, being forced. You are playing 
the global game. The game is global, you cannot play the game like [you are] on your own, 
like in North Korea. You are playing the same majong. You only have 17 pairs, you cannot 
have 19. You have the same pile of majong on the table, you have to play the same way. If 
you don’t know how to talk with Fonterra about a feeding contract, you’d better not 
touch them, because you are not speaking the same technical language. You have to be 
able to speak the same technical language while you can show your own strength by 
communicating additionally.  
A CEO from a New Zealand-owned horticultural company operating in China observed this too: 
The Mao generation, families were families of six and five, so large families. Then 
immediately there is a complete flip when you went to the One Child Policy, and we are 
seeing that huge bubble now come through of the age population, and just this huge 
chunk of … if you look out of my office window at the moment, everybody that’s walking 
on the street is between 25 and 40, or 25 or even 35. You just don’t see that demographic 
variation on the street up here. So what’s going to change is … the competition. A lot of 
people will still go through their whole life and still just be followers, but in that 
population also, there are increasing number of kids that will go to international 
universities for postgrad stuff, or … primary degrees, because they are one-child families, 
and their parents want them to go to … college in the US or England or somewhere. There 
is going to be an increasing amount of senior executives and leaders that will come 
through who will have experienced a different way of thinking, and a different way of 
managing, and I think they will be the agency of change in the future. And I think there 
will be a few colleges here in China that will start to teach differently.  
3.2.4 The grey economy 
In parallel to the phenomenal growth the official figures reveal, some New Zealanders who 
operate in China have observed another ‘grey economy’, which creates challenges for foreign 
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companies and require adjustments, as one New Zealand CEO explained: 
In China … you’ve got a huge grey economy that runs within China, directly parallel to … 
what you see, and that goes in everything from tax to processors. … As complex as the 
relational thing, it is as complex the way this economy runs. The economy runs obviously 
on earnings and paying taxes and doing the things that you’d expect the economy to 
record, but also there is this huge chunk of the economy that is grey. … And … most 
practices are of course completely frowned [on] in any other economy in the world. But in 
China it’s part of the way of doing things around here, and therefore one of the biggest 
challenges is to make sure that those practices don’t taint the company, and particularly if 
you are a foreign company, you cannot get involved in limited practices that are against 
the policies of the company, or in fact the laws of the company [of] origin. But it is a very 
difficult thing to avoid, so that’s a big challenge. 
And of course, the grey economy is all un-taxed, so the government themselves … they 
are talking about generating a 7per cent (growth in) GDP here in China. The real figure, [if] 
you take the grey economy into account, you might be looking at 10 per cent, 11 per cent. 
I don’t know, but it’s a big number. 
He further explained how this grey economy functions: 
Every transaction on every supply chain, there are countless gate keepers … who have to 
stamp a document to load a vehicle, to … purchase supplies. And in each case, there are 
gate keepers associated with those transactions … [there is] basically a transactional tax 
quite often … associated with those gate keepers, and that includes everything from 
government, to banks, to private enterprise, and all that does is just like us paying a 
service fee, and you look at it as an additional VAT. Quite often to get things done, you 
have to pay some service fee or establishment fees to individuals that control that 
particular element.  
Then he explained further: 
These are products of a system, products of necessity, I suppose, about how you get 
things done, and what advantage or opportunities people do … because it is fair to say 
that this is a very opportunistic environment. … For example, if you were a … government 
official, or somebody that controlled some minor document to move that container of 
food at the port, and that’s just putting it on a truck, then each one of those people would 
work their way to make sure … to get that block to put on the document, somehow would 
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have an advantage or opportunity. That’s that whole grey tax systems at works … It’s all 
about playing the game. 
It’s a grey activity, because quite clearly it means that we require endorsements for these 
transactions, whether that endorsement is tracked and traced is doubtful. The 
government in China is trying to iron out [this] … at government level and government 
official level … and they’ll continue to push that because for China to really be able to 
operate internationally, and particularly for foreign direct investment into China, then a 
lot of that has to be tidied up, because it … makes the whole operation … very slow, and 
that affects productivity, and there is a whole bunch of stuff that [it] affects. And if you 
get it wrong, quite often you can be held up just in simple, day-to-day transactions for 
weeks, if not months.  
This grey economy is seen as a product of the low-wage system in China: 
I think it’s probably born out of a low wage economy. It’s born out of this huge ability to 
make money out of nothing in China. They are the most capitalist country in the world. 
The opportunistic or the entrepreneurial streak is very, very high, as far as learning how to 
manipulate situations.... And I think their lower wages have formed a lot of that, 
because … if [you are on] lower wages, then people … tend to look for other alternative 
ways of supporting income. And obviously the income share in China is quite extreme. I 
don’t know what the stats are, but it’s something like 2 per cent [of the population 
holds] … 40 per cent of the wealth. It’s something like that. But it’s a huge chunk that is 
weighted towards the very few people in China, and how much filtered down through the 
average Joe on the street is extremely low. Most people don’t get [a] paid huge salary. 
And yet they have, individually, these young people who work for our company, have a 
huge responsibility to look after their family. So a young couple, for instance, the big thing 
that they want to be able to buy is an apartment. But not only they have to buy an 
apartment, but they have to buy one big enough to look after their parents, sometimes 
two sets of parents. And those parents expect their children to look after them. I guess 
they provide the nanny services to the one child that they may have. So a young couple 
starting up is like a young couple starting up with a family of five … on very low income. So 
you are talking about why these things occur. It’s a complex between low wages, but also 
huge family responsibility that put a huge financial drain on families.  
Another contributor to this grey economy is the large amount of liquidity within the economy: 
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There is so much liquidity. People are looking for a home for money. The net savings for 
this country [are] just enormous, at all levels. In New Zealand, we just spend everything, 
we just live beyond our means, like there is no tomorrow. In China, even if you earn 2,000 
RMB2 a month, there will be some form of saving with that money. There will be 
something set aside for the future, even though they pay horrific rents, surviving, and 
getting a bus …. Some of our staff travel 4 hours a day across the city, just to work here. 
And they live in some shitty little apartment, but they still will save 200 RMB a month. Put 
that aside for the future. … So there is this huge slush fund, a lot of it operates in that grey 
economy, on short term loans, or favours, or something.  
3.2.5 The grey trade 
In line with the concept of the grey economy, there is also a ‘grey trade’, which refers specifically 
to export and import activities that are not officially administered by China Customs. One New 
Zealand winery owner pointed out the significance of the grey trade in the wine industry: 
About 80 per cent of the wine imported is sold through hidden channels, to the 
government, for banquets, entertaining and gifting, through Mid-Autumn Festival and 
New Year. And [this is] all done generally through traders, who just opportunistically buy 
wine and do that, or the organisations themselves who … give those gifts, basically want 
to cut out the x number of middle men in between. I think last year there [were] about 
107 wine companies exporting to China, this is a year or so ago, from New Zealand; and 
yet when we look in the restaurants … you don’t see them. You see the same people, 
generally us, or Villa Maria, or Cloudy Bay … not a lot. And in the hyper markets, almost 
no New Zealand brands. So where do the New Zealand brands go? They go through the 
hidden channels.  
One New Zealand director pointed out the diminishing benefit and risks involved: 
Sale to Hong Kong attracts less tax than sales to China. … A lot of businesses have done it 
at one stage, some still do it now, but not where I am involved. Where people sell it to 
Hong Kong, then it goes through a grey channel into China where it doesn’t attract 
additional duty or tax. … That used to be widespread … but it’s not … anymore. … There 
are still some people doing it. But that’s not a good way to do it. …. It’s illegal for a start. 
The possibility of getting caught is a lot greater now than it ever was before, and it’s a 
good way to damage your company, a good way to damage your brand. 
                                                          
2 Equivalent to about 400 NZD at the time of the interview. 
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One government official in New Zealand also saw the lost opportunities in the grey trade: 
It’s allowed us to access Hong Kong and China in a way that we couldn’t have without it. 
But it does run the risk of compromising the integrity of our products. In other words, 
products going through Hong Kong … I’ve heard people [say] that they re-sticker them, 
they re-brand them, and they sell them, maybe not as New Zealand apples, but South 
America apples or something. There are a whole lot of risks in the middle market and 
trading that goes on in that space, and also the margins that are made by people that 
operate in Hong Kong doing it. If you go directly into China, and you go through a proper 
process, Chinese people know that they are getting apples from [here] … and it’s cheaper, 
if we can do it properly. If [there are] a lot of hold ups, then it’s not. But they are finding … 
that it can be cheaper, that we can get a better return for the growers.  
 
3.3 Political Environment 
Coexisting with the economic environment, the political and social environments that New 
Zealand agribusinesses have to operate within paint a far more complex picture. The following 
two sections of this chapter endeavour to illustrate this complex picture from the perspectives of 
the political environment and the social environment. The first looks at the powers that be, and 
this is followed by the practices that informants have observed within this environment. 
3.3.1 Powers that be 
3.3.1.1 Government involvement 
3.3.1.1.1 The importance of government involvement 
“When you deal with China, the official factor is so important”, summed up a New Zealand 
managing director. Indeed, the prevalence of government involvement in business dealings was a 
common theme of many of the informants. As one New Zealand agricultural consultant pointed 
out, “local government is always involved somewhere in business projects. Companies don’t get 
access to resources or land or whatever without local government’s involvement”. A Chinese 
entrepreneur who worked closely with New Zealanders also commented: 
You cannot be separated from the government in China. When foreigners come to China, 
I tell them: China is a country ruled by people, not by law, so if you are disconnected from 
the government, you will achieve nothing.3  
                                                          
3 Original Chinese quote: 在中国你不能离开政府的 … 老外来我就跟他讲，因为中国它是人治国家，它
不是法制国家。你脱离政府的话，你就什么都干不成了。 
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In addition, depending on the scale of foreign investment, various levels of government can be 
involved. A director for the Chinese market of a New Zealand cooperative described the different 
levels of government involvement in their investment in China as all “indelibly linked”.  
The hierarchy of government is complex, as one New Zealand independent director explained: 
There are many, many levels of officials … It’s hard to generalise, because you’ve got the 
Beijing officials, you’ve got provincial officials, and you’ve got the county officials. It 
depends very much on what it is that you are doing. … If you are doing something like 
setting up a farm, for example, you are talking about agribusiness here, then the ability to 
get oo well with the county officials, and explain what you are going to bring to their 
county or their part of the world, is really important, and staying in constant contact with 
them is really important … so there is that level. Then there is the ‘you make your way 
through the structures in Beijing’ level. It’s more a garnish and support at a high level. 
Trying to get a sense of where high-level policy is going … more those things … creating 
relationships. Even then it’s very different. You go and talk to NDRC4, it’s a very different 
conversation to go and talk to [the] Ministry of Agriculture.  
Not only are the levels of government complex, but the government is also regarded as highly 
important in relation to business activities. A district mayor of New Zealand, who was among the 
38 informants interviewed, shared his perception of the emphasis that Chinese businesses put on 
government support of their business activities: 
My presence at things is considered significant, so that’s what I do … I often open the 
shop, I meet with Foreign Affairs, often meet with the mayor. … It’s about giving the 
Chinese authorities confidence that they are dealing with a reputable company. While a 
mayor in New Zealand is very different … to what a mayor in China is, they no doubt 
consider the status is reasonably similar. … That’s about them understanding that this is 
real … I think they are used to a lot of state control, in just about everything they do. In 
New Zealand, there is not that level of state control. So if they talk to somebody, they are 
always asking, ‘What do the official[s] say, what does the government think?’. It’s really 
just a reassurance thing … and … that they are dealing with somebody relatively senior in 
the government.  
                                                          
4 The National Development and Reform Commission. 
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3.3.1.1.2 The power of the government 
The government − central, provincial or local − holds tremendous power over the rises and falls of 
businesses. One New Zealand business consultant, who was also a CEO, described his daughter 
and son-in-law’s unfortunate experience in relation to land-use right: 
The sanctity of that land-use right is also not very solid. For example, we had the situation, 
my daughter and son-in-law ran a [food] business, and unfortunately we funded this for 
them. We set them up with a really good meat processing factory, and they worked there 
for about 18 months. They were doing really well, and starting to develop their business. 
And one day the landlord knocks on the door, and says, ‘Government … is taking this land 
back to build the VW factory, and you have to be out in two weeks.’ ‘But we put in 
hundreds of thousands of dollars into building the factory.’ ‘We don’t care.’ So do you get 
any compensation? No. All of sudden, the government said, ‘We’ve changed the land-use 
right designation for this area. All of this is being knocked down, because we want to put 
the Volkswagen factory down.’ So even if you get the land-use right for a particular length 
of time, there is not any guarantee that you would actually … see that out.  
When asked whether he thought the 40-year lease that was often attached to a commercial land-
use right could be counted on, one New Zealand business consultant said: 
No. Not at all. … A few years ago, the government changed the rules with peasants not 
having to pay a tax. It was a thousand-year-old tax … to the government, for using the 
land. … It was a good initiative out of Beijing. All these peasants were paying this tax. It 
stopped that, so that they can keep their money, so the consequence of that is local 
governments, they were short of tax revenue, so they are taking land. Anything in China 
can change. There is a rule or law. There is black and white. And there is how things are 
applied to you. If you look at what happens, Shanghai is a little bit more black and white, 
because it’s a bit more international. But it still happens. Deals happen and things change. 
Your 70-year lease is. … The assets were changed out of this, or there is a new 
government [rule] that’s come in, and you are gone! All it takes is some red envelopes to 
the right people for them to make some money from the deal. It doesn’t matter who you 
are, you are gone.  
Another New Zealand business consultant shared a similar view: 
The other thing that you’ve got to realise in China … if they want to change the rules, they 
will change the rules. And if you can’t deal with that, you shouldn’t be here. At the end of 
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the day, if they want to take all the land back, they want to change the rules, they will 
change the rules. You’ve just got to assess that as a risk ... that’s why I won’t buy an 
apartment here, because I am not happy with the risk. Not because it’s a bad investment, 
but the rules can be changed so quickly ... They could turn around and say, any foreigners 
that have leasehold on land is now null and void. What are you going to do? Go to the 
court? 
On the other hand, when the government wants to encourage the development of certain 
industries, support such as subsidies is being granted. A New Zealand CEO observed some of the 
short-term investment mind-set and behaviour of Chinese businessmen as a result of this kind of 
government support: 
It … gives you the opportunity to start to think in the Chinese mind-set. Let’s say in [an] 
agri-horticultural type of business. If you can put something on there that you get your 
capital returned and profit returned quickly, then you don’t care about the long term, and 
this is … very much the investment mind-set in China. Investment companies tend to 
follow government policy, because when the government wants to encourage a particular 
industry, they put in a lot of subsidies to support that industry, and investors would come 
in and invest in that particular area, grab the government subsidy, which mitigate[s] their 
risk, so in other words, their risk is less because they’ve grabbed some money from the 
government … spend a short time in there, and then sell it on to somebody else who 
might want to earn longer-term money.  
3.3.1.1.3 Relationships with the government 
For some informants, the power the government held meant that businesses needed to pay 
particular attention to their relationships with government officials, because the power lay with 
the person in charge rather than the law. One New Zealand CEO compared the ways that 
government functions in New Zealand and in China: 
Government officials in New Zealand have a very low level of impact on business, 
compared to China. … Doing business in New Zealand with government officials is just 
bureaucracy, and sometimes the bureaucracy is frustratingly slow, but it’s normally the 
rules rather than the people. It’s the law rather than the people. But the big difference is, 
as the … mayor said, ‘In China, the law has to be flexible’, and that’s where relationships 
with officials are so much more important than in a country like New Zealand.  
A Chinese agricultural consultant offered similar opinions: 
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I think China is a country with a special commercial background. Any successful business 
operation cannot be separated from the support of the government. … The function of 
the relationships with the government and government officials is therefore very 
important. Maintaining a good communication with the local government is one of the 
fundamental keys to the survival of a business in that particular region.5  
Even for New Zealand agribusinesses that are not operating in China but are exporting goods to 
China, the Chinese government’s actions can have a significant impact on export performance. 
One New Zealand winery owner talked about the spectacular falls in New Zealand wine exports to 
China due to the anti-corruption campaign that took place after the new president came to 
power: 
Wine boomed in China from 1 million cases of imported wine in 2008 to considerably 
more in 2011. [Then in] 2012 with the new premier [president] it really did a nose dive, 
and three-quarters of all imported wine was not through traditional distribution channels 
– wealthy business people, connected with a lot of government officials. When all that 
entertainment stopped, wine sales in China … dropped 70 per cent in the last 12 months.  
One senior manager from a New Zealand horticultural company spoke of the importance of their 
relationship with Chinese government agencies, particularly Customs, in relation to their 
exporting of fruit to China: 
Market access for us is critical if we are going to be putting 20 per cent … of New Zealand 
production into China. Our reliance on China as a market is going to be huge, and people 
are making access ... decisions on issues that we don’t really understand or control or 
have input into. It’s too much risk for us. So having that relationship deeply with 
government is important to understand what they are thinking and why, so at least we 
can mitigate that risk without actually ever fall[ing] into managing it. Quarantine … is the 
most obvious legitimate reason, but we also understand that there are political reasons at 
times for that as well, and it’s important. But [if] we understand what might be behind 
that … [we can then] try and influence their thinking. 
However, maintaining these kinds of relationships with the government in China comes at a cost. 
Another senior manager of the same horticultural company spoke of the associated costs of 
                                                          
5 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得中国它是一个有自己特殊商业背景的 … 国家。… 在中国任何成功的企
业运作是离不开政府的支持的。所以与政府的关系，包括与政府官员 [的关系] 的作用是非常重要
的。… 你在和当地政府的… 保持一个良好的 … 沟通，是决定于你这个企业在那个地方生存的一个根
本关键。 
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maintaining relationships with the government in China: 
It’s being up there and getting your feet under the desk for it. … But resource is huge. 
There [have] been very few New Zealand companies … that have a department in their 
business that deals with government relations … let alone the luxury of having someone 
going to a market to look after government relations. … There are probably two New 
Zealand companies. So how small companies resource that, I don’t know. That’s a big 
investment to put into. 
3.3.1.2 The power of the Party 
For most informants the word ‘Party’ and the word ‘government’ were synonyms, and only very 
few spoke of the Party specifically. One New Zealand senior manager talked about the 
overwhelming power of the Party that he sensed: 
The Communist system … is still a boys’ state. … The Communist Party, and the power of 
the Party, is so phenomenal, and just almost the sense that everybody has an obligation 
to be doing something for the good of China, and for the good of the people of China, to 
the detriment of anything else or anyone else.  
One New Zealand business consultant spoke about the prevalence of the Party’s power in 
businesses: 
You often can’t distinguish whether somebody is an official or an executive. There is 
Community Party in every company, more or less … every significant company … the 
secretary general is a higher rank than the principal.  
When there is interplay between the Party representative and the governing officials, the Party’s 
view will eventually dominate, as one New Zealand agricultural consultant pointed out: 
You still can have that interplay between whoever is representing the Party in an 
organisation, versus the officials … governor vs. Party secretary … that type of thing. 
Usually those positions work very closely and comfortably with each other … but the 
Party’s view has to dominate at the end of the day. 
Indeed the lack of such knowledge of the prevalence of the Party’s power in businesses has led to 
some business failures. One independent director of several New Zealand agribusinesses talked 
about the lesson learned from one particular failure: 
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One of the biggest surprises to us was understanding the influence of the Party on the 
company. It’s … a private company, it’s extensively … privatised, but actually the Party had 
a very strong influence, which we didn’t realise until later. We knew that the chairman … 
was a Party rep, so knew that there were sort of links. We didn’t realise the extent to 
which the Party actually control what was going on in the company, so that was a major 
lesson. 
3.3.2 Practices 
3.3.2.1 Bureaucracy 
With the power that the government and the Party hold, many informants experienced 
bureaucracy in their dealings with government officials. One New Zealand CEO spoke of the layers 
of bureaucracy in China, and the resulting delays in business activities that could happen: 
In China, obviously there are multitudes of layers of bureaucracy, and trying to sift your 
way, firstly finding the information, and then getting access to the people that can 
support you through executing some policy, or getting access to some policy, is very 
difficult. You can either do that very efficiently, or can be delayed and [end up] spending 
months and months and not get it at all.  
However, bureaucracy is not limited to the government. Other people who hold power over 
certain processes can also be bureaucratic. One New Zealand middle manager talked about the 
frustration of banking in China due to its bureaucratic process: 
The whole banking thing drives me crazy. To pay a bill, or transfer cash, you fill out your 
slip ... the chop. If you … messed it up, you have to do it again … Basically if it is not 100 
per cent correct, as their example shows you, you’ve got to do the whole thing again, 
which you can get rejected several times in one day, and can [this] be very, very 
frustrating. … [Speaking of communicating with bank tellers] if I was at home, I would say, 
‘Can you help me with this? What do I need to do to this?’ If I say it here, … they’d just 
give me a textbook answer. They would just read the questions, and ‘Oh, I will write this 
back to them.’ You want a solution … which may come down to the language. … Even 
though they work for multinational banks, and they speak good English. Just that at times, 
simple things can seem difficult to get done.  
3.3.2.2 Games with officials 
To deal with the bureaucracy in business, some regard it as a game. One New Zealand owner of a 
restaurant chain in Beijing commented: 
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To get things done in China, obviously the government is always involved. So you’d need 
to be able to play their game, and it is very much a game.... Locals are better at playing 
their game than foreigners, because you could stir things up more than help things 
typically. … You’ve got to play the game, and the game for the officials is, there is got to 
be in the sense of ‘What's in it for me?’ And that doesn’t always [mean] things which we 
think it means, graft or corruption. It’s mainly just ‘making my life easier’. ‘Fill in these 
forms this way, because if you don't, I am going to have to go back to my superior why 
you haven't. Adhere to certain rules, so that I don’t have to come and check on you.’ 
There is certain value that they want. You are going to be able to offer them value.... 
There is a whole spectrum of value that needs to be offered. But by no means all officials 
are looking for a kick-back. 
3.3.2.3 Flexibility in practices of the law 
Despite the bureaucracy, many informants also observed flexibility in how the government 
implement the laws, rules, and regulations. One New Zealand CEO described his government 
contact, who was a former mayor of a city, as follows: 
He always laughs about the laws of China, and he always tries to explain to me how China 
has laws, but in China it’s always flexible, because the country is so large, and he doesn’t 
like bureaucracy getting in the way of us making progress … He always looks for ways to 
get around the bureaucracy. If [it’s] ‘Oh, no, you are not allow[ed] that information; it’s 
confidential’, you go and find a way.  
Another New Zealand restaurant owner talked about his experience with the differences between 
the words and actual practices of regulations:  
Regulation is kind of a handbook. There are kind of two handbooks. There is a handbook 
that the government will give you, and there is a handbook that you will get from China 
hands. It’s not written down, but it’s kind of personal wisdom that will lead you through.... 
Those two things are often quite different: how the government says and how the things 
actually get done. 
One New Zealand middle manager spoke of his experience of driving in a small town without a 
legal licence as an example of the flexibility in the Chinese practices of the law: 
They said ‘It’s fine driving’ … ‘You won’t have a problem, because the police won’t pull 
you over,’ because they had mentioned that I was coming into town, and not to pull me 
over. … We might call it corruption, but that’s just flexible, that’s just how they were. … 
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They sort of said, ‘China is a big place. They need to have flexible rules.’ … As long as you 
don’t do anything too serious, then they [were okay with it].  
This flexibility, when observed from the outside, can be perceived as lack of transparency. One 
independent director of several New Zealand agribusinesses commented: 
One of the interesting things is law in China … the way in which laws are anecdotal. By and 
large, all the laws that you would expect … are in place in China. … [For example,] there 
are good health and safety laws on the books. It’s actually how those laws are acted 
[upon], and that’s … what’s really [the issue] … lack in transparency. That’s what’s really 
hard to get your head around. When do these laws apply? When are people going to 
enforce these laws? Because the importance of the law is really inconsistent. And that’s 
an issue that makes it difficult. That’s a thing that’s improving a lot, but it’s not there yet.  
This comment is consistent with the observation made by another New Zealand agricultural 
consultant, who said that Chinese laws are often about goals and aspirations: they are thin 
documents, leaving room for a lot of personal interpretation: 
Chinese law documents that come out of Beijing, the State Council laws, which are then 
sent to the different provinces to implement, are very thin documents. The document for 
one of the Chinese grass land laws is only, I think, six pages long. So-called Chinese law is 
basically often a set of principles about … goals and aspirations that Chinese governments 
[want] to achieve, and the implementation of that, which happens first at a province level, 
[then] at a city level under that, and [then a] county level … there is room for a lot of 
personal interpretation. … The same sort of law in New Zealand will probably be 200-page 
long, with hundreds of paragraphs trying to dot every i and cross every t, and that doesn’t 
happen in Chinese law.  
3.3.2.4 Project vs. product 
Another practice observed by some informants is that some government officials tend to work 
towards the set five-year plan based on the number of projects they can achieve within that time 
period. There is a tendency for these government officials to only want to achieve certain 
milestones within their term of employment, and then move up the ranks based on these 
milestones, while not worrying about what might happen to the outcomes of these projects after 
moving on. Whereas a ‘project’ often has a start and finish time, a ‘product’ here refers to the 
long-term focus of certain business activities that will continue to produce a particular product to 
remain profitable. For example, a project could be building a fruit-processing plant at a certain 
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location, where the start and end time are clearly defined. But whether this processing plant will 
remain functional and profitable will depend on the ongoing management of the plant to process 
particular products. As one New Zealand agricultural consultant pointed out:  
China is good at the hardware, not very good at the software [the human operational 
systems].... One of the things [about] the local government officials here is that they have to 
be seen to be doing something in agriculture. … The absolute key issue is, ‘Why are you 
doing the project?’. As a foreigner, what you always have to assess is, ‘Is he/she going to do 
a project, and there can be all sorts of reasons for doing that, or is he/she doing it for the 
product?’ Fifty to sixty per cent of the time they do it for the project. As you get all the 
encouragement, because all the local officials [would say], ‘Shit, we brought this big unit in, 
and it’s going gung-ho’, but what has happened is, he/she hasn’t considered the 
management demands, the management skills that are needed, the market, post-harvest, 
all of those elements.... Again, what you have to remember is, if you look at these counties, 
these counties have very specific plans, and some very specific targets, and some very 
specific growth targets, it’s all based on the 5-year plan, so any economic activities that they 
can undertake will contribute to that 5-year plan.  
[After a project is finished] and it looks good! So the government official can go along to his 
boss at prefecture level and say, ‘We did it!’.... Why do you think if you drive around China, 
and you see so many empty roads? It’s all economic activity, isn’t [it]? Hell of a lot easier to 
build a building and build an airport than actually do something productive. And that's 
where we've got to be careful with these projects, because they are part of that culture, 
and you’ve got to pick the blind alleys pretty early, otherwise it’s a waste of time.  
 
3.4 Social Environment 
The complex picture of the social environment will be discussed from the perspectives of social 
institutions and social behaviours. 
3.4.1 Social institutions 
3.4.1.1 Overall institutional environment 
3.4.1.1.1 Differences and similarities in overall institutional cultures between China and New 
Zealand 
The overwhelming message from the informants was that the overall institutional environment is 
vastly different in China compared to New Zealand. Each informant explained the differences they 
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saw from their own perspective. For example, one New Zealand CEO spoke of the difference in 
the decision-making process: 
In a New Zealand way, or a Western way, we start at this point … once we’ve decided on a 
strategy, we pretty much go straight line, maybe we tack the aim line a little bit. But in 
China, it’s like taking a ball of wool. It takes a long time to unravel the wool to get to the 
end. It’s a whole different, complex, decision-making process, and the conversion thought 
process that goes on.  
This difference in the decision-making process is also seen in the dissimilar approaches to the 
process of establishing business collaborations. One New Zealand middle manager shared his 
perspective: 
The [Chinese] local government sort of felt the foreigners … try to rush things initially. But 
when things do get going, they are quite slow to expand. … We are too fast in the initial 
stages, and then we are too slow after that. … Someone has made that comment. They 
described the Kiwis as being conservative, which surprised me, because the impression that 
I got was that Chinese are very conservative. But I think that’s just during the initial stages of 
the development. And then after that … once the relationship has formed, the Chinese just 
want to grow like mad, whereas New Zealanders … may be more conservative in business 
planning.  
A Chinese managing director, interviewed in English, talked about the difference in relation to trust 
and contracts: 
Western culture is all developed under a legal system. If you have a business, you have to 
get everything in place. … The Chinese way is you forget about your papers, your signatures, 
forget about your lawyers. The Chinese way, the Oriental way, like Japan and Korea, would 
talk a lot about relationships, a lot … about ties. In the end, I think Oriental cultures are 
flexible, without sacrificing the values at all. To be more practical, to be more flexible. But 
Western culture is based on talking about legal, and contract. Everything is based on treaty. 
Like the Americans. They cheated the [Red] Indians. … Yes you have a contract. But a 
contract means nothing, if you are not telling with your heart. You cheated the Indians. 
They never knew what contracts mean.  
This reliance on relationships as opposed to legal systems is also reflected in the transparency in 
business processes and conflict resolution approaches in China, as one New Zealand Māori CEO 
pointed out: 
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In New Zealand everything is very clear cut. It’s very black and white. Because the 
government doesn’t support you to the same extent … actually they don’t support you at 
all, other than to provide policy, because they don’t do that, it’s very simple. … It is very 
black and white.... It’s all there laid out, very clear, very transparent processes … whereas 
here [China] the level of transparency is not the same.  
In New Zealand, in [a] Western economy, we tend to be quite quick to resort to a legal 
solution. First thing you do is, ‘I'm going to get my lawyer to give you a call.’ You’ve got that 
issue, number one, then you’ve got the complexity of a third party, then you’ve got the legal 
processes, the costs, and everything else that’s involved with it. Through that whole process 
you tend to lose productivity, whereas here you tend to put it through a very long 
resolution process, before that will get to the courts. I think that’s a very clear ... cultural 
[difference] in the way the business is done. That’s not to say that things don’t end up in 
court.... But there is no need. It’s a very timely, costly process, [and] typically there is no 
winner. Someone might walk away with a judgement, but at the end of the day, what have 
you won, really? All you’ve done is you have damaged your relationships, you’ve shown the 
government and enterprises that you can’t resolve situations unless you go to court, which I 
think in the long term is a loss, rather than a win. There is another way to be able to get a 
solution. … Going to court is very much a Western solution, straight up. But trying to find a 
resolution and an outcome that both parties can live with: I think it’s very much [part of] 
Asian and Chinese culture. 
This lack of transparency in Chinese business processes can cause frustration for New Zealand 
businesses, as one New Zealand senior manager expressed: 
Just … for me, it appears that for some of them, it seems to take so long, and you never 
really get anywhere. I tried to put some structure around a business that we were looking at 
having a relationship with. But they didn’t want to engage in the MOU [memorandum of 
understanding], and saying, ‘No, the MOU is no good’, but [they] couldn’t say what was 
wrong with it. I even gave them the opportunity to write up changes in the MOU, but they 
didn’t, so that’s quite different. I think we have a bit of a pathway, and a bit of process to 
the next steps [in] how we do business. But for me, some Chinese companies jump around 
a little bit [in their business processes].  
Nevertheless, a few informants recognised some similarities in the institutional cultures between 
China and New Zealand, as one New Zealand CEO explained: 
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I think it’s the fact that we are pretty similar, that we get on pretty well. … I think we work 
well with the Chinese, because I think it reflects on New Zealand’s … cultural diversity, in 
terms of the way that we accept nations in different nationalities, and we’ve got the 
European−Māori thing. The Chinese thing … is second nature to us. We know from a Māori 
point of view that you have to deal in certain ways, and there are certain protocols you 
honour and participate in [when] doing business, and it’s the same with the Chinese. You sit 
down, you talk, you entertain, you have a meal, and have a few drinks, and that goes with 
the business. I think it’s almost like second nature for Kiwis. … The Yanks, the Americans, 
they can’t even understand it. They are cut-throat businessmen. They want the deal done 
today. They want it done hard. They don’t care about tomorrow … and it’s the best price, 
and they will screw you to death. The Chinese and the Kiwis have a longer-term view to 
business.... I think culturally we relate to Chinese people well, and I think it’s about who we 
are as well. 
3.4.1.1.2 Different cultures in different regions of China 
Not only did the informants observe differences in institutional cultures between China and New 
Zealand, but many of them also commented on the differences across different parts of China. As 
one winery owner pointed out: 
You can’t look at China as one market. It’s a bit like the USA: every province is different, and 
a city within a province is different.... I don’t have enough experience from province to 
province, but my sense is that it is hugely different. Beijing is quite different to Shanghai or 
Guangzhou, for example. And there is a much more international feel in selling wine in 
Guangzhou. Why? That’s where the Canton Trade Fair is; many more international business 
visitors, over many, many more years than Shanghai or Beijing.  
A New Zealand business consultant based in Shanghai talked about the difference in institutional 
cultures between Shanghai and other parts of China: 
They [people in Shanghai] are a bit more international. They’ve got access to more 
international things. … I think they are a bit more honest … because you’ve got to be a bit 
more transparent, because you can’t hide things anymore. You can’t get away with it. The 
old story of charging each customer a different price, depending on how much money 
they’ve got, that’s gone. And if you behave like that, people will find out, and you will be 
buggered. … Also, they’ve got access to a lot more international information. Even if they 
can’t speak English, they can hire someone, hire a company here to research New Zealand. 
So they can go down to New Zealand, with very detailed information about the costing, 
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what’s going on. It’s all in Chinese … so they are very international. I think they are a lot 
more transparent, because they realise that the world is quite small.  
But then when you go to the south of China, it’s completely different again. You don’t know 
who you are dealing with. You don’t know anything. They want to run you around and 
confuse you. If you go to the north, they want to get you drunk, and try to get you to sign … 
so it’s, ‘What part of China is it?’ Are you from Shanghai, or are you from outside of 
Shanghai?  
Another New Zealand CEO, also based in Shanghai, shared a similar point of view when asked when 
the customary ‘meet and greet and drink’ happens in business activities in China: 
Well, that depends on where they are from. Up north, in Dongbei [the northeast region], 
they won’t do anything with you until you’ve been rolling around on the ground, drunk with 
them, then they are happy. Shanghainese, different again. You don’t have to do all the 
drinking. They want to know the cents and dollars. A few gifts and you are fine. That’s why I 
like being down here instead of up north. I was sick from drinking Baijiu just going to get 
paid a shoukuan, an account receivable.  
One New Zealand agricultural consultant who had visited China over 40 times since the 1980s also 
observed a heavier drinking culture towards the western part of China. He said, ‘I think the further 
west you go, or the more remote areas, that cultural integration, being able to play the games that 
they play … particularly the drinking games.’ 
A Chinese agricultural consultant went further to describe the cultural differences across various 
parts of China: 
China is such a big place, so there are certainly going to be some differences across the 
regions. For example, people from the north are more direct. They are a bit rough around 
the edges, and they tend to be more forthright. It will be different when you deal with 
people from the south. Those from the south pay more attention on the practicality of 
things. They want effectiveness, so for many things they will come from the perspectives 
of the actual outcomes, and relationships may come second. It would be more about 
whether there would be a joint benefit; it would come first ... places such as Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Shanghai. But the north, such as the three provinces in the northeast, 
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emotions would often be more important. Then based on the emotions, perhaps many 
business activities would become easier.6  
One former senior manager of an Australian-owned horticultural company in Yunnan (in south-west 
China) gave his observations and explanation of the different attitudes towards agriculture and the 
resulting differing behaviours between people in Yunnan and in northern China: 
We had to try and understand the Yunnan people.... They are very laid back.... They are 
totally different to people that you are dealing in Shaanxi, or whatever. … [In the] northern 
part, Xi’an and north, essentially, in generally terms, [people] have got to make sure that 
their crops produce for them, to feed the family every year, because winter time is too cold, 
and they can’t grow anything, so they can’t afford to make too many mistakes. … They are 
more attuned to making do with their crops 100 per cent, to make sure that they don’t 
make mistakes. Fujian and here, they can afford to have crop failure … because … for 
potatoes, you can grow three crops a year… so the attitude here is totally different towards 
agriculture. … They don’t want to make a mistake, if they’ve got 5 mu7 or 6 mu … they’ve 
got to feed 6 people. But if they make a mistake, it’s only 3 months, and they are back into 
production again, and do something else. … That’s exactly how I believe China works. So … 
here, they are not as attuned to … good agricultural practices as the rest of the country, 
as … you draw a line at Xi’an and across. The attitude is totally different. And you find that 
people [who] come from agricultural [areas – in the north] and grow flowers down here do 
a much more professional job than the locals. It’s got nothing to do with them being Han, or 
Yi people or whatever. They … realise that they can’t make mistakes with their crops in 
northern China.  
3.4.1.1.3 Different attitudes between males and females 
In addition to the differences across various regions of China, some informants also observed the 
attitudinal differences between males and females in China, as one male New Zealand agricultural 
consultant pointed out: 
                                                          
6 Original Chinese quote: 中国这个地域太大了，所以地域和地域之间肯定是存在差异的。包括不同的
区域的人都是不一样的。比如说像北方人，他就会比较直，比较粗犷，然后性格也比较豪爽。和他
打交道的话，又和南方又不太一样。南方呢现在很注重实际的，他很实效的。所以他好多方面就是
从实际结果出发，那么像这个人际关系往往可能要放在次要的，更多的是这种，比如说大家能不能
有一个共同的效益，可能是放在第一位的 … 比如说像江浙，包括上海。像北方，像东北三省，可能
这个情感是往往要 [占] … 一个比较重的 portion，然后呢在情感的基础之上，可能好多的生意都变得
容易一些。 
7 1 ha = 15 mu 
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[Women are] much more dedicated, much harder working, economically they are much 
more driven than the men. Men are lazy. They expect everything [to] come for them. That’s 
what I found. They [women] are much more determined. They are not into this bullshit 
drinking, socialising, relationship. They are interested in the job, and getting the job done, 
and getting the benefit from the job. These are big generalisations. The men tend to think, 
‘If I do all this, the benefits would come to me. [But] I don’t really have to do it.’ And the 
women here are a lot tougher than the men.  
You don’t see many companies run by women. But [they hold] senior management 
positions. Even within the government departments, the people that I come across, the 
women within the government, especially senior women, are much more dynamic than the 
men.  
If you go and talk [to] a group of Chinese farmers, it’s always the women who are up the 
front listening ... the men are at the back playing cards. And I’ve seen that in various parts of 
China. So it’s not only at a corporate level that you find it ... particularly when it comes to 
say 35- to 40-year-old women … a lot of [them] are actually in [a] very high percentage of 
marriage breakups, so they are actually supporting their child as well, so they are quite 
determined to make a success.  
I think they [women] are a lot more ambitious. Probably [they] know [what] they have to 
do, because of some of [the] cultural things ... well, women are still very much, I am not 
saying second class, but you know what I mean. There is definitely a glass ceiling here for 
women. It’s a lot tougher for women to get [beyond that ceiling] … here. Generally 
organisations here are very hierarchical, and if you look at the managers of those 
organisations, particularly government, or some of [the] more traditional organisations run 
by [a] 50- to 55-year-old man, who came out of the mid-1980s and 1990s, they bring those 
similar attitudes to them. … It’s a hell of a lot harder for women to get ahead here than it is 
for a man.  
I think the women here are not so worried about the face issue. They don’t [mind]. Men 
here seem to get threatened. They feel threatened fairly quickly if you question their 
authority.... Educated women don’t necessarily have that cultural baggage. 
One New Zealand CEO noticed the difference in loyalty to the employer exhibited by male and 
female staff members: 
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I think Chinese girls are very, very loyal to their organisations. You will notice within the 
head office, most of them are female ... because they are very loyal, and very hard working. 
Whereas guys, you will notice in China, guys tend to jump around from organisation to 
organisation more quickly. They might spend two or three years here, then they will move 
to another organisation, to get some different experience. 
Another business consultant observed the unique role that female Chinese played in forming 
business relationships: 
One thing I am going to say is that it’s much harder to form the level of intimacy of a 
relationship with a man, than [with] the women. The women will form friendship with 
foreigners very easily, and it may even be their job. … I am not talking about anything under 
the … everything is perfectly above board. Bright8 appointed a woman to be the contact 
person, Beingmate9 appointed a woman to be the contact person.... It’s amazing how many 
women they appoint to managing these crazy Westerners.  
3.4.1.1.4 Different frames of references for different generations 
Yet another variation in the nature of the social institutions in China is the different frames of 
reference for different generations that some informants observed. One New Zealand CEO 
summed up these differences well: 
The other thing, too, [that] is interesting to observe [are] the generational changes, because 
we talk about those who came through the Mao era, and you talk to those who have come 
through Deng Xiaoping, and now the latest moves to internationalised and globalised China, 
each of those different generations have [an] almost completely different frame of 
reference. And that’s also interesting to look at … even educationally, you can see each of 
those generations experienced different educational experiences, and that have moulded 
them into the way they are … in terms of how they conceptualise things. The generational 
frame of reference is quite different, which is … fascinating. It’s the biggest social 
experience in the world – China. 
3.4.1.2 Key social institutions 
Through the interview process a number of distinctive Chinese social institutions were identified 
by the informants. This section is dedicated to elaborating on these institutions. 
                                                          
8 A New Zealand dairy company. 
9 A Chinese infant formula manufacturer. 
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3.4.1.2.1 Hierarchy 
A number of informants made comments about the hierarchical social order in China. For 
example, a New Zealand district mayor commented on the differences in hierarchy in New 
Zealand and China: 
We have a very intimate understanding and knowledge of everybody. We are quite closely 
connected in New Zealand. There is no real hierarchy. … There is a hierarchy, but it’s not 
nearly as profound as there is in the Party in the government in China, so we have a very 
easy level of interaction. Over there, sometimes it’s more difficult. … They struggle to 
understand the level, sometimes, of … I can ring the prime minister this afternoon, or I can 
walk up to the prime minister … over there you would never get … that close to the premier 
or president, even the mayors. … It’s very different. 
A New Zealand middle manager noticed the hierarchy through the social behaviours of the 
Chinese: 
Where I was, the government … wasn’t controlling, but was very central to society. I don’t 
think that people felt they were being controlled, or under pressure from that government. 
But you know when a government official walked into a room, because everyone would 
stand. There is a huge hierarchy. Then the provincial government might come in, and 
suddenly, the one that was the boss suddenly just changes completely. Now he is just one 
of us again. It’s really quite interesting. 
From a relatively junior position this New Zealand middle manager also noticed how he was 
treated differently by the Chinese hosts depending on whether his own superiors were present or 
not: 
I spent about a week visiting different places with David [pseudonym] and Mike 
[pseudonym], and I noticed that you get treated quite differently when you are in the 
group, with David and Mike. We’d get picked up at the airport, we’d be taken for lunch, 
everything was sort of planned out. We’d be taken for lunch, we’d be shown something 
else, then dinner. There would be lots of drinking … nothing was a problem, this was going 
to happen, and this was going to happen. … We organised for me to come back and spend 
some time there, and have a look around the farm, do some agronomy, show them some 
lucerne, everything … nothing was a problem. Then I came back on my own, and I spent two 
weeks in a hotel, waiting, to even hear from them. … I was a worker, absolutely … not as 
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important at all. I was on their time. It’s quite an eye opener. And everything is a problem. 
Roads were washed out. There wasn’t a driver available. People are too busy.  
Such differences in hierarchy present challenges for New Zealanders, particularly at the start of 
building business relationships, as the real leader tends to do less talking in China, compared to 
what tends to happen in New Zealand. As one New Zealand business consultant pointed out: 
There are times when New Zealanders’ inability to suss out the hierarchies, and who the 
true decision makers are, and New Zealanders who don’t know how much to defer to the 
rankings of the people in the room, and we all struggle with that. … My first job, and I often 
fail in this, if I’m faced with six people in the room, I am trying to figure out which one is the 
damn boss! I’ve had some glorious cock-ups, thinking that this was the boss, but actually [it] 
was the one three on his left, who didn’t say a word, because we read different cues.  
The boss, in a lot of Western businesses, is the one who makes the most noise. In China, 
and all through Asia, that’s seldom the case, because the boss has people whose job it is to 
make the noise.  
Another senior manager in a New Zealand owned horticultural company observed the same thing: 
They [New Zealand entrepreneurs] have got to understand, in a meeting, the person that’s 
doing the talking may not be, in fact, the head person, or the person that makes the 
decision. It could be somebody, and most likely, the person that doesn’t say anything. He is 
just sitting there … sitting very quietly, listening to it all through the interpretation, or they 
may actually know English, and they won’t reveal that to you. So you are sitting there, 
thinking you are doing the deal with that person, but in fact it’s this person over here … so 
you need to look at the way, when the social part comes around, that person that has been 
very quiet, whether they turn up or not. Sometimes that person won’t come to the 
function, because they don’t want to reveal where they sit within the hierarchy around that 
table, and you’ve just got to watch and see. Eventually you may find that in fact that person 
is really the person that you are doing the business with, and this [one] is only the 
mouthpiece.  
This challenge is equally present for New Zealanders when they host potential business partners 
on their visit to New Zealand, as one agricultural consultant commented: 
I guess it’s slightly frustrating … if you don’t understand the hierarchy in an organisation, 
that people … represent themselves as perhaps being really important, when you 
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understand the organisation, they may or may not be carrying as much weight and power 
as they would like to suggest they do. … Their titles may suggest that they might be 
influential people, and they may or may not be at the end of the day. [It] never has been an 
issue for me, but I have seen situations, just when you get [a] visiting Chinese delegation 
coming to New Zealand, and they are trying to encourage business or opportunities ... just 
how much clout that they actually really have. 
This hierarchy and the consequential deference that Chinese people tend to show to their 
superiors not only affect the stage of relationship building, but also present challenges in business 
operations, as one New Zealand CEO discovered: “I think probably the harsh rule of China is that 
it’s so difficult to change the hierarchical relationship. Often it is much more efficient to just change 
the people rather than to make the people change.”  
Associated with the hierarchical social order in China is the emphasis that Chinese people place 
on their social status. One New Zealand winery owner explained why some people pay exorbitant 
prices for a certain wine in China: “People buy wine for status and not much is consumed! That’s 
where a Bordeaux wine is so-called ‘investment’.” The desire to show off wealth and the 
associated social status also permeates through to normal citizens, particularly young people, as 
one New Zealand CEO observed: 
It is interesting that I see a young kid who is on 2,000 RMB a month walking on the street 
with … a Gucci handbag, and you look at it, and you think it must be a knock-off. It isn’t a 
knock-off. These kids are spending [a] 6-month salary in buying a real branded handbag 
from Hong Kong, which is duty free.  
3.4.1.2.2 Guanxi 
Guanxi, translated as ‘relationships’ or ‘connections’, was one of the focal points in many 
informants’ comments. It was regarded as fundamental to business activities in China by many 
informants. Its layered or ring structure and associated long-term and complex nature, its close 
connection with associated responsibilities, as well as the difficulty navigating through it were all 
among the observations of many informants. 
3.4.1.2.2.1 Fundamental to business activities 
Having the required relationships with various agencies is key to the functioning of a business. As 
one senior manager for the China market from a New Zealand-owned international company 
commented: 
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Everything is around relationships and identifying the linkages that you need to do 
business … so as a company, making sure that your structure is set up to have the right 
linkages … and to be very clear, I mean business relationships, not anything under the table, 
or anything like that. But you need to establish the right level of relationships. 
Another New Zealand CEO went further to explain that guanxi was needed in all aspects of a 
business, irrespective of the size of the business: 
I used to think that it’s just at big enterprises you need big guanxi. Actually, knowing lots of 
guys now that are in smaller enterprises, you still need guanxi. You just need it. That's 
because at the end of the day you still have to pay tax, you still have to be involved with the 
local officials to do things. So you want things to be easier, you want relationships. Guanxi is 
not just with the official side of the business, it's actually about other things, about sales, 
distribution and everything else. It's about those relationships and networks across the 
country that help you in your everyday work. 
Another New Zealand senior manager further explained that not only was guanxi important, but 
also the ability to build guanxi was necessary for businesses operating in China: 
A Kiwi company coming to China has to have had time to build some of those trusted 
network[s], if they want to get help. And I’ll say that it’s not guanxi that’s important, it’s the 
ability to build guanxi, because somebody who has a problem doesn’t necessarily have a 
friend who can help them. They have to be able to find the person who can help them, and 
building that relationship is more important than just saying, ‘Oh, I had dinner with the vice-
governor of Sichuan, or whatever, so I’ve got really good guanxi.’ Bullshit, you’ve got no 
guanxi at all. If you’ve gone along to a meal, and the vice-governor of Sichuan is there, he is 
not there because he loves you, he is there because he loves the person you are trying to do 
business with. And no matter how smiley his face is, if there is a problem, he is not on your 
side, he is on his trusted partner’s side. 
3.4.1.2.2.2 Circles of trust – rings of guanxi 
The nature of guanxi is complex, and is often best understood in terms of a layered or ring structure 
surrounding each individual, representing different degrees of trust. A New Zealand CEO gave his 
explanation of this layered structure and the challenges for New Zealand business due to the 
complexity involved: 
I think the biggest challenge is … understanding that the relationships in China are far more 
complex than they are in a Western society. In a Western society, basically what you see is 
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what you get, in general. In China, it’s not that. It’s actually a complex of a hierarchy 
between the respect and responsibility to family, and then to friends, and then to the 
company you might work for. They … appear to be a reasonably strict hierarchy, and then 
you look at family. Family, generally, would do whatever they can to assist family. And then 
the friends are normally voted into two chunks: friends that are long-term friends, school 
friends and social friends; and then friends that are colleagues at work, which is another 
sort of bracket. And responsibility and loyalty that [are] given to each of those at different 
levels is far more extreme and almost unwritten. It’s the concept of guanxi that is just flat 
out complex. As at least that might add a little bit of a challenge, which is actually for the 
manager, particularly the farm manager, you have to understand how those complex 
relationships work, not only within your own organisation, but also externally, and how they 
relate. 
Another New Zealand senior manager further elaborated on this layered or ring structure: 
You’ve got to understand … that within this whole hierarchy … there is sort of like a ring 
relationship. In the centre of it, it’s family. It is very, very important not to violate anything 
within that family. Next outside of it, the next ring out, there is your school mates, your 
classmates, then outside that it’s friends, then outside that it’s the jungle. And anything 
goes out in the jungle. It took me a while to work out that the relationship, the next tier out 
from the family, was in fact your classmates. If you’ve got a problem, and it can’t be solved 
within the family, then the classmates are the first port of call, and their network allows you 
then to maybe get to where you want to. If not, then it’s friends, and then outside of that … 
once you get out in the jungle, it can be anything, because there [are] no allegiances to you, 
you have no friendship either … Is he trying to take advantage of me? Why is he coming to 
see me? As opposed to say, ‘I am going to try and help, because he’s asked a perfectly 
sensible question.’ But there is always that suspicion. Why hasn’t he solved it within his 
immediate friends? Why? 
Another New Zealand business consultant described the circles of the trust relationships as being 
like an onion: 
If the person come[s] through your circle of trust, then you can trust them. You get almost 
sort of like automatic trust. And family, obviously is your first circle of trust, siblings, mother, 
father, cousins. Immediate family … this is the onion … here is the real story of guanxi. Your 
inner layer of the onion is the immediate family; and your second layer is broader family, 
that’s where you’ve got your second aunties and third cousins, whatever, there is still a high 
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degree of trust; then you have this really special layer, which is your classmates; then your 
work colleagues; it goes out until you get to the outside of the onion, and it’s the common 
person, and they are basically fair game. No trust there at all. If you’ve been introduced to 
somebody through your guanxi network, through your circle of trust somewhere along the 
line, then you can move the needle towards ‘This person is okay.’  
3.4.1.2.2.3 Guanxi and responsibilities 
The relationships that guanxi represents in China go beyond what Westerners understand as 
familiarity between people. Guanxi also entails responsibilities that are attached to the 
relationships. As one New Zealand CEO commented: 
It is difficult, and as a Westerner, not understanding the languages … to say that you have 
that same depth of responsibility to go with the relationship … it’s not just the relationship. 
It’s the responsibilities that go with that. That responsibility and that relationship [go] very 
deep, so that’s a fundamental difference between the cultures. 
The expectations of the responsibilities provide the basis for what one informant called “the 
indebted society”: 
I think … the core has always been, in their times of unsettlement, who can you really trust? 
It’s going to be your family, because … okay, there [are] always instances, and there is 
exception to the rule, that some family member let[s] you down. But generally, who else 
have you got to rely on? You are getting into dangerous situations. If there is anyone I can 
rely on, it’s going to be my family surely. Family is going to try and protect itself, because it 
wants to stay − longevity … that’s what it’s all about. And then of course seek your 
immediate friends that have protected you in a school situation, or university. They are 
going to be your colleagues. They depend on you as you depend on them. So it’s what I 
call … an indebted society, because you are always in debt to someone, because they have 
done something good for you, so now you feel you’ve got to do something good for them.  
He further explained the phenomenon of gift giving within the context of an indebted society: 
So this gift giving, and how payment has come about, I can see very clearly how that’s all 
come about. We don’t do it so much in our society. If somebody does a good deed for you, 
you remember it, but you don’t feel … ‘Oh, I must do something good for them.’ Often … 
when I first came here and was living in here, I never understood why we were forever 
buying gifts, and we were always trundling around to see people to give things. I wouldn’t 
have done that in New Zealand. I might have to take them out for dinner, and that would be 
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the end of the matter. My debt is paid out. But it’s that constant … and that gives the 
reinforcement that you are truly a friend, that you have done something, and something is 
done for you. So now they feel obliged … sometimes, out of the blue, maybe six or nine 
months later, you ring and say, ‘Look, I’ve got a little problem, can you help me?’ And I don’t 
think there is anything wrong with that, to be honest. 
Another New Zealand senior manager shared a similar understanding: 
I think … everything you read has got a description of what it means or doesn’t mean … It’s 
people helping others and doing favours for others, not with an expectation of any 
immediate repayment, but just in the expectation that it’s deepened your relationship for 
further on, so at some point in your future, there may be a time where they need your help 
back. I think a lot of things happen … that are part of that people doing favours, or helping 
you out in a certain way that wouldn’t normally happen in a New Zealand business 
environment, that are part of that concept of relationship at a slight[ly] different level, and 
[a] different expectation of how that gets paid back in time … which is a different concept to 
understand. 
3.4.1.2.2.4 Difficult to navigate through 
The complexity of the guanxi network present challenges for New Zealand entrepreneurs and 
businessmen, who are often not used to the ‘rules of the game’ in China. As one New Zealand senior 
manager pointed out: 
Everyone in China we went [to] seems to have their own strong government connections. It 
would be Customs, or quarantine. For us, it’s quite difficult to understand what sort of 
relationships those people, or companies, or partners may have. Are they very transparent, 
open relationships? Are they [such] that we should be having nothing to do with [them]?  
Another senior manager shared the same perception: 
There are different ways of things that are facilitated in China that are different from New 
Zealand here. Everywhere I’ve been, and everyone I’ve talked to … will tell you about how 
close their links are, with Customs or CIQ [China Inspection and Quarantine]. ‘I was at so-
and-so’s wedding’, so therefore they’ve got this implied status. We are always thinking, 
‘Gee. Does that mean that this person has genuine influence, and I risk pissing him off by 
not doing business? How much influence could pissing him off have on what we are trying 
to do?’ I found that quite hard to get around in terms of how much credibility you put in 
people’s relationships. We’ve had … messages passed back at formal meetings with 
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Customs officials, which we know that the message has been passed through from a 
commercial party, back through an official meeting, to try and give extra weighting to that 
particular business situation. So understanding how much what the official is saying is true 
official policy, and how much of it is because he is this company’s guy in the Customs is hard 
to work through.  
Without established networks, navigating complex and intertwined relationships can be very 
challenging for foreign businesses, as one New Zealand senior manager commented:  
For us [New Zealanders], we understand how relationships are important, but [in New 
Zealand] the relationships are much narrower in terms of the scope, where you’ve got the 
people across the way that you are doing business with, and you want to have a 
relationship … [or] you’ve had some peripheral organisations or entities or government that 
you might need to interface with. Whereas in China, it’s so much broader. Why is this 
relationship over here important when we are talking over here? And the energy and the 
time that goes into the relationships from their perspectives, is just ‘Hey, no. I cannot … I 
can’t do this until I’ve done that over here. I need to have dinner with this person over here 
with whom we can have this conversation.’ We get all that, we just … we can’t navigate our 
way through it, because we don’t have that network.  
3.4.1.2.2.5 Guanxi within an organisation 
The business relationships outside an organisation are complex and challenging for New Zealand 
agribusiness entrepreneurs, but one New Zealand CEO also commented on the complexity of the 
relationships among the staff members within his own horticultural company: 
When you get to a business situation … you learn very quickly, and it doesn’t take long, 
three or four months, you start to get a picture of different groups within the employee 
group, so it’s not a cohesive whole like a team. First of all, in the office, everybody is an 
individual, very much individuals. … And then within that, there are very, very strong 
connections, for one reason or another, between individuals of the organisation, and 
sometimes irrespective of the hierarchy. And those particular loyalty groups eat lunch 
together. They socialise sometimes together. And you very quickly know who is of which 
side of the camp. Quite often they’ll do three or four different groups, all eliminated 
through situational things within the company. … You have the old employees, and the old 
employee group might be voted into two chunks, one supporting the previous manager, 
and one supporting the new manager. Then you get another lot supporting nobody but 
themselves. … It’s a far more complex thing to do [to] be able to develop anything that 
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looks like that − constitutes as a team that we think about and we often suggest that occurs 
in a Western organisation. 
This complexity of relationships within an organisation presents challenges in human resource (HR) 
management. One Chinese HR director of a New Zealand-owned (and operated in China) company 
explained why she saw ‘towing the company line’ as easier with a foreign boss instead of a Chinese 
boss: “There are a lot of intertwined complex relationships in this. There [are] a lot of emotions, 
relationships, who can restrict whom, all that sort of things.”10  
She further explained the reason why she could implement a specific policy within her own 
company, and why it was easier with a foreign boss: 
It does not matter if he [the boss] is a foreigner or a Chinese. It is because he supports me 
[that I can do this]. I believe that if it was a Chinese boss, if he was determined, could handle 
the pressures and was willing to support, he could do it too. For him [her foreign boss] it 
would probably be easier. ‘I am a foreigner. I come from a different country.’ For a Chinese 
boss, it would probably not be this simple, because he was born and brought up here, he’s 
bound to have his relationship networks. The pressures that he receives would be 
inherently greater, compared to a foreigner, but of course it all depends on his 
determination. … You cannot be in a vacuum. … My communication with a foreigner can be 
smoother and more open, because I have no need to know the kind of thinking and the 
networks that he has, because our networks would not overlap. … Everyone’s circle [of 
relationships] is different. For a foreigner, you are very goal-oriented when coming to do 
business, or anything else. It’s just this one thing. Not like a Chinese boss, it is possible that 
other than this one thing, there are many other contacts, relationships, etc.11  
                                                          
10 Original Chinese quote: 这里面有很多错综复杂的人际关系啦。这里面有很多人情啦，关系啦，谁能
把谁制约上啦，这种东西挺多的。 
11 Original Chinese quote: 不管他是老外还是中国人，是因为他能支持我。我相信如果是中国的老板，
他有这种决心，他能扛的住，他愿意支持，他也能做到。对他来说可能做起来更简单。我是个老外
呀，我从国外来的呀。对一个中国老板来说可能没那么简单。因为他在这儿生，在这儿长，他肯定有
他的人际关系网。他的压力可能无形当中会比一个老外的压力要大一些。但是这个也看决心 ... 你不可
能真空 ... 我同意跟国外的人交流可能会比较顺畅，比较 open一些，因为可能我也不用知道你原来有
一个什么样的想法、思维呀、圈子呀什么的。因为我们的圈子不会交集 ... 大家各自的圈子不一样吧。
做为一个老外你过来，你的目的性很强的，过来做事业也好，做什么也好，那你就是你这样的一个事
情嘛；不像一个中国的老板，可能我除了这个事情之外，还有很多我的人脉呀，关系呀，什么什么
的。 
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3.4.1.2.2.6 Similarity to Māori practices 
One New Zealand entrepreneur, who identifies as Māori, talked about the similarity in the concept 
of guanxi in China compared to some Māori practices he is familiar with: 
I think Māori and Chinese have a very similar outlook. Relationships are very important. The 
concept of face is very, very important as well. Chinese and Māori are very similar in that 
you do a lot of talking, trying to form some connections. And they will do that through 
family or through some kind of common thread. You do a lot of talking, making sure that 
you are comfortable with each other. Just look at the Māori culture when you go into a 
marae in New Zealand. First thing you do is that you must be welcomed, so there is lot of 
kōrero, lots of talking backwards and forwards, paying respect to ancestors and everyone 
else, and recognis[ing] certain things. Once that has taken place, then you are welcomed 
into the homes, you are welcomed into the marae. And in there, there is lots more 
dialogue, lots more talking going on, but at which point you become like a local, like a 
family. For me, the experience in China has been no different. There is a great deal of 
discussion, a great deal of talking, and people wanting to become comfortable with you.  
3.4.1.2.3 Face 
3.4.1.2.3.1 The importance of face 
The concept of ‘face’ was identified as one of the important social institutions in China that bore 
much importance in business dealings. One New Zealand business consultant pointed out: 
Protecting a Chinese person’s face is really, really important, still. In particular, if you want 
to say something that could be perceived as critical, for goodness sake, don’t make a 
comment that would appear to criticise a senior in front of a junior. You will lose them 
completely. They just won’t talk to you again. If you insult them in front of their juniors, 
that’s the end of a relationship. 
One New Zealand senior manager shared his observation on the differences between New 
Zealanders and Chinese regarding the concept of face in business situations, and the challenges that 
brought with it: 
In China, there is a lot about losing face. In New Zealand, I don’t think that’s anywhere near 
like that. … People who you are dealing with, a group of Chinese, if there was a senior 
person, and you must always show the utmost respect and even if … the discussion is 
getting frustrating, because you are not making progress, you’ve got to go … at a speed 
which you are always showing respect. In New Zealand, if it is not making progress, and the 
person across the table from you is someone you are not really getting on with, you tell 
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them, and quite quickly, you probably are going [in] separate directions. And that wasn’t 
the way that I felt I could do business in China. … I found that quite challenging, because it 
was mentally hard to all the time being … ‘If I say something, will it cause the person across 
there, the senior person, to lose face?’ 
Another New Zealand senior manager explained the range of activities that are involved with the 
concept of face in business dealings: 
The obvious things are things like the way in which … the conversation runs, who has 
authority, the respect that you pay to people who obviously have authority, seating plans, 
all those sort of things. From a business point of view, just ensure that you are talking to the 
right people, either the decision makers, or the most authoritative people in the room, 
those sort of elements; all the way through to banquets, and the way in which you treat 
people in banquets, and the way the toasts are done, all those sort[s] of business. 
One New Zealand CEO pointed out that the face of the officials in China, in particular, needs to be 
looked after: 
Very important. I think it’s a classic difference between the Chinese system and New 
Zealand. In China ... for these guys [officials], they are appointed into positions, and when 
they support, and you succeed, that obviously reflects well on them, as officials, as 
governors, as mayors, whichever. And when you perform poorly, then likewise, that reflects 
on them.... There is this face issue. If we commit to something and we don’t do it, then it 
becomes a big loss of face, not just for our company, but for the officials that have 
organised that, and because that goes back to the whole issue again, land and agriculture 
are very sensitive areas. If you don’t do it … they’ve backed you, they’ve supported you, 
they’ve represented you to senior levels of government − if you don't achieve it all, if you 
don’t do it, then it looks poor. That’s not to say some things don’t work out, but it can work 
through a process that everyone can come out of there, in a situation where there isn’t that 
loss of face, and people can move on.... Whereas in New Zealand there is none of that.  
3.4.1.2.3.2 Reasons for the importance of face  
When being questioned about why face is so important to Chinese people, one Chinese senior 
manager explained: “It’s about bringing honours to the ancestors. In China, for a little boy, from [a] 
very young age he will be taught, ‘You must bring honour to your ancestors.’” 12 
                                                          
12 Original Chinese quote: 要光宗耀祖。在中国一个小男孩，从小就被教育‘你一定要光宗耀祖’。 
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A New Zealand senior manager gave a similar interpretation of why face is important for Chinese 
people: 
It’s a matter of honour. It’s like us being accused of something that you don’t want to be 
accused of, and we feel very uncomfortable, and you don’t forget. And it’s the same with 
them. In their case, they refer to it as ‘face’, and if it’s shown up in front of some of their 
colleagues, then they are looking like being belittled, and they’ve been humiliated, and it’s 
not comfortable for them … then it’s a revenge for him. And you may find that something 
happens in the future that you were hoping that you might have been successful, and it 
turns out it hasn’t, because there is backdoor activities going on, because you’ve humiliated 
him here. It will come back to you.  
3.4.1.2.3.3 Implications for agribusinesses 
The importance of the concept of face has its unique implications when it comes to agribusiness 
activities, such as banquets and social functions, where luxurious foods are often consumed for the 
sake of gaining face. One New Zealand entrepreneur explained the implications of eating expensive 
seafood in China: 
Seafood is a currency for guanxi at government dinners, and it’s also a hugely conspicuous 
way of consuming, and it’s a way of showing wealth. It’s a very rich reality that we are in 
right now. People want lobster, they want salmon, they want expensive seafood. It’s the 
same to a bunch of Auckland stock brokers going out to a steak house. It’s … conspicuous 
consumption … basically is what wealthy government delegations want to eat, and wealthy 
Chinese businessman want to impress their friends by having shark fin soup, or whatever it 
is. 
Similarly, products such as wine are consumed according to their perceived value, depending on the 
type of social function. One New Zealand senior manager shared his observation on this: 
The more traditional banquet type, they go for French [wine]. And if they can’t get French 
they go for Australian. … New Zealand is not really seen in that … space in a banquet 
situation. … It’s not known. … But funnily enough, you put people in a situation where there 
is no face involved, and say, ‘What do you like? Which one would you try?’, they actually 
really like New Zealand white wine. They rate [it] really, really highly. But that’s in a safe 
situation, where you don’t have to sort of appear to be drinking the right wines.  
A Chinese senior manager also pointed out the unique implications of selling luxurious products in 
Asia due to the importance of face to consumers: 
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Particularly in Asia, in Japan and in China, things are expensive if they are precious. In 
Europe, roughly things would stay … the same prices for 1 year, 2 years or 3 years. But if it is 
a very beautiful looking, very delicious and very special fruit, you can sell it for a sky-high 
price in Asia. You say that ‘This will cost 100 RMB to buy, and only I have it’, and you will be 
able to sell it. This would be impossible in Europe. In Europe it would be, ‘It’s just an apple.’ 
[In Asia,] no matter how expensive, some people will buy it. If you dare to sell it, then I dare 
to buy it. I just want it to look beautiful.13  
This view was affirmed by another Chinese senior manager: “[For] Chinese … they just care about 
the face. Whatever is the most expensive, I will buy it.”14  
3.4.1.2.4 Goals and responsibilities in life 
3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival 
Another aspect of the social institutions in China relates to people’s goals and responsibilities in life. 
The strongest message that came from the informants in this context was about the concept of 
survival. A New Zealand district mayor gave his explanation of why many Chinese appear to be 
driven: 
They have to succeed. Effectively, in China, there is no effective welfare system. You … 
work … if you want a house, you want food, [then] you have to. In New Zealand, we are 
complacent like that … so naturally Chinese people are more driven … trying to survive.  
A New Zealand CEO who was based in China shared a similar view in the context of the rapid 
development in China: 
It is very, very competitive. I think the survival side is very high. … It is because … China has 
come so far and so fast, and everybody is trying to get on the conveyor belt. … As a young 
person, you are not dead in the water, but you might as well be, because there is no social 
support in China. You don’t earn − you don’t eat. So, that social support in [the] Western 
world, you can be unemployed and have no work for [a] long period of time, and still eat; in 
China, it’s not the case. It’s a pretty harsh environment. … That obviously build[s] this 
huge … survival streak within the population to make sure that we will survive.  
                                                          
13 Original Chinese quote: 特别是在亚洲，在日本，在中国，是物以稀为贵。你在欧洲，基本上一年、
两年、三年都是那个价。但是如果你是一个非常漂亮，非常好吃、非常特别的水果，你在亚洲就可以
卖天价的。你说这个 100块，就只有我有，还真就卖出去了。但是在欧洲是不可能的。欧洲是‘不就
是个苹果吗？’ （在亚洲）多贵都有人买。只要你敢卖，我就敢买。我就要漂亮。 
14 Original Chinese quote: 中国人 … 他就是好面子么。哪个东西最贵我就买哪一个。 
73 
 
Another New Zealand senior manager explained it from the perspective of the longevity of a family: 
If you look at the way that education goes on here, grandparents spend a lot of time looking 
after, nurturing grandchildren, because that’s an asset for the family. They won’t benefit, 
maybe the parents won’t, but the children of the children being nurtured may, so they look 
at it over a number of generations. In their case, they don’t look for immediate 
gratification … they look for that investment, and survival, longevity … stuff. … Understand 
the core part: that family wants to survive. How they are going to survive? … The 
grandparents see that core is very, very important to protect, and that’s that survival, 
longevity thing.  
He further explained that a difference between the Western world and China involves the ‘survival 
of individuals’ versus the ‘survival of the family’ in the context of family members helping each other 
out in China more than they would in a European environment: 
That is something that we don’t do in a European environment. You basically say, ‘Okay, I’ve 
got a few close friends. But you look after yourself. I am not going to help you. Why should I 
help you? You’ve learned as many of the rules as I have, so get on with it. Don’t come 
moaning to me.’ And that’s being harsh, but that’s basically … we are more individualistic, 
and our survival really is survival of the individuals, as opposed to the survival of the family. 
Family is hell of an importance [in China], whereas [for] Europeans survival is [about] 
individuals. And it doesn’t matter whether the family is broken down, because you can 
survive out there, because you’ve got enough, you know enough of the rules to not feel that 
you are at sea. Whereas family members that [are] cast adrift here − very, very hard to do.  
A Chinese senior manager explained the pressure for survival in China that she perceived: “I think 
the pressure for survival is big. … Lots of people, therefore we have such a pressure. … Perhaps 
because we have lots of people, we have huge pressure to survive.”15  
From a business perspective, a Chinese senior manager gave her answers to the question of how far 
ahead an average Chinese company would think, in terms of profitability, before deciding on what 
business to venture into: 
Of course he would only look at making a profit within that year! … This is probably because 
we have too many people in China. … He’s got to survive. If my company only has expenses, 
                                                          
15 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得是生存压力大 … 人多，大家就有这种生存压力 … 可能因为我们人口
多，我们的生存压力大。 
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and no income, how do I feed my workers, where would that money come from? Not every 
company can get [a] mortgage from a bank, not every company can get the support from 
the Government. … Because here in China, many things are competed from different 
starting lines. … As [a] human, he’s got to survive first, before seeking development. … Of 
course he would think that the faster [that he can make money] the better.16  
If you don’t get going, others would have gone. For your enterprise, if you don’t get ahead, 
other enterprises will soon get past you, and you will be eliminated. … Of course it’s about 
survival, because China has too many people. I think the fundamental [cause] is that China 
has too many people.17  
This drive to survive, from a business investment and operational perspective, present challenges 
for foreign agribusinesses, whose business activities often involve long production and investment 
cycles. One New Zealand horticultural consultant pointed out: 
One of the big issues with horticulture or agriculture is trying to get people [to] think 
beyond a 2- or 3-year timeframe. I think that’s definitely a cultural thing. I find, as you know, 
in most agricultural projects, you’ve got to be thinking minimum 5- to 10-year timeframe. 
Really difficult to get people [to] think in those terms here. 
Food safety and intellectual property challenges are also prominent at the farm level, where the 
survival streak of the farmers is high, as one New Zealand senior manager pointed out: 
There is a real tension there. … The issue around food safety and sprays and those sort of 
things, and counterfeit, arguably, at the system farm level is rife, because those people are 
earning [a] very small amount of money. Anything they can do to add to their income, or 
stretch it further, they are going to do. At the basic level, people would be putting whatever 
they can on the fruit [such as sprays] to get more … production, or better size, or whatever. 
They are subsistence [farmers].  
                                                          
16 Original Chinese quote: 他肯定只看当年赚了嘛！… 因为这个可能也是因为中国人太多的原因吧 … 他
要生存呀。我的公司只有付出去的，没有得到的，我怎么养活我的工人，那个钱从哪里来呢？你不是
每个企业都能从银行贷到款，每个企业都能得到政府的支持 … 因为中国这个 … 很多东西都在不公平的
这个起跑线上来竞争 … 人他总要是首先要生存，他才能寻求发展 … 他肯定就觉得是 [赚钱] 越快越好
嘛。 
17 Original Chinese quote: 你不走的话，人家别人就走掉了呀。你这个企业，如果你不前进，人家其它
的企业马上就超过你了，你就被淘汰了么 … 肯定是生存嘛，因为中国人太多了。我觉得最根本的还是
中国人太多了。 
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3.4.1.2.4.2 Family responsibilities 
As indicated in several other sections, for many Chinese the survival of the family is an important 
goal. Family members look out for each other. In particular, the younger generation are expected to 
look after the older generation, as one New Zealand senior manager observed: 
China is not just the only one that respect their parents, and they’ll look after them. But 
there is a huge sense of direct responsibility to make sure that they house and feed them, 
which is not sort of the case in other communities. 
A Chinese senior manager expressed her sympathy to people in their 40s and 50s in China, due to 
their family responsibilities:  
What’s the greatest characteristic of the Chinese? Not only [do] you need to look after the 
old, you’ve also got to look after the young, and the grandchildren. If your children have 
nothing to eat and come to your place, do you not give them food? Nowadays in China, for 
those who are in their 40s and 50s, it is very, very difficult.18  
3.4.1.2.4.3 Social responsibilities 
Beyond family responsibilities, Chinese also bear social responsibilities that are linked to various 
relationships, which, as one New Zealand CEO pointed out, go deeper than in New Zealand:  
We don’t really have that depth of responsibility.... We may have a relationship, we may 
have a commercial relationship. But … for instance, if you were absolutely in trouble, as 
people do get into trouble, you just sink or swim in your own right. ‘Well, hard luck, mate.’ 
And you will be getting on with the day. But in China, if you got in the shit, somebody would 
be there, somehow, with a red envelope to assist you, or suddenly a million dollars turn[s] 
up in a brown paper bag, and [a note says], ‘Don’t worry about it, just give it back to me 
when you are ready.’ Literally, the whole family’s savings are put on the line if necessary, 
literally, whole family savings, and I’ve seen it happen, and that will go into getting 
somebody out of a sticky position, and with no wanting … at all, and I am talking about a 
couple of million US, just given on total and utter trust. It will never happen in your Western 
concept. 
When questioned on whether such confidence in the repayment of the money was due to the belief 
that social networks will impose enough pressure to enforce the return of the loan, this CEO agreed, 
                                                          
18 Original Chinese quote: 中国人还有一个最大的特点是什么呢？不光要管老的，还要管小的，还要管
到孙子辈的。你说你子女没有饭吃了，来你着，你给不给她吃啊？… 现在中国特别是四、五十岁的这
一带人，是非常非常困难的。 
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but emphasised that it was “the social responsibility that weighed [on] the shoulders for honouring 
that contract [rather] than  any punitive thing that you may do. It’s just that social responsibility is 
absolutely enormous.” 
3.4.1.2.4.4 Similarities between Chinese and New Zealanders 
Apart from the differences mentioned above, Chinese and New Zealanders do share some 
similarities in terms of what they value in life. A New Zealand district mayor commented: 
I think China has been remote from the world until the last 20-odd years, particularly for 
New Zealand, and our access to it … we sort of quite hadn’t understood Chinese people. But 
actually, when you get to know them, they are just like any other people. They’ve just got a 
different language. They may have different beliefs, and certain things are slightly different 
about what they believe and what they value in, but they want to be happy, they want to 
laugh, they want to smile, they want to have a clean environment, they want to be 
successful in the world.  
3.4.2 Social behaviours 
3.4.2.1 China and Chinese-centric 
“When in Rome, do as the Romans do”. This was identified by many informants as how the ‘rules of 
the game’ are played in China regarding business practices. One New Zealand business consultant 
commented: 
China is just a big game. It’s a game. You come to China, you play by their rules. To sum up 
China is that the Chinese look after Chinese. That’s the basis. Any investment, any products, 
anything, they look after China. If you can understand that, and it’s all about money, then 
you build from there. 
Another New Zealand CEO pointed out the importance of understanding the rules of the game in 
China: 
Chinese have thousands of years of doing things the way they do [them].… There are 
obvious differences that you have to understand. That’s reflected in everything you do 
here.… You have to understand it, you have to appreciate it, and respect it for what it is. It’s 
a challenge that you have to come to grips with very quickly.... You must understand … [that 
it is] really important to understand the way they do business. 
A New Zealand senior manager talked about his experience of realising that things had to be done 
on Chinese terms: 
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I think the first year [after I moved to China] was the toughest, because it took some getting 
used to. You had to change. Even though I had been up here a lot of time[s], I had certain 
expectations, thought that the way things should be done, could be done, and it wasn't the 
case, so you actually just have to get used to it. You’ve got to do it on Chinese terms. It’s [as] 
simple as that. There are some lines that you have to draw, but at the end of the day, if you 
don’t find the way to move with the Chinese and work under their requirements, their 
system, and their way of doing things, you will be just hitting your head against the brick 
wall.… It’s generally taken by the statement that, ‘That's not the Chinese way’, or ‘China is 
different.’ At the end of the day, when you get through all your argument, and you get to 
hear the statement, when it gets to that point, you know you’ve lost. 
This China/Chinese-centricity is not only reflected in the ways that business is done, or the rules of 
the game in business, but also in wider social behaviours, whereby it is perceived that allegiance can 
only be pledged to either China, or somewhere else, but not both. A New Zealand CEO told the story 
of a former Chinese staff member of one of his acquaintances: 
I have had a lot of feedback from New Zealanders who have worked up there [in China] for 
extended periods of time, saying that if you get a group of the Chinese people who … 
become trustworthy, they are the best in the world. They are almost to the extent of stop 
being trusted by other Chinese. In fact, a person from the dairy board told me that he was 
up there for 5 or 6 years, and he had a woman working for him, who became almost his 2IC 
[second-in-charge], and she was brilliant, absolutely brilliant, everything about her. She was 
great at work, and she did everything very, very well, in terms of him selling dairy products 
in China. This is quite a few years ago. Then he was recalled to New Zealand, and she 
contacted him after a couple of months, almost in tears, saying that her life is now a misery, 
because the Chinese people wouldn’t trust her. They had to deal with her beforehand, 
because he was there. Now she’s been left because he was recommending that she was so 
good to deal with the local people. And now they wouldn’t deal with her because they say 
that ‘You are over there with these guys now. You are not one of us’ type of thing, and he 
found her a job in Auckland. In the end her and her husband came out here, because she 
was so unhappy.… When he described it, that word ‘traitor’ wasn’t used, but that’s 
almost.… ‘You are Chinese, but you are working for these New Zealanders. If you want to be 
a New Zealander, you be a New Zealander.’  
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3.4.2.2 Rely on the collective and stay unnoticed 
A New Zealand business consultant shared his observations of the Chinese reliance on the collective 
from a survival perspective: 
There are a number of features of Chinese culture that will drive their superiority: obsession 
with education, the ability to sort and sift people … [put] the right people in the right 
positions, the right talent then to be applied to the right things, the unwillingness to invest 
heavily in welfare, preferring instead to almost force people to stand on their own feet or 
fail, which we would think it’s just cold blooded, anti-social and horrible, but they can do 
that, while trusting that the collective will take care of the also-rans in life. Every society has 
its also-rans, and China has different ways to look after them … modest amount of welfare, 
but very modest. And then the collective has to look after the people that belong to it. 
This reliance on the collective, when manifested in a business situation, shows that there is a 
tendency in many Chinese, particularly as employees, not to make decisions or take the initiative for 
fear of failing. This brings challenges in business management, as one New Zealand CEO noted: 
There are some fundamental barriers.... A lot of those are that the way that people think, 
the way they’ve been taught … until such time where the education teaches them to think 
and make decisions, because there [is] still a huge focus on communal decisions, and 
individuals not being willing to make decisions from fear that they may fail, and therefore 
be singled out as an individual that made that wrong decision.… So the group won’t get 
around individuals and say, ‘Look, we’ll give this a crack, and we will share this success or 
failure. But what the hell. Let’s have a crack anyway.’ In China, you won’t get that, that 
almost everything gets pushed upstairs, and quite often the only person who seem[s] to 
make decisions is the president of the company, therefore there is huge inefficiency.… In my 
crew, I’ve developed a bunch of young people who can think for themselves.… But I think … 
there still is this hang-over about individual thought, and nobody really wants to take 
responsibilities to make decisions. It does impair productivity, and it does impair innovation. 
3.4.2.3 Social masks 
Linked to the notion of relying on the collective and staying unnoticed is the impression of Chinese 
people wearing ‘social masks’, as observed by many informants. This is particularly noticeable 
among officials, as one New Zealand CEO commented: 
The bureaucrats are … just so bureaucratic, and they hold the block, they hold the stamp. 
They only become very, very close to you once you can have a few drinks with him … to 
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actually get them [to] take off the mask. The way they do that is to get … blind drunk, so 
that they can then laugh and say stupid things, and they use alcohol as the excuse for doing 
that. When you can get that close, that creates the opportunity to develop a different type 
of relationship, rather than just be the bureaucrat to the needy guy, who go[es] along and 
wants to talk about land aggregation or other issues.… I think … that in general … they don’t 
want to be seen [to be] different, so everybody is very similar in their behaviour and their 
responses.… So they don’t really want to take off the mask. They want to make sure that 
they keep their guard up.  
Coupled with the social mask is the double meaning during communication that some informants 
find hard to manage. One New Zealand senior manager expressed his frustrations: 
I think it is … the double meaning.… There is this frustration that sometimes someone will 
tell you something that is black, when it is patently white, and you can’t sort of say, ‘Hold on 
a minute.’ You’ve got to work within that theatre, the whole act, in terms of here is 
somebody who we have to show respect to. They are telling us something which we know is 
obviously not true, or if it is, we want to dispute it, however, we are going to have to work 
our way around this. I guess that’s dealing with authorities as much as anything.… We go 
and meet with [a] government official in Wellington. They will tell you something, and you 
know that’s probably pretty accurate, and if it’s not, you can very much challenge it. Here 
[China], it’s just you are not too sure about either of those things. How true it may be, or is 
there any scope to question it further.  
One step further on from this double meaning is the challenge of dealing with people with 
unfriendly hidden agendas in business: the ‘knife hidden behind the smiley face’. One New Zealand 
senior manager described how he identified a genuine person from one with alternative motives: 
Almost it’s as if they are too friendly, so almost the more friendly they are, the less I trust 
them. You know, one of the 36 strategies, ‘knife hidden behind a smiling face’. So when I 
see the smiling face, I am always looking for the knife … and almost the more friendly the 
person is, the more I distrust them, because the people that I found you can work with tend 
to be … actually more honest. 
Another New Zealand senior manager shared his fear about being “shafted”: “At the end of the day, 
it’s just this inherent kind of disquiet that you are going to get shafted somewhere along the line, 
because it’s everybody’s obligation to shaft you.”  
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3.4.2.4 Conflict avoidance 
Chinese people avoid conflict in their communications, as one New Zealand senior manager noted: 
“The language is all about conflict avoidance, so the body language and the oral language [are] 
about avoiding that conflict.” He clarified further: 
It’s a history of China. China has been in conflict … this is the most settled time China has 
had for a millennium, basically.… Like all people, people want peace and settlement, so they 
don’t want to start up [conflicts], making things unpleasant, because nobody wants to have 
unpleasantness in their life, so the language and the body language particularly has been 
developed to try and avoid that.… I have seen it on the streets … things can flash very 
quickly. But it would have flashed even quicker if you [had] been in a European situation, 
whereas here it takes a wee while to develop. But when it does develop, stand back and 
move off quickly, because it can get really heated when things have reached that critical 
clash point. It doesn’t happen often in negotiation of course, but be in a street situation, 
then something has happened.  
The difference in the level of conflict avoidance between business negotiation and a street situation 
is a reflection of the layered relationship, as discussed in 3.4.1.2.2.2 Circles of trust – rings of guanxi. 
The counterpart in a business negotiation has the potential to become someone within the circles of 
trust, someone to develop a closer relationship with, whereas a person met in a street situation 
would be regarded as ‘out in the jungle’. 
3.4.2.5 Hospitality 
The custom of hospitality was described as part of the “Chinese way”, as one New Zealand senior 
manager commented: 
This is the Chinese way. When you have visitors, you are hospitable ... and you are positive 
in front of everyone. But you [New Zealanders] have got to be able to see beyond that. 
What does it really mean? That’s not the Chinese being devious, or trying to mislead you. 
It’s just the Chinese way. That’s the way they do it. 
A New Zealand district mayor said that he always found Chinese hospitality “amazing”: 
I’ve always found them very hospitable, look after me amazingly well. They take time out of 
their schedule, their family often come … to say hello. I am very grateful for the way that 
I’ve been looked after when I have been over there. Sometimes I don’t think we do quite 
enough when they come over here, but they think it’s okay.  
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Another New Zealand CEO spoke of the challenge physically, often during a pre-arranged visit to 
China for a limited number of days, as well as the experience of offending some Chinese hosts if 
their hospitality is denied: 
I’ve got to say, I put on about a stone while I was away. I don’t know if you call that a 
challenge or not.… The reality is that the Chinese thing … you sit down, and you talk, and 
you have a cup of green tea, and you go through that process, you do business, and you go 
and have a meal. Sometimes after having about the third banquet in the day … of course, 
for them, you are the only really important contact to have for that day, but for you, it’s the 
second or third one, and you’ve got it again tomorrow and the next day. So there is no 
doubt … just physically, that’s pretty draining. If you’ve got to go up there.  
The Chinese by nature are very generous. If we went for a meal, we never paid, and they 
were insulted if you attempt to pay. They went out of their way to pick you up at the 
airport. They organised the hotels. A couple of them paid for the hotels, and we didn’t know 
that until we were about to leave.… A few of them went to the effort of taking us to some 
touristy type of things, and definitely to their offices and things, and that’s a lot more open 
than you would get than [in] a lot of the European countries. 
One customer we went to … and we said, ‘Look, we’ve got to meet a guy at 1.00pm’, and it 
was moving on pretty close to there. And they said, ‘No, no. We are going for lunch.’ And 
we said, ‘Look, thank you very much! We very much appreciate it. But we just can’t fit it in 
this time.’ And they were really offended. 
Despite the hospitality that Chinese people show, it should not be misinterpreted as trust, as one 
New Zealand senior manager pointed out: 
The main thing is the relationship. It’s the number one.... This is about both people learning 
to trust one another, and that takes a long time. It’s not simply going to a banquet and 
saying, ‘Oh, yeah. They agreed with me, and they are going to do this, and they are going to 
do that for me.’ No, no, no. They do that to please you, because you will be hosted by them, 
so they are there to please.… Hospitality doesn’t mean to say that you are now a business 
partner. No way.  
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3.5 Business Environment 
Encompassed by both the economic environment and the social environment is the business 
environment, within which New Zealand agribusinesses operate. The importance of 
understanding the business environment was explained by a New Zealand CEO: 
Obviously … understanding the business environment is very important, particularly in our 
sector, more so than some others probably ... because it’s land, it’s agriculture, and it’s the 
number one priority for the central government, so it’s very important.... You are in the 
highlight, you are in the spotlight, so it’s important that you understand what that all 
means. And it means a lot. 
This section of the thesis will explain this environment from the perspectives of the overall 
business environment, business practices and behaviours, the agribusiness environment, as well 
as the challenges for New Zealand agribusinesses.  
3.5.1 Overall business environment 
“Everyone says there is 1.4 billon people here, the potential is huge.… But China is one of the 
most difficult places to do business with”, an Australian senior manager commented. Indeed, the 
size of the potential market is correlated with the difficulty of operating in such a market. A New 
Zealand business consultant also commented, “People go, ‘Oh, the numbers are big, so it must be 
easy.’ It’s the hardest place to do business.”  
Informants described the difficulties in operating in the Chinese market from the following three 
perspectives: competitiveness, diversity, and an evolving environment.  
3.5.1.1 Competitiveness 
“China is a very competitive place. It is an incredibly competitive market”, a New Zealand CEO 
commented. Another New Zealand senior manager used a few examples to describe the 
competitiveness of the Chinese market: 
When I first went there, there were literally no bars.… What we would call a bar, Western 
type of bar … so all the foreigners would go and drink in a bar in a five star hotel. Then a 
British lady and her local husband opened a place … and it was a proper Western bar. It was 
packed from the day they opened. It was utterly packed. There were queues of people 
trying to get into this bar … thousands and thousands of people. Within 6 months from 
them opening that bar, there were 300 bars in Chengdu. 
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Same thing, a friend of mine opened the very first coffee house in Chengdu. Within 6 
months from him opening the coffee house, there were coffee houses on every single 
corner. To this day, the coffee culture is now inbred in the society.… So if you come in with 
some idea … you have about a year to prove that your idea is successful, and then you will 
have a hundred competitors. 
Supporting this competitiveness is the savviness in the way Chinese people do business that 
informants observed. One New Zealand CEO used the term “hard businessmen” to describe Chinese 
business people: 
They are hard businessmen. You know where you stand, and you’ve got to do a deal. 
Sometimes it’s challenging to be able to get into the level that you need and do the deal. I 
think that’s quite a positive thing, that they are genuine businessmen. 
Another New Zealand CEO described Chinese people’s savviness in exploiting some foreign 
investors’ time pressure, and their superior ability to do business and understand trading compared 
to New Zealanders: 
I think for New Zealanders coming over here … they are under time pressure.... I think the 
culture here is quite good at exploiting that time pressure.... You know, they are savvy. I 
think there is an expectation from the Chinese side − and I wouldn’t call that a nasty thing, 
it’s just business − that if there is a bit of a weakness there, just exploit it. Just drive in hard. I 
think it’s just negotiating the best position.  
They do business with everybody. We forget that sometimes. I watch them deal with 
Indians and Africans. They don’t have a problem with it. I would say Anglo-Saxons would 
have more problems sometimes. Chinese business people that I deal with, they’ve got no 
trouble … dealing with any colour or race, or whatever, if it’s business.… Our culture is 
probably colonial, English colonial culture, where we were set up to produce for the Empire. 
We weren’t set up to be international traders.… That’s a culture that China also has. This 
trading ... trading [with] anyone and everywhere.… They understand business, understand 
trading, and understand relationships that are going to nurture wealth for everybody. I 
don’t think that we understand relationships that are going to nurture wealth. 
This competitiveness is also reflected in relationship building, as the same New Zealand senior 
manager commented: 
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You have got to get right inside … where you are on a proper friendship basis. And it’s really 
complex, because you might have the relationship with party Mr X, but around him would 
be all the people that also want to get his attention, and they will be working to undermine 
your relationship with him, because you are preventing them making money out of him, 
because they’ve got their own favourite project. 
3.5.1.2 Diversity 
The diversity of the Chinese market is due to the size of the geographical area covered as well as the 
size of the population. One New Zealand senior manager pointed out: 
Almost like the first principle of dealing with China … is that, don’t deal with China, in terms 
of, China is too big. China is like Europe and the United States all combined. It is a unified 
country, but it’s not a unified market. It’s a fast market, and it has so many local 
peculiarities.... Therefore, specifically in terms of New Zealand, dealing with China … New 
Zealand is too small to deal with China. New Zealand should be dealing with individual areas 
in China. That separation might be vertical market sector, or geographical location. But 
don’t try and bite off the whole of China. 
He also emphasised that Shanghai is not representative of China:  
Kiwi companies like to go to Shanghai, because it’s a modern city, lots of people speak 
English. Go down to Xintiandi, or the Bund at night, 150 bars that you can feel comfortable 
in. You can go and talk to people in your own language, and you think that you are in China, 
but you are not. 
Not only are there geographical and demographic differences; informants noticed a variety of styles 
within business operations, as one New Zealand senior manager explained: 
We’ve seen quite a diverse range of companies, from the very old traditional way of doing 
things, so no records, no tax, no paper work … business is done in [a] much less formal 
manner. The level of sophistication with the people that we are meeting is very different as 
well, very little English, the drinking culture is probably more important at that end of the 
spectrum. Through to what we would term ‘modern businesses’. So, administratively, much 
more correct, looking at being more transparent in terms of how they are doing things, 
better English, better standard of … interface.  
Then there is a real future style of business as well. We’ve had excellent English from our 
perspective, probably had a Western experience or education; using business models which 
are much more complex, online, internet-based business, different channels of distribution 
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and what have you, and they do business in a different way. Everyone seems to, across the 
board, have a good relationship, the relationship that makes the business work that we 
don’t get.  
Diversity can also be seen from the ownership structure perspective, as this senior manager further 
explained: “Also state-owned versus … commercially owned Western shareholding, or Chinese 
shareholding, or state shareholding … the joint ventures with American or European companies. 
They are all a little bit different.”  
Another New Zealand senior manager from the same company elaborated further:  
 [Lenovo Legend Holdings] has grown out of the Hong Kong environment, so almost less 
Chinese than most of the other Chinese companies, and how they operate. Whereas 
COFCO19 is [a] state-owned Chinese trader, similar size, quite different people to deal 
with … quite different philosophy in how they approach things.  
This senior manager also observed the diversity of business, particularly from the business culture 
and demographic perspectives: 
It’s the diversity that exists within the business culture in China … that we are not used to. 
Arguably, business ... in New Zealand or Europe, or other place[s], the maturity of that 
business, the level of understanding and uniformity within it … just doesn’t exist in China.… 
From the demographics, the income … China is the most first-world country in certain areas. 
Two doors down, it’s the most third-world country.... There is such a diverse way.… From 
the online guys through to the wet markets, and the wholesale, all that sort of stuff. That’s 
very, very different business models. 
3.5.1.3 An evolving environment 
The diversified Chinese market and business environment is not static. In fact, it is ever-changing. 
One New Zealand winery owner commented that “You are never exactly sure why things happen or 
why things change.” Nevertheless, some informants did give their versions of an explanation for the 
ever-changing nature of the Chinese market and business environment.  
Over the years education systems evolve, particularly with more Western influence in recent 
decades. These different educational backgrounds influence different behaviours in businesses. A 
                                                          
19 China National Cereals, Oils and Foodstuffs Corporation. 
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New Zealand CEO spoke of the business partners he had encountered who came from the “old 
China” and the “new China”: 
If I could categorise the ... partners, they fall into two groups, the old China, or the new 
China.... The management teams in the old China group are dominated by more elderly 
Chinese, guys in their 50s and 60s. They don’t speak English. They, in most cases, are only 
educated in China. Their business practices are based more in guanxi than on sound 
financial analysis. Their decision-making processes are not democratic; they are autocratic. 
They don’t practice good governance.… You could say that they don’t practice good 
management. So that’s the old China. 
The new China is … companies that have management where they all speak English, or they 
are multi-lingual. They are, in many cases, educated offshore. They understand the 
principles of good governance and management, and can be as sophisticated as companies 
from USA and Europe. So that’s the new China.  
Apart from the changing education, another catalyst for change in China is social media. People now 
use smart phones to share information widely through social media platforms, providing 
transparency, which puts pressure on unethical business practices, particularly those that are 
related to food safety issues. As one New Zealand business consultant pointed out: 
I think one of the key things that’s happening in China is transparency. Social media is 
changing China. When I arrived in 2007 … China was totally different. Because of these 
things here [smart phones] with cameras, people are starting to open up. China is opening 
up … and that’s going to change everything, because what Chinese consumers are worried 
about now is they want safe products, so what [some people have] … been doing in the last 
several years, is going to have to change.  
Chinese farmers, some of them grow product, which they know is not good for you, 
dangerous, but they still sell [it]. Most parts of the world, most of the farmers will go, ‘Hold 
on, that’s not right … that’s not fit for human consumption. We have to get rid of that.’ The 
Chinese mentality is that, ‘We will just sell it, so it’s someone else’s problem.’ So 
transparency through social media is opening up all these issues, which is good.  
He further explained: 
If you look at Weibo, which is like Facebook and Twitter combined. It’s a great platform. It’s 
an open platform. You communicate, and you engage, and you listen. Social media is not 
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like the old media, where you push everything out. Social media is where you listen and you 
absorb, and you find out how people are using stuff, and you search, and you engage and 
you listen to people. So what it’s doing is it’s given you the ability to talk to the consumers, 
and you can sit anywhere in the world. It’s also given you an insight to what they are talking 
about. What are they posting about New Zealand wine? How are they talking about it? If 
they are talking about it at all. 
3.5.1.4 Foreign companies’ advantages 
Apart from the above three aspects, some informants also observed some welcoming features in 
relation to foreign companies operating in China. For example, in relatively less developed areas, 
where farming is still primarily for subsistence, foreign investment is welcomed. One New Zealand 
middle manager described the biggest surprise he encountered at a rural area in northern China: 
Probably just how friendly the people were, I think, and just how welcoming they were for a 
foreigner. For the local farmers, the thought of a foreign company coming in to their town 
to build a dairy farm was just amazing for them. All they could do was to see opportunities 
and jobs.… Whereas if it was the same thing happen[ing] in New Zealand, there is a 
completely different reaction. They were more into this sort of foreign capital, and things 
coming into their town. I was always asked, when the dairy farm would be built, how many 
more foreigners would be coming in to the town, how many jobs was that going to create, 
how many cows.… They were very keen. 
There is also kudos in working for foreign companies because of the language (primarily English) 
and new ways of thinking that people can learn. However, this may only be a temporary 
phenomenon until China becomes the leader on the world market, as one New Zealand CEO 
described: 
Working for a foreign company is really interesting, because they get the opportunity to 
speak English, they get an opportunity to learn different ways, so there is a bit of kudos at 
the moment. It won’t be lasting very long, because China is becoming international so 
quickly, that almost all China companies, majors, there will be an international domain 
within the next 20 years, so that sort of kudos will drop off at that [time]. 
3.5.2 Business practices and behaviours 
Certain characteristics of the business practices and behaviours of Chinese people have been 
identified by some of the informants. These characteristics are reflected in three aspects of 
business practices and behaviours: communication, negotiation, and execution. This section of 
88 
 
the thesis is dedicated to describing these characteristics, as seen through the eyes of the 
informants. 
3.5.2.1 Communication 
Some informants noted that communication with Chinese business partners is not always 
straightforward. One New Zealand middle manager described his experience with the local 
government in a county in northern China regarding the likelihood of flooding in a particular 
region: 
When I first turned up, I asked the government, would we have a problem with flooding. 
The reply you always get is ‘Mei shi’, ‘No worries.’ I heard that a lot. I sometimes felt that 
you never sort of get a negative answer. If they didn’t know the exact answer, you’d either 
get ‘No worries’, or ‘It will be okay.’ I never got told that I was going to have a problem with 
anything, until it happened. When I asked, ‘Is it going to flood this year?’ They probably 
thought, ‘We have no idea. Some years it does. Some years it doesn’t. So we’ll just say, “No, 
you’ll be okay”.’ Whereas if I asked how many years out of 10 would this flood, I might have 
got a more straightforward answer. I sort of had to change the way I ask questions …. It 
made a small difference. 
A New Zealand senior manager described the strategy they employed in communicating with 
Chinese people in order to understand the subtleties of the unsaid words: 
We’ve used consultants who I guess we have a lot of confidence in, because they are 
helping us to understand not only what was said, but what wasn’t said, so that’s their job. 
We have them on board, so we have confidence [in] … what they are saying. They 
understand the subtleties. And also in our own team, we have people who understand the 
business relatively deeply. Fair to say, we think we have quite a bit of trust in their ability to 
also read the situation, because after the meeting, they sort of said, ‘Well. This is what was 
said. But this is what was meant.’ Again just building up that track record of knowing how 
things operate, and getting the feedback, and being able to discuss things at a face value, 
but also the innuendo, in terms of what was potentially being said, but was unsaid.  
A New Zealand agricultural consultant talked in particular about the ineffectiveness of 
communicating with Chinese people via email. By contrast, face-to-face communication was far 
more efficient: 
One frustration that I can think of is that when you are trying to communicate with people 
in China … organisations, in New Zealand, I might just flick an email to someone that I had 
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worked casually with once a month, someone in the US, and say that this is what I’ve been 
doing. If you do that to someone in China, normally they wouldn’t respond to that. They 
would only respond when there is a need to respond to something specific, so even people 
that I know really well, that sort of chit-chat email type of thing doesn’t work.  
And if you are trying to get some information that … when we were trying to set up a 
memorandum of understanding … a few years ago, we sent them [the Chinese counterpart] 
a draft, and they just kept stonewalling us, and they wouldn’t respond. I had Jane 
[pseudonym] at Trade New Zealand ring and talk to them, and they said, ‘Ah, yeah, we will 
deal with it.’ So after about 2 years, I organised a trip to go and see them. It all fell into place 
very quickly. But it just turned out that there were some paragraphs in the memorandum of 
understanding that they didn’t understand, were a little concerned about the implications, 
but instead of asking us ‘What does this mean?’ and do things like that, it all became ‘This is 
too hard.’ Yet when we went and saw them, everything fell into place in 2 days. And we 
developed a new understanding in that relationship.  
3.5.2.2 Negotiation 
Business negotiation takes place in China in different ways, as one New Zealand senior manager 
pointed out: 
They approach business relationships and negotiation differently. I guess that the multiple 
dimension is … the amount of time it takes to agree or settle on something. The venue for 
discussion is either at a dining table, or around a tea table. And I suppose, post agreement, 
it’s when things can change as well … that seems to be the common thing. It’s like the 
contract is kind of like a starting point, and then future negotiations, generally all based 
around price … so as long as you know that, you start with your price high, and you come 
back to where you want to be, then everybody is happy.  
As reflected in the above comment, there are two distinct features of business negotiation in 
China, as observed by a number of informants: the different emphasis put on contracts compared 
to the Western environment, and the drinking test involved in the process of negotiation. 
3.5.2.2.1 Contracts are considered differently 
A defining difference between Chinese and Western business practices, as observed by many 
informants, is how contracts are regarded in the business context. Whereas in the Western world 
contracts are often regarded as definitive – something to be strictly followed, in China, they tend 
to be treated as discussion documents, with their priority sitting somewhere below the actual 
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relationships between the parties. One New Zealand agricultural consultant shared this 
observation: 
I think there is a tendency for Chinese to see legal agreements as discussion documents. I’ve 
seen a number of cases where a New Zealand company has signed with a Chinese company 
a legal agreement about doing business, then the Chinese side coming back, and wanting to 
renegotiate items. So clearly their interpretation of the legal document [is different from] … 
the New Zealand side’s interpretation, where ‘this is the legal agreement’.  
When asked if he saw a contract as an important part of a business deal, a New Zealand business 
consultant answered: 
Nah. Not at all.… It’s a basis.… [A] contract is sort of ‘Where we are going’. But how are we 
going to do it? If you and I have an agreement to do some business here, but we don’t get 
on, how are we going to do business? I don’t trust you and you don’t trust me. How are we 
going to do business? Contract, yeah, it’s important. In the rule of law, it’s becoming more 
and more important, so you’ve got to get it right. But it’s a bit of paper. The reality is that 
you and I have got to get on to do business. If we don’t get on, and we are a joint venture, 
or whatever it is, the contract is over here. You can bring the lawyers in. Well that just costs 
money. It’s between you and I.… It’s sitting down and having a yarn, enjoying each other’s 
company, because we want to partner with you.  
An Australian senior manager indicated that he believed contracts with the growers only add one 
more layer to the relationship, have no impact on growers’ commitment to supply, and therefore 
are not necessary to have: 
In Australia, the company that I was supplying has contracts with Australian growers. But I 
didn’t believe there was any need for it here … because it worked without it, so why should 
you complicate it, and put a … division between the two … and quite frankly, the contracts 
don’t mean a lot to the Chinese anyway, because the legal system here is still not up to 
world standards, and dealing with the Chinese here.… If they want to deal with you, they 
will deal with you. If they don’t want to deal with you, they will nod their heads and say 
‘yes’, and then not do it, so it doesn’t matter if you’ve got a contract or not.... All it does is 
put another layer between the relationships, the cultural differences between the two 
players in place, and it wasn’t necessary. 
Another New Zealand business consultant suggested that “the bottom drawer” is the place for 
contracts: 
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It’s in the bottom drawer. That’s the place.… It sets up the rules of engagement, doesn’t it? 
This is how we plan to work together. The reason that I put it in the bottom drawer is 
because the world always changes, so what we said we would do may not be the thing to 
do now. What we said we would do, when we first set up this partnership, was if this 
happens, this is all we do. But I have a better suggestion now, why don’t we do this, this and 
this? That’s where you get this superiority of a relationship over a contract. 
When asked if New Zealanders understand the difference between how contracts are regarded in 
China and in New Zealand, this consultant answered:  
Some do. And some will understand that their behaviour is infringing their own contract, 
and will suggest a regular review. Of course, in every contract, we put ‘This contract shall be 
reviewed annually’, but it never is. They drift away from it, which is the cause of dispute 
later sometimes. I’ve never heard of a Chinese company pulling out a contract, and saying … 
[pointing at the table] ‘Have you …?’ But New Zealand companies would.  
A Chinese managing director, interviewed in English, spoke about the business deal his company 
had with a large New Zealand company: 
Most of the time, for [a large New Zealand company], we have 150 to 200 pages contract. 
Who would read it? If you fail Jane [pseudonym], you will not get the next job. Easy.… When 
we picked up this particular project, that’s all because of Jane’s trust. We don’t really have a 
contract.… No paperwork, nothing. Just a call. But we trust her. She will not fail us, so we 
send our crew in. That’s the way we do business.  
This resonates with the comment made by another Chinese senior manager, indicating that 
signing contracts could mean there was not enough trust, particularly between friends. 
Despite the importance of relationships over contracts, the latter should not be ignored. A New 
Zealand senior manager took a much firmer view on how contracts should be adhered to: 
Unless there is something which is outside the person’s … unless there is some external 
influence, which is having an overbearing effect, then you have to talk about it…. You just 
can’t go and change your mind because you decided that you didn’t like what you wrote. 
You can’t do that.  
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3.5.2.2.2 Drinking test 
Another distinct characteristic of business negotiations in China is the involvement of drinking 
alcohol. When asked if New Zealanders need to know how to drink alcohol in order to go to China, 
a New Zealand district mayor replied: 
I think you do. If you are going to go to China, you are going to expect that you are going to 
a banquet. If you don’t drink, just say you don’t drink and be really firm about it.… They 
prefer you do. They don’t sort of get it [if you don’t drink].  
He further explained the differences in drinking culture between China and New Zealand: 
Our drinking culture is different … that we drink slowly. Whatever we drink, we drink it 
slowly to enjoy. Over there, the culture with the rice wine and things is just to scull it, and 
even I found in red wine, in some parts, they just scull the red wine as well. We savour the 
flavours as we are drinking something. Over there it’s different.… And they would consider 
it a great day if people had slightly too much to drink. They consider that’s sort of a 
success … if they can get their guests like that. 
A New Zealand CEO described it as “hard work” for those who wanted to do business in China but 
did not want to drink, particularly when dealing with “the old boys’ club”: 
It’s hard work for the person that doesn’t do business through alcohol, it is a particularly 
difficult thing to manage their way through it.… You’ve got to drink, and often you will be 
offered cigarettes as well. You get half drunk, and for some reason you seem to be some 
sort of a man if you actually smoke … and you drink as well, so that demonstrates a strong 
link with history, and [a] certain moderately contemporary view on the behaviour of sort of 
senior management or officials. And … that will change very quickly, I think, as the 
government moves to stamp out corruption, and for the younger, more educated people in 
those type of positions.... But … [in] the old boys’ club … drinking is very much part of the 
culture. 
A New Zealand agricultural consultant observed regional differences in the drinking culture within 
China, and saw it as a test posed by the Chinese hosts to see if the guests could handle pressure:  
I think the further west you go, or the more remote areas, that cultural integration, being 
able to play the games that they play [is more important] … particularly the drinking games. 
In a way, they do that as a test. It’s a test to see how you react to different sort of pressures. 
If you don’t participate, that’s not good; if you participate to the point of getting drunk, 
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that’s really, really bad. So on the one hand your host is setting you up to see if they can get 
you drunk, but if you do, that’s really, really bad. It’s learning how to respond to a toast, 
respond to what they are doing in a way that you don’t lose face. I think the further west 
you go, and the more remote areas that you go, those old culture entertaining habits are 
much more strongly engaged.…. They are all [a] character test to put in front of you.… [They 
want to see how you can] handle the pressure, and how long it takes you to try to 
compromise…. I think they are trying to measure whether you are someone that they can 
intimidate and push over easily, how much resistance, how much give-and-take.… It’s a lot 
more than courage, I think.  
However, a Chinese managing director (interviewed in English), who was in his late thirties, 
thought differently about the custom of drinking: 
I believe the true friendship is not really starting from drinking, eating too much. A lot of 
times, the old Chinese way, you have to drink, you have to bribe each other, sending money 
or [a] gift to each other, which is out of date. The thing is, everyone has limited time. Get 
the job done is the way correctly to win the trust. 
3.5.2.3 Execution 
In terms of business execution, informants observed some contradictory characteristics displayed 
by Chinese people, from both the employer and employee perspectives. On the one hand, people, 
particularly employees, appeared to possess a different − and often more dedicated − attitude 
towards work compared to New Zealanders, represented by an unclear boundary between work 
and private life. These dedicated employees can be, at the same time, displaying their lack of 
willingness to make decisions and undertake solution-oriented thinking. There are also some 
other behaviours that are often hasty, ‘cutting corners’ at the expense of quality. 
On the other hand, some Chinese people, particularly those who are in more directive roles in 
businesses or government, can possess traits of short-term, opportunistic thinking, represented 
by their eagerness for quick success. These traits are sometimes manifested in practices such as 
bribery and counterfeiting. 
3.5.2.3.1 Unclear boundary between work and private life 
It was identified by some informants that the separation between work and private life in China is 
not as clear as it is in New Zealand. One New Zealand business consultant commented: 
The Chinese don’t differentiate between work and private life. If the company requires you 
on Saturday or Sunday, or at midnight, that’s part of life. Whereas New Zealand business 
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culture is there are work hours, and there are personal hours. If you look at everybody, the 
three separate agendas that we all have − personal, family and business − in China they are 
described by one circle, and they all sit inside it. Whereas we have three separate circles 
that overlap a little bit. 
This is in line with the opinion of another New Zealand senior manager, who commented on the 
different attitudes towards work that he observed in the two countries:  
People have a completely different attitude to work and what they have to do to earn their 
living. People took me to factories at various places. It absolutely blew me away that the 
concentration and the attitude to work − I am not being condescending or anything like that 
– it’s just that people obviously value the fact that they’ve got a job, and they want to do it 
properly. Whereas that just doesn’t happen here, in my view. 
3.5.2.3.2 Inconsistency in work quality 
Contrary to the attitude towards work observed by some of the informants mentioned above, 
some other informants noticed a tendency within various industries for workers to take shortcuts, 
for the purpose of ‘quick success’ (急功近利). As one New Zealand senior manager commented: 
There is no consistency. For a lot of sectors here, you almost have to train their people 
every day. You’ve got to train them every day. Because you say, ‘Do it this way’, and, okay, 
off they go. Next day, they will just start … taking some shortcuts, or trying to do things the 
other way. You don’t necessarily get that level of continuity. 
3.5.2.3.3 Lack of willingness to make decisions 
Some informants observed a lack of willingness among employees to make decisions. A New 
Zealand CEO described it as one of his frustrations: 
The other frustration is that all decisions are kicked upstairs, so the president of the 
company is almost God. The frustration is that, therefore people don’t debate or argue with 
the president … so in my world, I encourage people to argue. 
Another New Zealand senior manager from a New Zealand-based international company also 
observed a difference in the willingness to make decisions among their staff in China compared to 
staff in New Zealand. However, Chinese staff showed that they are able and willing to make 
decisions as long as they are provided with the right company culture: 
I have certainly noted that there was a certain need for more direct instruction from the 
Chinese than potentially I would have thought from a New Zealand perspective. Some of 
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the questions [are] about making decisions on even the smaller stuff that they are prepared 
to come and ask. But what I have found is, if you push the question back and ask for their 
opinion, then they would provide one, and that’s been quite reassuring to me that they 
actually do know the answers. It’s not as if they are just robotically thinking through until … 
‘Here is a fork in the road and [I] … have to make a decision beyond my ability to make a 
decision, so I defer to my boss.’ But when you ask them to go back and think about it, they’ll 
come up with a decision, and typically they are fairly accurate in terms of the way 
forward.… I think it’s a cultural thing. I think if there was a culture which empowers them, 
then they are prepared to … make decisions [if] they believe that they are within the scope 
of responsibility, which is going to be acceptable.  
3.5.2.3.4 Lack of solution-oriented thinking 
Another trait displayed by some Chinese employees, as observed by some informants, was their 
lack of solution-oriented thinking. One New Zealand CEO explained: 
Basically, why won’t these individuals make decisions, and why won’t they think about 
solutions, rather than breeding problems? Because it’s easy for everybody to walk through 
my door, and say, ‘Look, I’ve got a problem.’ I’ve been trying to say to my people, ‘Well, tell 
me what is the opportunity [associated with] the problem, and then tell me what you think 
you can do to solve it.’ So always bring in a solution. And that solution-oriented thinking 
isn’t there.... One of my colleagues said, ‘Look, our education system is, they talk about 
feeding the duck, just stuff it full of food, and it just regurgitates what you’ve fed it.’ So 
there is no conceptual ability. You just get rote learning and you answer the questions, but 
you don’t necessarily know the application, so as long as you know the theories, don’t 
worry about the application, you just get the answer right.  
3.5.2.3.5 Resistance to change 
Linked to the lack of solution-oriented thinking is a resistance to change that some informants 
experience with their staff members. One New Zealand CEO explained: 
You open a discussion about some small change, and there are 400 reasons why you cannot 
do this.... There was not one suggestion about, ‘That sounds like a good idea, so how are we 
going to do it What is the solution for implementation?’ That is a huge frustration.... I think, 
primarily, it’s the thought process and their style of education, and the constraint on them 
not wanting to step out and make a suggestion, for the fear that ‘The president might think 
that I’m an idiot’, or their colleague, who may still think that they are an idiot.  
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This resistance to change is also reflected in staff’s quiet ‘fading out’ in terms of executing certain 
actions. As one New Zealand CEO commented: 
If there isn’t a will to execute, then it will just sort of fade. It won’t be a priority. I had some 
of that just recently, when it was settled [that] ‘This is the way we are going to do a certain 
practice, and this is why fundamentally.’ And the excuse for not implementing was that they 
didn’t really believe that it would work, so therefore they didn’t do it. They just went back 
and did the old way. Even though a team of six people all agreed, and it was quite explicit, 
and it was written down, they decided that ‘No, the old way is better.’ 
This CEO further explained that simply asking a staff member to action something would not be a 
guarantee that it would be done and the results reported back, and that a follow-up was often 
needed: 
The other frustration is, if you ask somebody in China to do anything, well for most staff … 
that you must follow up. You can’t expect that suddenly they’ll realise that they’d been 
asked, and they should tell you, what the status of the play is, or where they are at. Quite 
often you will say, ‘Okay, we are going to do this particularly thing, and set a timeframe on 
it.’ And then you suddenly realise, two months later, you think, ‘Shit, I wonder what 
happened to this particular issue?’ It was a key issue that should have been knocked on the 
head. Then you go back and ask that particular individual, they may say … it was either done 
two days after I asked him, or ‘Oh, no, I had a problem. I couldn’t get it done.’ But they 
didn’t think to come to you and say, ‘I hit a rock here ... What are we going to do about this? 
What sort of tactics?’ … It just sits there, until sometime it’s [surfaced] again.  
3.5.2.3.6 Eagerness for quick success 
The trait of having eagerness for quick success is not only exhibited by employees taking shortcuts 
in their workmanship. Often it is also reflected in the mentality and behaviour of business people 
and government officials. As observed by many informants, often these people in China will focus 
on achieving success within the shortest possible timeframes, represented by having monetary 
gains. One New Zealand business consultant commented, “There is a facet of Chinese that says, 
‘Look for the main chance.’ Make a buck quickly and move on. Let’s do it.” Similarly, another New 
Zealand business consultant pointed out a similar trait in government officials: 
The bottom line is always cash, it’s always money. Money is the underlying factor.… Take a 
step back. How do you move up the ranks in the Communist Party? If you are a Communist 
Party official, how do you move up the ranks? Through generating GDP [gross domestic 
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product] growth, and tax revenue in your area.… So what’s their motivation? It’s money. 
China is all about money … the driving factor. 
An Australian horticultural senior manager observed the same monetary drive in flower growers in 
China: “Chinese philosophy is to make money. Chinese religion is … actually money.… Why? That’s 
why they get out of bed in the morning. I have never seen a grower yet who doesn’t want to make 
money. 
This eagerness for quick success brings particular challenges in agribusiness investments, where 
investment and production cycles are often long. Such challenges are particularly apparent among 
farmers, many of whom still farm for subsistence, as one New Zealand agricultural consultant 
commented: 
I think one of the things that I learned about the farmers is that you can very easily 
overestimate, or misinterpret, their view of the world. Their view of the world is really very, 
very simple. I used the word ‘peasant’, but I don't use the word ‘peasant’ in a derogatory 
way. That’s basically what they are. The only asset that they've got is their land.... 
Economically they are quite deprived. At the end of the day, as soon as they start dealing 
with you, the only thing that they are interested in is money.... As long as you pay the 
money, treat them with respect, that’s all they care about. 
A Chinese agricultural consultant explained the challenges in doing agricultural projects in the face 
of such quick success mentality: 
This is an overall societal trend, because I think this is a mentality of the people in China, as 
the development for recent years has been too fast. This has therefore caused an expansion 
of self-consciousness of people, leading to many things being rushed to the finish line in 
China. So on the road of pursuing success, people also want quick success, because there 
are just so many opportunities. There are indeed many examples where quick success is 
achievable. Where I mean quick success, I mean where you can soon see profit, and can 
make a lot of money. But agricultural projects … are different from others, such as a real 
estate project. If you want to fatten some livestock, you can’t have it happen straight away, 
so it needs to go through a process.… Many agricultural projects are often long-term 
projects, so going for a quick success may well slow the process down.20  
                                                          
20 Original Chinese quote: 这是一个整体的社会趋势，因为我想可能这是国民的一个心态，因为这几年
发展的太快了，所以它从一下的这种自我的膨胀意识，到国内现在好多东西都速成；那么它在这个追
求成功的路上呢，他也希望可以速成，因为机会太多了。确实是有好多例子是可以速成。所说的速成
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A Chinese senior manager also expressed her concerns about many Chinese businesses’ eagerness 
for quick success: 
I think in China the problem of seeking instant benefit is very serious.... This is why many 
enterprises in China do not last.… A company like us that is older than 10 years is regarded 
as a company of very long history in China.… Perhaps Chinese are too eager to make money, 
too eager for it to come quickly.21  
She further explained the thinking behind such quick success compared to how Europeans do 
things: 
When they [Europeans] do things, it must be 1, 2, 3, and 4; when we Chinese do things, 
step 1, then if step 2 can be omitted, I will jump straight to step 3. What’s the point of 
then doing step 2? But it’s not okay for them [Europeans, to do it this way]. I feel that 
when Chinese do things, as long as I can achieve this goal at the fastest speed, it does not 
matter what method I take. But for them [Europeans], they have formed such kind of 
patterns. In other words, they have formed such kind of rules. From their thinking since a 
very young age, they have already formed these rules. Anything I do, I must follow the 
rules. But for Chinese, I think many things are done [for the purpose of] a quick success.22 
A New Zealand business consultant commented on the challenges involved in forming business 
relationships in the context of this kind of quick success mentality: 
This is the real issue when it comes back to agriculture, is it’s all about cash right now. It’s 
money now. You look at how most people do business deals: ‘I don’t care about our 
relationship, I care about getting as much money out of you as I can, because tomorrow is 
another day.’ That’s right now. But what you need to do is you need to find the people who 
are saying, ‘Right, if we work together long term, we are going to have a very successful 
                                                          
就是它可以很快的见效益，然后可以挣很多钱。但是农业项目它是 ... 不同于其它的，比如说房地产的
一个项目。这个动物你没办法给它增肥到说，我马上就见效益的，所以它需要有一个过程的。… 农业
项目往往是一个长期的项目，那么你这种立竿见影的 ... 效果可能往往欲速而不达。 
21 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得中国急功近利的那种思想特别严重 … 所以中国的企业，很多都是做不
长 … 像我们这种 10多年的公司，在中国已经算很长的公司了 … 可能中国人就是特别想赚钱，特别想
来得快了嘛。 
22 Original Chinese quote: 他们 [欧洲人] 做事情，必须是 1、2、3、4；我们中国人做事情，第一步，
如果第二步能省，我就跳到第三步了。我何必要再去做第二步呢？但是他们不行的。我觉得中国人
做事情，我只要以最快的速度达到这个目的就行了，我不管采取什么东西。但是他们就是已经形成
这种模式了。实际上就是说，他们已经形成规矩了。在他们从小的这个思维当中，他已经形成这个
规矩了。做什么事情，我都必须按规矩办的。但是中国人呢，我就觉得很多东西急功近利。 
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business’.… Are you going to find that first person straight away? I don’t know. Potentially. 
Potentially not.  
3.5.2.3.7 Bribery 
One of the customs in business practices in China, as observed by many informants, is the use of 
bribery to “smooth the way”, particularly when dealing with government officials. One New Zealand 
senior manager described this practice: “I’ve witnessed, with our second distributor, just how he 
operated. [It] was very much with bribes, and paying people for stuff … just completely a way that 
we’d never consider doing business. But that’s how it was done.”  
Another New Zealand senior manager also shared his experience and understanding of bribery: 
I think that there are some Chinese that [are] just great to work with, and there are others, 
[who] might appear to be front-on good to work with, but there is always, I think, another 
agenda in behind that is their agenda, and often it’s related to … the sort of thing that New 
Zealanders don’t do, like.… ‘We give some cash to the person if they are buying our product, 
or whatever.’ And I am led to believe that’s a relatively normal way of doing business in 
China, so I shouldn’t be critical of it. But it’s quite hard for us to work in those 
circumstances. 
As indicated in the comments above, the practice of bribery is generally frowned upon by most 
informants, although some also recognise that certain gift-giving activities (and beyond) might be 
unavoidable. One of the informants openly admitted that “We take care of people sometimes, 
whether you call that bribe, or whether you call that taking care of people indirectly or directly”; and 
“We sell to sub-agents, who can do the ‘monkey-business’.”  
With the clamp-down from the government on corruption, which started in May 2013, the reduced 
prevalence of such practices may provide a more comfortable business environment for New 
Zealanders. As one New Zealand senior manager commented: 
Gift giving might be seen as corrupt in New Zealand, but here it’s not. It’s accepted. It’s the 
way you do business. Even underhanded … stuff, which I disagree with, but if that is the 
way, you have to turn a blind eye, and say, ‘Well, it won’t happen otherwise.’  
It’s uncomfortable. New Zealanders feel extremely uncomfortable with it.… Maybe you 
have somebody you trust to deal with that, and [who] deals with it in a legitimate way. You 
don’t go off and do something silly, like having suitcases of money, which was a silly thing to 
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have done, from a New Zealand company’s point of view, and you get caught. I think with 
the clamp-down that’s going on now … we may be able to feel a bit more comfortable. 
However, accompanying the clamp-down is the confusion it has brought to foreign business 
operators, who now wonder where the boundaries lie, as one New Zealand senior manager 
described: 
You get a sense now there is a real focus on the government in China itself becoming quite 
strict on inappropriate influence on government officials and bribery within the government 
system … so we are feeling our way in terms of what’s appropriate.… In New Zealand, we’ll 
go and have lunch with people we need to deal with, because we know … that’s fine. In 
China … is it okay for us to take someone out for lunch? Would there be asking? Do we give 
a gift? Do we not give gifts? So it’s some of those cultural things as well that we are working 
through.  
Another New Zealand business consultant further explained the difference between ‘black money’ 
and ‘grey money’, and he thought it was difficult for him as well as the Chinese to differentiate the 
two: 
I think there is still a lot of corruption, as we would define it.… I have seen what I call 
corruption, but I always find it difficult to draw the line and find out where the Chinese draw 
the line, between grey money – okay, and black money – not okay. A Chinese once 
explained it to me: black money is when a company goes to an official and says ‘If I pay you 
this money, will you give me my licence to build this … bypassing all the procedures’? But 
grey money is when I go to the editor of the journal and say, ‘Here is 200 yuan, could you 
put my advertisement in a nice place in your magazine.’ That’s allowable. That’s part of the 
oil that oils the wheels of commerce. But finding the line between grey and black is not 
always easy, even for Chinese, I think. 
3.5.2.3.8 Counterfeiting 
Counterfeiting can also be problematic for foreign businesses to combat in China. One New Zealand 
senior manager commented, “We get a lot of photos [of counterfeits] that we can plaster these 
walls”. One New Zealand winery owner also commented: 
Counterfeiting is another problem in China. The French wine industry, Bordeaux has 
suffered badly. People don’t trust French wine, the Bordeaux, because they don’t think that 
they are getting the genuine product … so there is almost a criminal element that is 
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destroying the development in a sensible, gradual way, [of] the distribution and sale of wine 
in China.  
Counterfeiting, along with adulterating products to the detriment of human health, is one of the 
boundary-pushing activities that exist in China. One New Zealand senior manager commented, “As 
soon as someone makes the rule, half of the people will try to work a way to get round the rule.” 
Another New Zealand senior manager elaborated: 
China has changed [an] enormous amount over the last 10 to 20 years, and there is an 
attitude among people that’s outdated now, but people were sort of trying to get ahead … 
20 years ago. It was around pushing the boundary to everything you possibly can, or 
everything you possibly can get away with to make success, to make yourself wealthy, to 
bring money to the family, all those sort of things. I think that pushing of the boundaries is 
still there to a certain extent.… In fact, that’s a key characteristic among some Chinese and 
some Chinese businesses as well.… There is almost a hint of desperation. 
3.5.3 Agribusiness environment 
Along with the social and business environments that New Zealand agribusinesses find themselves 
operating within, there are also some other conditions that are unique to agribusinesses. This 
section of the thesis is dedicated to describing the characteristics of these conditions. 
3.5.3.1 Legal and operational environment 
3.5.3.1.1 Land tenure and availability 
One of the most important assets in any agribusiness is land, particularly if the business activity 
involves production on the land. Farmers in China see land as being of great value to them. One 
New Zealand senior manager explained its importance and the origins of the current land-use right 
system in China: 
Land has always been the number one issue in [a] Chinese person’s understanding of 
wealth … land and gold. Those are the two endurable things that you can build your wealth 
on, so the cycle that the Communist government set out to break was this cycle of 
landlordism, where certain families would grow massively wealthy, take over the majority 
of the land, and the peasants working on the farm have absolutely nothing, then have to go 
and work on the landlord’s farm to grow the rice, get just enough to live, but virtually not 
enough to live, and so you have this huge rich-poor divide. So the first reform, the number 
one basis of the Communist Party reform was to redistribute land … they took all ownership 
of all the land in China, so right now nobody can actually own land. You can get various 
length of leases, 49 years, 79 years, 99 years, I think the longest one I’ve seen is 159 years, 
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but never ever own the land. You only own the land-use rights, that you can use that land 
for a certain period.  
The exact number of years that land leases are believed to be issued for in China varied among 
informants. However, many did agree on the absolute power the government held in changing the 
land-use right designation. This has been discussed in section 3.3.1.1.2 The power of the 
government. Nevertheless, some informants thought that the land-use right designation for most of 
the rural land would simply roll over towards the end of the terms: 
[In New Zealand], the people who have the land think they own the land, and that attitude 
will be a hell lot of stronger here. You take the land off these people, you change the rules. 
Personally I think they will just roll everything [the land contract between the government 
and the farmers], which is what they tend to do in China. The government doesn't want any 
more problems with agriculture.  
Contrary to the belief of many New Zealanders, the land tenure system does have some similarities 
to that in New Zealand, as one New Zealand senior manager pointed out: 
We will have effectively land use rights [in China] that are pretty close to almost owning the 
land. We can put up permanent buildings on that land. We can mortgage the land and 
buildings. It’s almost as good as owning them. 
Another New Zealand CEO also indicated that land certificates are the only securities that banks 
require as securities for loans: “Always land, always assets. No land certificate, no money.... If you 
can offer a certificate, then you can use that as a security.” 
According to the explanation of a New Zealand senior manager who had lived in south-west China 
for 9 years at the time of the interview, in rural China the land is owned by the government, which 
then contracts the land to the village committee for a term (for example, 30 years). It is then up to 
the farmer to decide what he wishes to do with it. The village committee is elected by the villagers 
and will be in charge of allocating the land. Each family will be allocated small parcels of good, 
average and poor land, to even out the fertility differences. In the case of a long-term lease of the 
village land, if 80 per cent of the households in the village have decided to lease the land out to a 
particular party, then the other 20 per cent have to follow. 
When it comes to agricultural development in rural areas in particular, the contracting of land use is 
often directly negotiated with the village committee. As this New Zealand senior manager, who was 
involved with a horticultural production development at the time of the interview, explained: 
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The land comes under the control of the responsibility of the township government. So 
that’s official government representatives. But the agreement and everything [are] actually 
signed with a village. The final decisions are made with the village committee. So in any 
meetings that we had, we’d have [township] government officials, and the representatives 
from the village, sitting in on a meeting.  
A copy of a signed land-use contract was shown to the researcher by the informant at the time of 
the interview. At the end of the contract all the heads of households within the village had agreed to 
take part in leasing the land to this horticultural production company by giving their thumb prints. In 
addition, in order to protect their own interests, the horticultural production company also signed a 
contract with the township government regarding this proposed production. In the rare case of the 
village committee not adhering to the land-use contract, the company would seek protection from 
the township government. 
Apart from the complex involvement with village committees and township government in signing 
land-use contracts, some informants also described the difficulty of finding appropriate land for 
agricultural use. Having the right contacts was deemed to be essential. A New Zealand middle 
manager commented: 
If someone from New Zealand wanted to go over and start a farm in China, I just can’t really 
imagine where you would start. To find the land, it’s all about the contacts.… You can’t just 
go and drive into a town and ask them, if there is available land.… It doesn’t happen like 
that at all. You can’t just go to a real estate agent to lease some land somewhere. To me, I 
see that is being probably the major difference as to the availability of the land. 
Not all informants believed in the worth of trying to ‘own’ − or essentially lease − land long term 
in China. A New Zealand senior manager explained: 
There is no point in us … trying to own orchards here.... The land issue is so important. It’s 
like the Māori’s. Land is the last the thing the family will give up. They may live in the city, 
and they may have a small plot of land out in the back … somewhere. But, hey, that is their 
tie back to where they came from. They are not going to give it up, and particularly to give it 
to a foreigner. They are not going to do it, so don’t bother going there.  
Geographically, the vast expansion of urban areas has created challenges to finding appropriate 
agricultural land. A Chinese managing director, interviewed in English, commented on the 
increasing pressure to try to produce maize for dairy production: 
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For the [maize] silage, I think that will be a really challenging part, by competing [for] the 
soil of the farm land.… We have to be very cautious [about] the growth in number, because 
the land size is really limited. They are getting smaller and smaller.  
A New Zealand senior manager indicated that temperate fruit production had been moving from 
the east to the west of China, because the land value along the coastal strip on the east is getting 
very high. He also indicated that land with good access to water, for the purpose of agricultural 
production, is “worth a lot of money here”. There was, however, another New Zealand senior 
manager who argued that although crop land is expensive to lease, the vast areas of grassland in 
China are not: 
There is a lot of grassland available in China that’s not being used. It’s actually 400 million 
hectares of grassland in China, which is a huge amount. People say there is not enough land 
in China for farming. There is big demand for suitable crop land. But the government 
categorises land as either crop land, forest land or grassland. Crop land is relatively 
expensive to lease, about, in fact, the same prices as to lease good land in New Zealand, but 
you can actually lease what they call natural grassland with very low cost, and that’s what 
we are targeting. 
There are, however, limitations on what can be grown on grassland. As a New Zealand middle 
manager indicated: 
On those grassland[s], you can only grow things that look like grass. Those are the 
government terms. For maize, you have to have designated crop land, which is a lot more 
expensive … it’s 30 times the costs per acre.  
3.5.3.1.2 Opportunities in food and agribusiness 
Almost all the informants spoke of the opportunities in the food and agribusiness sector in China. 
“Food is the new oil, and New Zealand is [the] new Saudi Arabia”, as one senior New Zealand 
manager commented. “Everyone wants to be in China in agribusiness”, he said. Another New 
Zealand CEO commented: “China has two main focuses through the medium-term mark; that's 
food security and energy security. If you can be involved in one of those sectors, then there is a 
great deal of potential.”  
These opportunities in the food and agribusiness sector are reflected in the scale of the markets 
in China, as well as the opportunities, particularly those related to agri-tech. “When these things 
move, they move in big numbers”, a New Zealand senior manager commented. Another New 
Zealand senior manager also commented on the scale of the market: 
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I suppose the scale … you can look at the statistics and say, ‘This is a big market.’ Until you 
are there, and see a lot of things with your own eyes, you don’t appreciate how potentially 
big it is.… I mentioned about the movement of … half billion people from poorer incomes to 
much better incomes, and seeing that almost in front of your eyes happening.... Just the 
potential, I think, really blew me away, with the potential of what could happen there.  
This senior manager also commented that the real opportunity is inside China: 
China is about China. You do anything here, you've got to think about the opportunity 
locally, huge opportunities locally ... not for export.... Growing here in China is about 
producing for China, or the neighbouring countries, but not for Europe, not for North 
America. It just won't happen. 
Not only is the scale large, but the variety of products demanded is also increasing, as one New 
Zealand senior manager described: 
But the Chinese market is getting much more sophisticated, demanding a lot more variety, a 
lot more range.... So things are changing here, and the market is becoming much more 
segmented, in terms of what it wants. Whereas traditionally, it probably couldn’t be 
supplied, because the internal infrastructure didn’t allow [it] … [now] products move a lot 
more around China. Whereas before, you take here, 15 or 20 years ago, most of Yunnan, 
the economic activity of a village was for a 6 km, because that’s as far as they could walk to 
the various markets.... Now you’ve got these big highways connecting all around China, so 
it’s changing significantly. And the Chinese consumer is no different than any consumer. 
They want something different, so they are looking for a much wider range and varieties, so 
the food is changing quite quickly.  
When it comes to agricultural technology transfer, one New Zealand CEO spoke about the 
opportunities for New Zealand: 
The opportunities are huge, and they are far, far greater than working in the agri-sector in 
New Zealand.… Far greater. There is a lot of technology and know-how out of New Zealand 
that can be exploited here. 
Another New Zealand CEO agreed: 
For New Zealand enterprises, we have so much knowledge. At the end of the day, there is 
only so much productive capacity in New Zealand, because we have a limited producing 
base. We’ve only got so much land area, so we can only supply so much. There is no way 
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that New Zealand can supply anything near that China would demand and consume. But 
what we have done in New Zealand is that we’ve developed a great deal of expertise, 
intellectual property. So the way forward I think, in terms of growing New Zealand’s wealth, 
is through transfer of IP, and actually extracting value out of that IP. It’s limited if you are 
just going to do that in New Zealand from a production perspective and then export, 
because we’ve got a limited producing base, so if you want to extract the real value, 
establish yourself inside the market. 
3.5.3.1.3 Environmental concerns in agriculture 
As in other parts of the world, the environmental impact of agricultural activities has been 
drawing the attention of the Chinese government. Despite the publicity around the world about 
the many environmental issues in China, and the resulting perception that the Chinese are doing 
very little about protecting the environment, several informants gave a different view. For 
example, a New Zealand senior manager based in China commented: 
We tend to think [of] China [as having a] lack of environmental awareness and so forth, and 
that’s incredibly incorrect. China actually has very large [high] environmental standards … 
the whole environmental management around being good keepers of the land, and that’s 
certainly … always been there … that looking after the environment, looking after the land is 
far more important now. 
China is incredibly focused on the environment and getting things better, whereas perhaps, 
looking in, we might not agree, or we might not understand that. We look at the pollution 
and think, ‘Does anyone care?’ Actually, I believe they are hugely committed to [the] 
environment and trying to make things better. 
As some of the informants noted, not only is the Chinese government committed to 
environmental protection, but farmers who work on the land also want to see it being sustainably 
used. One New Zealand senior manager recalled his experience at the start of a negotiation with 
some farmers: “One of the first things that farmers said to me was that, ‘How are you going to 
guarantee that you give me back the land in the same condition as it is now?’.” Another New 
Zealand senior manager had a similar view when asked if the farmers care about the 
environment: 
I believe farmers do. I believe it doesn’t matter where you are in the world, if you have the 
privilege of having land, there [are] very few people who don’t take that very seriously, and 
want to look after it for their families. Probably nowhere else in the world, the concept of 
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family, handing things on, is more important than it is here [China]. So I think that’s always 
been very important.  
3.5.3.1.4 Intellectual property (IP) protection 
The protection of intellectual property (IP), particularly in the area of plant varieties, is seen by 
many informants as a real challenge. One New Zealand senior manager spoke about his caution in 
taking a new fruit variety to China: 
We’ve just commercialised another [variety] here [in New Zealand].... Us taking that plant 
material into China is going to get spread throughout China, so we don’t necessarily want to 
take our varieties into China, because we don’t believe we can sufficiently control the IP. 
That doesn’t mean to say it’s not in China already. In fact, our last variety is all throughout 
China … because we did a small trial there, and there is budwood being sold on the internet.  
An Australian senior manager had also observed a lack of understanding about intellectual 
property in China: “The Chinese generally don’t believe in varietal rights. They don’t understand it. 
They don’t understand the PVR [plant variety rights] requirements, and they don’t understand the 
legal issues.”  
This assessment of the risks involved in doing agribusiness production due to a lack of 
understanding of IP was not shared across all informants. One New Zealand senior manager 
commented:  
Most foreigners don’t know how to come into China, or it’s much easier for them just to say 
‘no’, because we all know the horror stories of intellectual property in China, which from my 
own point of view is no worse than anywhere else in the world.  
A Chinese senior manager explained how he saw the reality of maintaining IP in plant varieties: “If 
you want to do large-scale planting in China, fruit for example, to ... totally protect your IP, it is ... 
still rather problematic.”23  
When asked if farmers understand what intellectual property is, he responded: 
He might know a little bit. But who cares? If I get it, I can grow it. Actually it’s not just the 
farmers. Government officials are the same. You have good stuff, so I want my farmers to 
grow it here, and make them rich, so my economy [will] be good, and my farmers’ income 
                                                          
23 Original Chinese quote: 如果要在中国大规模种植，比如说水果，要 ... 完全保证你的知识产权的话，
这一点 ... 还是比较麻烦的。 
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[will] increase. Government officials, even if they know [that it is not right], they [will] still 
do it deliberately.… They mean well, just some things they [will] deliberately ignore.24  
Another senior Chinese manager shared a similar view, and it is worth quoting at length: 
In China, I think there is a big difference compared to other places, because … there are 
plant variety rights, brands and so on in other countries. Here in China, in terms of 
intellectual property, I think it is very difficult to protect.… Perhaps people are now 
gradually recognising the importance of intellectual property; many of these things [people 
have known] only since the Reform and Opening, so the length of time that we’ve known 
about intellectual properties has been relatively short. In addition, if you go and talk about 
intellectual property with the farmers, they find it very difficult to accept. They just think 
that you should give them the varieties.25  
Every time they bring in a variety, they talk about intellectual property, they talk about 
protecting it.… I always feel it is very difficult to achieve. This is probably the biggest 
difference between us and the Western countries. Why do you think they find it difficult to 
do agriculture here?26  
As for fruit, it only takes a bud to be stolen, then your variety is gone. You say you want to 
pursue your intellectual property rights, you want to sue them … that will take a very long 
time. By the time you win the law suit, that variety is already everywhere, it’s already 
developed.27  
Farmers in our country are unlike farmers overseas, [who have] been through [a] very good 
education. Farmers in our country, you can probably say that they are of the lowest quality. 
You talk about intellectual property with them, they don’t even know what intellectual 
property is, how can you then promote it?.... All he hears is that [there is] good [stuff] 
                                                          
24 Original Chinese quote: 他可能知道一点点，但是我管你呢，我拿到了，我种出来就是了。其实不只
是农民，政府官员他也是，你这东西好，我就想让我这里的农民种，让他们发财。我经济好了，我的
农户收入增高了，政府官员，他是知道他也故意要把它这么干的 … 他们出发点是好的，只不过有些东
西他故意不去考虑的。 
25 Original Chinese quote: 在中国嘛，我觉得它跟国外有很大的差别，因为 … 国外它存在这个育种者的
权利呀，品牌，等等一系列的问题。在我们中国，就知识产权来说，我觉得很难保护的 … 现在可能大
家逐步在认识这个知识产权的重要性；很多东西是改革开发以来，接触知识产权这个东西还比较短
了。而且你跟农民来讲知识产权的话，他很难接受的。他就觉得你就是应该把品种给他。 
26 Original Chinese quote: 他们一拿品种进来，一跟我谈知识产权，要保护呀 … 我就觉得很难做到的。
这个就是我们跟西方国家的可能的最大的分歧就在这里。为什么他们进来做，很难做农业？ 
27 Original Chinese quote: 水果的话，只要一个芽被偷掉，你这个品就丧失了吗。你说你要去追究知识
产权，我要去打官司 … 这很漫长的事情。等你打赢官司了，那个已经铺天盖地了，已经发展了。 
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somewhere, and he will go and steal it. It’s very simple, and you cannot avoid it. Unless it’s 
F1 seeds28, every year only F1 seeds, then you can control it. Things like our fruit trees, 
there will be a lot more trouble.… Not only farmers, some of the researchers.… Whoa, this 
variety of yours looks good, he comes and cuts a branch off, and you would never know. It 
can be spread out very quickly through grafting. Very quick. Three years, it will be 
everywhere.29  
Unless you can control the final sales, and extract your profit from the sales profit, and 
return it to the breeder, that is the only way. But if you are selling it in China, it still wouldn’t 
work, so unless you export it.… If they do it in China, it is impossible to protect intellectual 
property, even though our country, our government, is trying hard to do these things − the 
government is making a very big effort in protecting intellectual property. But because 
China is a big agricultural country after all, you go and reason this with the farmers, I think 
it’s very difficult.30  
Despite the great difficulties that many informants believe China presents in terms of intellectual 
property, one New Zealand CEO suggested that the only way to protect intellectual property is to 
stay “ahead of the bunch”, particularly inside the market: 
There is risk for IP to be stolen in New Zealand. You don't have to go to China to have your 
IP stolen. You can just stay at home to have your IP stolen. At the end of the day − this is my 
personal view − the biggest challenge for the protection of IP for people is, if you think you 
can sit on your IP and do nothing with it, that’s when it’s going to get stolen. Because in the 
absence of you taking something to the market, like anything, there will be a vacuum for it, 
there is a vacuum for the demand. If you don’t provide your IP into that space, someone is 
going to fill that space. And if they can’t develop their own IP to go into that space, they will 
take your IP and modify it, and then fill that space.... There [are] very few form[s] of IP that 
                                                          
28 F1 seeds are from first generation crossbreeds, which are either infertile or produce uneven offspring. 
29 Original Chinese quote: 我们国家的农民，不像国外的农民，他都是经过高等教育啊，受过很好的教
育。我们国家的农民，可以说素质是最低的。你跟他讲知识产权，他都不知道什么是知识产权，你怎
么去推广知识产权？… 他就是听到哪里 [有] 好 [东西]，他就把你的偷掉了，这个很简单，你根本防不
胜防的。除非你是第一代种子，每年都是第一代，那个可以控制。像我们果树这种的，就很麻烦了 … 
不光是农民，有的做科研的 … 哦，你这个品好了，他把你剪掉一枝，你根本不知道的。一嫁接就马上
可以传出去了。很快，三年就可以铺天盖地的出来了。 
30 Original Chinese quote: 除非你能够控制销售末端，你从销售的那个利润当中来提取一部分利润，来
返回给这个育种家，这个可能是唯一能够行得通的。但是如果我在中国卖那你也没办法，除非你出
口。... 他们在中国做，他不可能保护知识产权，虽然说我们国家现在，政府是在努力做这摊事情，政
府也花很大很大的力气在保护知识产权。但是因为中国毕竟是农业大国，你去跟农民讲这个道理，我
觉得很难的。 
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can’t be replicated, so the best way to protect your IP is to get to your market as quickly as 
possible, is to commercialise your IP as quickly, and as efficiently, as possible, and get it out 
there, and then continue to be innovative, and develop your IP further, so that you are 
ahead of the bunch. That’s easier said than done, because it’s not easy. Commercialising IP 
is very, very difficult. But commercialising IP inside the market is much easier than 
commercialising IP from outside the market. Much easier, much quicker. You have that 
competitive advantage of getting to market earlier, getting to market more efficiently. 
Being inside the market means that you can reach more of the market more quickly. And 
then, you continue to be innovative around your IP, so that everyone coming in is following 
you. They are chasers, and you are the leader. That’s a mind-set in itself.  
Another New Zealand senior manager looked at it from a different angle again, emphasising that 
the actual intellectual property is the relationships that one has. He explained this while 
describing the strategy of setting up a demonstration orchard to encourage more production 
from neighbouring farmers for future fruit procurement:  
What you do is you have a demonstration orchard … and you put all of the technologies, the 
yield is better, or whatever … you put those all in there.… Some of this will be taken, and 
you don’t worry that’s your IP, because your IP is in fact your relationship. That’s your IP. 
Nice and easy relationship, not the physical things, or the intellectual things. It’s actually the 
business relationship that’s your IP. That’s your value. An idea is no benefit until it’s actually 
implemented. That’s when it’s beneficial and valuable. There is no point having it in a book 
− waste of time. It’s okay for your ego so that you can have a look at it every now and again, 
and somebody else reading it. But when it comes down to practical things, it’s actually the 
use of that information, that’s when the value comes. 
3.5.3.1.5 Rural labour 
One of the key components for agribusiness investments in China is rural labour. Both local and 
foreign entrepreneurs face the same challenges created by the characteristics of rural labour in 
China. According to the informants, overall the rural labour force in China is ageing, with young 
people exiting farming. The cost of rural labour has significantly increased over the past decades, 
partly to cover social welfare costs. Nevertheless, people in rural villages do not generally receive 
the same level of medical care as those in the towns and cities, which drives a more pronounced 
quick success attitude in order to survive. Nevertheless, informants commended the high level of 
farming skills that many Chinese rural people possess.  
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3.5.3.1.5.1 Ageing population in farming 
One New Zealand CEO shared his observation of the ageing population in farming in China: 
Farmers have more children than the city people31. But a lot of those young kids have some 
sort of education, and they don’t really want to work in the field. They want to enter the 
city and get an iPhone, smart suit … so there is a big drain of young kids out of the 
countryside.… I look out of my window now, and everybody is sort of in their young 30s, 
late 20s, almost everyone, but in the country, it’s the reverse, and everybody is over 60. I 
think in the future we will struggle in China to maintain workers who want to work the land, 
and that’s not unusual in any country. 
Another New Zealand middle manager observed the same thing when he spent a few months in a 
rural town in northern China: 
One of the big things that farmers talked about was what would happen in the next 
generation, because their children … the local high school was out of town, so they’d moved 
out of town for high school, and then most of them would go to university, and they 
wouldn’t come back to the farm after that. There [were] very few young people of my age 
in the town … very few. There were heaps of children, heaps of older people. But [those] at 
my age, they had gone to … high school, out of the town, normally gone to university, and 
they wanted to live in the cities, and they didn’t really want to come back.  
A Chinese senior manager described the same phenomenon, which she had observed in 
southwest China: “Basically, nowadays in rural villages, the young and the male[s] have all gone. 
Those who are actually left behind in the field are all women and the elderly.32  
A New Zealand senior manager commented that one of the goals of the agricultural development 
projects he was involved with was to try to attract young people back to farming: 
Another thing which people are keen to see … happen is to try to keep the kids, make 
agriculture an attractive option again, rather than everybody leaving at the moment, which 
is not good for China … so … we are going to … look at training and new development, and 
offering new career path[s] for younger people out of the township and village. 
                                                          
31 The One Child Policy was seldom enforced in rural China. 
32 Original Chinese quote: 基本上现在农村，年青人，男的，基本上都出来了，实际上真正留在田里
面、地里面的，都是妇女跟老人。 
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3.5.3.1.5.2 Increased labour costs and inadequate health care 
One New Zealand senior manager estimated that there is an on-cost33 of 42 per cent for every 
permanent employee of an agribusiness firm, in order to cover other social welfare costs for the 
employee. This on-cost is also based on a significantly increased labour costs. One Chinese senior 
manager said that 10 years ago a labour unit would cost 15 to 20 RMB per day, whereas at the 
time of the interview a male worker was expected to be paid about 150 RMB per day, and a 
female worker about 120 RMB per day. She also indicated that the farmers who worked for her 
did not regard themselves as farmers anymore, because they no longer worked on their own land. 
Rather, they were employees of this entrepreneur, and therefore deserved better pay, as if they 
were working in the cities.  
The significantly increased labour costs are, however, still regarded as relatively low compared to 
New Zealand, making efficiency less of a focus compared to New Zealand, as one New Zealand 
senior manager explained: 
Agriculturally, because of our economy, we are very focused on efficiencies, and one of the 
greatest efficiencies that we look for is labour. In here it doesn't count. It doesn’t matter. 
The cost of labour has gone up. When I first started here, we were paying 20 RMB a day, 
now we are paying probably 100 RMB. But think about it: $20 [NZD], it’s nothing, so 
efficiency will be more of an issue. When I was setting up the packhouse, I used to go nuts, 
until I realised I was going crazy over 10 cents a carton. It wasn’t worth it. Get more people. 
In addition, despite the significant on-cost, it was pointed out by two Chinese informants that the 
level of health care provided for rural farmers is far from satisfactory. According to them, a 
government official would have all medical expenses covered by health insurance, but for a rural 
villager, only treatments that involve hospitalisation are eligible for claims against health insurance. 
Furthermore, depending on the grade of the hospital a villager chooses to go to, only 50 to 70 per 
cent of the expenses incurred during hospitalisation will be covered by health insurance. The villager 
still needs to front up the other 30 to 50 per cent of the costs, and any other costs of treatments 
that do not involve hospitalisation.  
The inadequate health care system available to rural farmers has meant that the mentality of 
survival and quick success remains alive and well in the rural community. This has been discussed in 
section 3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival. For a foreign agribusiness operating in China, it is therefore very 
important to ensure that all measures are taken to minimise health and safety issues, as one New 
                                                          
33 An overhead expense. 
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Zealand senior manager pointed out: 
There is quite a focus on health and safety. But the other thing is that if you do have an 
accident, again, as a foreign company, you are under the gun.… With people here in the 
countryside, health is a major issue. If you get sick, it will ruin you, or if you get injured. 
That’s why you’ve got to be really careful, because any small issue, you will have to claim 
[insurance], or they [farmers] will be putting pressure on you, because they can’t afford to 
[get sick].  
3.5.3.1.5.3 Skilled and motivated farmers 
For those who are on the land, the skills and motivation to farm well are undeniable, according to 
the observations of some informants. One New Zealand senior manager commented: 
To the land and the agribusiness … one of the first recognitions that people need to 
understand is that you can’t teach the Chinese farmer much about growing things – most 
brilliant farmers in the world. Okay, you’ve got a bit of pesticides … and that’s maybe 
training about how to deal with things in a different way. But in terms of when the Chinese 
farmer is inspired to grow something, they grow it very, very well. There is a great 
motivation to do a good job, in terms of producing stuff, whether it’s growing pigs, whether 
it’s growing vegetables, or whatever.… For a New Zealand company to come, and think that, 
for example … let’s come and teach the Chinese people how to grow kiwifruit. Bollocks! 
Can’t do it.… This whole concept of ‘Let’s go and own vast orchards of kiwifruit, vast 
orchards of apples’, or whatever it is, is not going to work. You have to be able to tap into 
the strength of China, which is inspiring people who have got very, very little, and give them 
an opportunity to grow something that can make them money, and lift their family out of 
poverty.  
3.5.3.1.6 Disconnection between science and farming  
Some of the informants noted that what is being researched in science, particularly the 
agricultural sciences, in China is not always closely linked to the actually practices in farming. 
Many scientists focus on the number of publications they produce rather than the practical 
implications of their research. A New Zealand agricultural consultant talked about a grassland 
scientist in Guizhou, who, he believes, is very practical, and the farms are performing well under 
his guidance. Yet other scientists from other provinces told this New Zealand consultant that “He 
doesn’t publish very much”, or “He is working on applied stuff, he is not doing real science”. As 
this consultant commented: 
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Science organisations are often quite separate from the implementation agencies, and 
there is a lot of guarding your territory going on. That’s one aspect of it. The second is, the 
scientists, in many cases I think, are very academic in their approach and their thinking, and 
less focused on developing practical outcomes. They are really focused on achieving the 
academic outcomes.… I think it’s for the recognition.… There is kind of a snobbery. I guess 
people’s own measure, or institutions’ measures, of academic success are papers published 
in English-language journals … so there is a lot of really good science being done, but it’s 
disconnected from the science needs at the farm level or a county level.  
This disconnection between science and actual farming needs is also reflected in the eagerness 
for quick success among scientists, as one Chinese agricultural consultant pointed out: 
Science and research in China [are] seriously disconnected [from] the practical implications. 
Science should not be inside the ivory tower; it should direct production, and then your 
science and research would have life. But now, because a scientist needs to publish 
papers, … he needs to hurry it along. Consequently, it is possible that a lot of data have not 
been collected [and analysed] for 3 years. ‘I can’t wait for 3 years. Promotion is next year, 
and I want to get into a senior position, so I need to publish the paper this year.’ His data 
therefore are not [collected and analysed] from a practical perspective, and hence [do] not 
[create] the close connection between research institutions and the farmers. This is a 
serious problem in China.34  
This disconnection between science and farming extends to a disconnection between extension 
workers, or farm technicians, and the farmers. One New Zealand agricultural consultant described 
how the technicians in Inner Mongolia used to go to the local villages for 3 days at a time, 
summon the farmers to the local school, then read out new technologies from a book to them. In 
contrast, he said that in New Zealand, technicians always go to show the farmers how to do things 
in the field, and get farmers to talk among themselves. Or they choose a farmer to demonstrate 
to other farmers. He went on to say: 
There is a common view among the extension [workers], they are called technicians in 
China, who are mostly city people, and they get to be technicians because they passed the 
                                                          
34 Original Chinese quote: 国内的科研和实际严重的脱节。科研不是说是象牙塔里的科研，你要指导生
产。你这样的科研才会是一个有生命力的科研。但是现在因为他要发文章，所以呢他要把他搞得很
快。这样就变得呢他更多的数据呢，可能也没有说要做三年。‘我三年的时间我等不了，我晋级马上
明年的事，就要评高级职称啦，这个文章今年就要发了。’所以他的这个数据没有一个从实际的角度
出发 [来收集和分析] ，所以也没有 [形成] 科研机构和农户之间的一个很紧密的联系。国内这个问题很
严重。 
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exam to get [into] university and it’s harder for the country people to do that … you often 
hear them saying that ‘Oh, the farmers are dumb, and they don’t do what we’ve asked 
them to do.’ But they fail to understand that farmer make decisions for all sorts of reasons. 
There is either a high risk about the technology that the technician might be wanting to take 
to the farmer, or [it] might be cash up front, which the families just don’t have, to make 
investments in seed or fertiliser, or there may be major health issues.  
Another characteristic of operating in agribusiness that was identified by some informants again 
reflects the disconnection between science and farming: technicians lack practical skills. One New 
Zealand senior manager explained: 
We’ve been very successful at recruiting graduates out of the agricultural universities, and 
vet universities, and we put them on basically an internship programme, so that we are 
seeing where their core skills are, and then helping them develop. Often they’ve got 
incredibly good knowledge, but absolutely no practical. That’s the bit that we need to 
resolve. Literally, you have qualified vets who’ve never touched an animal.  
3.5.3.2 Social environment 
Coexisting with the legal and operational environments is the social environment that 
agribusinesses find themselves operating within. According to comments made by the informants, 
New Zealand enjoys a good reputation in China because of the ‘three firsts’ (see below) and its 
integrity in food safety and quality. “As New Zealanders, we are incredibly lucky, we are incredibly 
highly regarded in China, and I think that makes it a lot easier to have doors open to build 
relationships”, a New Zealand senior manager commented. China, however, does not receive the 
same level of favouritism in New Zealand. 
3.5.3.2.1 New Zealand’s four firsts 
New Zealand is often favourably thought of as a country by the Chinese, and this is related to the 
‘four firsts’ that New Zealand has achieved, according to some informants. The four firsts refer to: 
New Zealand was the first country to agree to China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) by concluding the bilateral negotiations component of that process in 1997; New Zealand 
was the first developed country to recognise China as a market economy; New Zealand was the 
first developed country to commence Free Trade Agreement negotiations with China, which was 
launched in November 2004; and in April 2008, New Zealand was the first country to successfully 
conclude a Free Trade Agreement negotiation with China (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
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& Trade, 2016)35.  
Of the four firsts, the latest receives the most recognition and has the biggest implication in the 
business context. A New Zealand district mayor commented: 
I think some of the best things are around our big first. What Rewi Alley did and all those 
sort of things, Chinese people have great reverence for that. That we signed the Free Trade 
Agreement first … and the fact that we spend, in my view, quite a lot of effort, trying to 
maintain relationships with China, for the size of our country, I think that’s recognised as 
well. 
I think at the moment they hugely respect us, because we are the first country that signed a 
Free Trade Agreement. And I know they will be signing others, and may well have signed 
others since. When I go around, they say, ‘Yeah, we know. New Zealand, the first one!’ The 
fact that we were first is significant. We are treated as a non-threatening country. We are 
not the United States. We are not considered as colonial like the UK. Similar to Australia, 
although they are more reliant on Australia than they are on New Zealand, because of the 
minerals.… But they value us. We are a small place, but we’ve got a stable system in the 
government; we’ve been there right from the beginning; we were prepared to take a risk on 
our relationship with China, and I think they respect us for that. It is a good thing.… Most 
Chinese know where New Zealand is. They might not know where anything else is. They 
know where New Zealand is, and they generally have a nice impression of New Zealand.  
Another New Zealand senior manager also viewed this first as a great advantage: 
The fact that our government worked hard to become the first partner in a free trade 
agreement with China, in reality, there are many Chinese [who] know and understand that. 
I think we get recognition for that, the fact that we worked hard to make it happen. By 2016 
[tariffs] will be down to zero. That will give us significant trading advantage.  
3.5.3.2.2 New Zealand’s integrity in food safety and quality 
Despite the number of incidents in recent years regarding food safety issues involving New 
Zealand, this country remains highly regarded for its integrity in ensuring the highest food safety 
and quality standards. One New Zealand senior manager explained: “I was told … that Norway and 
New Zealand were the two countries that they valued in terms of food integrity.… Things that we do 
                                                          
35 In 2015, New Zealand was also known to be the first Western country to join China’s Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) (Rutherford, 2015), and this is referred to as the ‘fifth first’ by some people.  
117 
 
with our food, and the processes and so on.” 
Informants also commented that the recent food safety incidents had generally played in New 
Zealand’s favour. One New Zealand senior manager spoke about the outcomes of the melamine 
scandal in 2008: 
We dreaded it [the consequence of the scandal], because we thought it might have been 
negative, but it was actually positive. It was the fact that New Zealand was the whistle 
blower in the melamine scare of Fonterra. New Zealand is seen as clean, green, natural, 
safe, [and] fresh. The fact that New Zealand put itself out, went to the Chinese government, 
said, ‘You’ve got a problem. You will need to fix this,’ particularly when young babies are 
involved and things, only strengthened New Zealand’s reputation.  
A New Zealand business consultant shared what he saw as the result of the botulism scare in late 
2013: 
When I look at the scare of what happened with Fonterra and botulism ... and things that 
were going on in the media.… Well that’s fine. It still doesn’t change New Zealand’s position, 
because if you take a dairy farm here in China, and a dairy farm in New Zealand, you take 
the photos of the two, you show it to the consumer, what are they going to think? It’s chalk 
and cheese.… My thinking is that everything is a product of their environment.… So we are 
still in a good position, we just need to adjust our positioning, and it’s call transparency, and 
it’s called, ‘We’ve got nothing to hide.’ 
A New Zealand senior manager also thought that this incident did no harm to New Zealand’s 
reputation: 
They talk about New Zealand losing traction in China because of the scares. But actually, 
when you talk to a consumers in China, they don’t see it that way. They see it completely 
the opposite, that New Zealand is the only one says, ‘Shit, we got it wrong. Even though we 
might have been a bit late, but we don’t care about that.’ They just say, ‘Look, we trust New 
Zealand, and it’s like having an old friend, and New Zealand is an old friend. So, yeah, okay, 
you might have stubbed your toe, but we originally trusted you, and that trust has not been 
destroyed by this one little blip.’  
Another New Zealand senior manager shared his thoughts on the positive future of agribusiness 
trading between the two countries due to New Zealand’s good reputation for food safety and 
quality, and the close relationship the two countries have politically, despite the recent incidents: 
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I think our reputation is good, regardless of the issues that we had over the last couple of 
years. Fonterra issues, botulism and Sanlu [melamine scandal], the meat issue and Zespri 
issue, I guess, are the current ones.… In the circles that we are mixing, [New Zealand] food 
quality, food safety are still at the top, from the Chinese perspective, so I think that they are 
engaging with people that they genuinely want to be doing business with, so doors are 
immediately open. Politically, we know that New Zealand and China have … a close 
relationship that neither party wants to compromise. We are so reliant on them as a 
market. They are so reliant on us as a supplier. Plus I think there are other political issues [in 
which] we’ve been proactively positive, so we do have a good relationship. I think that’s 
been positive.  
3.5.3.2.3 Food safety concerns 
Food safety concerns are at the forefront for many Chinese people, which in turn gives New 
Zealand a unique position for the sale of its food products into China because of its integrity in 
terms of food safety and quality, as mentioned above. A New Zealand business consultant 
commented: 
For Chinese people, they know the air is polluted, they know the water is polluted, they 
know the foods are polluted in China. They all know that. What can they control? They can’t 
control the air. They can’t control the water, and the food. If you get your story and your 
product in front of the right people, and it’s all traceability, all that jazz, the price point is 
irrelevant. They don’t care. They don’t care at all. ‘How much is that?’ ‘It’s a hundred bucks 
a kilo.’ Bang! ‘I don’t care. I will take that, and I will take it every week.’  
A senior manager from a New Zealand dairy company spoke about her humbling experience when 
recruiting Chinese staff: 
It’s very, very humbling when you are interviewing someone for a job, and they say that 
they want to work for you, because you are making safe milk, which will keep our babies 
safe. When people actually say that out loud, as Kiwis, we are not used to that, and just 
assume that everything is safe.  
Contrary to New Zealand’s good reputation on food safety, as observed by some of the 
informants, some of the food safety practices in China were seen as far from desirable. One New 
Zealand senior manager commented: 
They will have a massive food poison happening one day, I am sure, because you can’t just 
keep getting away [with it]. It makes a mockery [of] how tough they are with our processes, 
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on our hygiene standards and things, when it’s so hypocritical when you look at [their] own. 
We were just about dry retching going through some of those plants.… It’s all about cutting 
the costs.  
Another couple of New Zealand senior managers spoke about the challenges faced in procuring 
safe fruit in China due to these less satisfactory food safety practices: 
Food safety is certainly a big challenge for us.… There is a real tension there.… The issue 
around food safety and sprays and those sort[s] of things, and counterfeit, arguably, at the 
system farm level is rife, because those people [farmers] are earning[a] very small amount 
of money. Anything they can do to add to their income, or stretch it further, they are going 
to do. At the basic level, people would be putting whatever they can on the fruit to get 
more … production, or better size, or whatever. They were subsistence.  
I know for us, it’s to be able to be a change agent for managing food production in a natural 
way, using science, technology and some standard good practices, and that’s probably our 
single biggest challenge … procuring what we consider verifiable, safe food in China for 
supplying to major international supermarkets in China. 
These food safety concerns are often magnified when issues related to infant formula come under 
the spotlight. A New Zealand district mayor shared his concerns for New Zealand’s future trading 
with China on food products after the botulism scare happened in late 2013: 
They [the Chinese] generally have a nice impression of New Zealand. This milk scare type of 
thing doesn’t help, but generally they have a good impression of New Zealand, clean, green, 
not many people, beautiful, that type of thing, safe, healthy, wholesome type of food.… I 
am just mortified by what has just happened with the milk powder last week [botulism 
scare].… What happened last week is very serious for us.… I don’t think that we can keep 
doing that. I think if something big like this happens again, the New Zealand milk powder 
industry may not recover from it. Chinese people have gone to foreign powders because 
they consider them safe. It is not like buying a kiwifruit. You’ve got a child. The child needs 
formula. The child is the most beautiful bundle of joy in a person’s life. They will do anything 
to guarantee his or her safety. So the emotional connections that go with the safety of milk 
powder are much more heightened than if it was tomatoes that [have] residues on them. So 
I think we should not underestimate the significance about what just happened. I think we 
can recover, but if it happens again, I am not sure we can.  
To address these food safety concerns the Chinese government have also strengthened their rules 
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and regulation. One New Zealand CEO commented: 
China has become more stringent in their requirements. A lot of that unfortunately has 
come out of the food scare with Fonterra and things. The government in China has taken 
more of an interest in food safety requirements, and that’s starting to reflect in some of 
their regulations. So it’s got tougher. 
3.5.3.2.4 Some New Zealanders’ prejudice towards China and Chinese people  
In contrast to the good reputation that New Zealand and New Zealanders enjoy in China, China 
and Chinese people are not always thought of favourably by New Zealanders, as some informants 
observed, particularly when it comes to Chinese investment in New Zealand. One New Zealand 
business consultant commented: 
There is a large, unwashed population of New Zealand that is suspicious of, fearful of, and 
antipathetic towards all strangers and foreigners. We don’t welcome Chinese buying Crafar 
farms, we don’t like the ideas of Chinese buying into Fonterra, if they ever did. We don’t like 
the idea of Yashili36 building a milk plant here. We think somehow they are going to steal 
something. So getting over that level of prejudice … I think it is prejudice, I think there is a 
huge subset of people in New Zealand who … there is a racist attitude there at so many 
levels, particularly on the left of the spectrum, in my view. 
A New Zealand district mayor also observed this prejudice within his community: 
I think there is an inherent, still, an inherent racism in New Zealand against China, Chinese 
people … and I think that’s transferred from what might have been unknown. We don’t 
know, we haven’t been to China. It’s a huge country that is under Communist control. It 
used to be that. Now I think the racist element is coming because people are scared by the 
growing middle and upper class in China, the wealth of them and their ability to buy. That’s 
what I think [it] has been transferred to now.… I think there is still an element of that. I 
detect it in [my district], even though we’ve had a 30-year relationship. I just ignore it, or 
push it aside, because I found Chinese people being fantastic here, very trustworthy, 
hardworking, never cause any problems, just want to get on and succeed, which is great. 
But there is a … great unwashed ignorant type of people … who are a bit jealous of some of 
their success.  
New Zealand media, as perceived by some informants, are often negative about China and the 
                                                          
36 A Chinese infant formula and soy product company. 
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Chinese way of doing things, and such negativity is not always justified. One New Zealand senior 
manager pointed out: 
One thing that I think we’ve learned is that what we hear in the media in New Zealand and 
what’s gone wrong in China is always the Chinese fault, and the complexity of the Chinese 
system. Whereas the reality that we’ve seen is that it’s [as] much of the fault of the people 
trying to interact, be they government or commercial, from New Zealand, who have 
screwed up somehow, made errors, which the Chinese [then] reacted to in their own way. 
But the fault … is not something which is deliberately created. The example of the meat 
export, one that we are constantly reminded of, is that that could have been solved in New 
Zealand long ago if the New Zealanders had been more effective in terms of their own 
systems, and in their own relationships up in China … when the problem did arise. So the 
Chinese, at the end of the day, were just doing what they kind of have to do. 
Media has always … portrayed that this has been a problem in China, the Chinese system is 
too complex, you never quite know who you are dealing with, or what you are dealing with, 
so that means that every so often things just go wrong and you won’t know why. Well, in 
that case [the meat case], they did know why, and they should know why, and they should 
have been able to fix it from New Zealand.  
3.5.4 Challenges for New Zealand agribusinesses 
“China is still an agrarian economy”, a New Zealand CEO commented at the interview. Within this 
economy, ventures in the agribusiness and food sector are confronted by some challenges that 
are unique to this sector. These challenges − some of which are perceived as risks by some 
informants − come from “the nature of the product, and the sensitive politics element of it”, as 
one New Zealand senior manager described it. This section of the thesis is dedicated to discussing 
these unique challenges faced by New Zealand agribusinesses, as perceived by the informants of 
this research, from the legal and operational perspectives, and from a cultural perspective. 
3.5.4.1 Legal and operational challenges 
Various challenges were identified by informants for agribusinesses operating in China. Some of 
these challenges were believed to be unique to China, and some were not. 
3.5.4.1.1 Lengthy timeframe required 
One of the overwhelming messages coming from the informants was the lengthy timeframe that 
it required to make progress in business ventures in China. One New Zealand senior manager 
commented: “Timeframes − things take so much longer to be done here [in China]. We have a very 
direct approach to things, [whereas the] Chinese are going round and round and round, so you have 
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to be incredibly patient.” Informants talked specifically about the lengthy timeframes required to 
build trusting business relationships, as well as to make progress on business transactions. 
3.5.4.1.1.1 Lengthy timeframe to develop trusting business relationships 
One New Zealand senior manager explained that: 
Business partner[-ship] is about trust, and that takes a long time to build. So you now 
know where the boundaries of theirs are, and what they are looking for, and likewise, 
they look to you to find out where your boundary is and what you are looking for. 
Indeed, as indicated by many informants, trusting business relationships take time to develop. 
The basis of such lengthy timeframes, informants said, was that no one should be trusted when 
entering the Chinese market until they have proven trustworthy. One New Zealand CEO 
commented: 
China is not the place to rush into, and setting up structures too early. You’ve got to walk 
before you run, you’ve got to do your homework. You should do the basic things right, start 
very small, and don’t trust anybody. That’s a harsh thing for New Zealand to understand. 
But work on that principle from day one. It’s terrible, but even if you are very close, and you 
developed this relationship, just don’t trust anybody.… You shouldn’t trust anybody for at 
least 5 years. And that’s a terrible thing to say. For New Zealanders, we are so naïve, we 
believe pretty much everything everybody says must be right. That isn’t the case with a 
large chunk of the way we do business in China. So don’t trust anybody, take 5 years. Take 
double the time you’d [expect for] anything else. 
Another New Zealand senior manager also said that time is the essence, when asked what was 
required to build a trusting business relationship: 
Time. Literally time. You literally have to spend time … all of us here, the long-term people, 
they just repeat over and over again. Boots on the ground, time spent in China. You cannot 
do deals by flying backwards and forwards from New Zealand to China. You have got to get 
right inside the whole operation of that, where you are on a proper friendship basis. 
Let’s say that you seriously want to do business with China, and your company says, ‘We 
have made a strategic decision to come to China.’ That’s a really important decision in itself, 
because for you to make that decision, you have also got to accept ‘I am going to financially 
support my entry to China for as long as it takes.’ And it might take 10 years…. So if you 
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think that you can jump into China and in 6 months or 1 year build a successful business, 
you are dreaming. You are absolutely dreaming.  
A New Zealand middle manager also observed some practical challenges in building relationships: 
“Relationships aren’t built on their own. It takes months and months of dinners and banquets and 
drinking, which isn’t always easy.” Another New Zealand mid-level manager, who visited China for 
the first time and was assigned to do some plant trials in a certain area by his senior management, 
shared what he learned from his Chinese helper: 
The comment that James [pseudonym] made to me, he felt that, one of the main 
differences was that the Chinese like to spend their time building a relationship. He said 
that it wouldn’t be unusual for me to go there, and spend the summer there, and not do the 
trial at all, just be there, communicate with the local government, go out for dinner with 
them, have a look around the town, and build the relationship. Then come back next year, 
and put the trial in then. He said that that wouldn’t have been unusual. Whereas I turned up 
there, met them, a week later I was asking ‘How do I cultivate the land?’ and ‘How do I do 
this?’ He sort of felt that I was rushing things.  
3.5.4.1.1.2 Lengthy timeframe for business transactions 
“I think China moves at an incredible pace, once you understand how to make it move. If you 
don’t understand how to make it move, then it seems to be incredibly slow. But that’s generally a 
lack of understanding as to what’s important”, one New Zealand senior manager commented. A 
New Zealand business consultant believed that things moved slowly until the decision maker was 
convinced of the ‘right move’: 
In China, everything moves so slowly until you get to the decision maker. You get access to 
this guy? You go and see him.… I am looking at doing some deals coming back into New 
Zealand for products out of China … and we want funding for about 100 million dollars. No 
problem at all. Absolutely no problem. Go talk to the right guy. Money is no issue, if you talk 
to the right guy. 
There is an apparent contradiction whereby, on the one hand, China, as a whole, and Chinese 
business development are progressing at a high speed, yet, on the other hand, business people 
encounter painstakingly slow progress when it comes to making progress in business transactions. 
A New Zealand district mayor shared his impression of dealing with Chinese business people who 
were considering investing in New Zealand: 
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Things … I found take quite a long time. They [the Chinese]’ll come back and have a concept, 
and they are still thinking about it in 6 months’ time, and they’ll come back and we will talk 
about it, to take it to the next stage, rather than next week.  
For New Zealanders who are venturing into China it also takes time to achieve certain business 
goals, as one New Zealand middle manager noted:  
You’ve just got to be patient, which would be another main thing. Things don’t happen 
overnight. As they say, in New Zealand, you can register a company in 10 minutes or 
something, here it takes 5 or 6 months. Constant need of things … documents … nothing 
black and white, a lot of grey area. 
The existence of the ‘grey economy’, as explained in 3.2.4 The grey economy, functions as the 
lubricant in business transactions for moving things along. For those who decide against engaging 
in the activities of this economy, business transactions can take much longer. As one New Zealand 
CEO explained: 
I think … our company has a policy not to be engaged in such things, and that’s caused us 
more than a fair share of strife and hold-ups. But … it’s systemic, and to change systemic 
grey marking, it’s alright if you can find politicians that might need products, but to actually 
get to the bottom of some of these other small transactions which [is] where gate keepers 
are involved, that’s a far more systemic issue.… The big thing is that I think that foreign 
companies find it very slow, sometimes unproductive, and some of them give up mainly 
because of that whole thing, because it’s just so difficult for them to transact in China. 
3.5.4.1.2 Biological and environmental challenges 
Unique to the food and agribusiness sector is the influence of biological and environmental 
constraints during production, which are largely uncontrollable. Informants identified this as one 
of the challenges in operating agribusiness firms in China. One New Zealand agricultural 
consultant explained this as follows: 
If you’ve got to supply … [a] manufacturer something, it’s relatively easy to set the 
specifications, put a quality management protocol in place, and decide what you are going 
to do if quality isn’t being achieved, and have very rigorous specifications. In agribusiness, it 
kind of depends on what the product is, what level of specifications. If you are running a 
feed mill to produce compound feed, it would be very simple to write specifications about 
the quality of the feed, the protein, the energy, the … whatever coming out, because you 
have a defined product. When it gets to growing animals or supplying animals … it’s a lot 
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harder to control. You’ve got a lot more environmental influences that require decision 
making to be changed weekly, just as any decision making on a farm … it’s drier than 
expected weather, what do we change to cope with that? That’s quite different from having 
[computer] chips coming out of machine, so it’s a lot more complex system that requires 
interaction.  
[It is a matter of] understanding … the partner’s ability to make decisions, to cope with [the] 
changing climate, changing weather, which then means how hands-on do you have to be. I 
think there is something to be said for a New Zealand company having some people at least 
very hands-on, on the farms, at least in a technical capacity, and helping with those 
decisions on a daily basis. That’s one issue that Jason [pseudonym] got to sort out, because 
he can’t be living in Shanghai, and the farm is 2000 km away, which means that things 
happen, and you only learn about it later.  
The biological and environmental constraints are not only limited to the production phase.  
Product deterioration can occur during transport, post-production. One New Zealand CEO spoke 
about the challenges involved in exporting chilled meat into China: 
It is not possible yet to trade … chilled meat in China, because they haven’t got the 
sophistication for the temperature control. They just haven’t got the infrastructure. They 
haven’t got the holding cold stores. They haven’t got the transport vehicles designed for 
chilled [meat]. And it’s a vast country, so distances become a problem. With chilled [meat], 
product has got to be stored at zero plus or minus a half degree. It’s very, very strict. And if 
it goes out, then you would get deterioration very quickly, so it’s a vulnerable product. 
That’s just a reflection on the size of the country and the lack of infrastructure. Not so much 
for frozen, because when it’s frozen, it’s frozen. But having said that, I am pretty sure that 
when it gets to near the end of the supply chain, it will be thrown in vans without any 
temperature controls, or on bikes, somewhere along the line. But because it’s frozen, it 
hasn’t become an issue. So there is always that risk. Just the vastness of the country, and 
the necessary infrastructure.  
Similarly, in the distribution process of wine, temperature control is important for maintaining the 
quality of the wine. One New Zealand winery owner spoke about the contention that could 
emerge if the temperature control was not satisfactory during transport and distribution: 
White wines, you can’t sell them for any long period of time. They really need to be sold, 
depending on which wine, within a few years or so. But also the way it’s handled in the 
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country, because wine does not like extreme temperatures. It doesn’t like to be in the very 
hot temperatures, so the distribution network and the handling of the product are very 
important in the market.... If the product was not handled properly … and the quality went 
down because of that, and further down a distributor in a city or something, or someone 
who is dealing with the wine said, ‘This wine is not very good quality’, and that’s pointed 
[out] back to the producer, then it’s going to start causing problems…. That could be an area 
of contention…. Of course in China with some of the heat that you get over there, it needs 
to be considered. I mean China … does have its extremes in temperatures. 
The biological and environmental challenges are also reflected in the management of food safety 
issues, particularly at the border of entry. One New Zealand CEO explained why he and his 
business partner decided not to be in the business of importing food and beverage from New 
Zealand into China after discussing the incident of New Zealand meat being held up at the Chinese 
border in May 2013, and the subsequent lawsuit between Danone (a French dairy company) and 
Fonterra after the botulism scare in August 2013: 
Imagine if we had a container of chilled beef just arrived. We are going to deliver. Next 
thing, bang! This was all stopped. I don’t want that risk. Say by some miracle I’ve gone 
through all … the work, and managed to be an agent for Fonterra. Just imagine … the 
amount of work to just to get to that level would be huge. Say if we are bringing … baby 
formula in or something. And next thing, bang, there is a recall comes out, and all the 
material has to go back. How much money would you lose at the end of the day? You might 
be like the … [French] and go to Fonterra and seek compensation. You might … but the fact 
is, you take a hit! That comes out of nowhere! It comes out of the blind side. There is no 
warning for those things.  
3.5.4.1.3 Complicated agribusiness supply chains 
The structure of the agribusiness industries from the supply chain perspective, as observed by 
some informants, is fragmented and complicated. There are many ‘ticket-clippers’ along the 
supply chain, from production through to procurement, processing, distribution and marketing. 
One New Zealand CEO explained how they procure fruit in China: 
Like everything in China, there is normally about five gates you go through. We go to the 
individual farmer associations, so we talk to the farmers through farmer associations. And 
some of those farmer associations act as agents. In some cases, the farmer associations are 
collected under an agent, largely to do with money, because the agent will be the middle 
man, with some money to pay the farmer or the farmer association. And the farmer 
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association takes a fee, the agent takes a fee, the … fertiliser supplier to the grower 
association or the agent takes a fee, so all the way along, there are fees being paid for 
various things, and it just spreads the wealth … that trickle-down effect … those fees spread 
the wealth through the stratum.  
The distribution network involved is just as complicated: 
We deal direct to a wholesaler, or direct to an agent, who then may have an agent with a 
particular wholesaler, who is connected with a supermarket, so you might have three or 
four gates to go through. We deal direct [with] master agents, international brand agents. 
We deal direct to supermarkets in our own right. China is still largely a wet market, where … 
purchases [are made] three times a week, even buying in supermarkets.… The supermarket 
will shop in [a] wet market, or buy in wet markets through a string of agents.… They get into 
direct retail or purchases, particularly for imported product, but also increasingly with 
specification, and they’ll want secure supply lines of certain products domestically as well, 
and that’s the area that we are interested in playing, in being a trusted supplier to major 
brands. 
One of the consequences of such a complicated supply chain is that it brings challenges in terms 
of managing food safety issues, as is widely known by people within the agri-food sector after the 
melamine scandal in 2008. This kind of challenge is not unique to the dairy industry and is often 
aggravated by what might be regarded as compromised moral standards. One New Zealand CEO 
explained the difficulty they face when trying to address the issue of misusing antibiotics, which is 
aggravated further by the generally poor air quality: 
I am trying to stop the use of things like antibiotics in food production in our particular 
supply chain.… They said, ‘What the hell, it’s a creeping death anyway, we might as well use 
it.’ Breathing the air is going to kill them faster. 
3.5.4.1.4 Lack of system thinking 
One factor that has made New Zealand’s food and agribusiness industries among the best in the 
world, as identified by some informants, is the ‘system thinking’ approach, whereby every stage 
of the value chain − from the biological input at the production level, through to procurement, 
processing, distribution and marketing − is part of the system, and these parts need to function in 
a co-ordinated way in order to maximise the outcome from that system. However, this kind of 
system thinking is not commonly seen in China, according to a number of informants. One New 
Zealand agricultural consultant explained it like this: 
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I think Kiwis by and large … [understand] that you have to adapt the system to the particular 
environment that you are working at.... It’s a reflection, I think, of the way that agriculture is 
taught in New Zealand universities and Australian universities.… In the States, it tends to be 
not that much system focused. It tends to be more discipline focused, and that’s what the 
Chinese have done with their education and training. So you can get people who are really 
good on their discipline, but they don’t understand the whole system.… I think that’s 
actually one of the biggest contributions that New Zealand can make, is helping people in 
science, people in administering agriculture [in China], to understand that we are working 
with a system, and need to understand the interaction of the whole system.  
This lack of system thinking presents real challenges in the day-to-day management of 
agribusiness operations in China, because it is difficult to find staff with the desired mind-set, 
particularly staff at the management level. One New Zealand senior manager commented: 
More and more, and it’s a slightly sad comment that we are recognising that we would have 
to build our own people almost entirely from within. We’ve looked, and have been looking 
very hard at people from other businesses within China, and we are finding there is a gaping 
chasm between what we would consider acceptable and how they do things. We had 
hoped … we would produce two or possibly three managers from within our ... system, and 
looked to get one or two externally from within China. What we are identifying is that we 
just wouldn’t be comfortable to take people from within China. That’s a sweeping 
statement − there will always be exceptions. 
3.5.4.1.5 Lack of volume of supply from New Zealand 
The vast difference in size between New Zealand and China has meant that it is impossible for 
New Zealand to satisfy Chinese consumers’ demand for agri-food products. One New Zealand 
senior manager explained it like this: 
Look at the figures. New Zealand, 4.5 million people; China, 1.3 billion. New Zealand can’t 
produce enough to supply all of China. Sichuan province itself is about 80 million people. 
Chongqing is 30 [million], so you are up to 110 [million]. Yunnan is 60 million. Guizhou is 30 
million. If you just look at that little circle, you’ve got 200 million people, which is almost as 
big as [half of] Europe.  
If you are a New Zealand company, and you come up with something … that was going to 
sell everywhere, you couldn’t meet the demand. If every Chinese person started to eat 
butter tomorrow, New Zealand couldn’t produce enough butter. If every Chinese person 
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started to eat lamb, you couldn’t supply even a 10th of it. Actually there [are] some 
interesting statistics. Somebody figured out that if the New Zealand land mass was 
converted to a farm, and it produced food [for a year], it could only feed China for 4 days. 
So New Zealand is never, ever going to conquer China.  
Other informants shared a similar view. A New Zealand business consultant commented: 
Let’s put it this way, China … [is] going to take all your product anyway. They are just going 
to take the whole lot, whatever you are producing. Apart from the big boys like Fonterra. 
The meat guys, if they get it right, China will swallow it up.… The problem with New Zealand 
is about scale.  
Similarly, a district mayor in New Zealand said: 
One of the things that we are struggling with in New Zealand, though, is to supply enough 
volume in a way that they are used to handling it.… What we don’t have in New Zealand 
easily is a way of meeting the demand when something takes off.… We can’t produce 
enough often to satisfy the demand. 
Such lack of volume of supply leads to the value proposition of high-end and luxurious agri-food 
products. However, some informants saw challenges in that approach too. One winery owner 
explained: 
Now in wine, you either have a small amount of wine, you have a middle amount, or you 
have a large amount. And one of the biggest fears for Chinese [is], has New Zealand got 
enough wine to supply me if it is really successful. That’s an important question. And if New 
Zealand wine took off in China, the answer is ‘no’. We can’t. We’ve almost maxed out with 
our vineyard areas, so we haven’t. So for New Zealand, it is smaller volume, added value, 
higher price.  
Another New Zealand business consultant commented: 
Everyone is going in and say[ing], ‘Right, we will hit the top [sell premium products].’ But 
what they do is … they might have a good margin, but sell nothing, so what’s the point? So 
you need to come in with a different strategy. 
This lack of volume of supply provides the rationale to produce inside China. As one New Zealand 
senior manager said, “New Zealand, in New Zealand, can never hope to satisfy the demand for 
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growth in China”. The challenges that come with operating agricultural production inside China 
are covered in other sub-sections of 3.5.4 Challenges for New Zealand agribusinesses. 
3.5.4.2 Social challenges 
Parallel to the legal and operational challenges that confront of New Zealand agribusinesses are 
the social challenges. Among them, the language barrier and the politics of food were identified 
as the most significant. 
3.5.4.2.1 Language barrier 
Several informants identified the language barrier as the biggest challenge overall when in China. 
The challenge lies within the unknown, and hence the uncertainty, during communication. One 
New Zealand CEO explained: 
I think my personal frustration [is] that I do not speak Chinese. If you don’t speak Chinese, 
it’s a bit like … and we do it in the New Zealand scenes or any Western economy, that the 
innuendo [and slang] give us all [sorts of insights].… It’s interesting that when you hear a 
European speak, within half an hour of them speaking, you pretty much can categorise their 
educational status, what nation they come from, or what area of the country they may 
come from. So there is a lot of those nuances that you are blind [to], and therefore you just 
can’t see a lot of that unless you are really smart, and you start to pick up a lot of that stuff. 
And it takes a little bit of time, so that’s a huge frustration. 
Another New Zealand senior manager shared her frustration at not being able to speak Chinese, 
and explained that there were lots of “checks and balances” in place within their business 
operation for the purpose of effectively communicating past such language barriers: 
Look … I think the biggest challenge is … sadly I am not fluent in Mandarin. I would love to 
wake up one day and be able to [speak it], but it’s not going to happen. It’s a frustration 
with us, not of China, to be very clear, that we do things in translation. And that’s just life, 
basically. And even with what I would call very high-end Chinese staff, we still need to be 
constantly checking to make sure they’ve heard what we think we told them. So there are 
lots of checks and balances that you put in place to make sure that everyone has the same 
understanding. But … that’s something you would have anywhere in the world where you 
are dealing in a language which is not your own, and it’s how you manage that. And even 
things like different definitions for words, that’s something that we need to be really 
understanding: have we just delivered the message that we think we did? 
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Another New Zealand senior manager commented specifically about the language used at 
meetings, and the uncertainties he sensed when a meeting was conducted in Chinese: 
The other difficulty is what language your meetings are in.… obviously if they are in Chinese, 
then you are never a hundred per cent sure that the message that you are trying to convey 
is actually getting across in that way through the interpreter. It’s a challenge.… Plus, when 
directors or senior management out of here [are] going to Europe, or other markets like 
that, there is a greater level of English, and they can kind of understand a bit more. But 
sometimes when more senior people from here, board of directors, [are] going into China − 
I don’t know whether it was convenient, but there was no English spoken, so it’s very 
difficult for the directors to get a sense of things in China. I think in other markets you get a 
bit more [of a] sense. 
Frustration also arises when translators take a more round-about way in their translation, rather 
than the direct approach preferred by some informants. One New Zealand middle manager 
commented: 
People that we use to translate weren’t translating how we [wanted them] to translate it. 
They will say it softly and in a round-about way, rather than how we say it at home. You just 
say it to the point, and it’s understood, and everyone knows what’s happening. Whereas 
here it can quite often go round and round ... that’s probably one of the bigger challenges. 
Similarly, a New Zealand CEO indicated that much is often “lost in translation”: “A lot of it is lost in 
translation, even with quite good English speakers [who are Chinese], it’s lost in translation.”  
The language barrier also means that foreign expats might struggle with a permanent or semi-
permanent position in smaller towns, as another New Zealand middle manager noted from his 
own experience: 
If I went back there, I’d like to be able to just have conversations with local people. For the 
month when my translator went away, and I couldn’t communicate with anybody, I was 
pretty much just on my own, using hand signals and different things to get by. You are quite 
isolated, and that’s not easy. That’s why I don’t think it would be an easy place for an expat 
to live permanently, or on a sort of semi-permanent basis. 
3.5.4.2.2 Lack of understanding about China in New Zealand 
Informants identified that there are some cultural hurdles when doing business in China or with 
the Chinese. This was, as indicated by some informants, partly due to the language barrier, but 
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also due to the lack of understanding about China and the way things are done in China. One New 
Zealand senior manager explained that it was about understanding the cultural nuances, and that 
a lack of understanding of these nuances creates cultural hurdles: 
I think it’s about how we do business versus how they do business. And it’s the 
understanding of those nuances that we miss, because we don’t understand, and have not 
got a good appreciation of the language, and the body language. Whereas if you are dealing 
with a European, you have a much better ability to interpret those nuances in the language, 
because English … is almost cut and dry. There are way[s] of interpreting, but we are used to 
it, so we can see if we are being misled generally. And we can see from the body language 
whether they are telling us a tall tale or not. Whereas we haven’t learnt yet those nuances 
that go on within the Chinese society.… It’s about understanding the language and some of 
the word usage … you need to understand that signal … to them a signal, but to you, it’s a 
different signal, so you need to understand that, and that interaction. 
Another New Zealand senior manager pointed out that the lack of “Chinese inherent 
understanding” has meant that they did not understand the nuances within certain processes and 
procedures as well as they might have wished while dealing with some of the issues: 
We’ve dealt with our own issues … again because of that lack of Chinese inherent 
understanding, we’ve dealt with stuff for the last 2 years from just a completely foreign 
perspective. I don’t know if we would have done things differently at the end. But we would 
have understood processes and procedures a lot better than we did … expectations and 
those sort of things around how systems work, and what’s expected and required, just the 
nuances of how the systems work. 
Specifically for agribusiness operations, particularly those involving agricultural production, some 
informants pointed out that New Zealanders do not always recognise the need for the quick cash 
returns that many Chinese desire. One New Zealand senior manager commented: 
If you are a Kiwi company coming to China, and Kiwis think in terms of, ‘Oh, let’s build a 
massive farm, and let’s run it really profitably for 30 years, and then we will pass it on to our 
son and daughter, and they’ll run it for a generation.’ The Chinese mind doesn’t think like 
that at all. They want to get the money out as quickly as possible, and mitigate that risk in 
case policy’s changed, or something happens … so cross-culturally, New Zealand companies 
need to figure out that dynamic. 
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This lack of understanding, particularly by those who are based in New Zealand, can sometimes 
cause friction within businesses, making it difficult for the operation in China to proceed. One 
New Zealand senior manager explained with an example of an argument over the necessity of 
having everything ‘signed on a dotted line’: 
Other frustration … is that back here, people don’t get it. We certainly don’t have all the 
answers. But I think we are learning, and I think our learning curve has been pretty steep.... 
But … explaining in our words, the learnings we’ve gone through in terms of why … this 
might be the case in China, which would never really be the case in New Zealand, but in fact 
it’s okay over here, and it’s legitimate, and it’s a good strategy, although we would never do 
it in New Zealand, actually taking people on that journey with you is not easy.… We’ve even 
got stakeholders in this business here, who … would say, ‘Look, you shouldn't be talking to 
anyone in China that … unless everything is black and white, signed on a dotted line, and 
absolutely 100 per cent straight from a Western perspective, you shouldn’t deal with them.’ 
And the answer back to them is, ‘Well. It’s China. I am not saying it’s right or wrong, it’s legal 
or illegal. I am just saying it’s different. And you can’t take your existing preconceptions 
about business environment into the Chinese system and exist there. People here don’t get 
that. Everything is not always written down. 
Some informants attributed this lack of understanding about China in New Zealand to New 
Zealand’s traditional non-China-centric economic reliance, the less diverse demographic makeup 
in previous decades, as well as the lack of Chinese language education. One New Zealand 
restaurant owner explained his perspective, and it is worth quoting at some length: 
The world understands that China is the economic engine going forward. That’s a reality I 
think that most New Zealanders get. What they don’t get is how difficult it actually is for 
New Zealand to engage with China, for us to shift our legacy relationships from Australia 
and the US, and prior to that, they were England … and [there] is that whole cultural legacy, 
that colonial legacy, and then there was the time that I would say the Pacific and 
generations through the North American, Atlantic kind of economy, which is that Anglo-
American economy, and now is basically [it is] China and ASEAN.... And the number is just 
astounding in terms of where that trade’s coming from. But there has not been the 
psychological awakening amongst New Zealand investors or ... I’d say the mass of them ... to 
actually realise how to take advantage of this opportunity, and not to lose the 
opportunity.… It’s ever present, just through very straightforward things, like ... racial 
stereotyping, and a degree of racism in the New Zealand mind-set towards Asians. And that 
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is in itself one enormous hurdle for people to really step up and take advantage of the 
opportunity. Yeah, there [have] been goldminers in Otago since … the 1860s, and we all 
believe that there is this kind of legacy relationship with China, but it’s a drop in the ocean, 
and it’s not important to most people.… Most people wouldn’t know … the difference 
between Cantonese and Mandarin. I mean, that’s the reality.  
It is getting better. I think with a new generation of people, I would say under 25 from my 
experience, with people in my family who do business in China, who are young students in a 
university, have grown up with a mind-set that, ‘Okay, that guy is from Bangladesh; that guy 
is from Iran; he is from Singapore, he is from Korea; and, oh yeah, I went on a trip with him 
to Japan.... And they are kind of the same.… Some guys are black, some guys are white, and 
some guys are yellow.’ That’s normal amongst us, as it’s kind of … a tribal species. But, 
under a certain age, those stereotypes of legacy [have] largely been eliminated. At least 
that’s what I see from my experience with the youth when I interview people from Europe. 
We have internship[s] from all over the world to come here. [They] kind of basically said, 
‘Okay, I am now going to Asia, as opposed to previously I would have done all my 
internships in Holland, or Germany.’ So that kind of discernment is real. But anyone north of 
25, which is kind of ... 40 … I still think there [are] a lot of challenges to people who are in 
corporate New Zealand. There are large institutions that have some legacy baggage, 
whether they are government institutions, or large corporations, and that’s just the reality 
of where the country is at. There is a fantastic ground swell of change.... I have fantastic 
experiences with young New Zealanders who are coming here. But it’s a small population. 
The level of sophistication is not high. But there is a hunger and desire to learn more, so 
that’s a great positive.  
You know, we are not the first people to the party cab. We think we have a God-gifted right 
to be doing business in China, and that because we are from New Zealand, we are nice guys, 
we’ve got this great product.… It’s not quite that easy. You need to work [out] what they are 
about culturally, what motivates them, what incentivises them, and how do you become 
relevant. Yeah, you may have great product, you might have great dairy powder, you may 
have a great aquamarine product, you may have great technology, but you really need to 
work out, ‘Okay, how am I going to get that up to China, and how are they going to be 
interested in it?’ And on the flip side, the other reality is that the Chinese are better 
prepared to do business in New Zealand than New Zealanders are … to do business in China. 
[At] a most straightforward level, language. If you’ve worked out the number of Chinese to 
go to New Zealand speaking English, I don't care how shitty their English is, they can actually 
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communicate with you, versus the number of New Zealanders who come to China and are 
literally in need of a translator with them 24/7. I mean, that’s just an operational reality. I 
didn’t come to China speaking Chinese, and that was very difficult. It’s still difficult. But if 
you are going to do business in a country, you’d better have someone with you 24/7, or be 
ready to have that, and understand cultural nuances.  
A New Zealand senior manager spoke about the need to educate the general public in New 
Zealand about China and ensure university graduates have some understanding about China: 
Your graduates from New Zealand … somehow getting them an understanding of China.... 
It’s just such a big beast. It’s going to be everyone’s world in some way … so anything that 
you can do to … not so much of doing business in China, but just that appreciation of what’s 
here and what’s involved. Everyone should have some basic rounding of it, I believe. You 
look at the numbers of kids that are doing Mandarin in New Zealand, it’s pitiful. 
This lack of understanding of China is sometimes reflected in the negative media slant about 
China in New Zealand’s media. This was discussed in 3.5.3.2.4 Some New Zealander’s prejudice 
towards China and Chinese people. This prejudice − as it is seen by some informants − was not due 
to arrogance, but rather a lack of understanding. One New Zealand senior manager commented, 
“I think it’s just a lack of understanding…. I don’t think it’s arrogance. It’s just the understanding.” 
Another New Zealand senior manager explained that such lack of understanding, and the 
resulting fear and prejudice, was due to not spending enough time in China: 
When New Zealanders come up … they get scared, because they don’t have that linkage.… 
In my opinion, that’s what makes them scared. They don’t have the linkage, so they come 
up here, and they get frightened, and they do stupid things that they wouldn’t do if they 
[were] going to Australia, because your customs basically say you are comfortable in that 
environment, whereas here, ‘Whoa, I don’t know anybody. This person is trying to do 
something, I am not sure that’s the right thing.’  
They say it’s very hard to work out the body language of a Chinese person. Yes, but you are 
not here long enough. Yeah, they might have different ways of reacting. They are going to 
be stony faced, but it’s there for a reason. So we need to spend more time, and feel 
comfortable. There is a lot of prejudice in New Zealand. And I notice it now when I go back, 
and I feel very uncomfortable with it, because these are my people, and I don’t like them 
being criticised. I read a lot of stuff in the newspaper, it’s just a load of dribble. And they 
always pick out some peculiarity, something that’s gone on here that paints the place in a 
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bad way.… People are people … and you live here, and they are basically the same. It 
doesn’t matter what they look like, and how they behave, in a way, basically they are the 
same. They have the same needs, the same wants as anybody. Just if you understand that, 
then it takes away that fear. And prejudice comes from fear.  
However, some other informants were less optimistic about overcoming such a lack of 
understanding. One New Zealand middle manager suggested that the way to fully understand ‘the 
Chinese way’ is by fully integrating into a living and working situation with the Chinese: 
I’ve only lived here [China] for … just over a year … probably need to marry into a Chinese 
family to grasp it fully. I do spend a lot of time, just around Chinese people.… You’d have to 
fully integrate into a living situation and a working situation with the Chinese, and for a 
number of years, to fully understand.  
A Chinese senior manager saw that the cultural hurdles were indeed significant to overcome, both 
for foreigners going to China, and for Chinese going to another country: 
Chinese [in another country] would have great difficulty in integrating into their circle.… 
They [foreigners] would not accept.… To be able to communicate heart to heart like two 
Chinese do, it would still be very difficult.… It’s not [the language barriers], it’s still the 
cultural differences. He [the New Zealand business partner who was based in China] also 
finds it difficult to integrate with the Chinese, because there is the language barriers [to 
start with].37  
3.5.4.2.3 Politics of food 
Different ports of entry can often have different requirements for similar types of documentation, 
as noted by some informants. One New Zealand winery owner said, “Policies with regard to 
importation and rules surrounding borders and customs, they are very challenging, because one 
border has one set of rules, and another port has another set of rules”.  
Other informants recognised the political games that governments play against each other using 
the importation of certain food products. This was recognised as a significant risk that is beyond 
the businesses’ control. Maintaining good relationships with border officials was identified as the 
way to reduce this kind of risk. As one New Zealand senior manager explained:  
                                                          
37 Original Chinese quote: 中国人 [在国外] 很难融入他们那个圈子 … 人家不接受的 … 能够处得像中国人
那样能够交心的，还是很难的 … 不是 [因为语言上的障碍] ，还是文化差异。他也很难融到中国人中
去，因为他语言就不通嘛。 
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We’ve seen it operating with oranges, and now it’s happening with apples, [it involves] 
understanding where politics get involved in the business…. The worst nightmare is 
potentially around market access or being shut out of a market. It’s understanding how 
much of that is genuine market access around quarantine issues, and how much is 
politically driven. We’ve seen the issue with American oranges into China, which arguably 
would be solved by addressing access of Chinese product into America. Similar thing is 
happening with apples as well. How do you safeguard business against politics? And that’s 
our nightmare, is that things happen for unforeseen reasons … and that we get caught up 
in those sort of things. That’s part of the purpose for trying to forge as broad and deep 
relationship as we can with officials and with the government at a high level, so that we 
don’t find ourselves becoming a casualty of something like that. 
3.5.4.2.4 Difficult to change habitual farming practices 
Apart from a general resistance to change by staff members, as discussed in 3.5.2.3.5 Resistance 
to change, some informants also referred to the challenges in getting farmers to change their 
farming practices for a particular kind of agricultural production. One New Zealand agricultural 
consultant said, “One of the problems that we face is that … farmers are peasants. It takes a lot to 
get that mind-set out of people’s thinking”. Another New Zealand business consultant 
commented: 
The thing I see with farming here in rural agriculture is it’s so bloody hard to get things 
going, and it takes time. Kiwis are coming up here and trying to change things.… It takes a 
very long time to change anything. It’s like Chinese people going down talking to a Kiwi 
farmer. And they go, ‘No. Bugger off. We are happy with what we are doing’.… A mate of 
mine said it really well. He said, ‘China will change when they go from peasants to 
farmers.’ And that’s a big step. It’s a huge step, because the guys have been doing the 
same thing … they are head down.… That’s what they do, so how do you change that 
mentality? It's hard. 
A New Zealand mid-level manager talked about his experience trying to find acceptance for a 
different dairy farming system in China, which the business he was working for was trying to 
promote: 
It is hard. We are trying to change perception. And there is a set way that things are done 
everywhere. Whenever you come in with something new, people are always going to 
resist it, which we’ve definitely found a lot of people ask, ‘Why? Can they not just do it 
like how everyone else does it?’.… These Chinese guys, they are so set in their ways. 
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They’ve got it in America, they’ve studied in America, or worked in America on farms. 
They’ve seen it in America, and they think it should be done here. And of course the issue 
of bringing the American system here is that China doesn’t grow very good-quality alfalfa. 
America does.  
 
3.6 Reasons for Past Failures 
At the time of the interviews informants were asked what they saw as the biggest mistakes that 
New Zealand agribusinesses have made in their ventures in China. Many informants shared their 
views on the reasons for the past failures of these ventures, and five distinctive themes emerged. 
Informants blamed the mind-set of ‘We are the experts’ and ‘China is like anywhere else in the 
world’ as two of the main causes for these failures. They also believed that it was a mistake for 
some agribusinesses to try to work solely on their own, without working with the locals. An 
unwise choice of business partner(s) as well as ‘rushing it’ were also blamed, along with an over-
emphasis on relationship building while losing sight of the main task at hand. 
3.6.1 Thinking ‘We are the experts’ 
Having a relatively advanced agri-food industry, particularly in terms of being efficient at 
agricultural production, has led to some New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs thinking ‘We 
are the experts’, which then becomes a stumbling block for their business ventures in China. As 
one New Zealand senior manager commented: 
If you look around the world, you see it far too often … any culture coming in, not just 
Kiwis, and saying, ‘Oh, we are experts, we know what we are doing. We will show you 
how to do it properly.’ And there really needs to be that culture of we are in a new 
environment, we actually think they are quite good at some things, but let’s just watch 
and see, and find out what works and what doesn’t work.  
Another New Zealand senior manager explained that the distinctive population difference 
between China and New Zealand has meant that there are different kind of needs in agricultural 
production: 
The biggest mistake ... this is not just applied to China … is to go in there and say, ‘Wow, 
I’ve got a deal for you!’.… Too many New Zealanders … I think, go in there … they look at 
what’s happening in China, and they go, ‘Wow. This is what used to happen in New 
Zealand 20 years ago. I can fix your problem.’ But the Chinese people haven’t actually 
identified that they’ve got a problem yet, and they possibly don’t think that they have got 
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one. In many cases, they probably haven’t. We are talking about completely different 
situations, where we have three or four million people in total in the whole country … and 
what’s Christchurch? 300,000 or something, and that’s one of your bigger cities. Whereas 
a small city in China is 5 million! So we need technology … because of the small 
population. We will lean on technology, pay our people very well, too well internationally 
in many ways.… Whereas you go in there [China], and you say, ‘This is the way we do it in 
New Zealand, and it works. Well, I can fix all your problems.’ [A] Chinese businessman 
would say, ‘Hang on. Who said that I’ve got a problem? I haven’t got a problem. And this 
is the way [it] works here, where we’ve got a lot of people. Our wage structure is much 
lower, even when they are being paid reasonable wages.’  
3.6.2 Thinking ‘China is like anywhere else in the world’ 
Many informants indicated that a common mistake made by New Zealand agribusiness 
entrepreneurs in China is to think that the Chinese market is the same as or similar to other 
markets in the world. As one New Zealand winery owner noted, the biggest mistakes that New 
Zealanders have done, in term of food and agribusiness in China, involve “Treating it like you 
would with another relationship, like another international country, and not seeing China is 
different … and not understanding deeply enough the cultural differences in the way of doing 
business.” Another New Zealand senior manager thought that the biggest mistake was 
Trying to operate the way they operate everywhere else.… We regularly hear stories of … 
big companies that are trying to plant their New Zealand model or Australian model … 
into China, and trying to roll that out. For all the reasons that we are learning, that doesn’t 
work. There is a distinct way of doing things in China that doesn’t fit elsewhere.  
Similarly, another New Zealand senior manager commented: 
From a New Zealand business point of view, there are a number of companies that go in 
there totally unprepared, and there is an expectation of what worked in New Zealand or 
the rest of the parts of the world is going to work in China. The stories are classic, the Lion 
brewery in … Suzhou, and the AFFCO freezing works.… A lot of people would go in, and 
they haven’t done the ground work.… You see a lot of the same elements there. China is a 
big country. It’s a complex country. New Zealand businesses, to go in you need to actually 
understand what [it] is that they do, in a really in-depth sort of way. There is no substitute 
for years on the ground and people on the ground because of their experience. You’ve got 
to have that. 
140 
 
3.6.3 Trying to compete against rather than working with the locals 
Many informants thought it is ‘unwise’ for any agribusiness venture in China to try to work alone. 
Working with a suitable local partner, to utilise the existing networks and particularly the 
distribution systems, was deemed essential. One New Zealand senior manager told the story of 
the spectacular failure of Lion Nathan: 
Your biggest train wreck was Lion Nathan.… If you had boots on the ground, you would 
have understood that the 90s beer wars.… If you walk in to any bar in the 90s, you had to 
run through a gauntlet of beautiful girls with short skirts, holding a bottle of beer, wanting 
to promote their beer to you. That was like that every bar … Carlsberg … every brand of 
beer. So in the 90s, you had every brewery jumping into China to try and take over the 
Chinese beer market, it was [a] really, really bitter fight, [an] enormously bitter fight. And 
Lion Nathan came in, their strategy, which I am sure it was a good strategy, even though it 
was completely wrong, was, ‘We are going to put the most modern, brand new brewery 
near Suzhou.’ Good location, because you are thinking that you are going [to] service the 
Shanghai market, which is probably the right market to service. Although on one level it’s 
not, because Shanghai is also where you have the most competition. And they went it 
alone. They tried to build their own distribution networks.  
So if you imagine there [were] about 100 brands of beer, fighting for market domination 
in China, so every major brewery in the world was trying to get in here. When the wars 
were over, and the wars were won or lost, who won? And what did they do that was 
different to other people? And [it] all boiled down to one very, very simple choice. 
Carlsberg, Budweiser … Heineken, all came out on top, because they went to an existing 
strong brewery, said, ‘We will build a beautiful factory, beautiful new production plant in 
your brewery. We will basically hand it over to you, we will take a royalty on the beer that 
you produce, and you run it as your company, your distribution networks, your sales 
channels, and how do you feel about that?’ And of course, all the breweries, the ones 
they’ve approached, said, ‘Absolutely’. So they put their money in there, let the Chinese 
brewery control and own it, and they stood back and took just basically a royalty.  
So Lion Nathan’s mistake was assuming that somehow they could build an effective 
distribution channel in China. Impossible. Absolutely impossible. So … it was a big loss of 
money. And Lion Nathan came back, and if you read the press around that time, all these 
bad stories about China, it’s a bad market to go to, blah, blah, blah. But go and ask Mr 
Carlsberg [about] what he thinks about the China beer market…. Even Budweiser, an 
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American beer, it’s a horrible beer, it’s one of the dominant beers in China, because they 
used the Chinese system to be successful. 
A variation on this competitive mentality is trying to ‘colonise’ the Chinese market. One New 
Zealand business consultant explained: 
There are a lot of people who think, ‘I want to be an economic colonialist of China. I want 
to colonise it with my restaurants, or my brand, or my outlets, whatever it is’, and they 
find a partner, who is only an instrument of their colonisation in China, and they try to 
take full control of the partnership, and do it their way, and the Chinese partner feels 
highly pissed off. They cannot understand why their partners don’t listen to them, don’t 
follow their advice, and don’t make money. If your real agenda isn’t the agenda that you 
put on the table, you are not heading to a good place. There are many, many stories like 
that.  
3.6.4 Unwise choice of partner(s) 
Along with the importance of having a local business partner is the challenge of finding the right 
one. One New Zealand CEO recommended spending more time and resources to ensure the right 
partners are found before any serious investment is undertaken: 
Fundamental to everything we do in China is finding the right partner. The road is … 
[littered] with failures because people have chosen the wrong partner, and just got blindly 
ripped off. So the biggest advice is: spend double the time that you’ve ever dreamed of, 
and probably double the money, getting the front end right, and getting the right partner, 
the right connections before you spend any … real money in China, or any infrastructure. 
Related to this notion of finding the right partner is the appropriateness of signing exclusive 
agreements with a single partner in China. Some of the informants believed that signing exclusive 
agreements is the biggest mistake that some New Zealand agribusiness firms have committed, 
because it is unwise. One New Zealand business consultant commented: 
Signing exclusive deals, I think, is the biggest issue, biggest mistake New Zealand 
companies have made. Do it for a province. Do it for a local area or part of China.… If you 
say to a Chinese guy, ‘Oh, I am meeting you here today. I’ve got another guy who is selling 
too down at Shenzhen’, they will talk to each other. I guarantee it, they will. And if you got 
the same price, and it’s a level playing field, then they’ve got nothing to complain about. 
And it becomes a performance. I’ve seen it so many times. People come in here with their 
New Zealand hat on, and go, ‘… You are great. We will go with you’.... They are not doing 
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the test.… They come up … they meet this guy, and they go, ‘Right, this is the guy.’ Sign an 
exclusive agreement with them. Great! And this guy here now goes, ‘Oh, shit.’ Now he 
works out how to sell his product.  
A New Zealand senior manager acknowledged that reliance on one partner had led them into 
trouble: “One of our business mistakes was we became too reliant on one partner, and the one 
partner was doing business or telling us some things that weren’t quite right with Customs.” 
The underlying reason for this issue is the diversity of the Chinese market, as has been explained 
in 3.5.1.2 Diversity. 
Also related to this concept of finding the right partner(s) is the notion of having a wide local 
network in China for cross-referencing. One New Zealand senior manager commented that their 
reliance on too few people was one of the factors that led to a serious incident within their 
business: 
In the past, I think what we’ve been guilty of is channelling things through a handful of 
individuals, within our business, and then through our partner networks. We have come 
unstuck, because we’ve relied too much on too few people. We haven’t been able to 
cross-reference the thinking more broadly.… Probably not doing sufficient due diligence, 
not knowing who they are dealing with, not resourcing it sufficiently from their end, not 
investing enough time in the relationship, not continuing to front up and saying, ‘Okay, 
we’ve signed the contract. The deal is over. I am now off to India to sign the next deal,’ 
but continue to invest in the relationship. 
3.6.5 ‘Rushing it’ 
One of the reasons identified by many informants for failing to spend the time and resources to 
find the right partner(s), which then led to business failures, was ‘rushing it’. One New Zealand 
business consultant commented: “That’s part of doing stuff up here. You don’t do your business 
deal on the first day. It takes a long time. That’s where a lot of Kiwis fail. They want to do it fast, 
fast, fast.”  
A New Zealand agricultural consultant also believed that rushing to build relationships and not 
spending enough energy on doing due diligence had led to business failures. When asked to name 
the biggest mistake New Zealanders had made in food and agribusiness in China, he answered: 
I think … rushing it … failing to build good relationships. Trying to rush things is a 
mistake…. Promises about supply of inputs into agricultural processing need to be very 
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well researched, because there are a couple of cases there where companies were over 
promised … what could actually be delivered. 
A New Zealand senior manager gave a similar answer to the same question: “Being too quick, and 
being aggressive.... Thinking that they’ve made a friend. Thinking that because they’ve simply 
signalled to you, ‘We are well connected. We know all these government officials,’ [so they are 
the right partner].  
Another New Zealand senior manager also commented on the mistake of rushing into a 
committed business relationship: 
There have been a lot of people … who are really struggling, because they got absolutely 
rushed into the front end too fast, and it’s costing them … a bloody fortune, to try and 
[extract] themselves out of that bad position, or pay their way out of it to start again. It is 
bloody painful. 
3.6.6 Over-emphasise relationships 
Despite the importance that all informants put on building relationships with the right partner(s), 
other informants warned that New Zealanders could also fall into the trap of overdoing the 
relationship building, and thereby lose sight of the real business. One New Zealand senior 
manager explained: 
Some people are too sensitive to the Chinese way of doing things. In other words, they 
put a lot of effort into the relationship. We all hear about how important relationships 
are, and I think they overstate the importance of that. In other words, you can sit and go 
through all this rubbish about great guy, dah, dah, dah. But at the end of the day, you 
actually don’t expect anything to happen out of it. So some people put too much 
importance in that, and so they actually find it very difficult to do much progress.… I 
think ... you have to do things within our framework, but you have to really keep your eye 
on the task in hand. Right, this is what I have to do. And you don’t necessarily approach it 
in the exactly the same way as you would in the Western place. But at the end of the day, 
don’t get diverted off into some of this other crap. 
3.6.7 Bad luck 
China is not an easy place to do business, and perhaps more so for agribusiness ventures, for the 
whole variety of reasons mentioned above. Succeed or fail, is there any element of luck involved? 
One New Zealand CEO saw it differently from many other informants: 
144 
 
China is a very competitive place. It is an incredibly competitive market. Companies fail for 
lots of reasons ... not because people have done things bad or done things wrong, just 
because the guy next door [has] caught what they call a lucky break, and got a bit more 
support, just [for] whatever reason. Companies here are just like they are in New Zealand, 
they come they go.… China is a place full of opportunities, but likewise, it's like the 
Bermuda Triangle, with plenty of ships gone down in it. Some of them are big ships. Lots 
of small fishes came here and have become big fishes, and get swallowed by sharks. 
That’s the nature of the beast.  
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter is the first of three results chapters in this thesis. It is dedicated to describing ‘how 
things are’ in terms of doing agribusiness in China and/or with the Chinese, through the eyes of 
the informants. This description was elaborated from economic, political, social and business 
environment perspectives, and was complemented by the reasons given for past failures, as 
identified by the informants. 
3.7.1 Economic environment 
China has become an important economic force on the world stage, and its significance to New 
Zealand’s economy is undeniable. Informants observed the coexistence of the ‘grey economy’, 
where many transactions are undertaken in cash only, and the ‘grey trade’, where foreign 
products enter China via Hong Kong without meeting all the required Custom entry criteria. In 
their eyes, China’s economy continues to develop at a rapid pace, and its society is becoming 
westernised during this process. 
3.7.2 Political environment 
In this advance towards prosperity, according to some informants, the Chinese government as 
well as the Communist Party play a crucial role, and their power extends into all business 
activities. Maintaining good relationships with government officials − which at times can be 
difficult due to the need for foreign business operators to judge the appropriateness of certain 
activities − has become an integral part of everyday business operations in China. The 
bureaucracy of government officials has sometimes caused frustration for the New Zealand 
agribusiness entrepreneurs interviewed, many of whom regard dealing with these officials as a 
‘game’. What also frustrates and confuses these foreign entrepreneurs is the flexibility with which 
the laws can be implemented, creating ambiguity as to where exactly the boundaries lie. 
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3.7.3 Social environment 
Despite its widely recognised westernisation, China was perceived by the informants as a place 
where many of the social institutions that have been around for centuries continue to affect 
people’s business behaviours. These informants observed that China continues to, as it has for 
centuries, operate under a hierarchical social order, where guanxi remains a fundamental 
element in all business activities, and beyond. Within these observed guanxi networks, each 
individual forms his or her own circles of trust, and reliance and responsibilities are proportional 
to the level of trust given. Guanxi resembles certain characteristics of Māori tribal customs in New 
Zealand, as observed by some informants. Such resemblance, however, is not enough to negate 
the challenges facing these New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs in navigating through guanxi, 
regardless of whether it is within or outside an organisation. 
The concept of ‘face’ has made the interviewed New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs more 
cautious in their communication with their Chinese counterparts compared to how they 
communicate with Westerners. It also has implications for the rises and falls of New Zealand 
luxury food and beverage products selling into China, particularly in the context of the anti-
corruption campaign initiated by the Chinese government.  
According to the informants, survival of self and family in the harsh competitive environment 
remains the top priority in life for many Chinese people. The responsibility to ensure the family 
members’ survival then extends to the social responsibilities to other members within each 
individual’s trusted network, which often far exceeds what individuals feel they are obliged to do 
within a Western society. Nevertheless, informants felt that Chinese people share with 
Westerners some basic values of what a good life is about, and therefore strive to create such a 
life for themselves and their families. 
Although Chinese people generally show great hospitality to visitors, informants warned that such 
hospitality should not be misinterpreted as trust. They believe that the ‘rules of the game’ in 
China are always all about China and the Chinese way of doing things, in that the collective voice 
is louder than individuals’ voices, and people hide behind their social masks in order to stay 
unnoticed, relying on the collective and avoiding conflict. All of these characteristics make 
relationship building and staff management challenging for these New Zealand agribusiness 
entrepreneurs.  
3.7.4 Business environment 
Overall, the informants perceived the Chinese food and agribusiness sector to be an evolving and 
highly competitive playing field with vastly diversified markets, in which social media are playing 
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an increasingly important role. Nonetheless, foreign agribusiness firms still appear to possess 
advantages over local firms in terms of their perceived advanced ability to improve the livelihood 
of rural areas, as well as providing employees with an environment in which to improve their 
English-language skills. 
For the interviewed New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs, the communication style of the 
Chinese people can be subtle and convoluted, making information exchange at times a matter of 
guesswork.  
In terms of business negotiation, views were divided as to the importance of contracts, with some 
informants seeing them as discussion documents that should subsequently be left in the bottom 
drawer, while others insisted on strictly following contracts− unless circumstances force 
agreement terms to change. This divided view, however, was not seen as negating the 
significance of the relationships between interested parties, which sat above the importance of 
contracts. Also, in the process of business negotiation, informants observed that there was a 
common practice to host potential New Zealand business partners with banquets, during which 
‘drinking tests’ usually took place. The custom of such drinking tests was observed to be more 
prevalent the further west and north one travels. 
When it came to business execution, informants noticed that unlike the relatively clear boundary 
between work and private life in New Zealand, the work−life boundary was somewhat blurry for 
the Chinese, in that they would dedicate themselves to their work 24/7 if required. Yet coexisting 
with such dedication was a tendency to take shortcuts in performing one’s tasks, particularly for 
unskilled workers. Unless reassured by an environment where mistakes are not punished and 
decision-making is encouraged, Chinese staff tend to shunt away from such decision-making for 
fear of losing ‘face’.  
Informants also noted that solution-oriented thinking is lacking among Chinese staff. This is 
largely due to the rote-learning style of education these staff had been through. Some informants 
were frustrated by the fact that both a lack of willingness to make decisions and a lack of solution-
oriented thinking led to an unnecessary number of decisions having to be made by senior 
management. Some informants also believed that such a lack is linked to staff’s resistance to 
change, and the amount of energy required by senior management to follow up on orders given 
to staff members is large.  
From the management perspective, informants observed that Chinese business people can 
exhibit traits of eagerness for ‘quick success’, which is often represented by monetary gains in the 
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shortest possible time, partly encouraged by the perceived ever-changing economic and policy 
environment. This creates particular challenges for agribusiness investments, where production 
and investment timeframes are often as long as 5 to 10 years. To achieve such quick success, 
some people engage in bribery and counterfeiting activities, both of which present challenges for 
New Zealand entrepreneurs to manage. This is particularly the case for bribery, where the 
boundaries are often unclear as to what is regarded as bribery and what is not. 
Despite these difficulties faced by agribusiness ventures, the informants see China as full of 
opportunities for New Zealand entrepreneurs. They consider that, in theory, land tenure policies 
in China provide land certificate holders with very similar rights to those of a land owner in New 
Zealand. However, there is the fear among those who hold these land certificates that the land-
use right can be changed by the government with very little warning. For New Zealand 
agribusiness entrepreneurs who want to invest in agricultural production, the real challenge lies in 
finding appropriate and economically viable production land, after which the negotiation usually 
happens at the village committee level. Contrary to common perceptions outside China, 
informants observed an increasing societal concern about the environmental impact of farming, 
and that the Chinese government is trying hard to address this issue by setting strict policies.  
There was a diversity of perspective relating to intellectual property protection in China. Some 
New Zealand respondents believe that ‘staying ahead of the game’ offers a form of protection, 
and that varietal rights can be protected in China, whereas some Chinese entrepreneurs see it as 
nearly impossible, unless F1 hybrid seeds are produced every year. New Zealand agribusiness 
entrepreneurs are also faced with a general disconnection between scientific research and an 
ageing rural labour force, who are nonetheless skilled and motivated to work to improve their 
livelihood under the limited welfare system. 
Informants felt that New Zealand as a country benefits greatly from the ‘three firsts’ that China 
associates historically with the New Zealand government. Its reputation for food quality and 
safety is highly regarded in China, where food safety concerns are particularly widespread among 
consumers and the government is trying hard to address such issues. In contrast, China and the 
Chinese people often do not receive the same level of favoured thinking by New Zealanders, 
which is reflected in the negative slant in the New Zealand media.  
Specific challenges facing these New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs in China relate to the 
unique Chinese social and business environment, described above. Lengthy timeframes are often 
experienced in both building trusting business relationships and operating day-to-day business 
transactions. The biological and environmental constraints during production and/or distribution 
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bring uncertainty and risks to business operations, which, as observed by the informants, can be 
aggravated by the complicated agribusiness supply chain structures in China, consequently adding 
risks to food safety management. The fragmented supply chain structure also means there is a 
lack of system thinking among Chinese staff, posing employment challenges for these New 
Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs. Informants pointed out that even with all of these 
operational challenges successfully addressed, New Zealand agribusiness might still find the lack 
of volume of supply an unconquerable constraint. 
Informants’ experience was that the language barrier poses significant difficulty for day-to-day 
operations, adding uncertainties and frustration to communication. However, what frustrates 
these New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs even more is the lack of understanding about 
China in New Zealand, and the related negative opinions about China and Chinese people in New 
Zealand. These New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs also found the politics of food difficult to 
manoeuvre around. As a result, they have tried to build relationships with particular Customs 
officials in order to gain insights into the political games among countries that might be 
happening, because these games can have an impact on their business operations in China. At the 
production level, these New Zealand entrepreneurs have also encountered a fixed mind-set on 
habitual farming practices, which requires much effort and time to change.  
3.7.5 Reasons for past failures 
Overall, not all agribusiness ventures in China have been successful. Informants identified many 
reasons that contributed to this. Among these, considering ‘We are the experts’ was perhaps the 
biggest culprit, from which disrespect was shown to the Chinese counterpart. Informants believed 
that mistakes have also been made when China is not recognised as being any different from 
other parts of the world, and when its unique ways of doing things in business and beyond are 
ignored.  
Linked to these two mistakes is New Zealand agribusinesses trying to strike out on their own, 
competing with the locals instead of working with them. The informants also pointed out that 
some New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs tend to rush into a business deal without taking 
the time to build trusting business relationships and identify the ‘right’ business partner(s). 
However, some informants thought that there is an equal danger of spending too much energy on 
relationship building and losing sight of the actual task at hand, and achieving nothing. Despite 
the perceived variety of reasons for failure, some other informants believed that the mishaps of 
these New Zealand agribusiness ventures could all be simply put down to “bad luck”. 
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Now that this chapter has dealt with ‘how things are’, the next chapter will focus on ‘why things 
are the way they are’, as seen by the informants.
150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
 
Research Results II:  
Why Things Are the Way They Are 
151 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The complex phenomena depicted in Chapter 3 relating to ‘how things are’, as seen by the 
informants, stem from deeper cultural differences between Chinese people and New Zealanders. 
Chapter 4 will delve into these cultural differences, again through the eyes of the informants, to 
identify crucial elements that make the Chinese people ‘different’. These crucial elements will be 
unravelled from the perspectives of world views / ways of thinking and value systems. As with 
Chapter 3, this chapter aims to portray a rich picture through extensive use of quotes, which will 
provide internal validity, external validity and reliability of the emergent insights.  An extended 
summary of key emergent themes is given at the end of the chapter. 
 
4.2 World Views / Ways of Thinking 
Many informants spoke about the different way of thinking that Chinese people have compared 
to New Zealanders. They saw this difference as the reason why businesses were conducted 
differently within these two cultures. Indeed, as one Chinese senior manager commented, 
“Culture is not about who is right and who is wrong.… It’s just a habit accumulated over the years 
and a way of thinking that is different.”38 Another Chinese senior manager pointed out: 
I think there is quite a difference between the Western and Chinese cultures. They come 
here to do business − why do they find it so difficult to succeed? I think there is indeed a 
big cultural difference – ideas, concepts, they are all different.39  
4.2.1 Understanding from a historical perspective 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, many informants observed the prevalence of traditional Chinese 
institutions in their business dealings in China or with the Chinese. Institutions such as hierarchy, 
guanxi and face continue to play significant roles in the ways of the world in China. A New Zealand 
business consultant indicated that to understand China, one has to study from no later than the 
Warring States Period (475 to 221 BC): 
The pathway I’ve chosen to take is to study China. I started off by studying post-1949 
China, and realised that was totally short term in a long-term country; that you actually 
have to start studying China from no later than the Warring States Period, and try to 
understand all the social, cultural and technical forces that operated to bring [China] to 
                                                          
38 Original Chinese quote: Culture不是说谁对谁错 … 它就是大家这种多少年积累下来的这种习惯、想
问题的方式不一样。 
39 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得中西方文化还是有很大的差距的。… 他们来这里做，为什么我觉得他
们很难做成呢，还是确实有比较大的文化差异 - 理念哪、概念哪，都不同的。 
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where it is today ... to understand, even though it’s been through a period of forced 
socialism, in the sense that all production was controlled by the state, it has now come 
out from underneath that. And to understand the drivers that were always there … those 
abilities, the entrepreneurial capability, the understanding of economics, the 
understanding of the need for urgency for rapid and accurate decision-making, when you 
can’t have all the information you need. These things are critically important in all 
economies, but I think that the Chinese have really got it first.  
A New Zealand senior manager also commented that perceiving China as a Communist country is 
in fact only partially correct, and therefore inaccurate, and that the traditional cultural 
imperatives, such as Confucianism, are actually being used by the Chinese government to justify 
their social structure: 
Our perception of China as a Communist country … we talk about land and land 
reforming, [and] we tend to look at it ... almost from a Communist [perspective]. You tend 
to think what the influence of the government is, particularly the Communist government, 
but it's not. These cultural things are so ingrained. The Communist government is just the 
tiniest blip. And it’s interesting, those cultural imperatives, those cultural traditions, are 
becoming much, much more important. You are actually seeing them being used by the 
government a lot more. Whereas 30 years ago they worked like hell trying to get rid of 
those cultural issues. But now they actually promote them. 
People in China have much, much greater respect for their leaders than we do, so there is 
this inherent respect for leadership here, which is a Confucian thing as well.... Their 
leadership, say for the last one [president], and probably the one before, they didn't have 
the character, they didn't have the personality, like say Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. So 
they need to replace it with something. Because people here are becoming much more 
sophisticated. Look at us, three generations ago, we actually used to respect our 
monarch, and all that sort of thing, but we don’t any more. So, what the government is 
doing here is they raise that profile, and Confucianism is a key way of doing that. Because 
if you think about it, Confucianism, actually to a large extent, justifies the social structure 
here, so nothing is really changed with Communism. Nothing has changed. So instead of 
pushing the Communism issue, it’s politically much better to push the Confucianism. 
You hear it all the time now, 5,000 years of history ... always. ‘China has 5,000 years of 
history, therefore we are culturally a strong country,’ and that has all sorts of implications 
as well.... Because we, as foreigners, we don't put that into a total historic context. For the 
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Chinese, their experience with foreigners is pretty bad. And if you put it in the context of 
the whole of Chinese history, it’s a very small part. Communism is even smaller. 
These traditional imperatives are believed to be more prevalent within agribusiness. A New 
Zealand senior manager commented that within agribusiness, “the game is guanxi” and “it’s very 
Confucius [sic]”: 
It’s a lot more prevalent in agribusiness than in most industries ... this whole politics. And 
the reason I believe that [is] ... it’s almost traditional. Because agribusiness is out in the 
sticks, life in the back blocks ... basically the game is guanxi ... where do you fit in the 
ladder.... It’s very Confucius [sic], this whole hierarchy and what not. People need to know 
where they fit in the ladder. If they don’t know that, they feel uncomfortable.… They 
know there is a game, they want to know, ‘Where do I fit?’. It’s kind of like ‘Play my role’ 
then I’ll work out how do I improve my role, but first I need to work out where I fit in the 
structure.  
4.2.2 Pragmatism 
 “Chinese people are incredibly pragmatic” was a comment from a New Zealand senior manager 
and echoed by many other informants. For example, a New Zealand business consultant 
explained how Chinese judge their own shortcut-taking as pragmatism, while others’ short cuts 
are not acceptable: 
People who try to take shortcuts irritate the Chinese.… But [they themselves taking short 
cuts] is allowable. If you are in their head, ‘What I can do to make things work is just my 
pragmatism,’ but when [a foreigner] comes in, and tries to do things quickly … that’s not 
acceptable.  
It is worth noting that such an attitude towards pragmatism is itself a reflection of Chinese 
people’s pragmatic approach to things.  
The same business consultant gave another example of Chinese people’s pragmatic thinking: 
I feel that Chinese connect cause and effect better than we do. New Zealand thinking is, it 
takes 2 hours to get from Wellington to 100 k north, so let’s think about what we might 
do about it one day. The Chinese would say, it takes 2 hours to get from the middle of 
Beijing to the sixth ring road, let’s put in another freeway, and do it tomorrow. It’s just a 
cause and effect thing. In New Zealand now, if we suggest building a new road, there is a 
whole political party that will try and stop it.... ‘Oh, if you build new roads, that just 
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encourages cars, and cars are bad.’ China doesn’t say cars are bad. China says, ‘Cars are 
bloody great things, but we need to limit the amount on the road, therefore we will sell 
licences.’ Look at the price of a car licence in Shanghai! I think it’s over 40,000 yuan now.… 
They are more pragmatic in terms of finding solutions. 
It has been noted that even with Western thinking being introduced in China, Chinese still adopt it 
in their own pragmatic way. A Chinese senior manager who had been working with a New Zealand 
entrepreneur for over 10 years indicated during the interviews that she agreed with the idea of 
‘You only have one life, one opportunity, so you should make the most of it.’ When asked how she 
regarded the contradiction between this idea and the traditional Chinese understanding of 
reincarnation, she said: 
I always think that no matter [if] it is a foreign idea, or a Chinese idea, you can’t say one is 
totally right, and the other is wrong. Over the last several years I have a feeling that I 
should make such a judgement based on my own characteristics: whichever I like, 
whichever suits me, I will regard it as right.… We need to respect our own wishes and 
thoughts, as it is crucial. But many of the old traditional Chinese stuff, I still like it very 
much, and would not want to abandon it.… I think if I can find what suits me, and what I 
like, then I will be moderately successful.40  
This informant chose to accept the Western idea of ‘One life, one opportunity’, yet the 
justification of her acceptance of such an idea was still arrived at through a pragmatic process – 
whatever suited her was the best choice.  
Yet another example of Chinese people’s pragmatic thinking is their government’s approach to 
some potentially illegal conduct by business operators. As shown in 4.2.1 Understanding from a 
historical perspective, Confucianism is one of the core values within the traditional imperatives in 
China. Due to its influence over the centuries Chinese people have learned to seek the truth 
through facts, which is a pragmatic approach to things. A New Zealand business consultant 
explained the thinking behind the Chinese authorities letting people try to get away with 
potentially illegal conduct as a way of experimenting, of “seeking the truth”: 
                                                          
40 Original Chinese quote: 其实我一直觉得外国人的想法，还是中国人的想法，不能完全地说他的就
对，他的就错。我这几年有一个体会就是，我应该根据我自己的特点，然后看我喜欢哪一个，哪个
适合我，那我认为就是对的 … 其实要尊自己的意愿和想法，这个也非常关键。但是其实中国很多的
这些老的传统的东西，其实我非常喜欢的，我丢不掉的 … 我觉得找到适合自己的，和自己喜欢的，
我觉得我就是比较成功的。 
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New Zealanders find [it] hard to cope with … that ... the Chinese [think] … ‘We’ll do 
something, and see if [we can] get away with it … because if it’s not legal, the authorities 
will stop us’. Well, sometimes they let it go for a long time, and then stop you, and then 
say ‘Ever since then, you’ve been doing something that’s illegal,’ It’s part of that ‘First get 
on the bus, then buy the ticket’ philosophy, and that’s very hard for Westerners to 
understand. But it’s directly linked to that Confucian, seeking truth through facts41, they 
allow people to try things, and only after the results of the experiment [do they decide 
whether it was appropriate].… The businessman doesn’t think of it as [an] experiment, he 
is just doing business. But the authorities looked at turning a blind eye to what he was 
doing as an experiment, and after they decide whether it was a good outcome or not, 
they may stop it or not. And we find that difficult.  
Additionally, many of the characteristics of ‘how things are’ described in Chapter 3 can be 
explained by Chinese people’s pragmatic approach to things. For example, the importance placed 
by Chinese people on guanxi in business dealings is a consequence of their understanding that 
wealth is nurtured by relationships and achieved through trading, and this understanding is a 
reflection of Chinese people’s pragmatic thinking. A New Zealand senior manager explained that 
Chinese people understand the concepts of nurturing and trading better than New Zealanders: 
Our culture is probably colonial, English colonial culture, where we were set up to 
produce for the Empire. We weren’t set up to be international traders.… That’s a culture 
that China also has. This trading ... trading anyone and everywhere.… They understand 
business, understand trading, and understand relationships that are going to nurture 
wealth for everybody. I don’t think that we understand relationships that are going to 
nurture wealth. 
From the ‘grey economy’ to how guanxi is managed and nurtured through communication 
(including gift giving), pragmatic thinking directs Chinese people’s behaviour. A New Zealand 
senior manager based in China made the following comment about gift giving, which not all New 
Zealanders approve of: 
I’m thinking about that all my life, with people who I interact with. Yeah, you might say it’s 
some kind of a shallow way of gaining favour, but I am not going to do anything illegal. It’s 
                                                          
41 This is likely to have come from the idiom “seeking truth from fact”, which is the English translation for a 
Chinese idiom, 实事求是 (shishiqiushi). The idiom originally came from the Book of Han (a historic text 
recording the history from 203 BCE to 23 CE), and was used by Mao in reference to pragmatism in 1938, 
and then further promoted by Deng Xiaoping as a central ideology of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. 
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just in my interest to make my life easier in this place, because, you know what, that’s 
what everyone else is doing. You open the boot of any black Audi in Beijing. And what’s in 
the trunk? Baijiu [rice spirit], tea, cigarettes, whatever. These guys are just handing out 
stuff all the time. It’s not that expensive. It’s the cost of doing business. It’s just lubricating 
everything, because that’s culturally what people did in Chinese communities. 
4.2.3 Long-term and short-term thinking coexist 
Through this pragmatic lens one can perhaps also understand why long-term and short-term 
thinking coexist in the Chinese mind, as one New Zealand senior manager observed: “We’ve seen 
examples of both. We’ve seen examples of a mixture of guanxi, long-term, strategic win-win; and 
grab as much as we can now, and back to … have a long-term relationship also.” 
This coexistence of long-term and short-term thinking can be confusing for some New Zealand 
entrepreneurs. A New Zealand senior manager expressed his confusion like this: 
Because of the relatively short history of … [modern] commercial business in China, there 
is much more of a desire to win … [a] quick success … which always to me then sits at 
odds with everything else you … read … which talks about the needs to invest in long-term 
relationships.… In business seminars, New Zealanders are always being told … be 
prepared to invest a couple of years to manage the relationships, [but] … it’s the quick win 
is the other side of it, which to me is almost at odds with what you read about … this need 
to take time to [build] relationships. 
This coexistence, however, is the product of historical development over the past millennia, as 
one New Zealand senior manager explained: 
In China, any statement that you make, the exact opposite can be true, and that’s the yin 
and yang principle. For example, a lot of people would say China has very long-term 
strategic thinking, and it does. China on a macro level would think in terms of 100 years, 
or 150 years. I think they almost think in dynastic terms. You know the famous statement: 
somebody asked Mao Zedong,42 ‘What do you think of the French revolution?’ and he 
turned around and said, ‘Oh, it’s too soon to tell.’ So there is a concept in the Chinese 
mind of very long-term thinking. But there is also a concept of incredible short-term 
action. Maybe a good example of this is that somebody perhaps is doing a job for 
somebody, creating a product or a service. They don’t care, at the end of the day, 
whether that works out or not, as long as they’ve got their money for it. Because they say, 
                                                          
42 There are also views that this quote should be attributed to Zhou Enlai. 
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‘Okay, that 2 RMB in my pocket is guaranteed, and I don’t care if it’s going to be 100 RMB 
in the future, because that might not happen. So I will take my benefit now, which is my 2 
RMB, put that in my pocket, and I will just wait for the next opportunity to make 2 RMB.’ 
Rather than saying, ‘Okay, I will take a risk, and wait for the 100 RMB.’ So, always, in 
everything, you have the two competing principles going on in a Chinese person’s mind.  
It’s completely historical. No matter how stable China is politically, there is always this big 
reserve in the mind that ‘What happens if things break down again?’ You only have to 
look at the whole of Chinese history, in fact, the opening words of The Art of War: ‘The 
empire long divided must unite; the empire long united must divide.’ So you have this 
even flow, all the way through … the most successful, longest dynasty is the Ming 
Dynasty, which was only about 300 years. That’s the longest period of continuous stability 
in all of China in its history. In between all of those times, and at the beginning and the 
end of those dynasties, there’s just been trouble. So people think, ‘What happens if 
tomorrow everything falls apart?’ That’s always in the mind of people. So they are looking 
for short-term gain. And that, as we discussed, [is]… about the velocity of return of 
capital. On one side of the equation, the person wants to get their money back as quickly 
as possible, so that money is retained as family wealth; rather than saying, ‘Let’s invest 
that for 20 or 25 years,’ because who knows what’s going to happen in that 20 or 25 
years. But when you transfer the thinking onto the strategic and macro level, you have a 
very long-term view. For example … China’s attitude to Taiwan. China is not saying, ‘Oh, 
we’ve absolutely got to go and grab Taiwan and bring it back to China tomorrow.’ They 
will be quite content to wait for 30 years, or 40 years, or 50 years, or 100 years, as long as 
the pressure is going to bring Taiwan back to China … so that’s on that level. 
One could perhaps argue that the short-terming thinking comes out of the drive to survive, which 
was discussed in 3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival. But it is taking a pragmatic approach to the perceived ever-
changing environment that has brought about such a survival instinct; while pragmatic thinking 
directs Chinese people to think long term, again, for the purpose of longevity and survival of the 
family and extended network. 
4.2.4 Trust has to be earned 
The manifestation of the pragmatic approach in the historical context extends beyond the 
coexistence of long-term and short-term thinking. Chinese people’s reserve in trusting others is 
perhaps another pragmatic form of self-protection. During many interviews, trust was a 
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frequently mentioned subject, often indicating that this reserve in relation to trust has a direct 
impact on business dealings.  
Indeed, the importance of trust within a business relationship was alluded to in various sections in 
Chapter 3. In particular, 3.5.4.1.1.1 Lengthy timeframe to develop trusting business relationships 
addressed the idea that no one should be trusted until proven trustworthy when entering the 
Chinese market. This particular section (4.2.4 Trust has to be earned) will explore several aspects 
of what this earned trust entails, and draws links to certain characteristics of ‘how things are’ 
described in Chapter 3. 
4.2.4.1 No trust to start with 
One of the key characteristics of the Chinese way of thinking, as identified by the informants, is 
that trust has to be earned rather than presumed. One has to prove to his or her counterpart that 
he or she is trustworthy, and is assumed to have an ulterior motive at the outset of the 
relationship building. One New Zealand senior manager explained: 
You should start with a point of view that that person is not your friend, and that’s what 
Chinese people do, because, you know, after 5,000 years of history, Chinese mentality has 
heard every single sweetie word that can possibly be said.  
A New Zealand business consultant gave the following comment when asked what the moral code 
in China is: 
Full of bullshit. Talk the big game, but deliver very little … overall, most people. Everyone 
talks how good they are. You need to pull back the curtains and find out.… So everyone is 
full of bullshit. I was reading … about the guy … from [a New Zealand firm operating in 
China] … he said something, ‘Never trust a Chinese ever.’ I think he is right, because the 
Chinese don’t trust the Chinese. 
Although one can try to gain a certain degree of trust via introduction by someone within the 
circle of trust, as alluded to in 3.4.1.2.2.2 Circles of trust – rings of guanxi, this general lack of trust 
among Chinese has meant that a trustworthy business partner is the essential basis for business 
interactions. One New Zealand district mayor spoke about his impression of Chinese people’s 
greater reliance on understanding and trusting a business partner compared to New Zealanders: 
I think it’s probably more important for them to understand us, than [for] us to 
understand them, because [although] a lot of how the Chinese people operate is a 
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mystery to us, they may [also] think that how we operate is a mystery, but they are more 
reliant on understanding and trusting us than we [are].  
This different reliance on understanding and trusting a business partner may be due to the level 
and prevalence of corruption that exists in both countries. A New Zealand senior manager made a 
comment about where a starting point for relationship building should be, and said that it was 
difficult for New Zealanders to not have any trust to start with, due to there being less corruption 
in New Zealand: 
No. No trust. And that’s hard for a New Zealander to do, because we tend to trust … 
because we don’t have corruption in a way that … people that define corruption from a 
New Zealand perspective.  
Another New Zealand senior manager gave similar advice based on his experience during the 
melamine scandal in 2008: 
I think the big single thing is don’t believe. When people say it’s the way things are done 
in China, don’t believe them, even if it was Kiwis [who said that]. Work it out yourself … 
Don’t trust anyone, really. You’ve got to go down to a great level of detail.… In the food 
industry, you don’t comprehend that people would add additives to milk that would 
actually kill people. That’s a hard thing to believe, I guess.… Be less trusting is probably 
good advice. Look at everything to a very high level of detail. 
4.2.4.2 Earning a high level of trust 
In this exercise of seeking trustworthiness, Chinese people rely on emotions and intuitions, as one 
Chinese senior manager indicated, whereas Westerners rely on laws. His point of view was 
affirmed by a Chinese managing director (interviewed in English), who explained that his purpose 
in giving a presentation at a meeting was to validate an intuition about whether the counterpart 
was trustworthy or not: 
Why [do] people have a presentation for the bidding process? It is not like you are trying 
to clarify everything … every single detail you have for your firm. Impossible. It will be 
tonnes of details to be discussed. There is no way to get everything addressed during the 
presentation interview. But the reason that you still need to meet that person is you are 
looking for the chance to get an intuition, whether you are going to trust that guy. 
Whether you are going to put all your future, and risk the future onto that guy’s shoulders 
and let them lead you on your project. If you can get that feeling during … [the] one-and-
a-half-hour time presentation, [then] the goal is achieved. 
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On the other hand, New Zealand entrepreneurs seem to rely on due diligence to confirm 
someone’s trustworthiness. One senior manager of a New Zealand-owned international company 
explained the approach they take and the resources required: 
I think it’s just about cross referencing everything that you hear. Someone will make a 
claim. You need to go and check it out … two or three different times, before you actually 
start to be in a position to believe or not.… We are a powerful brand up there. We are an 
attractive business for so many people. Everyone wants a slice of it. We’ve had hundreds 
if not thousands of companies approach us and tell us how good they are, and how they 
would be the best partner for us. We’ve had others who would come along and pretty 
much threatened us: ‘If you don’t work with us, and our relationships are so high.’ These 
are very big organisations, so people working in isolation ... within the organisation, not 
representing the entity itself, but making quite aggressive claims about what they are able 
to do for us. Going behind and making sense of all of that, cross referencing … you see 
whether a business is legitimate, or whether it’s just a fly-by-night business, or someone 
opportunistically having a crack. But it’s [about] the time you need and the resource that 
you need to go and check all of that, and deal with all of those different claims, and make 
sense of it, in terms of your bigger strategy … just the resource to double check, triple 
check and quadruple check, and make sure what has been said is actually true. 
Perhaps how trust is earned in Chinese culture compared to New Zealand cannot be over-
simplified as above. But whether it is through emotions and intuition, or via law and due 
diligence, the level of trust that is required between business partners still needs to be very high. 
One New Zealand senior manager explained:  
You’ve got to have somebody you trust to play the game. With this person you are going 
to have strong confidence.... I am talking about [a] very high level of trust, as the same as 
the keys to your safe … otherwise you should be heavily involved yourself, because the 
last thing you want is a game being played around you that you are not aware of. 
“Business partner[-ship] is about trust”, as one New Zealand senior manager summarised it. The 
amount of effort and the resources required in the search and/or fostering of such a high level of 
trustworthiness desired of business partners are linked directly to the lengthy timeframe that 
such exercises consume. As a New Zealand agricultural consultant commented: 
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There [are] plenty of challenges doing anything in China, that so much of it revolves 
around trust … trusting you, knowing you, trusting your judgement, and your advice. 
Building a relationship is so important, which takes a little bit of time. 
4.2.4.3 Trust beyond business partners 
Lack of trust is not limited to what is between potential business partners. It also has an impact on 
the way business transactions are done. A New Zealand business consultant talked about how 
Chinese do not trust the Chinese, and hence it is always ‘cash up front’ in business transactions: 
“How does it work in China? No one trusts anybody, so you put the cash down, and you get the 
product. It’s normally a deposit up front, and then cash … that’s how it works here.” 
Not only does trust play a big part in how business relationships are formed, and how business 
transactions are done, but it also has an impact on the internal relationships among staff 
members within an organisation. The degree of trust or lack of it within an organisation in China 
contributes towards the complexity of staff management for New Zealand agribusiness 
entrepreneurs. One New Zealand senior manager shared his experience: 
It’s interesting that even in my own crew, from the day I arrived, over the next month, 
almost without exception, every staff member came to me and told me who in my 
company I shouldn’t trust, so even between colleagues is this whole trust system into the 
very low level. 
However, some New Zealand entrepreneurs seemed to achieve a high level of trust among their 
staff. One Chinese senior manager from that particular business commented that what they had 
within their company was very rare in China: 
I feel that in this company, we can all trust each other. When you have problems, you feel 
that people around you would all help, including the Chinese.... This kind of atmosphere is 
very, very difficult to form. Have you noticed that in many other [Chinese] companies that 
you go to, each person just looks after himself/herself? He/she would not care about 
anything else if it has nothing to do with him/her. Especially in some big companies, it is 
impossible to have this kind of atmosphere [that we have].43 
                                                          
43 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得在这个公司，我们都能够彼此相互信任。你有问题的时候你会觉得周
围的人都会帮你，包括中国人 … 这个气氛非常、非常难造就。你有没有发现去很多 [中国] 公司的时
候人人都是为了自己，事不关己，高高挂起？尤其是一些大公司，不可能有这种氛围的。 
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Whether it is between potential business partners, or between business transaction partners, or 
within an organisation, the overwhelming message from the informants is that, without a doubt, 
trust has to be earned, not presumed.  
4.2.5 Straight-line vs. inter-woven logics 
Yet another manifestation of the pragmatic thinking of the Chinese people is their understanding 
of the world as being a place in which all things are interconnected. As a result, they use an inter-
woven logic in their reasoning about things. A significant difference in the way of thinking 
observed by the informants when comparing Chinese people and New Zealanders is that 
Westerners, including New Zealanders, in general tend to think in a straight-line fashion, whereas 
Chinese are said to be “going round and round”. One Chinese senior manager explained the 
differences that she observed between Westerners and Chinese in their way of thinking: 
I think Europeans all think in a straight line. A very simple example: if I tell two things at 
the same time to him [a European], he would not understand. But for us Chinese, even if I 
talk about 10 things all at the same time, there will be no problems. This is probably 
related to their social background and culture. They are all quite simple [people].44 
Another Chinese senior manager further explained: 
For Chinese people, it’s okay as long as I can achieve my goal. Of course I am not going to 
harm anything; it’s simply going via some roundabouts, or through a particular person, a 
particular thing, to get this thing done. But it would probably be more straightforward for 
them [Europeans]: this is how it should be, so it will be … more clear-cut, black and 
white.45  
The fact that some Chinese people see the justification of “going via some roundabouts, or 
through a particular person, a particular thing, to get this thing done” shows pragmatic thinking at 
work. As a New Zealand senior manager commented, “[In China,] as soon as someone makes the 
rule, half of the people will try to work out a way to get around the rule”. 
                                                          
44 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得欧洲人都是直线思维的。很简单的一个例子，你两件事跟他同时讲，
他是不明白的。我们中国人，十件事一起讲，都没有问题。这个可能跟他们的社会背景呀，文化
呀，都是有关系，他们都是很简单的。 
45 Original Chinese quote: 中国人就是，我达到目的就行，当然我不是说损害什么东西，只不过说是绕
绕弯子啊，或者是通过某个人，某件事情，来把这件事情办成了。但是呢，他们可能就更直接了，
这件事应该怎么样，就是怎么样 … 黑白更分明一些。 
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This intertwined logic in which all things are connected is also reflected in Chinese people’s 
business practices. A New Zealand winery owner gave a practical example of this: 
The other factor of cultural differences, is the way business is done in China. The networks 
of wealthy businessmen ... I make furniture, so my customers will buy wine from me. We 
even have a couple here who make steel. Most of the steel went to hotels. Oh, hotels sell 
wine. They wanted to import our wine. And there was a lot of that [in] 09, 10 and 11. 
Huge! 
Despite this difference between Chinese and Westerners, some informants believed that there 
are values that can be learned from each other. A New Zealand senior manager suggested that 
some compromise should be made between the two different approaches by learning from each 
other: 
I think there is a compromise between the two. One of them is probably a bit too rigid, 
and the other one is too loose, so somewhere in the middle there, you have some ways of 
learning from each other. And we don’t. We think we’ve got the best system, and Chinese 
think they’ve got the best system, so there is a bit of discourse between the two of us.... 
We’ve got rules and they’ve got rules. Why don’t we look and see what advantage we can 
make of both of our rules, so that it works, instead of saying, we must impose it. 
Whether or not a compromise should be made was not agreed on by all, but many informants did 
observe that this difference in the way of thinking also had an impact on how people 
communicate. This was alluded to in 3.5.2.1 Communication, where it was indicated that 
informants found that communicating with Chinese business partners is not always 
straightforward. This style of communication, however, is not limited to between business 
partners. Within an organisation, between employers and employees and among staff members, 
the communication style was also said to be less straightforward and transparent. One Chinese 
senior manager working in a New Zealand-owned firm commented: 
I think the communication with a Chinese boss is not that carefree. I cannot do it like I do 
with a foreign boss, communicating openly … because perhaps we Chinese have been 
influenced too deeply by Confucianism, the higher level the boss is, the harder it is to 
judge his emotions, very difficult. Even through what he says, you cannot find out what he 
wants to do. Yesterday I heard this on TV: ‘I think he said a lot. But when I thought about 
it carefully, I felt that he said nothing.’ Sometimes I get that feeling. [You] always have to 
think, to guess, to analyse.… I mean, perhaps for a lot of his thinking, he would have a lot 
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of concerns, and therefore cannot be made that clear. Many of the ways … things are 
done cannot be said very clearly. I am not sure whether it is for not claiming 
responsibility, or trying to balance, or something else. Just that it would always make you 
guess, make you think, about whether it was done right, about whether it was done well. 
[It is] very tiring.… Over here [where I currently work] they are very open … you don’t 
have to go around so many circles in your thinking.46  
Communication among staff members was a similar story: 
Over here [where I currently work] it’s very simple.... [In the Chinese company that I used 
to work for], it’s too complicated!... You have no idea when you would annoy somebody! 
This person all of a sudden would be very nice to you; all of a sudden would be nasty to 
you. You just don’t know.47 
Arguably, this less straightforward style of communication is also a product of the lack of trust 
discussed in 4.2.4 Trust has to be earned. Moreover, perhaps the combined effect of the lack of 
trust and the interwoven logic explains some of the social behaviours discussed in Chapter 3, such 
as wearing social masks.  
 
4.3 Value Systems 
Apart from the world view and ways of thinking that helped to explain the characteristics of ‘how 
things are’ described in Chapter 3, informants also talked about various value systems that exist in 
China, which could also provide some insight into ‘why things are the way they are’. 
4.3.1 Integrity 
Despite the prevailing impression of corrupt business behaviours in China, along with the 
numerous food safety scandals that have occurred in recent decades, many informants believe 
that integrity is highly valued in China and is worth adhering to. A Chinese senior manager shared 
                                                          
46 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得可能沟通上没有那么畅快，和中国的老板。我不能像跟国外的老板这
样，那么畅所欲言 … 因为我们中国人可能受那种儒家的思想影响过深，尤其是做到越高层的老板，
你判断不出他的喜怒哀乐，很难。你甚至从他的言语当中，你不知道他要做什么。我昨天从电视上
看到：“我觉得他说了很多，但是我仔细想想，又觉得他什么都没说”。有时候就会有这种感觉。
[你] 就老要去想，去猜，去分析 … 就是说他很多想法，他可能有很多顾忌吧，不能说得那么明确。
很多做法呢不能说得那么明确；也不知道是为了免责呢，还是为了平衡呢，还是为了干嘛呢。就是
老让人得猜，老让人得去猜想，做得对与不对，做得好与不好。挺累的 … 在这儿 [现所在公司] 他们
很 open … 思维上不用转那么多圈儿。 
47 Original Chinese quote: 这儿 [现所在公司] 很单纯 … [在原来工作过的中国公司里] 太复杂了 … 你都不
知道什么时候，就把个人得罪啦！这个人突然对你好，突然对你不好。你不知道啦。 
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her belief in doing things the right way: “I think we need to be a good person, then we can do 
business.”48 This was affirmed by a Chinese managing director (interviewed in English), who 
commented: 
I see the world, even though there are people [who are] Muslims, Buddhists, Baptists, but 
the basic value should be more or less the same: integrity, honesty, trying to be kind. I 
don’t think there is too much difference in that.… The language that people speak, a lot of 
times we are talking about … technical things.… English, Italian, Chinese, French, that’s the 
technical part, but the true part, there is only one human being language, it’s the value 
part. As long as you stay with the value part … technical part is easy. iPhone can translate 
for you now. Why bother? So, that is my belief. Be a good person. Meet a good person.  
Another Chinese senior manager made a similar comment: 
I think as humans, if we treat each other with sincerity, there is actually not a lot of 
difference between us [Chinese and Westerners]. Sometimes, even when a 3-year old 
child looks into your eyes, he would know whether you are sincere or not. The key is 
whether you are sincere or not. If you don’t clown him around, he will take you seriously 
too.49 
A New Zealand senior manager also saw commonalities among business people from both 
countries, particularly when it comes to the attitudes towards politicians: 
Their [Chinese people’s] drivers may be a little bit different, or the way they go about it. 
But at the end of the day, they are business people. Even at a political level, an informal 
level, they are as disparaging or distrusting of politicians as anyone else that I’ve met 
around the world. It’s not, ‘Oh, no. They are great leaders. They are closer to God.’ That’s 
not like that at all. ‘So-and-so is useless. He is corrupt. He would have done better if he’d 
done such and such.’ So, that sort of political debate happens, which is almost kind of 
reassuring. 
From the employee’s perspective, a business operated with integrity was said to be a place that 
informants liked to work for. One Chinese middle manager commented: 
                                                          
48 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得还是要先做人，再做事。 
49 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得人哪，如果说是真诚相待，似乎差别都不会太大 … 有的时候，你就是
一个三岁的小孩看你的眼神，他也知道你真诚不真诚。关键在你真不真诚。你不要敷衍他，他也会
认真对待。 
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For me, if I was to go into a firm, of course I would like the type that has very high 
integrity. It would be as if the company is like a person, who’s got high integrity. Anything 
he does would need to be fair, and he would be very willing to help others, not just to 
earn money, to make a profit. Otherwise it would be meaningless.50  
In these comments made by the Chinese informants, integrity meant something beyond just not 
engaging with corrupt behaviours. Being fair to others, particularly employees, and not 
compromising food safety for the purpose of financial gain were all part of this concept. It is 
possible that government and business operations are now forced to show greater integrity due 
to the wide information sharing on social media, as alluded to in 3.5.1.3 An evolving environment. 
But then it is the wide appreciation of the value of integrity among Chinese people that 
empowers social media to have such an impact on these operations. One New Zealand senior 
manager gave his explanation of this wide appreciation: “The people here are not corrupt.... The 
corruptions [are] in the officials.”  
Another example of this appreciation of integrity among Chinese people is shown in their attitude 
towards New Zealand after the melamine scandal in 2008, as one New Zealand senior manager 
explained: 
New Zealand was considered to be the hero in that … because Helen Clark had been the 
one person who blew the whistle on it. No one cared that Fonterra was a major 
shareholder in Sanlu.… Well, if Kentucky Fried Chicken has a huge food scare in New 
Zealand, you wouldn’t care who the shareholders were, but you would care about the 
person who actually made it public, and that’s what happened, I think, in China.  
4.3.2 Win-win 
The term ‘win-win’ was often used by various informants as the outcome that people value and 
want to achieve in a business deal. For example, a New Zealand senior manager explained what 
they want to achieve when developing farms in rural China: 
What we are trying to do is [to] say … ‘There is work for you if you want work, but also, if 
you continue farming, we want to work with you to help your crops get better, and to 
basically be your main customer’ … so very much trying to make that a win-win. 
                                                          
50 Original Chinese quote: 对于我来说，如果我去某一个企业的话，当然我喜欢那种很正直的企业。就
感觉这个公司像一个人一样，很正直的。[他]做什么事情都讲究公平，然后会很愿意帮助其他的人，
不是说光 …  赚钱，… 拿利润。这个就没有意义。 
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Sometimes this win-win goes beyond just the financial gains of both parties. One New Zealand 
senior manager explained that New Zealanders need to show a willingness to be part of the local 
system, the local environment: 
Let’s get together and spend time with people in the village, and ask, ‘Okay, what are the 
issues in front of you? Anything, let us know, so that we can try and work within the 
framework that we are trying to work [in], so that we can help you.’ It might be that they 
want something done with the local school. Okay, we can, as a company … come in and 
put new windows in the building, or whatever. It doesn’t matter. Probably a poor 
example. But it’s that sort of thing, so that we are showing them that we are truly part of 
their system and their environment. We are not there to simply take, which is 
unfortunately what my colleagues in New Zealand want to do. It’s just simply take, take, 
take. No. That’s why I always refer to it as ‘Leave a little bit of salt on the table’.... It’s 
about saying, ‘We are part of you, or trying to be part of your society.’ We will never 
become fully integrated. But we want to say, ‘Look, we are doing business with you, so 
let’s see what we can do to benefit each other. You might help us by growing more fruit. 
Okay, we can help you by doing other things. We might be able to provide you with school 
books for your kids.’.... We are [trying to be] part of the community. That’s all. 
But win-win is more than just both parties achieving satisfactory outcomes. It is about each party 
wanting the other to prosper out of the business relationship, as one New Zealand business 
consultant explained: 
Win-win is each party wanting the other side to do well, so it isn’t, ‘I want to have my win, 
and they can have theirs as well.’ That’s the wrong thinking. If you don’t have the win-win 
the way I defined it, then you get contracts that are not durable. People think that ‘Oh, I 
got slightly screwed in that negotiation. I didn’t know it at the time, but it turns out that I 
got the short end of the straw,’ and they look for ways to get out. So if you want 
something that is going to survive long term, each party must want the other to win, not 
just at the time of the negotiation, but during the period of the validity of the contract. 
That to me is something the Chinese have always understood, and Westerners are just 
coming to realise how important that is. Americans still say, ‘Here is the contract. I am 
going to enforce it to the letter, even if we smash our relationship and the business that 
we are doing,’ because they have this mental model, that a business is like a sports game, 
with a winner and a loser. Chinese don’t have a winner-and-loser mentality in business. 
They want to work profitably, but they know that they need to have stakeholders that are 
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pleased with what’s going on – suppliers, stakeholders, customers, they all need to want 
to be there long term.  
In this exercise of seeking a win-win outcome, New Zealanders were perceived by some 
informants as being pragmatic, which is perhaps a helpful trait for doing business with the 
Chinese. One New Zealand senior manager commented: 
What I have concluded more recently is that New Zealanders are really quite pragmatic to 
the point that … commercially … they give up a little bit relatively quickly. Pragmatic to the 
extent that they’ll look at a situation, and say ‘win-win’ is here. This is where the balance 
lies, and they get there quite quickly. From here to here, we give up quite quickly because 
we expect the other person also [to] give it up quite quickly, because pragmatically that’s 
where the deal sits, that’s where it should sit. In other cultures, I think, Australians are 
different, Americans are different, French are different than the Italians, [and] Koreans are 
very, very different. People are slower to give, to concede, [and] to get to the win-win point 
in different cultures. I think we are very quick.  
But I think once we get there, we won’t keep going … as quick as we are to get to a fair 
point, we are not quick to concede beyond the fair point.… But it does accelerate the 
process by recognising ‘This is the point.… We are here … and this is where they will get to, 
and that will work’. 
This appreciation of a win-win outcome by the Chinese people could perhaps explain why they try 
to avoid conflicts, where there are typically winners and losers. Chinese people’s tendency in 
avoiding conflict was discussed in 3.4.2.4 Conflict avoidance. But perhaps to find out what sits 
behind the motivation for a win-win outcome requires going deeper into Chinese people’s world 
view, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
4.3.3 Commitment 
Informants observed that commitment and loyalty are highly valued by Chinese people, 
particularly when it comes to agribusiness activities. One New Zealand senior manager explained 
the reasons for his choice of committing to live in China: 
Particularly in agriculture, probably for a lot of things, if you are not here, you can’t do it. 
You've either got to commit yourself to China, or not do it. I was coming backwards and 
forwards, it really wasn't getting anywhere. Chinese are incredibly hospitable people, they 
look after you, make all the right noises, but nothing happens, especially in that type of 
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thing. So I saw pretty clearly that if you want to actually do something in China, you had to 
live here, or spend a lot of time here.  
He also shared his experience of when he first moved to China to live and work: 
When I moved to China ... there was a very interesting thing happened.... As soon as I said 
that I’m moving here permanently, everything changed. All the attitudes changed to me. It 
was actually quite interesting to see what happened.... I told them I’ve rented my house 
out, this is now my home. You could just see people’s attitudes just changed. Not that 
before … there was any problem. But it was quite marked.... Once they saw that you were 
willing to make a commitment, now we start talking seriously. And of course, the longer I 
stay here, the more important that becomes, because as far as Chinese are concerned, 
you’ve made a commitment. They just don't like people that come in and out, in and out.... 
Especially if you are trying to develop something in China, you’ve really got to be here.  
Genuine commitment was also recommended by some Chinese informants. A Chinese senior 
manager gave the following answer when asked to give a suggestion to New Zealanders wanting 
to do agribusinesses in China: 
I think they need to come and do it, not just talk about it. You need to really let people see 
your actions … [bringing in] technologies or money.… Although New Zealand talks about 
investing in China, so many years have gone by, I have not seen real stuff coming in. 
Perhaps they still have many concerns.51  
A New Zealand senior manager felt that one of the roles of expatriate managers in China is being 
there and showing the local government their commitment: 
A lot of [his] … role, as I say, when you are establishing a business anywhere, is actually 
being there, and consistently being in their face, so that if you can’t get a meeting today, 
you come back tomorrow. If you can’t get a meeting tomorrow, you come back the next 
day. I think we’ve gained a huge amount of respect because the local government have 
realised that we are actually committed. We are not just popping in on a plane, saying hello 
and going again. He [the manager] is actually there, pushing things forward. 
                                                          
51 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得还是来做，不要一天只是说。你要扎扎实实让人家看得到，你确实拿
出行动来在这里做了 … [带来] 技术也好，钱也好 … 新西兰虽然说要投资中国，但是那么多年下来，
我看没有实实在在的东西进来的。他们可能还是存在这很多很多的顾虑的嘛。 
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4.3.4 Simplicity and security 
Much of Chapter 3 depicted a complex environment in China, even without the unique challenges 
of doing agribusiness being taken into account. The complicated social hierarchies, the variety of 
responsibilities that one has for people within the guanxi network, and the many implicit social 
rules and nuances make many Chinese people long for a simple life. This simplicity has two 
aspects, which are inter-related. On the one hand, it refers to a minimalistic attitude towards life. 
One Chinese managing director, interviewed in English, gave his interpretation of a simple and 
happy life: 
If you don’t think about anything, … [then] you would have … a very easy life. Who is the 
happiest? I see the workers in our crew. They work in the field, in the mud, doing their job … 
when the whistle for dinner comes, they come back, take a quick [shower], and show up in 
the canteen. Big bowl of rice, with pork and vegetables, then they [go] back to the 
dormitory and … they have a wonderful sleep. That’s a true and simple way of being 
happy…. Are they getting more money than we do? No, they are getting less. But their 
quality of happiness is [greater] than mine, so they are rich in [another] way. 
On the other hand, the simplicity that many Chinese people long for involves there being less 
complexity in the social dynamics they live and work in. A Chinese senior manager described the 
New Zealand firm she was working for as a simple place which attracts employees: “It’s very 
simple here.… [For the employees,] what’s attracting them is the environment here; it’s the simple 
atmosphere where they are able to understand each other and communicate with each other.52  
This valued simplicity is also reflected in the business dealings between Chinese and New 
Zealanders. When asked what the good things are when it comes to dealing with foreigners, one 
Chinese senior manager commented: 
It’s simple! You see, if I was dealing with Chinese, I would probably be … more on guard. 
Chinese are more complicated! Will he somehow ‘jump the fence’? It is better with 
foreigners, because you don’t have to worry. As long as we sign this agreement and put it 
there, nobody needs to worry. Perhaps at the start of the negotiation it can be quite 
difficult, but once it’s negotiated, and the agreement is there, then everybody will surely do 
things as stated in the agreement.53  
                                                          
52 Original Chinese quote: 这儿很单纯 ... [对员工来说] 吸引他们的是这个环境，是这种互相理解、互相
能沟通、很单纯的这种氛围。 
53 Original Chinese quote: 简单嘛！你看我跟中国人打交道，可能就比较防得起来，中国人就比较复杂
么。他会不会又怎么跳墙呀？跟老外就好，你就不用担心。只要我跟他签个协议，摆在那里，大家
171 
 
There are times, however, when this simplicity of New Zealanders causes frustration. “Kiwis … 
[are] direct and simple. Too simple,” one Chinese senior manager commented. A New Zealand 
senior manager further explained: “Our simplicity turns into frustration for the Chinese, because 
we can’t unravel the complexity.” Indeed, this frustration is not just limited to the Chinese side, as 
many New Zealand informants found the complex social dynamics in China difficult to navigate, 
which was alluded to in several places in Chapter 3, such as 3.3.2.1 Bureaucracy, 3.3.2.3 Flexibility 
in practices of the law, and 3.4.1.2.2 Guanxi. 
Although the direct and simple nature of New Zealanders can create frustration, it equally creates 
security, which many Chinese long to have. A New Zealand senior manager explained this from a 
company culture perspective: 
Company culture is so critical in China. It’s an easy gain for New Zealand businesses to get, 
because ... New Zealand has [a] great culture as a nation, in terms of honesty, in terms of 
integrity, and in terms of transparency, and all that kind of stuff.... It’s kind of our moral 
fibre. And I say that with absolute certainty. It’s something which we take for granted. But 
when you come to a place like China, that’s not grounded at all.... For people [who] come to 
[company name], they really sense there is something different here. I asked my staff why 
they’ve been here so long. The big part of the reasons is that they feel safe here. They feel 
actually in here what you see is what you get. There are no games, there are no politics, 
there is no bullshit beyond or behind the scenes, there is no guanxi, all that. Any time I see 
games going on, I jump on it. You just crush it, stop it now. Now we’ve got enough people at 
the top who are used to that, and they actually don’t buy into that. We’ve kind of passed 
that now, it’s not even an issue ... when there are new senior incoming people, that’s the 
only time we’ve got to be really cautious. 
This comment was affirmed by a Chinese middle manager from the same business, who said: 
One of the greatest benefits of this company is that you have a sense of security here. You 
feel that people around you are not thinking, ‘What does he think of me?’ or ‘Why does he 
say bad things about me?’ every day. It won’t be like that. If you’ve been here for a while, 
you will notice that everyone here is very simple and genuine. Real!54  
                                                          
不用担心的。但是开始谈的时候，可能很难谈，但是一旦谈成了，这个协议摆在那里，大家肯定就
会按照那个协议去做事。 
54 Original Chinese quote: 在这个公司最大一个好处之一，就是很有安全感。你感觉身边的人不会天天
去想，‘他怎么看我’，或者‘他怎么说我不好’，不会有这样的。你待时间长了你就会发现，每
一个人都挺朴实的。实在！ 
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Whether or not this approach of the New Zealand employer not allowing ‘games’ is going to be 
sustainable in the long term is a different matter. But the above comments show that there is a 
connection between simplicity and security in the Chinese mind. The value of security can 
perhaps also help to explain some social behaviours discussed in Chapter 3, such as 3.4.2.4 
Conflict avoidance, and certain social institutions, such as 3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival.  
This value of security may also explain the choice made by some Chinese of living outside China 
yet still doing business with China. One New Zealand winery owner gave the following comment 
about their Chinese business partner, who is based in New Zealand, and how he took advantage 
of this set-up for his own business operations:  
I think that [living in New Zealand] is a major difference [for them], because they have 
security here. They’ve got their business; they’ve built up a network and assets. They have 
security. And I don’t think they are in that same environment [as other Chinese living in 
China] … at all. And that’s probably a good thing for us, that we can build the business, and 
they are our shield in a way between what’s going on in China, and because of their 
knowledge of the culture, and how people operate in China. There [is] in-depth knowledge 
that’s very beneficial. 
4.3.5 Equality and fairness 
Within the hierarchical society that informants observed there is a desire for equality and 
fairness. A Chinese middle manager explained what she likes most about working with her two 
New Zealand employers: 
I think they don’t at all seem to be putting themselves up there as the bosses. They are very 
amiable and [that makes me feel] very comfortable. I think [a Chinese boss] has a little bit of 
‘I am your boss, so you must listen to me.’ When I was at school, I used to work on some 
part-time jobs in some Chinese companies. They gave me the impression of ‘You must listen 
to me.’ But here I think it’s different. Any suggestion that we have, we dare to speak it out, 
and they will listen. They very much respect us … and will not … tell you off, and make you 
very uncomfortable. I have been here for all this time, and never felt that way.55  
                                                          
55 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得 … 他们一点儿都没有老板的架子。所以特别亲切，特别舒服 … 我觉得 
[中国老板] 有一点，‘我就是老板，你一定要听我的’ 。… 我上学的时候也在中国的一些企业里做
过一些兼职，印象里他就会‘你一定要听我的’，但是在这里就不是了。我们有什么建议都敢说出
来，他们都听。很尊重人 … 不会 … 讯你呀，让你特别不舒服啊，我在这儿这么长时间，从来没有
过。 
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One of these two entrepreneurs offered his opinion on how and why they have adopted such an 
approach: 
We really believe that whoever shares the hardship needs to share the fruit of the labour.... 
We have hundreds of ways of rewarding people.... I guess it comes down to ... the 
fundamental element for me is to show these kids that ‘You have value’ for the business as 
an individual. Everybody wants to feel valued. These guys are single [only] children typically. 
They’ve spent their whole life feeling valued by their family, so that’s the norm for them. 
Instead, to feel unvalued [in a typical Chinese business] is very strange and traumatic to 
them.  
This desire for equality also leads to a longing for fairness, or perhaps more precisely a 
resentment of unfairness. One Chinese senior manager made the comment that many people in 
China have a strong sense of unfairness, which she further explained: 
He [who senses unfairness] has a strong sense of imbalance [unfairness, injustice]. He thinks 
that ‘[For] some people, he is not better than me in anything. Perhaps because he had an 
opportunity, or has some special power, he suddenly leapt to the sky in one step.’56  
This yearning for equality and fairness could be a consequence of a hierarchical social structure 
and the complex guanxi network within it, as well as the weakness of the legal institutions where 
there is no separation between legislation and judiciary; and recognising that it is only a yearning 
and that reality is otherwise could perhaps also explain why Chinese people resort to a guanxi 
network for their own advancement, because they perceive it as the ‘game rule’ and the way 
forward in real life. How guanxi networks functions was discussed extensively in Chapter 3 under 
3.4.1.2.2 Guanxi. 
4.3.6 Confidence and pride 
Some informants observed a growing confidence in China as a nation and its people as having an 
enhanced self-identity. One New Zealand senior manager explained the changes he had observed: 
China is going through a dramatic change at the moment – well, for a long time. If you look 
politically, economically and culturally, it’s changing. The fundamental thing that you’ve got 
to keep in mind here is, these people don’t like foreigners. Foreigners have screwed this 
country for over 200 years, and they are not going to allow it to happen again.... China has a 
                                                          
56 Original Chinese quote: 他有一种强烈的不平衡感，就觉得‘有些人，他也没比我强什么，他可能就
是因为一个机会，或者有点儿特权，一下子就一步登天了’。 
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level of self-confidence, which is being promoted by the West. You know, when you tell the 
person that you are going to save the world’s economy, they actually start believing it. So 
you’ve got to be really careful as a foreigner, what can you bring here? What can you do? 
And I find it even with myself. When I first came here, people would listen to me. They 
actually don’t listen that closely anymore, because ‘We don’t actually need … those 
[foreigners] to tell us what to do all the time.’ And you can just see it in very subtle ways all 
the time.... China is becoming much, much more focused on China. In their government 
policy, ‘We have to develop [the] domestic economy,’ not an economy based on export and 
cheap labour. It’s not going to go anywhere for this country. You watch the decisions that 
have been made: it’s all about what’s good for China, and they will still accept foreign input 
and that, but I think the attitude to it has changed, and if you are not very careful, you 
won’t make any progress, or you will potentially lose out. It is getting increasingly hard to 
get the ideas across. So it’s a new trend.... This is an incredibly self-confident country now. 
You are seeing it exercise[d] in all sorts of ways now. ‘So why should we listen to foreigners. 
All they do is to give us crap. All they’ve done is to lead us crook for 200 years.’ And if you 
think about it, it really [is] only the last 10 or 15 years that they’ve actually got beyond that 
point. 
This perception was echoed by a comment made by a Chinese senior manager: 
We need to learn to say ‘No’ to foreigners. We can’t always just say ‘Yes’.… This is because 
Chinese do have a bad habit of worshiping foreign things. Now we have more and more 
foreigners coming in. Some people are still very curious about them, but it’s not the case for 
us anymore.… For a foreigner who is here, if I can help you, if I can let you have something, I 
will do my best to; but if it was a matter of principal, we still need to learn to say ‘No’.57  
This confidence and pride in their own identity can perhaps explain some social behaviours 
described in Chapter 3, such as 3.4.2.1 China/Chinese-centric, which indicated that for anyone 
who want to do business in China, the Chinese ‘rules of the game’ must be followed. 
 
                                                          
57 Original Chinese quote: 我们跟老外要学会说‘No’，不能永远都是‘Yes’… 因为中国人崇洋媚外
的思想是比较严重的，但现在的就是说因为来的老外也比较多了 … 对很多人来说还是很稀奇，但是
对我们来说就不稀奇了 … 做为一个老外在这里，我能够帮你的，我能够让你的地方，我还是尽量让
你的，但是如果是原则性的东西，我们还是要学会说‘No’的。 
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4.4 Summary 
This chapter provides insights from informants on ‘why things are the way they are’ in China. It is 
by no means an exhaustive explanation of everything that was described in Chapter 3, but it does 
illuminate certain perspectives for further contemplation and will form the basis of discussion in 
Chapter 6. 
4.4.1 World views / ways of thinking 
Informants believed that one must attempt to understand China from a historical perspective and 
study its history from no later than the Warring States Period (475 to 221 BC). Communist 
influence was merely a blip in the context of a country that has evolved over several millennia, 
and the impact of Confucianism still extends deeply into Chinese culture, leaving a society that 
remains highly hierarchical. Over this long history people in China learned to embrace a very 
pragmatic approach to things, and this way of thinking is reflected in how Chinese people adopt 
new ideas, how the government regulates society, and how they do business. This pragmatic 
approach may have also led to long-term and short-term thinking coexisting in the Chinese mind, 
given that the future is always deemed unpredictable and ever changing.  
Another manifestation of Chinese people’s pragmatism could be their reserve in trusting others. 
In business dealings, in particular, informants believe that no trust should be given at the start of 
a relationship. While Chinese rely more on emotions and intuition and New Zealanders more on 
law and due diligence to gain trust, the level of trust that is needed between business partners 
should be as high as “the keys to your safe”. Informants pointed out that this general lack of trust 
also means that many business transactions in China are done cash up front; it also means that 
staff management can be challenging, but a trusting work environment is highly appreciated once 
it is achieved. 
The pragmatic way of thinking of the Chinese people may also influence them to see things as 
interconnected, causing a preference for using inter-woven logic and leading to what New 
Zealand informants perceived as roundabout ways of doing things. Westerners or New 
Zealanders, on the other hand, were seen by the informants to be mostly following a straight-line 
logic. These different logics may help to explain the communication difficulty that exists both 
between New Zealanders and Chinese people and among Chinese people themselves, which 
informants have observed. This difficulty is particularly pronounced when it comes to people from 
different hierarchies, such as employers and employees. Combined with the general lack of trust, 
this inter-woven logic of the Chinese people may help to explain certain social behaviours, such as 
wearing social masks. 
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4.4.2 Value systems 
Despite the prevalence of corruption in China, informants observed a high level of appreciation of 
integrity. Non-engagement with corrupt behaviours, being fair and honest, and not compromising 
on food safety are all characteristics that informants associated with business operations run with 
integrity. With these business operations, Chinese people seek to achieve win-win outcomes, 
though not always in monetary terms, particularly when rural development is involved. 
Informants also pointed out that this win-win goal not only means that both parties benefit, but 
also that each party wants the other party to thrive from the business relationship. Compared to 
people from some other countries, New Zealanders are believed to be pragmatic in reaching win-
win points in business negotiations with the Chinese. 
Commitment is another value that Chinese people regard highly, as indicated by informants. They 
also believe that commitment is what is needed to succeed in business ventures in China, 
particularly those in agriculture. 
In their effort to make sense of this complex environment, Chinese people were observed by the 
informants to appreciate simplicity, involving a minimalistic attitude towards life where 
complicated social dynamics are made simple. While the perceived simple nature of New 
Zealanders can create frustration and difficulty for business dealings with the Chinese, it also 
creates security, particularly for Chinese employees working for New Zealand-culture-dominated 
companies. The values of both simplicity and security can perhaps help to explain Chinese 
people’s tendency to avoid conflict and their effort to survive. 
Yet simplicity and security are not the only characteristics of some New Zealand-operated 
businesses in China; equality and fairness within the cultures of these companies are also highly 
regarded by the Chinese staff who were interviewed. Nevertheless, the very things that made 
these Chinese staff appreciate equality and fairness − the power of hierarchy and the guanxi 
network − reveal the importance of guanxi within Chinese society. 
Lastly, informants observed a growing level of confidence in China as a nation on the world stage, 
leading to a changing attitude towards foreigners and foreign investments in China. Chinese 
people take pride in the achievements of their long history, and are said to have recognised the 
wrongdoings that Westerners inflicted them over the past 200 years. Their confidence and pride 
to say ‘No’ to foreigners can perhaps help to explain the China/Chinese-centric social behaviours 
described in Chapter 3. 
177 
 
The informants’ interpretations presented in this chapter will be further discussed in Chapter 6, 
where they will be linked to existing theory. Before embarking on that discussion, informant 
recommendations for New Zealand entrepreneurs wanting to venture into China, or deal with the 
Chinese, will be presented. These perspectives are presented in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Research Results III:  
Agribusiness Pathways in China 
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5.1 Introduction 
During the interviews, informants were asked to give their advice on how New Zealand 
entrepreneurs should go about their business dealings when venturing into China or doing 
business with the Chinese. This advice touched on various aspects of business dealings. Chapter 5 
is dedicated to presenting this advice from the perspectives of market entry, value proposition, 
relationship building, business negotiation, agribusiness operations, and understanding the power 
game. Extensive quotes are once again utilised to demonstrate the internal and external validity, 
as well as the reliability of the emergent insights. There is also an extended summary at the end of 
this chapter. 
 
5.2 Market Entry 
To many New Zealand entrepreneurs the Chinese market is a complex minefield that remains 
daunting and unfathomable. Informants offered some practical advice to conquer such a fear.  
5.2.1 Find the right partner(s) 
While they might differ on some suggestions, the majority of the informants pointed out that 
finding the right partner(s) is absolutely crucial for doing business in China. As one New Zealand 
business consultant commented, “You can’t do it yourself. You can’t do it at all.... That’s the rules 
of the game”. And as one New Zealand senior manager stated, “The fundamental necessity [is] to 
find the right partner.… Seriously, you’ve got to be up here.… to try 20 different people, different 
companies.” 
Similarly, a New Zealand winery owner, who is a Chinese, advised that New Zealand businesses 
that want to get into China should use local contacts to open the market. A New Zealand senior 
manager elaborated further: “[The] principal of finding the right business partners … [is] 
universal.... But I think it applies more in China, because the consequences here of getting the 
wrong business partner are greater.”  
Finding the ‘right partner’, however, can be easier said than done. A New Zealand senior manager 
recommended approaching those who had experience in China as the starting point: 
It’s a matter of working [through] … a lot of expats, NZTE58, a lot of the government people 
all … have connections … so there is that experiential approach, where you can actually find 
                                                          
58 New Zealand Trade & Enterprise, a government body. 
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connections who know connections who know people, and that’s probably the front end of 
what … people should do. 
Another New Zealand senior manager gave more specific advice: 
There a number of companies that are there … NZTE has a Doing Business in China booklet. 
That’s got a list of recommended people who do those things. Talk to trusted people that 
are already on the ground in China.… Most New Zealand companies have got relationships 
here with an auditor, Deloitte, KPMG, whatever it is. They’ve all got offices in China, and 
they will give you advice … as well as NZTE. There is local New Zealand business 
communities … [a] KEA59 network on the ground. So all those people have got experienced 
operators in China. They will be the sort of guys to give you names. 
Although these names might be the starting point for a business venture, what these experienced 
China-hands can offer goes beyond just the names: they help to decipher the myths and 
complexities within the business dealings, and therefore inform decisions about who might be the 
right partner(s). A New Zealand senior manager explained in detail the value that these 
experienced China-hands bring to their business: 
What I’ve taken a lot of comfort from … is that we’ve got a handful of people who have 
helped us to make sense of it. Local Chinese experts, or experts on China, who have sat 
there and said, ‘This is the situation you are dealing with right now.’ We look at it through 
our eyes, and go, ‘Man! That’s complicated.’ Then you look at it through an expert’s eyes, 
and they’ll say, ‘Yes, it is. But it’s not really. This is what’s going on.’ And you go, ‘Okay … 
that kind of makes sense.’ And you know that you’ve got at least a pathway forward.  
Informants also suggested that New Zealand companies should utilise more of the Chinese 
immigrants within New Zealand, who still have connections back to China, to help open up the 
market. As one New Zealand senior manager commented: 
I think New Zealand now can benefit from its Chinese community that it’s got in New 
Zealand, because people like you [the researcher], who were born in China, and … young 
people can be recruited out of that community, and help New Zealand companies grow 
business in China.  
Another New Zealand senior manager gave a more specific explanation: 
                                                          
59 Kiwi Expatriate Association. 
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I don’t think New Zealand makes enough use of people like yourself [the researcher], who 
are basically New Zealanders in heart now, but are still basically linked back very strongly to 
China.… But they are your person, who you trust, and have spent a lot of time building that 
relationship, so that when you do get into these meetings, you can say after the meeting, 
‘You realise what was going on in that meeting?’ ‘Oh, I didn’t understand it at all.’ Whereas 
you’ve got the eye, because that’s your background, and you know how these things are 
operated. 
In this demystifying exercise of finding the right partners, one New Zealand senior manager 
suggested that a partner needs to be relevant and offer some value: 
I think you’ve got to be very selective in terms of your partners.... You need them to be 
relevant, and you need them to be offering value. Unless they are going to sit there and be 
silent in your business, then you need some kind of synergy. If they’ve got some kind of 
downstream or upstream synergy that they can offer to your business, then that brings … 
value. 
A Chinese senior manager spoke about what was essential in a potential business partner from 
the perspective of integrity: 
I think for them [New Zealanders] to come to China, they really need to find a good partner. 
This is essential for them. Even if it’s in China, it’s still the same. If you [the partner] say one 
thing and do another, this will surely fail. You see, my success in collaborating with New 
Zealanders is really because we have both found a good partner.60  
You’ve got to work it out during the process.… Any project, the key is to decide on the 
person, not the project. No matter how good the project is, if you haven’t got a very good 
person to operate it, the project is still doomed to fail. Anything you do is like that, be it in 
China or overseas, I think.... No matter how good the project is, if the person is not right, I’d 
rather give up this project.61  
                                                          
60 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得他们来中国，还是要找到一个好的合作伙伴，这一点对他们 [新西兰
人] 来讲非常重要的。包括你在中国也是一样的，如果你 [合作伙伴] 说一套做一套的话，这个东西绝
对是要夭折的。你看我跟新西兰人合作能够成功，还是真的是双方都是找到了一个好的合作伙伴。 
61 Original Chinese quote: 那你要在做的过程中自己去看了嘛 … 任何一个项目，关键是决定这个人，不
是决定这个项目的好坏。这个项目再好，如果不是那个很好的人来操作的话，这个项目也是要失败
的。任何事都是这样的，在中国，在国外我觉得都是这么回事 … 你这个项目再好，如果那个人不
行，我都宁愿放弃这个项目。 
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With or without the help of New Zealand expatriates, searching for the right partner(s) for a long-
term success is somewhat like dating, as one New Zealand business consultant commented: 
Chinese has one wife, and many mistresses.… When you go to China, if they are interested, 
at first you are just their mistress, you are not their wife … and mistresses can be discarded, 
but the wives stay forever.  
5.2.2 Alignment 
Sitting alongside finding the right partner is having alignment. This alignment is three-fold. Firstly, 
the business venture in China must be aligned with government policies in China. This is 
particularly the case when it comes to food- and agribusiness-related ventures. One New Zealand 
senior manager explained: 
Agriculture is a sensitive sector because it involves land. And anything that involves land in 
China is … sensitive, because it’s about peasants and farmers, so politically has a lot of 
issues attached to it. But again it’s making sure whatever you are doing, there is some 
alignment. [In] everything we are trying to do, alignment is very important, making sure that 
our developments are aligned with core policies, so that helps with a lot of regulatory stuff. 
He further explained what this alignment involves and how it is particularly helpful when dealing 
with government officials: 
They [government officials] all tend to sing the same Party line, sing the same song tune. It 
doesn’t mean that they will all sing it at the same time, all singing in harmony. They all have 
different views on how things can be done. So number one is making sure that you have 
enough influence within the big picture, so that these guys aren’t going to stonewall you. 
And that comes down to number one, having an enterprise that is relevant, having an 
enterprise that has some scale, and an enterprise that is seen to be doing good things inside 
your sector, but also adding to the economic growth of the province.… We are very 
fortunate, that … inside our sector we are very relevant. We have the scale, and it’s 
continuing to grow. And we contribute, add a lot of value, not just in terms of our economic 
activity, but in terms of what we do − transfer of technology, and helping the local farmers, 
and bringing new varietals in, and all these sorts of things. So there is no reason for people 
not to support us through the long term. 
The second aspect of alignment is that between potential business partners, where their interests 
align in terms of what each party wants to achieve out of the business venture. This is largely 
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achieved through the exercise of finding the right partner discussed in 5.2.1 Find the right 
partner(s). 
The third aspect of alignment is having alignment within the business, because this provides unity 
and therefore reassurance for potential business partners. One New Zealand senior manager 
explained: 
Certainly it’s important … that you actually know what it is that you are trying to achieve. 
You can’t go into a meeting without knowing what you want to come out having achieved … 
so very clear messaging around things is important. And the other thing is being very 
consistent, so whether they are talking to me, or Michael, or Alvin, or Grant [pseudonyms], 
who is our guy on the ground, we’ve actually got to make sure we are completely aligned in 
terms of what we are trying to achieve. 
5.2.3 Be there 
“You’ve got to be here” was a comment made by many informants. A New Zealand senior 
manager made the comparison between their customers in other countries and those in China, 
and pointed out the need to physically meet up with the latter: 
You can deal with other customers in other countries and start doing stuff [with] no more 
than their email address and a phone number. You might either email them or talk to them. 
But it may be 2 or 3 years down the track … before you actually physically get to meet them. 
But that is very rare in business with the Chinese. You’ve got to make the effort for physical 
contact, and getting to the market. 
But being there means far more than just flying up to China and meeting with potential 
customers. A New Zealand senior manager based in Shanghai shared his perspective: 
You’ve got be here.… You’ve actually got to be here. You’ve got to have the cash behind 
you, and … be here for the long haul. It takes time, and you’ve got to do a lot of hard 
work.… If you are not on the ground, you are not going to understand the business to the 
depth required to know what you’ve got to do.… You’ve got to be better than the locals. 
You’ve got to be smarter than the locals. You’ve got to have a business model more 
profitable than the locals.’ You’ve got to be … a better investment prospect than the locals.  
When asked how long someone needs to have been in China before he/she gets a ‘feel’ of things, 
a New Zealand senior manager answered: 
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As long as they can. Three or four years, maybe, something like that as a minimum. But you 
are still learning all the time. I had a lot to do with China, but I didn’t really.… I found out so 
much through the [xxx] crisis [a food safety scandal]. Under pressure, a lot of things emerge. 
I would have thought by then, after about 10 or 15 years dealing with China, and [spending] 
a lot of time on the ground, that I would have a good sense of it. There was so much more 
that I found out during that crisis.… I guess what I am saying is that it’s not necessarily time 
so much. It’s the in-depth experience, and probably go[ing] through a few problems. 
A slight variation on this suggestion of being there is having someone representing the company 
based in China. One New Zealand middle manager commented, “I think it is important to have 
someone there, just to have a presence, [and to know] exactly what’s happening.” A New Zealand 
senior manager explained in detail: 
We need New Zealanders … who can speak the language, understand the culture. We need 
New Zealand companies and entrepreneurs who are committed … to invest and to meet 
the costs of having people up here, to extend their supply line from New Zealand deep into 
the market here.… But a lot of them are trying to do it on a sort of fly-in fly-out basis. You 
can’t do that. You’ve got to put people on the ground here.  
Another New Zealand senior manager implied that whoever is posted to China needs to be totally 
trusted by the company and have an understanding of both cultures, and is likely to be more 
valuable for exploring high-value markets: 
You really only make progress when you have one [person] up there that you can trust 
implicitly to do your business. That person, who … probably best is … a Chinese, but could 
be a New Zealander, who’s lived there for some time, and who you trust without 
reservation, is working there. This business like what we do, which is flying up there once or 
twice a year for a few days … and deals with the people, the number of agents and so on … 
it works, but only works with that low-value product. You want to get into the high-value 
stuff, you are going to have to do it a little bit differently. 
A senior manager from a New Zealand-owned international company spoke about the challenges 
they faced due to not having a senior manager based in China: 
One of the biggest challenges, and one of the steepest learnings that I’ve had, was that we 
sit around and assess these things for hours, trying to [work out] what it might mean based 
on a very, very low base of understanding.... We sit in the … board room for hours, what we 
should be doing, or could be doing, and in reality, the best thing we can do, is to go to 
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China, and start to develop a dialogue up there to understand the situation better. We try 
and second guess things too much, in my view, rather than actually trying to get to the real 
basis of the conversation, which means going there and talking to people.  
You can find out more in 5 minutes from a conversation in a round-about way. We’d 
agonised over here for hours, or in some cases, months. Then you actually see the right 
people … that’s the value … of being on the ground…. Peter [pseudonym] is up there a week 
a month, which is a lot, but still probably in the context of things, that’s 3 weeks that you 
are not there. 
There is no one in the business here [in New Zealand] who has really lived in China, worked 
in China, and understands.… Everyone talks about scale and difficulty and those things. 
There is no one here that has lived and breathed that. So you don’t have someone sitting 
here … at the board table, an executive, who’s got that knowledge of what’s required in a 
place like China. It’s quite a different operating environment. Whereas perhaps in another 
market … Europe … there are more people around who have got experience being in 
Europe, or through other careers lived and worked in Europe. They get that. But China is 
unique.  
Similar to the analogy of wife and mistresses mentioned in 5.2.1 Find the right partner(s), some 
informants compared being there to dating. One New Zealand business consultant said, “You’ve 
got to be on the ground up here. It’s like dating. How do you find a wife? It’s exactly that.… Try 
the merchandise.” 
It is also worth noting that while informants suggest that being there is important, they also 
suggest avoiding investing in hard assets. One New Zealand business consultant explained the 
reasoning behind this: 
In China, if you put something on the ground here, factors are at play that you would never 
ever know at [which] … point [that the government] are going to take that asset. It’s going 
to happen. That’s the rules of the games here, because Chinese always look after the 
Chinese. For me, I would never ever invest into hard assets.… You need to partner with the 
right people, for them to build the assets.… Why would you want to build a cool store, when 
you can hire one? Why do you need your own facilities when you can hire one? The 
mentality of setting up a big asset in China for the business to grow into is ridiculous. You 
want the business to be growing, then you fund the asset.… If you are going to put 
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something in the ground, the local governmental official [one day] would say, ‘I really want 
that land. I quite like that. We change the rules.’ That happens all the time. 
5.2.4 Need capital 
Capital is a necessary requirement for any business ventures. However, for businesses that want 
to venture into China capital is particularly important, as one New Zealand senior manager 
pointed out from their experience of operating in China: 
Capital is a big part of it....Whether it’s from inside China, or whether it’s from overseas, at 
the end of the day, you would need capital.… Money is critical. In fact, you will never have 
enough money at any point in time.... Cash is king.… I think people don’t realise, or forget, 
conveniently maybe, … just how much money you need to establish a viable business up 
here. Because what you are trying to do, local companies are also trying to do it. They can 
exist on the smell of an oily rag, because they are supported by family and friends. If they 
have to go hungry once or twice a week, it’s okay. They only go to the restaurant a couple of 
times a week, that’s fine. Just have a plate of rice and a bowl of noodles. You get by. 
Whereas firm[s] that come up here − not so easy. The bigger you get, the harder it 
becomes. Not easy in many cases. The bigger you get, the more people you are obligated 
to. 
5.2.5 Target second-tier cities 
As indicated in 3.5.1.2 Diversity, informants believe that Beijing and Shanghai are not 
representative of the whole Chinese market. In fact, during the interviews many informants 
shared their belief that second-tier cities should be the main target markets for New Zealand 
entrepreneurs. As one New Zealand senior manager explained, tier-2 cities have markedly less 
competition: 
You are far better to pick a particular area suitable to what you are doing and develop that 
really well. Then if you are successful and you have got capacity after that, then you can 
extend it to different areas. And stay away from Shanghai and Beijing, because there is too 
much competition there. If you go to Shanghai, you’ve got every single American company 
that makes what you make there, every single British company, every single French 
company, every single German company, Russian company, Indian company, Pakistan, 
Australian company … every single one of your global competitors will be sitting on your 
door step. But go to the tier-2 cities, Tianjin, Qingdao, Hangzhou, Chongqing, Chengdu, 
Kunming.… Go to t-2 cities, and you don’t have all of that competition. Maybe your 
competition is only 10 per cent of what you would have in Shanghai. 
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A New Zealand district mayor gave a similar suggestion: 
I’d … target second-tier or third-tier cities. I think unless you’ve got a large corporate entity 
behind you, or a large logistical company behind you, I don’t think there is much future 
going to Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou.… I think there [are] big opportunities in a wealthier 
second-tier [city]. Chengdu is getting quite up there, but Qingdao, Kunming, Ningbo … that’s 
where I would go. And one of those second-tier cities, if you can get the right logistical 
[arrangement] … they will take all the product that you want, because they are so big in 
their own right. You shouldn’t have a whole-of-China strategy if you are an agribusiness 
company in New Zealand. You should say, ‘What am I selling?’ Whether it’s technology, 
whether it’s a food-based product. What is already going from New Zealand to those 
places? Who are the people that have done it before? Go and talk to them, and say, 
‘Actually, this is the part that I want to be in. This is the part of China [that I want to be in]’. 
Then … you can go and talk to the council, because there are 37 sister city relationships 
between New Zealand and China. If you want to go to Shandong province … then the first 
thing I would do would be to go and talk to the councils that have a relationship with 
Shandong province. Talk to their foreign affairs. Then I would go up and try to find the 
businesses. But I’d also go up and see the foreign affairs people through NZTE, but also go 
there and say ‘This is what I want to do. I want to build a relationship’.… But don’t get on a 
plane, and turn up in Shanghai, and walk around … with an electric fence unit. That’s just 
never going to work. 
5.2.6 Mental preparation 
Lastly, informants gave advice on the mental preparation one should have before venturing into 
China. One New Zealand senior manager suggested that entrepreneurs should ask themselves 
what their skills are before entering China: 
Well, be genuine and be yourself. That’s really important. Have you had the skills? Make 
sure that you have got the skills. Once again, be honest about what you can actually 
contribute, and make sure that you do have the skills, and you are not trying to do too 
much, that you are not trying to do things that you are not able to do. It’s a tough 
environment in lots of ways, and you get found out pretty quickly … whether you have the 
ability to do things or not.  
But having the skills was not deemed to be enough by informants for venturing into China. Many 
suggested that New Zealanders should make the effort to learn the different culture and different 
ways of doing things in China. One Chinese senior manager (interviewed in English) pointed out 
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that one of the mistakes that he saw New Zealand entrepreneurs make was displaying a lack of 
willingness to learn about the new culture: 
When they go to a different country, a different culture, it takes time for them to get used 
to it. I think some of them [New Zealand entrepreneurs], in my opinion, their willingness to 
learn [was lacking], and maybe [they should] try not to battle from their perspective, and try 
to understand more from the Chinese perspective. I think that’s one of the mistakes. 
One New Zealand senior manager made a similar comment: 
I would like to see lots more New Zealanders … see lots of young New Zealanders working 
up here … working as interns, learning the language, learning the culture, learning what it is 
like to live here.… As a country, we need to learn more about … how we can bring this 
about. How can New Zealand get more out of the Free Trade Agreement with China? 
This opinion was echoed by a Chinese agricultural consultant: 
I think the most important thing is to first … understand the market. That is a necessary 
preparation, because that is the most essential thing to do before you make any 
commercial decisions. This understanding means that you need to go there, to watch more, 
to listen more, to think more, and to learn more, then you can make a commercial decision. 
That is the very key.62  
More specifically, one New Zealand senior manager talked about learning the system in China and 
what is important there: 
Understanding the system, understanding what’s important. We look at things from a Kiwi 
perception, but they may not be the key drivers for the Chinese people or the Chinese 
government, so really that whole understanding of what’s important to this market, to this 
country, is hugely important. 
All this learning also takes time. One New Zealand senior manager suggested: 
I have been here a long time now, and I am still learning. Don’t think you know everything 
within 5 minutes. You don’t. Ten, twenty years of experience, you are still learning every 
day something new. Something you think, ‘Whoa … that was interesting. I’ll store that one 
                                                          
62 Original Chinese quote: 我觉得最主要的是要先去了解这个市场。这个是必要的一个准备工作，因为
这是一个你在做商业决定之前的最基本的一个工作。这个了解是说你要去到那里，去多看，多听，
多想，多学，然后你才去做一个商业决定，这个是非常关键的。 
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away, because I didn’t appreciate that was something that I should have been looking out 
for.’ 
The vast difference in institutional cultures between China and New Zealand portrayed in Chapter 
3 and Chapter 4 indeed shows that there is much to learn. However, for some informants passion 
is the absolutely crucial element of the mental preparation needed. One New Zealand senior 
manager commented: 
I’d say the biggest piece of advice for anybody coming to China [is that] … sure as hell you’d 
better be passionate about what you do, because if you are not, this place will chew you up 
and spit you out, because you are going to bash against the wall whether you are 
passionate or not. When you are passionate, it doesn't hurt as much. That’s pretty much 
how I see it.  
Tied in with having passion is the need to be prepared to fail, or perhaps, having an ‘escape plan’. 
One Chinese middle manager commented, “When doing business with the Chinese, always have 
an escape plan: What will you do if the other person does not do what he/she has promised to 
do?” 
 
5.3 Value Proposition 
Many informants shared their belief during the interviews that the future of New Zealand 
agricultural export cannot rely solely on commodity products, which has been the main income 
earner in the agri-food sector for the past decades. Informants gave specific recommendations as 
to how New Zealand could break away from such a reliance on commodity products, and 
explained from the perspectives of value adding, technological edge, and communicating with 
consumers and customers. 
5.3.1 Value adding 
Informants made it clear that it is impossible for New Zealand to supply every market segment in 
China, as alluded to in 3.5.4.1.5 Lack of volume of supply from New Zealand. “Value adding” came 
through clearly as the recommended value proposition. A New Zealand senior manager gave his 
opinion as to why New Zealand entrepreneurs should target further down the supply chain, using 
an example of processing blueberries versus producing them: 
A better way to look at it is more the downstream type of industries in my opinion … 
Blueberries. Let’s suppose you’ve got a New Zealand company who is great on blueberries, 
190 
 
knows everything about it, going to grow blueberries in China. They would be far better to 
come in and create some downstream industry with blueberries, maybe it’s a blueberry and 
a lingzhi63 drink. You put a little bit of Chinese medicine in it, combine with that, put that 
through a Chinese distribution thing, and then you engage the farmers to supply for your 
product, and you clip … the ticket in the downstream side, rather than trying to compete 
with the farmer to grow blueberries. Because even if you are successful, if you put in a big 
orchard of blueberries, and you are doing really well, and all the people in the district would 
go, “Whoa, what are they doing? Whoa, they are making some money. I could do that.” And 
the next thing you have, the whole market will be flooded with blueberries, your price will 
be pushed down, but your cost structure won’t be, because you won’t be living in a farmer’s 
house. You would have all of the administration, all of the extra costs of running your 
operation, because you are doing it as a Western commercial enterprise. But the farmer 
knows how to save every single penny, every single fen64, he will be saving, so that his cost 
structure is much lower, 10 times lower than you could ever possibly even imagine 
matching. And then your essential strength is gone, because you go to the market, here 
[are] the farmers selling blueberries. 
One of the ideas raised by the informants is to add value by packaging products specifically for 
Chinese consumers. One New Zealand business consultant gave his ideas about packaging in 
general, and then more specifically about packaging lamb: 
New Zealand food packaging is crap. It’s not right for the market.… What the Chinese want 
is they want to know information about it. You need to have more information about your 
product in the packaging.… [Also,] black colour resonates with Kiwis, but doesn’t resonate 
here.… I think we need bright colours, because you want people to be happy. Because like 
anything when you are targeting the people, you don’t target … the males, you target the 
females. They are the people with the money.  
We are still cutting up the animal as we would for Europe. We need to change it, and say, 
‘Right, how do the consumers use it?’ And let’s trace it back, and let’s package it. How 
would I pack the lamb? Well, take for example, the ribs, the rib cage. Everyone loves to 
bloody gnaw on a bit of bone up here. I would vacuum pack that, ready for the consumer, in 
a way that maybe I would add some spices or something at the start. And then I want the 
consumer to whack open the bag, drop it into a pan, and add some local things, and have a 
                                                          
63 A type of mushroom often used for medicinal purposes in traditional Chinese medicine. 
64 A monetary unit. One fen equals one hundredth of one yuan. 
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nice dish.… So why would you want a big shoulder of lamb, a big leg of lamb? What the hell 
are they going to do with it? 
Another form of added value is the authenticity of the product. The senior manager from a New 
Zealand winery that had successfully increased its wine sales to China over the few years prior to 
the interview shared his opinion as to why they succeeded: 
I think it is the fact that we have authenticity. We are a single vineyard. We can trace exactly 
where the wine comes from. It’s made in our own winery. It’s sort of like a French chateau 
model, really, in New Zealand. I think that’s one major advantage. When people deal with 
[winery name], they deal with the owner. I travel across to China. I’m the face that’s over 
there as well, helping sell wine. Everything … you’ve got that high level of authenticity.  
This concept of unique single-origin authenticity can be extended to a country level: the idea of ‘a 
food basket’ was also suggested as another way of creating collective added value through 
authenticity for New Zealand products: 
Bulking up … the basket concept … a basket of products … a New Zealand Inc. basket … 
because if we had a New Zealand store in the top 10 cities in China, and we had all the 
products that went through, and … behind the scenes … we followed up with a whole lot of 
online stuff, that’s probably the best way to go. 
5.3.2 Technological edge 
To achieve value adding, some informants suggested that having a technological edge is the key. 
One New Zealand senior manager explained it like this: 
New Zealand companies have to think … in terms of ‘What technological edge can I put into 
that supply chain that will lift me above that basic level of competition?’… So New Zealand 
agribusinesses should be looking at things they can do that give them some technological 
edge that raises them above the mass market.… And that’s never going to go away, because 
how could you deny the right of some poor farmer who is absolutely struggling because he 
is earning 150 US dollars a year, who’s got to educate his family, clothe his family, to pay for 
health care. And he looks across the fence, and he sees somebody who is making some 
money doing something that he knows he can do, so he is going to go and do it, and you will 
never stop that. What he can’t do is, say in the mogroside65 example, he can’t go out and 
invent a technological process to extract it in a more efficient manner, because he doesn’t 
                                                          
65 A natural sweetener extracted from luohan fruit. 
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have the education for that. So companies need to lift themselves above … what everybody 
else can do. 
In applying this technological edge, New Zealanders should also adapt to local conditions in China, 
as another New Zealand senior manager based in Shanghai commented: 
Technology is the application of science. You always have to apply science in different ways 
and in different conditions. And of course, the conditions are different here. Conditions vary 
throughout New Zealand. But they vary more dramatically when you come here, so you’ve 
got to be willing to acknowledge the need to adapt to the different conditions that exist 
here. 
5.3.3 Communicating with consumers and customers 
For the specific exercise of adding value, informants suggested that communicating with 
consumers is the first step, particularly utilising social media platforms to talk to the younger 
generation. One New Zealand business consultant commented: 
The old traditional model of selling into China is that you send something up, and you hope 
like hell that you get another order. You’ve got no idea where it goes. With the opening up 
of social media and technology like it is these days, you can actually go directly to the 
consumers.… It’s all about adding more value. But it’s going to the consumer, and go, ‘How 
do you use it? I will give you this leg of lamb. What are you going to do with it? How are you 
going to cut it up?’ Watch them cut it up, so find out how the hell they are going to use it. Is 
it diced? Is it minced? Whatever it is. ‘Oh, we don’t really know.’ So it becomes an 
educational thing. So, you say, ‘We’ve got this great protein from over here. Here is a recipe 
with it.’… The problem is we need to look at how do we add more value, and it’s a long-
term game. They need to start from people on the ground; they need to understand the 
consumers; they need to talk directly to the consumers.… And you can do that now through 
social media. The information is there. It’s not all the distributors. It’s not all the consumers. 
It’s the younger generation that’s got money, who are going to grow up. You need to start 
talking to them. 
While recognising that the final consumers are a critical element, understanding the customers, 
who will be the distributors or processors, is also deemed important. One senior manager from a 
New Zealand meat company gave an example: 
[One] thing that we learned on the trip, and we underestimated it, was how the Chinese 
value the bones, because we assumed that they just [wanted] premium protein, and that’s 
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what everyone else pays the money for, and the bone is just wasted. There is no material 
value. It goes to the rendering department, and is used as animal feed or waste. Whereas 
the Chinese will pay good money for the bone. Before we went over, we were selling … the 
femur bone, and some of the bigger bones. So we actually dismantle the whole carcass, and 
put the whole skeletal arrangement on the table, and took pictures of it. They say, ‘Oh, we’ll 
take that. We want that.’ And even just the knuckle tip of the leg, which is basically the 
bone and the tendons, they said, ‘That! That’s the most valuable bit! We will pay $2.80 for 
that!’ And we are throwing it away, and trying to get $0.40 for it over here.… I mean, it’s 
pretty simple, isn’t it? Go and find out what the customer wants. Understand what their 
dietary requirements are.  
He further explained the philosophy their particular business has in regard to developing value-
added products, targeting hospitality, restaurant and institutional markets rather than retail: 
We prefer not to go down that retail path. We … would go to the HRI trade, which is 
hospitality, restaurant and institutional, and as a business philosophy, we want to link up 
with people who have skin in the game in terms of putting the highest-value products on 
the white table cloth, so that everyone is driving for the most value, and finding ways to 
increase the value of your product, not decrease it. 
 
5.4 Relationship Building 
The importance and complexity of relationships, or guanxi, has been discussed extensively in 
3.4.1.2.2 Guanxi. Indeed, as one New Zealand senior manager commented, “I think … that 
business in China is more about just dollars and cents and profitability. It’s about trying to develop 
meaningful long-term relationships or partnerships. That theme comes through more in China 
than anywhere else”. This section of the thesis is dedicated to explaining how to build such long-
term relationships, as seen by the informants. 
5.4.1 When 
Relationship building is be needed prior to business negotiation rather than during the course of 
negotiation. This is mainly to find out the background and the trustworthiness of the potential 
business partner. A New Zealand senior manager used the analogy of “turning the meal around” 
to explain this: 
[It’s] about turning the meal round, trying to eat the dessert first, the main course in the 
middle, and the soup at the end, to use a Western [analogy]. It’s not what the deal is … the 
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first thing is who, then it’s why, and then it’s what. So you shouldn’t even be talking about 
doing a deal with somebody until you are satisfied who … Who are they? Why would you 
deal with these people? What are their networks … the whole thing! And you should be 
dealing with several different possible co-operation partners before you choose the one you 
actually, ultimately use. And before you even do that, you should have been spending [a] 
considerable length of time getting to know those people, getting to know their personality. 
Are they trustworthy? What have they done in the past? Who have they stolen money 
from? What was their last business deal?… Just find out who they are, but in the big, broad 
sense. 
A New Zealand agricultural consultant spoke about the need to ‘play along’ with the social games 
before getting into negotiations: 
You’ve got to be able to listen to what they want and understand what they want. You don’t 
want to be in a rush for an outcome. You’ve got to build the relationship before you can 
actually get to the hard stuff in terms of negotiations. You’ve got to be able to play the 
Chinese banquet drinking games and [be] seen to be sympathetic, and understanding 
Chinese culture, and be prepared to eat anything that is offered. All of those little things, I 
think [are] very important. 
Another New Zealand business consultant summarised the process like this: “Go through the 
‘getting to know you’ phase, before even try[ing] to … talk generalities, and say what we both want 
to achieve, and over time get your shopping list on the table.”  
5.4.2 How 
How to build trustworthy business relationships was regarded as much easier said than done by 
the informants. Nevertheless, they offered some of their advice regarding this. 
5.4.2.1 Where to start 
One New Zealand senior manager suggested that entrepreneurs should allow time, and start 
“through the easy door”, and then move on to “building your own” networks: 
If you haven’t spent a whole year in China, just living here, then you don’t know anything. 
And it’s easy to start off with. You don’t even need your own Chinese networks. You come 
here, head for the expat bar, where the businessmen drink, start to talk to the local 
businessmen. ‘What do you do? Okay, you are in this field. What government departments 
are you dealing with? How do you find them? Have they treated you well? What subsidies 
did you get? Can you introduce me?’ Talk to another guy. ‘What are you doing? Where are 
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you working?’ Etc. etc. Start your network through that easy door, because you can at least 
speak your own language. But then very quickly move on to building your own [networks], 
dealing with and working with the actual Chinese people. Just use the expat sort of thing as 
a doorway to get in. And there are plenty of success stories. 
5.4.2.2 Clear communication 
When communicating with a potential business partner it is important to have clarity, and be 
totally up front, as a sign of showing respect, according to one New Zealand senior manager: 
I still believe it’s just [about] that absolute clarity on what you want to achieve, and what 
you require … that total up front.… I think too often you sort of think, ‘Right, we will get in 
the door, and then we will tell them the bad bits once we are in the door.’… There are a lot 
of companies take that sort of line. I think we disrespect the people that we are dealing with 
if we do that. The people we are dealing with, they are not dumb!... I think too often we 
actually sort of denigrate the people that we deal with.... We have an assumption that we 
are smarter, and we are not. We are dealing with incredibly clever people, as a culture and 
as individuals. To me, we are disrespectful if we don’t give them the good and the bad, 
because they’ll find out, if they don’t already know. Often [they] will have a whole line of 
experts. They will bring in their expert panels.… These people are clever cookies. They may 
have some different concepts to us. They are smart. They know what questions to ask. 
This desired clarity also means that a high level of communication should be maintained at all 
times, as one New Zealand senior manager suggested: 
Have a really good understanding of what each party wants to achieve in this business 
relationship … and just keep [a] very high level of communication at all times, and make 
sure that as you go along, each party understand[s] what the other one actually means 
when they are doing things, and how it’s going to work. 
As already indicated above, this high level of communication includes passing on good news as 
well as bad news, particularly when it comes to maintaining relationships with the government. 
One New Zealand senior manager explained their approach in China: 
I think we’ve tried very hard, and if something is going good, or if something is going bad, 
Gary [pseudonym] and I would be in a car pretty quickly going to see the local government 
and let them know…. They would know before the day’s out … far better that we’ve been 
and told them, especially if it’s a problem [compared to if they found out the problem 
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themselves], so we are just trying very much to have that communication … in that 
relationship, so that … we can let them know what’s happening, good or bad. 
Continuity also helps to provide clarity, as one New Zealand senior manager explained: 
You’ve got to front up. I think continuity is important − same faces telling the same stories 
right the way through.... We’ve had a number of different meetings. We are demonstrating 
continuity, there is a rapport being built. We are consistent in terms of the messages that 
we are providing.… It just means that there is less scope for mistakes or misunderstanding 
of what we were doing, which I think has been useful in that they know we are genuinely 
interested in making ourselves available, which is good. 
5.4.2.3 Be humble 
Overall, the humble attitude of New Zealanders is a well-related-to and much-welcomed trait by 
the Chinese, as observed by some informants. One New Zealand senior manager commented: 
I think that New Zealanders tend to be [a] humble sort of people, and I think that goes 
down well with [the] Chinese as well. [The] Chinese have got similar sort[s] of attributes, not 
all of them, but by and large. 
Another New Zealand business consultant commented, “I think they like our willingness to listen, 
our humility where we have it.”  
Indeed, a humble attitude was said to go a long way in the effort to build a long-term, trustworthy 
relationship. A New Zealand business consultant gave his advice on this: 
The one piece of advice that I’d give to young people going up there is … ‘Do your 
homework,’ understand China as well as you possibly can before you get there, and just be 
humble. Acknowledge the expertise that you encounter while you are up there. If you are 
selling, as with any customer, until you know otherwise, treat them respectfully and assume 
that they are bona fide experts in what they are doing. Always assume that your customer is 
an expert. He is in the position, he has some authority; as far as the sellers are concerned, 
they are the experts. 
It doesn’t matter who you are, if a foreign expert arrives, and demonstrates quickly that he 
knows only as much as the locals know, and doesn’t listen, is prescriptive, and tries to throw 
his weight around, tell them what to do, treat them like second-class citizens, there is no 
better way to do a bad deal. You just can’t. So being humble, asking and not telling. When 
you really have some expertise, offering it humbly.… It’s an offering up to a person who is 
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intelligent enough to judge whether they want it, versus, ‘This is the way it’s going to be, 
fellas.’ 
One New Zealand senior manager gave his suggestion for the agribusiness context: 
Sit, watch and listen, and learn. Spend time, just [to] understand. You have certain views on 
what agribusiness is about, which are in a modern agricultural environment. You can look 
and see what other issues you are bringing, and how they match with what you see here. So 
you go away then and do your homework to see whether your values, and your perceptions 
are going to meet [with] what you see over here. And if they don’t, then you say, ‘Is it 
possible that we can somehow match this up? Do I give up some things here, and gain over 
here? Or how do I do that?’ But you can only do that by sitting, listening, watching and 
learning, and explaining. And don’t be arrogant enough thinking your system is the only one 
that would work, because understand that this [system here] has been evolved over a much 
longer time than your one.  
5.4.2.4 Search for common values 
A Chinese managing director (interviewed in English) explained that he sought shared common 
values when making a judgement as to whether a person could become a potential business 
partner: 
A lot of times people were not really aware when I am trying to do this kind of tests. A lot of 
times I am talking about parents, talking about kids, talking about some public events. I am 
trying to gather my feedback, about how he/she is treating the parents, how often they go 
to see their parents, family gatherings, in what way they are educating their kids. What are 
their dreams for their kids? Or talking about some guy publicly shared around the media, so 
‘What’s your idea?’ Most of the time, I believe, in the conference room talking about 
business may only need 5 minutes. You use the calculator, multiply and divide, plus and 
minus, you get your results easily, done. The real business is outside the conference room.… 
Paperwork … is not my interest. I would like to work with people … at least we are 
somewhere close in the values.… Otherwise you are wasting your time. 
5.4.2.5 Test everything 
This idea of ‘testing’, mentioned above, was much talked about as an overall tool or strategy to 
use during relationship building. This testing was widely interpreted as double-checking, seeking 
confirmation via alternative sources, as well as giving the opportunity to prove one’s 
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trustworthiness. For example, a New Zealand senior manager explained the necessity of cross-
checking any information being offered by the counter party: 
I always find that there is a need to check or cross-check what people are saying. 
Sometimes, of course, there is a cultural sense that people … don’t really want to disagree 
with you, or deliver bad news. So bad news is cast in terms that are never quite as clear as 
what you are used to.... So talk to a number of people, or cross-check what people are 
saying, cross-check back, asking the same question two or three different ways, is a good 
way of getting around that. 
One New Zealand senior manager suggested that one should “take every situation on its own 
merits” and take the time to make sense of things:  
You take every situation on its merit, and you make sense of it the best you can, by taking 
advice, by spending time, by doing research, by talking.… Time is so important, in terms of 
at which point you say, ‘Okay. I see it clearly, and I am prepared to make a decision on 
something.’ Until you get that level of confidence, I guess, particularly in China, you are not 
ready. And how you can accelerate that by using external advisors or research, or 
whatever… [is] important, but just take every situation on its own merit. 
A New Zealand business consultant explained that everything he does is a test: 
For me … everything I do is a test … everything I do! I am watching to see how you react, to 
see how you come back to me, to see how the relationship builds, because there are going 
to be triggers to say, ‘Hold on, this is not going to work. You are not doing what you said you 
are going to do,’ or whatever.… It’s so important to watch you, who I am dealing with. If you 
say you are going to do something and you don’t do it, I’ll ask you why not. It’s not one big 
test. Everything is a little test, everything, and that’s the way to build up trust.  
This concept of testing is particularly recommended when choosing the right business partner. 
The same business consultant made a comment about a New Zealand company, which, at around 
the time of the interview, had just signed an exclusive agreement with a Chinese partner: 
For all of China? Stupid! Absolutely stupid! … I think those guys have just gone about 
completely the wrong way.… I am not against exclusive agreements or exclusive deals. 
Exclusive is good, because it brings everyone together, but you need to prove it to me, 
because everyone up here talk[s] shit. Everyone can do everything. Everyone has got a 
cousin or a family that can produce … that thing for you.… This guy is saying this one thing, 
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and [you] need to talk to 20 others to find out. So … you have a lot of options, and you are 
trying to back a winning horse ... you let them all go, and see which ones win.  
It is worth noting that while New Zealand informants felt that ‘testing’ is necessary for building 
trustworthy relationships, they were also put under tests themselves for trustworthiness by their 
Chinese counterparts. According to one New Zealand senior manager: “You’ve got to pass the test. 
And that test is that you’ve got to be honourable, and you’ve got to be honest, and you’ve got to be 
open.” 
5.4.2.6 Non-engagement with bribery 
Sections 3.5.2.3.7 Bribery and 4.3.1 Integrity alluded to the prevalence of corruption in China and 
the way in which integrity is valued among Chinese people. This section covers the 
recommendation made by informants not to engage with bribery. One New Zealand senior 
manager shared his opinions on this: 
To me, China is a place that you’ve got to operate really, really ethically to succeed.... I 
think that you go and operate at a higher set of standards.… If you think, ‘This is China. 
We do things the Chinese way,’ that’s fooling yourself, if you believe that.… I’ve got a 
situation now. One of the companies that I am dealing with can’t get product into China 
because their importer is saying, ‘You’ve got to pay money to the port to do it.’ … Once 
you set the standard … I don’t think there are many instances at all that actually stops the 
business [from continuing]. 
I think the worst thing you do is to set precedents whereby people expect that of you.… 
That’s why I say, operate at the highest set of standards – operate as if you were 
anywhere else. And I really strongly believe that. 
One New Zealand business consultant believed that becoming involved in corrupt activities gives a 
‘lever’ to the Chinese party that is involved in such activities: 
As soon as you cross the line, the people with whom you have crossed it now have a lever; 
because ‘If you don’t continue to give that black money, I will tell everybody that you gave 
me black money the first time.’ Pretty soon you finish off wearing an orange jacket [being 
prosecuted].  
One Australian senior manager believed that there is no need − and it is ‘not worth it’ − to be 
involved in corruption: 
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There is no need to do that. It just takes longer … absolutely. We could have put the 
factory in [in] 9 months. It took us nearly 2 years, so there is [a] cost. The trouble with the 
red envelopes is that people change. Senior people in government change, so you’ve got 
to start all over again. And you’ve got to have a very good memory. But it’s not worth it. I 
don’t believe it’s worth it. 
Another New Zealand senior manager pointed out that the much lengthier timeframe to achieve 
things due to non-engagement in bribery or grey channels is worthwhile: 
I personally think anybody who is basing their business on the grey channel has been 
incredibly short-sighted. You’ve got to … start doing things legally.... There is no future 
doing that [bribery]. Even the Chinese companies, I think, are starting to address that.... If 
you come in here expecting that you are going to have to do business by graft and bribery, 
don’t come here.... You go on that track as a foreign company, you might as well … [not] 
come here. Stay away. You will find it much more difficult not to pay your way, but if you 
are serious about China, just don’t get involved in it. Do it properly. Do it legally. And the 
trend in China is to do it the legal way. This is an incredibly corrupt country, there is no 
doubt about that. But as a foreigner, you don't have to.... You know what will happen? 
They will find that official. They will jail him. They will cancel your business licence. They 
will seize your assets, the whole thing. Why would you do that? 
All I am saying is that you can exist quite comfortably without being corrupt.... You’ve got 
to do everything exactly right. If a problem does occur, as long as everything is done right, 
there are official channels, there are ways to actually deal with those issues.... Once you 
are in the system [of corruption], once you’ve done it, you are committed.... It can be 
incredibly expensive, and [an] incredibly frustrating business. 
It’s a dangerous game.... The problem is that you can’t put a value on it. There is no way. 
There is no finite value. You can never control it.... Undoubtedly there is a game that has 
to be played here. All that the Chinese are doing is sizing you up. That’s all they are doing 
− the dinners and meetings, and the bullshit that goes on. That’s all part of the game. You 
eventually get beyond that game. 
5.4.3 What to achieve 
The exercise of building a long-term trusting relationship should not be carried out with no goals 
in mind. The informants offered their opinions on what these goals should be from the 
perspectives of “bigger relationships”, guanxi harness, and interdependence. 
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5.4.3.1 Bigger relationships 
One New Zealand business consultant suggested that the relationship that entrepreneurs seek to 
build should be ‘bigger’ than the business deal, for the purposes of protection: 
If your relationship is this big, and the deal is this big [hand gesture showing a smaller 
scope], then the deal will probably go well … [because] the other party wants a relationship, 
which covers a much bigger scope [than the business deal under discussion].… That’s 
another little trick that New Zealanders can use, for any new piece of business, to make 
sure it’s done within the scope of the existing relationships; so that [the deal is a] little bit of 
the [bigger] business. It is not in the Chinese interest to screw it around, because they 
[would then] put a whole lot more at risk. 
5.4.3.2 Guanxi harness 
In line with this concept of creating a relationship that is bigger than the business deal is the 
concept of ‘guanxi harnesses’. One New Zealand senior manager suggested that entrepreneurs 
should try and create such guanxi harnesses around relationships, and that without them, one 
should take the development of the relationship very slowly: 
Another principle is what I call ‘the concept of harness’. If you are doing business with 
somebody, and you have a harness on them, and the harness is an outside force, and it’s 
your relationship that is looking over the business deal [then] that will prevent that person 
doing something bad, because he knows he is going to get into trouble from over here. 
You’ve got a control on that person, independently of the relationship.… This actually is just 
showing … how complex it actually becomes, because there are all sorts of dynamics [that] 
have to go in, and sometimes, you can’t put all those pieces in place. Sometimes you can’t 
get a harness on them; sometimes they don’t come through your guanxi circle, in which 
case, you’ve got to be very, very conservative with your relationship, and let the 
relationship develop slowly.  
5.4.3.3 Interdependence 
Although the concept of interdependence was not explicitly talked about by many informants, 
they did express the need, for security purposes, of having interdependence within a relationship. 
One New Zealand senior manager explained: 
On my side of the business, my … business relationships, I always need to make sure that 
the business partner needs something that we’ve got. [For example,] we need to retain 
control of the brand or the distribution system, [and ensure] that they are always reliant on 
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us … [for] that. As soon as we give that up, then they’ll just take, take, take, then there is the 
potential that they say, ‘Okay. We’ve got what we want. See you.’ 
The above comment was specifically about creating a situation where the business partner 
depends on you for the business partner’s own benefit. What was implicit, however, was that the 
speaker also wants to maintain the relationship with the business partner for his or her own 
benefit − hence the need to create such interdependence between the two parties. 
 
5.5 Business Negotiation 
If ‘relationship building’ is about two parties getting to know each other, in search of 
trustworthiness, then ‘business negotiation’ would be the next step in the progression of business 
dealings. This section of the thesis explains the recommendations given by the informants about 
business negotiation, from the aspects of attitudes, strategies, and tools. 
5.5.1 Attitudes 
Several attitudes were suggested by the informants as being necessary for New Zealand 
entrepreneurs engaging in business negotiation.  
5.5.1.1 Go with the flow 
Similar to the concept of creating interdependence in relationship building (5.4.3.3 
Interdependence), ‘go with the flow’ was another implied concept in many of the comments by 
the informants, yet was not often explicitly expressed. “When I go to China, I go with the flow” 
was a comment given by a New Zealand senior manager, and that was an attitude that many 
other informants indicated they held when dealing with the Chinese, particularly when it comes 
to business negotiations. Another New Zealand senior manager pointed out that there is a big 
difference between long-term vision and long-term plan, and that the former is what Chinese 
people tend to hold onto, whereas the latter is more common with New Zealanders, who need to 
recognise such a difference and go with the flow during business negotiations.  
5.5.1.2 Compromise 
Being able to compromise during negotiation is deemed important by some informants. One New 
Zealand senior manager spoke about the particular importance of being able to compromise in 
the face of dispute: 
I think a big lesson here in China for foreign enterprises is compromise: understanding that 
there does need to be compromise, understanding that’s part of this culture thing. 
Sometimes you’ve got to give a little bit before you can take a little bit, so both sides have 
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to be happy with the outcome. When you have got some dispute resolutions that you are 
trying to work through, it’s about getting an outcome that everyone can live with 
comfortably. 
This ability to compromise, however, requires a depth of the relationship, as one New Zealand 
senior manager explained: 
You’ve got to have the depth of relationship, where you can discuss … things honestly, and 
that you are aware of … that essential pressure, that essential disunity of idea, and maybe 
reach some sort of compromise where both parties get somewhat what they want. 
5.5.2 Strategies 
Informants suggested a number of strategies in terms of business negotiation. 
5.5.2.1 Expect the best, prepare for the worst 
One New Zealand business consultant suggested that one should negotiate a business deal with 
the best expectations, but still have clauses in place for worst-case scenarios: 
Expect the best, and prepare for the worst. It’s a fairly normal Western approach. Recently, 
with an infant formula company that I advise, they asked me for a comment on the contract 
they were doing with their master distributor, and the contract was silent on the issue of 
poor behaviour by a competitor, which could amount to copying the product, copying the 
brand, adverse claims in the market place, offensive behaviour, so I simply advised him to 
understand what was his role and his master distributor’s role if they should uncover any of 
that sort of behaviour in the market place. Whose responsibility was it to bring a 
prosecution, to issue and see some desist notices, to take injunctions … and who meet[s] 
the cost of all of that; and if they sue somebody successfully, who [gets] the proceeds? If 
you have an agreement that’s silent on all of those things, then you run the risk of you 
won’t be able to negotiate to a particular place when it happens. So my advice is to expect 
the best, but prepare for the worst. 
5.5.2.2 Do not show impatience 
During the course of negotiation, informants suggested that patience is a valuable trait for New 
Zealanders and one should avoid showing any signs of impatience, which will be identified as a 
weak point and used against them by the Chinese counterpart. As one New Zealand senior 
manager explained: 
Just be a bit more patient. You’ve got to have infinite patience. I’m an impatient guy, very 
impatient. But one thing I’ve learned very much here is to be extremely patient, and don’t 
204 
 
show your impatience, which is what I do if I am not careful. I am thinking, ‘Look, it’s a 
waste of time.’ And you start showing elements of frustration. At that point, they know that 
they’ve got you, and they’ve got you in a weak point, so they know how to deal with you 
then. They will frustrate you, so that … you sign the document at this point, where in fact, 
had the negotiation gone on a bit longer, you may have got more [to a] position of strength 
yourself, as opposed to showing frustration, and they will say, ‘Ha ha … we’ll get him now.’ 
5.5.2.3 Create competition among partners 
Another strategy suggested by informants is related to the notion of being cautious about signing 
exclusive agreements in China (3.6.4 Unwise choice of partner(s)), and testing everything during 
the relationship building period (5.4.2.5 Test everything). This strategy for business negotiation is 
essentially to create healthy competition among business partners so that they will work hard 
towards an outcome that New Zealand entrepreneurs desire for. One New Zealand senior 
manager explained the thinking behind this strategy with an analogy of the internal staff 
management within his own company: 
Every single thing that you do in China, you have to have some contra-force. In our studio, 
we have two people on the same level who are studio managers. They’ve got slightly 
different titles, but they are at the same level, and they do exactly the same job, and they 
compete against each other. That means Mr A always knows Mr B can step into their job, so 
he loses some power and control. He doesn’t feel so important. If he thinks that he is the 
only person who make[s] decisions, then he [will] start to cause trouble. He’ll ask for more 
money; he’ll want more time off; he wants to do this; he wants to do that. So that balance is 
really important…. You always have to have this balance. You always have to have two 
competing forces to keep everybody in line. So having a few distributors? Great idea. 
Absolutely great idea. Keep them all with a carrot. [Tell them] ‘If you do a really good job, 
you’ll get some more’.… You could sign up distributorships in vertical markets … [or] maybe 
some small geographical area.... But certainly, people who sign up all of China rights without 
testing the market is … unadvised. Far better to say, ‘Okay, let’s just test one area.’ 
Informants also pointed out that such “keeping them all with a carrot” needs to be organised, as 
another New Zealand senior manager explained: 
You need more than one [partner], but they need to be organised as well. The last thing you 
want is two agents or two distributors competing in the same territory, or in the same 
sector, because all they do is compete against each other, then you run into trouble of 
pricing, price positioning, industry build, all that sort of stuff. 
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Another New Zealand senior manager shared the strategy they had adopted in managing this kind 
of healthy competition: 
We’ve taken a strategic approach, where we have labelled four of those long-term 
customers as diamond customers, and we’ve labelled four as gold customers. The diamond 
customers will get maybe five or six hundred tonnes, and the gold customers will get two or 
three hundred tonnes. So the key thing about that is that they know that they are 
important, they know that they are one of four, we are not trying to do too much around 
the edges. They know that there are others coming in, wanting to be diamond supplier, and 
they are willing and will take the place if they knew a way. Likewise, there are some others 
showing some interests, that if a gold disappeared, there is another one that … can come in. 
Indeed, the New Zealand business consultant who pointed out the mistake of a particular 
company signing an exclusive agreement around the time of the interview also described the 
approach he believed this company should have taken: 
The problem with their model is that they’ve just got one company. What’s the motivation 
for that company to do well?... What they should have done, is that they should have said, 
‘Right, you guys are in the north China. I am going to have one in the south, and we are 
going to have one probably in the central.’ And you tell them who everyone else is, and you 
say… ‘Look, this is what you’ve got to start with, and we are going to grow you.’… ‘Right, 
prove yourself.’... And this is the way to do it. You say, ‘Here is the market allocation. This 
year 200 tonnes, next 400 tonnes, or whatever. You guys go for it.’… That equals [to] … 
[giving] them … hope.... I want to say, ‘I want you to work your arse off, because this 
person … down south is also doing it.’ 
5.5.2.4 Joint ventures should have the Chinese partner taking a greater shareholding 
Having been the representative of a New Zealand majority shareholder within a joint venture 
company (with the Chinese partner being the minority shareholder), but gradually being squeezed 
out of the key decision-making within the top management team of the company, a New Zealand 
senior manager shared his experience and the lessons he had learned: 
We should have said, ‘Look, why don’t we get the Chinese partners to buy in 60 per cent or 
70 per cent of the company, they will keep a close watch on what’s going on, because it’s 
them that’s being penalised.’ Whereas in my case, with only a small proportion, they were 
robbing the bank dry, because they felt they were being disadvantaged, even though they 
weren’t being in the long term, [but] they wanted instant gratification. We couldn’t provide 
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that, because business sometimes takes longer than you expect. So the fact that they are 
saying, ‘Shit, why is it taking so long? We’ll take a bit now. We can take this.... They [the 
foreigners] won’t mind.… They are going to get a larger chunk eventually, but we want the 
money now.’ So that was wrong. You [got] somebody here to look after your venture.… 
[They are thinking], ‘You’ve brought business to me, and we’ve waited 3 or 4 years, the 
company is not growing as fast as we thought it was going to grow, because the marketing 
is taking longer than we expected, so we want to get something back from it now.’ You are 
thinking, ‘Yeah, that’s fine.’ But it can cripple the company, so you need to have somebody 
that’s watching, and they are watching their investment basically, and they are not trying to 
say, ‘Take it off the foreign guys.’ They will be looking for protecting rather than robbing, 
and that’s a big difference. 
5.5.3 Tools 
Apart from the above strategies, informants also suggested a few practical ‘tools’ to use when it 
comes to business negotiation. 
5.5.3.1 Have a good observer  
One New Zealand senior manager advised having a good observer in the team, preferably 
Chinese, who is trustworthy: 
I am an observer, basically, and I watch, and see what’s going on.… You need somebody in 
your team that is good at doing that. He may not be your high-powered negotiator, but they 
are the person that’s looking around, having the opportunity to watch, and the interactions 
[that are] going on, and has a feel for it.… So having somebody that can be with you and do 
that interpretation is very, very important. Somebody you can trust. That’s your person; not 
a translator that’s been given to you by the people that you are negotiating or asking 
information from, because they … are obviously helping the person that’s hired them, or in 
their confidence.  
5.5.3.2 Have a Chinese lawyer 
Another practical piece of advice given by the informants for business negotiation was to have a 
Chinese lawyer. One New Zealand agricultural consultant explained: 
You do need to have, I think, from the New Zealand side going into those sort of 
agreement[s], a Chinese-trained lawyer … local lawyers who know business law, to help to 
guide you through that. Because if you don’t understand that, and end up being in a dispute 
that has to go to court … and actually having documents that [are] in English and Chinese 
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[and] really do say the same thing … and interpreted the same, and you can only really get 
that by having a Chinese lawyer who is very familiar with both sides of the fence. 
 
5.6 Agribusiness Operation 
During the interviews, informants also gave some suggestions as to how businesses, particularly 
agribusinesses, should operate in China. One New Zealand senior manager described his role as, “I 
guess I am a band master, composing, keeping the rhythm in the orchestra.” This section of the 
thesis will cover these recommendations for such a ‘band master’ from the perspective of 
operating from New Zealand and operating from within China.  
5.6.1 Operating from New Zealand 
The clear message that came through the interviews for agribusinesses operating from New 
Zealand for product export was the importance of having good distribution and logistical channels 
in place. A New Zealand district mayor explained: 
In my view, unless you’ve got very good distribution channels and logistical channels, you 
can’t operate … [and] you still have to have a very good relationship with the person who 
controls that.… A person in New Zealand ringing up somebody in China and say[ing], ‘I want 
to sell you some peaches tomorrow,’ or, say, meat … it’s not that simple. You’ve got 
Certificate of Authenticity in New Zealand, you’ve got to get customs clearance, you’ve got 
to meet a whole lot of things to get through into China, then it would be off to a logistic 
[company] or middle man before you get there. 
This informant further pointed out the importance of having reputable companies operating the 
distribution and logistical channels. According to his understanding, a problem that occurred with 
a particular New Zealand company around the time of the interview was due to a distributor 
doing things that were not supposed to happen, and that a long-term relationship with a 
reputable and reliable distributor is the best way to avoid such problems happening again: 
What happened to [the New Zealand company] is that they were using people over there 
on the ground to do things that shouldn’t have been done. I think the best way of avoiding 
that is to have long-term relationships with distribution channels at the other end, which 
are reputable, and that’s why we work with [a particular logistic company].… They are well 
known to our government. They are supported by Foreign Affairs.… You can take products 
to certain places … and they make sure that it’s got all the appropriate labelling, and if it 
[hasn’t], they fix it, and it goes through to the market, away it goes into China.  
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5.6.2 Operating from within China 
For New Zealand agribusinesses operating from within China things get more complex, 
particularly where farming operations are involved. Informants gave their recommendations from 
the perspectives of people management, prudence in management and independent financial 
management, as well as specific suggestions for dealing with farmers. 
5.6.2.1 People management 
One New Zealand senior manager commented, “I think [for] the directors, one of their biggest 
focuses is not how we build the farms, and not how we put the livestock in; it’s how we put the 
people in.” Indeed, people management sits at the centre of business operations, and drew much 
attention from the informants, who gave advice regarding selection of staff, looking after oneself, 
talent development, and being cautious about hiring foreign-educated Chinese staff. 
5.6.2.1.1 Selection of staff 
For a foreign-invested agribusiness venture in China, some informants believed that it is 
important to have a foreign manager at the top management level. One New Zealand senior 
manager explained: 
I think first thing is that if you are involved in a foreign company here.... Certainly for the 
first 5 years, you need a foreign manager, because I think establishing that interface that’s 
between [the] foreign company and the Chinese is really important. And I would personally 
put more focus on the foreigner at that top level … because at the end of the day, if the 
investor is a foreign investor, Australian or New Zealand company, there are certain, 
obviously, corporate disciplines and governance disciplines that you need. You are never 
going to, in [the] short term, particularly in agriculture … develop those with local staff. So … 
the first 5 years, which is the critical set-up time, I think you need a good foreign manager. 
He then explained the need for a good skilled technician, who is preferably Chinese and can 
interface with the foreign culture, or a foreigner is able to train up a Chinese technician: 
In most farming operations, whether it’s … agriculture or horticulture, there is a need for a 
good technical person.... And I would suggest to you that can be either a Chinese, or 
foreigner.… At that level … if you’ve got a foreigner there, you need an excellent Chinese 
person to transfer it through, down to the next level. And I would suggest to you, your 
ultimate aim must be bringing that Chinese person through to take that role. 
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Being based in a region where many rural areas are occupied by ethnic minority people, this New 
Zealand senior manager spoke about the challenges and therefore cautions to be taken when 
hiring a technician: 
Even within the Chinese people, you need to be very careful, because for example, where I 
am working out there, they are all Yi66 people. [If you] put a Han67 person in front of them, 
you’ve got to be careful.... It’s a tribal thing, and … culturally you’ve got that factor coming 
into play … particularly in agriculture, as you go down. You have Yi people, and you've got 
Han people, and they have a different outlook.... There is no overt tension. [But when] you 
go out to where I am, all the local government officials are Yi. There is virtually no Han 
people out there. That’s at the county level.... If you bring a person from north China, and 
put him in there, they might have all the skills you need, but as foreigners we can get away 
with that, to a certain extend.... So it is not a case of just finding Chinese people, because, 
what sort of Chinese people? You put a person from Shanghai here? You ask the people 
[here] about Shanghai[-nese] − thieves, crooks. You’ve got to be careful with that. 
5.6.2.1.2 Looking after oneself 
One New Zealand senior manager based in Beijing pointed out the fundamental importance of 
looking after oneself in the harsh environment of China, for the wellbeing of the company: 
Number one is about looking after myself, keeping myself in a good space. If I am mentally 
healthy, physically healthy, spiritually healthy, and socially ... a pretty balanced lifestyle, that 
energy passes on to my team. In China, I need to be more aware of that, because it can get 
you down pretty quickly, if you are not on top of that.... Pollution, traffic, people, it gets you 
down, [so] even outside [of] work, you’ve got challenges [as well]. 
5.6.2.1.3 Talent development 
Other than looking after oneself as a New Zealand entrepreneur working in China, some 
informants also pointed out the need for talent development within the staff, as one New Zealand 
senior manager commented: 
We really believe businesses are about system and people.… We are extremely gung-ho on 
developing talent. I feel I should spend 70 to 80 per cent of my time on talent development. 
If you get the right people in the right position, all your problems go away, and problems 
don’t arise.… Don’t build a business around yourself. Build a business away from yourself.... 
                                                          
66 An ethnic minority in China. 
67 The ethnic majority in China. About 95 per cent of the population are of the Han ethnicity. 
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It’s really easy to measure. How long can you leave the company without the business going 
backwards? I found 6 months … is a pretty good benchmark. 
5.6.2.1.4 Caution towards foreign-educated Chinese staff 
Although many informants mentioned that New Zealand entrepreneurs should utilise more of the 
Chinese graduates who have studied in New Zealand, one thing that some informants believed is 
particularly worth paying attention to is the management of foreign-educated Chinese staff. 
These Chinese staff might be particularly motivated towards self-gain due to their educational 
advantages. One New Zealand senior manager explained: 
One of the big failings … there is an awful lot of Chinese people who move out of China, get 
some education in the likes of New Zealand, Australia or America, who then think that they 
are going to control the business relationship, and they use their position to effectively steal 
the benefit out of the relationship. And we see this happen over and over again.… That type 
of person is absolute poison. I tell you, if I’ve seen this once I’ve seen it a hundred times ... 
because they … tend to have a higher requirement, which is ‘Somehow, I want to use my 
privileged position of being able to study abroad and live abroad, to get into my own 
business,’ so they will be looking for their ownership of something for themselves. Even if 
it’s just getting their 10 per cent, somehow they want to manipulate the situation to get 
their 10 per cent reverse commission, but they’ve got to want to make something out of 
that relationship. That is a generalised statement, and it’s not 100 per cent at all, because I 
do know a lot of good people that do perform well in that situation. But there is a very big 
percentage of them who fall into that category. And again, it comes down to the amount of 
time that you spend with the person, to see whether they are trustworthy or not, and you 
test them. 
5.6.2.2 Prudence in management 
Not only did the informants find people management a delicate task at times, but having a strict 
discipline in following things up in all business dealings was also deemed necessary. One New 
Zealand senior manager commented: 
You've got to put really strict disciplines [in place], and you have to keep revisiting, and 
make sure that [the] path becomes really well worn, otherwise you will lose control, 
guaranteed that you will lose control … particularly in the country areas, [where] you don't 
offend one person, you offend the family, so you’ve got to be really careful. 
Another middle manager spoke about being prudent in business dealings, especially in the farther 
away provinces: 
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Just be more careful and be more prudent in the dealings … especially up in the provinces 
[referring to the northeast provinces in this particular conversation] … because you might 
be promised one thing or another, and when push comes to shove, it doesn’t exist, or they 
don’t want to give it. 
Another New Zealand agricultural consultant spoke about being aware of how much weight one’s 
own suggestions for implementation actually carry: 
[You should] not assume that because you’ve had a discussion [about] what might be the 
right design [for implementation], and then leaving it to the partner to go off and do, that 
what you’ve asked or suggested [is] actually going to carry any weight. 
He further explained that in a particular situation he was aware of, the Chinese business partner 
was the majority shareholder, who knew nothing about agriculture, and hired a manager. As a 
result there was a need to spend time and build a relationship with the manager, who actually did 
the implementation: 
I think in this case we have this investment company in [named Chinese city] that has the 
largest part of the investment, and they know nothing about agriculture, so they hired a 
Chinese manager to manage the implementation. But he is one step removed from the 
person that you started your relationship with. And the only way I think you can develop a 
relationship with a person that is actually doing the implementation is probably to be 
actually sitting beside him, instead of sitting beside the business partner. 
5.6.2.3 Independent financial management 
A New Zealand senior manager shared the lessons he had learned regarding financial 
management for the joint venture company he was involved with, and pointed out that having an 
independent party to manage the finance is necessary due to the common practice of having two 
or three sets of financial books for one company: 
In the financial sense, the mistake that I’ve made is trusting who I thought was a friend. 
Turned out it wasn’t. In that sense, it would have been far better for the company, and it 
would be much more healthy for the company, to have understood the way that there are 
two books, or three books, and that we should have had finances handled by, say, a 
company in Hong Kong, who is completely independent of where we are, so that they come 
in once a month and did the books, so it wasn’t done inside the company, and particularly 
with family members. 
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5.6.2.4 Dealing with farmers 
Specific advice was also given by informants regarding the recommended approach in dealing 
with farmers. This included setting up model farms, listening to farmers’ needs, and being a good 
local citizen. All of this advice was, to a large extent, about showing respect to the farmers. 
5.6.2.4.1 Set up model farms 
One New Zealand senior manager explained that using a model farm is particularly helpful for 
getting farmers to adopt new farming practices: 
Simply just because I say it’s right doesn’t mean … it’s right. But if you can explain why it’s 
right and demonstrate, and maybe you can have some demonstration points where you 
might be fortunate enough to have a farmer, or you may actually set up a model system 
that you want to implement, so that they can look over the fence and think, ‘Oh, yeah, I 
think I can do that.’ They may actually do it much better. And they may take your bits, and 
take those away and start doing things, and that’s the challenge for them. [You] say, ‘Well 
you do it better.’ Then they own it. 
5.6.2.4.2 Listen to farmers’ needs 
One New Zealand agricultural consultant shared his experience of how the project he was 
involved with helped the rural farmers to fulfil their needs and built the relationship with the 
farmers: 
We had a project in [named province] with [an ethnic minority] communities. When we sat 
down at the start of the project and had our community meetings with the farmers of the 
village, the number one issue for them was their drinking water. The quality of their 
drinking water, which they took from streams, [was] being polluted by the livestock. And 
the women were saying that you had to get up at four o’clock in the morning while it’s still 
clean for drinking. And the second big issue was the condition of the school. So while the 
project was a land-use project, the first two things that we did were to build a water supply 
system for the main village and had the school repaired. From that, that built a relationship, 
[so for] the other things which were around feeding animals, keeping animals alive over 
winter, they started to respect and trust us. So, listening to the community needs was 
really, really important. It’s called participatory approaches, so it’s not top down.... You have 
to not only sit down at the start, [but also] talk through what ... their issues [are], and try to 
understand the issues of the locals. 
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5.6.2.4.3 Be a good local citizen 
When asked if rural farmers would turn back on a lease agreement and demand more payment, 
one New Zealand senior manager said: 
No, I don't believe that is the case. But one of the ways to counter that is you’ve got to be a 
good local citizen … [and show that] you are providing employment and benefit and so forth 
to them. I think if you sat there and completely isolated the local village, yeah, you 
potentially would have that problem, which would possibly be reflected in other way[s]. But 
that’s why I think you have to provide employment, you have to provide benefit.... As part 
of the water conservation, we are building quite a big lake, and we are going to landscape 
that, and stock it with fish, so the local village can use it. Where we’ve got waste land, we 
will probably put up a basketball court, or something like that. You don’t actually have to do 
much, but just doing things which are of benefit to the local village. 
 
5.7 Understanding the Power Game 
One particular comment given by a New Zealand business consultant perhaps encompasses all 
the areas discussed in this chapter. He described businesses as ‘power games’ within a system: 
I think ultimately business is about power, and the customer has the power, the people who 
have the customer reach have the power, and people who manufacture cheaply have the 
power.… Where does the balance of the power lie, who can actually extract margins … and 
in the long shadow of the future, how much margin do you want to extract today, if you still 
want to be doing business tomorrow? That’s … reduced to its simplest essence, that’s 
business, that’s the game of business.... If I do this, what would my competitors do, what 
would my customers do, what would my consumers do, and how will all of these decisions 
interact with each other in a system? Not many business people actually think like that. But 
that’s what they are doing. They don’t know it, but that’s actually what they are doing … all 
players in that system [are doing]. 
 
5.8 Summary 
Having dealt with ‘how things are’ in Chapter 3 and ‘why things are the way they are’ in Chapter 
4, this chapter has focused on ‘agribusiness pathways in China’, as seen by the informants. The 
suggestions given are by no means exhaustive, and should therefore be regarded as appetisers for 
further thinking and trialling in real-life situations, from which everyone learns so much more. 
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5.8.1 Market entry 
To enter the Chinese market, informants believed that the essential element is to find the right 
business partner(s). Starting the market entry process through experienced China-hands via 
government or commercial agencies is the recommended approach. Whether the criterion used is 
mutually added value or the fundamental integrity of the potential partner, the exercise of finding 
such a partner was likened to the effort of finding a wife, rather than a mistress. 
In this process of finding the right partner, according to the informants, New Zealand 
entrepreneurs should also give consideration to achieving alignment on three different levels. 
First, the business venture must be aligned with government policies in China; second, the 
business interests of both parties within a partnership should be well aligned; and last, within a 
New Zealand organisation itself all staff members should have their vision aligned, which is 
particularly important during communication with potential business partners.  
Informants also believed that business ventures in China or with the Chinese require the 
dedication of physically being in the market in China, or at least having a representative of a 
company based in China. This was deemed particularly important for exploring the high-value 
markets. ‘Being there’, however, should not be interpreted as investing in hard assets, which in 
fact is a practice warned against by some informants. 
Informants recommended that, with sufficient capital backing, the best target markets in China 
are tier-2 cities, where competition with other international brands is less, yet the size of the 
market is still sufficiently large to satisfy most New Zealand producers.  
However, all of the above advice for market entry is worthless if one’s mental preparation is not 
sufficient, according to the informants. They believe that New Zealand entrepreneurs should be 
honest with themselves about where their skill base lies, be prepared to learn about new cultures 
and ways of doing things in China, possess a passion for whatever one wants to achieve in this 
tough environment, and, lastly, have an escape plan. 
5.8.2 Value proposition 
Informants believed that New Zealand entrepreneurs should put their effort into developing 
value-added products. This can be achieved through further processing downstream of the supply 
chains, specially packaged products for Chinese consumers, and emphasising the authenticity of 
New Zealand origin, which could be either for a single product or for a collective of New Zealand 
products through the concept of a ‘food basket’. 
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Informants suggested that New Zealand entrepreneurs should take advantage of the 
technological edge for product development, adapt it to the local conditions, and avoid 
competition with the mass market in China. This is because within the mass market many farmers 
not only possess the skill base for agricultural or horticultural production, but also have a 
comparatively much lower cost structure due to their own family networks and high tolerance for 
harsh living conditions.  
To achieve effective value-adding, informants recommended utilising social media to 
communicate with consumers, particularly the younger generation. For those whose clients are 
distributors or processors, it was deemed equally important to keep a high level of 
communication with clients, and adjust products accordingly for value-adding purposes.  
5.8.3 Relationship building 
The importance and complexity of relationships in business dealings in China has meant that the 
exercise of relationship building is both vital and complex. Informants believed that long-term 
trustworthy relationships should be built prior to any business negotiations. New Zealand 
entrepreneurs should first find out about ‘who’ and ‘why’ regarding a potential business partner, 
before entering any discussion of ‘what’ the business deal might be.  
New Zealand entrepreneurs could start from the “easy door” of talking to expatriates in China, 
but should soon begin building their own local networks of Chinese people. During the exercise of 
relationship building, clear and up-front communication should be maintained at all times, and a 
humble attitude will serve one’s effort of building trust well. Potential business partners were said 
to be searching for common values during this exercise, and “testing everything” was 
recommended by informants as a way of seeking trustworthiness. At any point during this 
relationship-building exercise, however, New Zealand entrepreneurs should avoid any 
engagement with corrupt activities, even though it was acknowledged that things will thereby 
progress much more slowly, due to the prevalence of bribery in China. 
According to the recommendations of the informants, New Zealand entrepreneurs should aim to 
build relationships that are bigger than the business deals as a form of protection for these deals. 
Where possible, a “guanxi harness” from an outside force provides security for the relationships, 
and one should take extra caution if such a harness is not possible to achieve. The long-term 
security of a business relationship, however, goes beyond just having a guanxi harness: the 
interdependence of the two parties involved is in fact the ultimate security for a long-lasting 
relationship. 
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5.8.4 Business negotiation 
The building of a trustworthy relationship is followed by business negotiations, during which 
informants emphasised the importance of going with the flow and being prepared to 
compromise.  
Informants recommended that New Zealand entrepreneurs adopt the strategy of expecting the 
best, but preparing for the worst for any business negotiations. Showing impatience or frustration 
will be taken advantage of as a weakness and should therefore be avoided during negotiations. 
Informants also recommended that entrepreneurs utilise the strategy of having more than one 
business partner in China, to create healthy competition among the partners in order to grow 
market demand. Where joint ventures are formed, informants believed that getting the Chinese 
partner to have a greater shareholding in the venture provides incentives for them to look after 
the business rather than “robbing” it because of their own insecurity for the future. 
Informants recommended having a good observer in the team during the process of business 
negotiation, and having a Chinese lawyer to ensure the wording in the contract cannot be 
interpreted differently between the Chinese and English versions. 
5.8.5 Agribusiness operation 
Specific advice was also given by the informants for agribusiness operations, conducted from New 
Zealand and from within China. According to the informants, the key issue for agribusinesses 
operating from New Zealand is to have good distribution and logistical channels in place, with 
reputable and reliable people operating them, and good relationships with such people to ensure 
the functioning of these channels.  
For agribusinesses operating from within China, particularly those that are farm-based, operations 
require particular care. Informants recommended a foreigner sit at the top management level to 
ensure foreign corporate and governance disciplines are adhered to in the business operation. It 
was deemed, however, important to have a Chinese technician who can interface between the 
farmers and the foreign culture; and if such a technician cannot be found to start with, a foreign 
technician must serve the purpose of not only providing technical support for the operation, but 
also training up a Chinese technician who can eventually take over the tasks. Particular attention 
should also be given to recruitment where an ethnic minority is involved, because of the potential 
for strife between different sub-cultures in China. 
Informants believed that New Zealand entrepreneurs should also pay attention to their own 
wellbeing − both physical and mental − to ensure the ongoing healthy performance of the 
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business and the staff, whose talent development was also said to be of great importance. A 
particular category of staff was singled out by some informants for special caution. These were 
foreign-educated Chinese staff, who, as some informants warned, could possess an ulterior 
motive of utilising their privilege within a foreign company to set up their own businesses. Not all 
foreign-educated Chinese staff are like that, however, and their trustworthiness should be 
assessed by spending more time with them and testing them. 
Informants suggested that New Zealand entrepreneurs should take particular care when it comes 
to business implementation, because they observed that some things will not necessarily carry 
through from the original decisions, particularly when rural communities are involved in the 
implementation. Informants also suggested that entrepreneurs should make the effort to spend 
time and build relationships with the person who is in charge of implementation rather than 
relying on business partners to keep an eye on things.  
In the area of financial management, lessons were learned by some informants in regard to the 
importance of having an independent third party involvement and avoiding association with 
family members of the business partner. 
Specific recommendations on how to interact with farmers were to a large extent about showing 
respect to the farmers. Informants recommended setting up model farms to demonstrate 
practices that one might want the farmers to adopt. Listening to, and fulfilling the needs of, rural 
farmers − which could be outside ones’ core business activities − was just as important in building 
trusting relationships with farmers. Providing employment and other benefits to the rural 
community would offer the best insurance against farmers turning back on a lease agreement of 
any land use that New Zealand entrepreneurs might undertake. 
5.8.6 Understanding the power game 
Indeed, agribusiness pathways in China require a very tactful effort, in the view of the informants. 
It is regarded as a ‘power game’, where one must make judgements on the amount of margin that 
you want to extract today for the long-term benefits of tomorrow, and where all decisions act as 
components within an interactive system, from which the margins are extracted. 
 
Such an understanding of the power game brings an end to the three results chapters, in which 
Chapter 3 describes ‘how things are’, Chapter 4 explores ‘why things are the way they are’, and 
Chapter 5 explains ‘agribusiness pathways in China’. The challenge for the researcher in the next 
chapter (Chapter 6 Discussion and Theory Development) is to go back to the literature to revisit 
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existing theory that could help to interpret these three results chapters, before delving into any 
new themes that have emerged, which will then be synthesised for future contemplation.
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6.1 Introduction 
The previous three chapters have described the complex operating environment the interviewed 
entrepreneurs found themselves working within (Chapter 3), some of the reasons they saw for 
such complexity (Chapter 4), and recommendations they drew from their experiences (Chapter 
5). In Chapter 3, in particular, informants identified challenges both in the general environment 
and within the agri-food sector specifically. Chapter 6 now aims to integrate these findings with 
existing literature and thereby deepen insight. Back references are made to informants’ insights, 
mostly from Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, where appropriate. 
To be more specific, Chapter 3 described, through the eyes of the informants, the rapid economic 
development in recent years in China, the hierarchical social structures, and the power of the 
government and the Communist Party within economic activities, as well as some ambiguity and 
flexibility in practices such as in the implementation of laws. Informants observed overall 
differences in the institutional cultures between China and New Zealand and diversity within 
Chinese institutional cultures, and also identified some key social institutions in China, including 
hierarchy, guanxi, and face, as well as the goals and responsibilities in life that Chinese view as 
important, particularly the survival and longevity of the family.  
Informants also identified less straightforwardness in Chinese people’s communications, and that 
contracts could be considered very differently in China compared to New Zealand. Chinese people 
were seen to have the tendency to rely on the collective, to hide behind social masks, and to 
avoid conflicts. In business execution, informants found that while some employees were 
resistant to change. They also found some business partners and/or competitors were willing to 
engage in illegal activities for financial gain. Many challenges were identified relating specifically 
to agribusiness, such as issues around land tenure, rural labour, intellectual property protection, 
biophysical constraints, and supply chain management, as well as developing system thinking in 
Chinese farmers and farm managers. Ignorance and arrogance were perceived by the informants 
as having contributed towards many of the past failures of New Zealand agribusiness ventures in 
China.  
Chapter 4 shared the insights of the informants on possible explanations for the complex 
environment described in Chapter 3. Informants identified a different way of thinking that 
Chinese people have, and touched on the pragmatism they observed among the Chinese people, 
as well as their general reserve in granting trust. Chinese people’s appreciation of win-win 
outcomes was one of several values they hold on to dearly, informants indicated. 
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Chapter 5 offered practical advice to future New Zealand agribusiness ventures in China. In 
particular, creating interdependence and going with the flow were given as advice for New 
Zealand entrepreneurs, which reflect how Chinese people conduct themselves in business 
dealings, as observed by the informants.  
The following three categories provide a summary of the key points from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
relating to the Chinese people: 
How it is: 
 hierarchy 
 ambiguity 
 flexibility 
 diversity 
 opposites coexist 
 interconnectedness. 
What is important: 
 guanxi 
 trust 
 face 
 harmony 
 survival 
 win-win. 
What they do: 
 avoid conflict 
 go with the flow 
 strive for interdependence 
 eager for ‘quick success’ 
 test everything. 
The key points identified above encompass various aspects of the complex environment the 
informants found themselves in. Some of these have been extensively studied by scholars, 
particularly on the topics of:  
 guanxi (Ai, 2006; Buckley, Clegg, & Tan, 2006; Chang, 2011; X.-P. Chen & Chen, 2004; 
Davies, Leung, Luk, & Wong, 1995; Fan, 2002; Gao, Knight, & Ballantyne, 2012; Lo, 2012; 
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Y. Luo, 1997, 2007; Y. Luo et al., 2012; Park & Luo, 2001; Shaalan, Reast, Johnson, & 
Tourky, 2013; Standifird & Marshall, 2000; M. M.-h. Yang, 1994; Y. Zhang & Zhang, 2006) 
 trust (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Blois, 1999; Cai et al., 2010; Castaldo et al., 2010; Huff & 
Kelley, 2003; Jiang et al., 2011; J.-D. Luo, 2005; J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015; J.-D. Luo & Yeh, 
2012; Ndubisi, 2011; Newton, 2001; Welter, 2012)  
 face (Cardon & Scott, 2003; Earley, 1997; Hwang, 1987; Mavondo & Rodrigo, 2001; M. M.-
h. Yang, 1994; Zammuto, 2000).  
These previous studies offer extensive insight into the importance, the categorisation, and the 
roles these social institutions play, as well as how they affect business dealings in China, 
particularly those involving a Western player within a business partnership. These studies were 
usually set within the generic commerce context, and were not specific to the agri-food sector, 
where some defining characteristics (as indicated in Chapter 1) apply. 
The purpose of this PhD research extends beyond these prior studies in two ways. First, there is 
an endeavour to place these social institutions, along with the others recognised in this study, in a 
wider sociological context, to provide an interpretation of the reasons and origins of these 
institutions, as well as how they interact. Second, the aim is to place these social institutions in 
the context of food and agribusiness, and identify whether or not the unique and defining 
characteristics of the agribusiness sector have an impact on the functionality of these institutions. 
In this discussion chapter, readers’ attention is first drawn to existing knowledge within the 
literature on the key social institutions identified above. A closer look at how the different world 
views of Westerners and Chinese lead to contrasting strategic thinking across the two peoples is 
then taken, followed by a focused discussion on how the Chinese sociological system functions as 
a self-reinforcing organism. Some emergent ideas from the research results are then briefly 
discussed, and relevant future research topics are suggested. Lastly, readers are asked to refocus 
their attention on the question ‘Is agribusiness different?’. An answer is sought in terms of 
whether the unique and defining characteristics of the sector have an impact on the social 
institutions identified, and consequently on business dealings, particularly relationship handling, 
and the challenges this creates for New Zealand entrepreneurs. 
 
6.2 The Literature Revisited 
The purpose of this section is to provide the basis for an assessment of whether the research 
results from this thesis confirm or conflict with past findings, or contribute something new. This 
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revisiting is structured into ‘How it is’, ‘What is important’ and ‘What they do’, as previously 
identified above. 
6.2.1 How it is 
6.2.1.1 Hierarchy 
Scholars have long recognised the hierarchical social order that existed in Imperial China, and 
have largely attributed this to the influence of Confucianism (Z. Li, 2002; Snell & Choo Sin, 2003; 
Taylor, 1989). This hierarchical social order still exists in modern-day China, including the 
managerial realm, in both the government (C.-K. Wong, 2009) and commercial organisations 
(Kong, 2006; Krone, Chen, & Xia, 1997). This continuation of the hierarchy within society was 
found to be the case by many informants in this research, as indicated in 3.3 Political environment 
and 3.4.1.2.1 Hierarchy.  
6.2.1.2 Ambiguity 
‘Ambiguity’ here refers specifically to institutional ambiguity, which was seen by informants as a 
source of confusion and frustration when operating in China, including in business processes and 
communication (refer to 3.4.1.1.1 Differences and similarities in overall institutional cultures 
between China and New Zealand and 3.5.2.1 Communication), and in law enforcement, with 
particular regard to land-use right issues (refer to 3.3.1.1.2 The power of the government). These 
findings echo previous literature. In the specific case of land-use rights, Ho (2001) argues that the 
Chinese government chooses to practice a “deliberate institutional ambiguity” to avoid social 
conflict, because “land policy-making strongly resembles a trial-and-error process accompanied 
by deliberate institutional ambiguity for political manoeuvring” (Ho, 2001, p. 417). Also in the 
context of land-use rights and property rights, Droege, Lane, and Spiller (2009) suggest that such 
institutional ambiguity arose from the ideological changes that were occurring while China 
transitioned into a Communist-led market economy.  
What was not identified by the informants was the connection between this institutional 
ambiguity and the need for guanxi networks: Bian and Zhang (2014) see institutional ambiguity as 
an inevitable outcome of the economic reform that China had been undergoing, and believe that 
such institutional uncertainly encourages corporates to develop guanxi-based social capital to 
strengthen their competitive advantage. McNally (2011) argues that the lack of separation 
between the party-state’s governance and judiciary system and the continued deep government 
involvement in economic affairs gives local officials wide discretion, creating institutional 
ambiguity:  
224 
 
The power of local officials to intervene in society and economy … creates ‘deliberate 
ambiguity’ – ambiguity over how economic rules and laws will be enforced.… Therefore, 
while formal legal mechanisms have been proliferating in China, the institutional logic of 
guanxi continues to hold sway. (McNally, 2011, p. 19)  
6.2.1.3 Flexibility 
‘Flexibility’ here refers to the less rigid implementation of laws, rules, regulations, and contract 
adherence observed by the informants compared to what they had experienced in the Western 
world (refer to 3.3.2.3 Flexibility in practices of the law and 3.5.2.2.1 Contracts are considered 
differently). Flexibility, sometimes referred to as biantong (变通) in Chinese, has received 
attention from previous scholars (Corne, 2002; Peerenboom, 1999; Zhou, 2009). For example, 
Corne (2002) describes the Chinese legal system as appearing to operate in a way that defies 
logical explanation, particularly in law and regulation implementation, leading to the ‘fog’ 
observed by many. Zhou (2009) considers that uniformity in policy making combined with 
flexibility in implementation is one of three organisational paradoxes that are a consequence of 
the Chinese institutional logic of organisational adaptation to the operational environment. In 
fact, the Chinese word biantong literally means ‘change and pass through’, which in itself reflects 
Chinese thinking that adaptation leads to overcoming obstacles.  
6.2.1.4 Diversity 
The diversity in China is reflected in many aspects of business dealings, as observed by the 
informants. They identified diversity of institutional cultures in different parts of China, as well as 
between different genders and generations (refer to 3.4.1.1 Overall institutional environment). 
Diversity was also recognised in the overall business environment (refer to 3.5.1.2 Diversity). 
Previous literature, however, seems to have not focused on the diversity that exists within China, 
and future research in this area is warranted. 
6.2.1.5 Opposites coexist 
This concept of coexisting opposites lies at the heart of Daoism (丁常云, 2012), a philosophy that 
pre-dates Confucian thought. Further explanation of Daoist philosophy is given in section 6.3.2.1 
Daoism (below). As a philosophy, not only has Daoism influenced many great thinkers throughout 
ancient Chinese history, including Confucius, but it also continues to have an impact on 
contemporary Chinese thinking. Within contemporary Chinese thinking the idea of opposites that 
coexist, including dialectics, continues to play a significant role. Mao Zedong Thought, which is still 
one of the decreed guiding philosophies promulgated by the current Chinese government, also 
included perspectives on dialectics, in which contradiction is believed to be universal and absolute 
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within the natural and human world (Mao, 1937). Such a coexistence in China was identified by 
the informants as well, as mentioned in 4.2.3 Long-term and short-term thinking coexist.  
6.2.1.6 Interconnectedness 
The interconnectedness or inter-relatedness of things reflects Chinese people’s contextual 
understanding of the world. Many ancient Chinese texts speak about the interconnectedness of 
things (Murray, 2012): “The ancient Chinese assumed that events in the human realm reverberate 
throughout and impact the entire cosmos” (p. 521). They believed that heaven, earth, and 
humanity were three inter-related realms, and their perception of nature and nurture being inter-
related led them to a belief in the shared efficacy of both nature and nurture (Murray, 2012). This 
interconnectedness was identified as still being strong in modern-day China, as indicated in 4.2.5 
Straight-line vs. inter-woven logics.  
6.2.2 What is important 
6.2.2.1 Guanxi 
The concept of guanxi was discussed at length by the informants (refer to 3.4.1.2.2 Guanxi). A 
term that fascinates the Western world, guanxi has received much attention from scholars 
around the world over the past decades. On an individual level, guanxi has often been categorised 
by the nature of the relationship: with family members, with friends, or with mere acquaintances, 
according to a review conducted by Y. Zhang and Zhang (2006). These authors also summarised 
three types of guanxi: the obligatory, the reciprocal, and the utilitarian (Y. Zhang & Zhang, 2006). 
On an organisational level, a meta-analysis conducted by Y. Luo et al. (2012) grouped guanxi as 
either involving other organisations, particularly those that have business transactions with the 
focal organisation, or government authorities. Looking from within an organisation, J.-D. Luo and 
Cheng (2015) use the concept of a ‘guanxi circle’ and indicate that Chinese leaders categorise 
their staff members into in-group and out-group members. Similar to some informants’ 
understanding of entering a person’s circle of trust through the introduction of someone within 
the focal person’s guanxi network, J.-D. Luo and Cheng (2015) also argue that the boundaries 
within and outside a guanxi circle are not fixed for the focal person, with members moving in and 
out of the circles according to the situation. This implies that there are often overlapping areas 
among guanxi circles, with bridges connecting various circles (J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015).  
No matter how it has been categorised for the purposes of achieving a deeper understanding, or 
how it functions to connect various trust networks, guanxi is generally seen as important for 
business operations in China (Ai, 2006; Buckley et al., 2006; X.-P. Chen & Chen, 2004; Davies et al., 
1995; Fan, 2002; Gao et al., 2012; Lo, 2012; Y. Luo, 1997; Park & Luo, 2001; Shaalan et al., 2013; 
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Standifird & Marshall, 2000; Y. Zhang & Zhang, 2006), with benefits such as reducing transaction 
costs (Standifird & Marshall, 2000), which suggests that the concept of social capital is embedded 
in guanxi (Bian & Zhang, 2014; Huang & Wang, 2011; Y. Luo et al., 2012). Yang (1994) also notes 
that guanxi exchange makes possible the production of symbolic capital, the possession of which 
compensates for the lack of material or political capital. It is this notion of guanxi as social capital 
and symbolic capital that this discussion will particularly draw on in a later section (refer to 
section 6.3.3.2 What is important). 
6.2.2.2 Trust 
Trust is another topic that informants talked about at length (refer to 4.2.4 Trust has to be 
earned). Trust in the context of business relationships has received much attention from 
international scholars (Bachmann & Inkpen, 2011; Blois, 1999; Cai et al., 2010; Castaldo et al., 
2010; Huff & Kelley, 2003; Jiang et al., 2011; J.-D. Luo, 2005; Ndubisi, 2011; Newton, 2001; Welter, 
2012), although not all of their research relates specifically to Chinese people. Among the various 
definitions of trust in the business context offered by scholars, the one summarised by Castaldo et 
al. (2010) in a content analysis of trust in scholarly research on business relationships seems to be 
the most comprehensive: trust is defined as:  
an expectation (or a belief, a reliance, a confidence) that a subject distinguished by specific 
characteristics (honesty, benevolence, competencies, and other antecedents) will perform 
future actions aimed at producing positive results for the trustor in situations of consistent 
perceived risk and vulnerability. (pp. 665-666)  
Although the level of interpersonal trust is recognised as being lower among Chinese people 
compared to that in (what are categorised as) individualist cultures (the United States and 
Germany;) (Huff & Kelley, 2003), and a low level of trust is prevalent in Chinese society (Child, 
1998), trust is nevertheless considered important in business dealings by the Chinese (Cai et al., 
2010), and is often associated with obligations (J.-D. Luo, 2005). Furthermore, trust is regarded as 
a form of social capital, which contributes positively to democratic stability (Inglehart, 1999; 
Newton, 2001). Similar to the review of guanxi above, it is this concept of trust as social capital 
that this discussion will draw on at a later stage (refer to section 6.3.3.2 What is important). 
6.2.2.3 Face 
The concept of face was often mentioned by informants during the interviews (refer to 3.4.1.2.3 
Face). Sometimes referred to as mianzi (面子) and/or lian (脸), the concept of face has also been 
the research focus of many scholars, who unanimously agree on the importance of the concept 
within the context of business dealings in China and/or with the Chinese (Au, 2014; Buckley et al., 
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2006; Cardon & Scott, 2003; Earley, 1997; Hwang, 1987; P. C. King, 2010; Leung & Chan, 2003; M. 
M.-h. Yang, 1994; Zammuto, 2000). ‘Face’ refers to an individual’s social position and prestige, 
which is acquired by performing specific social roles that are well recognised by others (Hu, 1944). 
Face is also an emblem for personal identity and for the autonomy and integrity of personhood 
(M. M.-h. Yang, 1994). Some scholars suggest that there is a difference between the meaning of 
mianzi and lian, with the former focusing on one’s reputation and prestige, while the latter 
involves a person’s endorsement and enactment of good morals (Earley, 1997; Hu, 1944; P. C. 
King, 2010). Mianzi, in particular, is vitally important in Chinese society and requires all parts of a 
business relationship to be protected on a reciprocal basis (Buckley et al., 2006). Earley (1997) has 
suggested that mianzi could act as a form of social currency by which fortunes could be won or 
lost, while others take it further and regard mianzi as social capital (Chan, 2006; Graham & Lam, 
2003). This is further discussed below (refer to section 6.3.3.2 What is important). 
Yang (1994) also notes that there is a link between face and guanxi exchange, in that by losing or 
giving away part of one’s substance (in forms of gifts, banquets or favour) in guanxi exchange, one 
paradoxically gains face. Conversely one loses face when receiving another’s substance in the art 
of guanxi, and the greater the amount of another’s substance one receives, the more face one 
loses. 
6.2.2.4 Harmony 
Although the word ‘harmony’ was not always mentioned by the informants, they did specifically 
talk about Chinese people’s tendency to compromise and avoid conflict (refer to 3.4.2.4 Conflict 
avoidance and 5.5.1.2 Compromise), reflecting a preference for harmony. Originating from Daoist 
philosophy and endorsed by Confucianism, the importance of harmony to the Chinese people 
derives from Chinese culture being highly contextual (G.-M. Chen, 2002; Cheng, 2006; T. Cone, 
2007; Earley, 1997; Jullien, 1999, 2004; Z. Li, 2002; Nisbett, 2003; 丁常云, 2012), in which an 
indirect communication style is emphasised (Cardon & Scott, 2003; G.-M. Chen, 2002), and 
harmonious social relationships are desired (Lin, 1935). Regarded as the ‘cardinal value’ of 
Chinese culture, harmony guides Chinese people’s pursuit of a conflict-free relationship, and 
forms “the ontological foundation by which Chinese regulate the transforming, cyclic and never-
ending process of human communication” to reflect their perceived “interlaced system of the 
comprehensive harmony of natural equilibrium” between man and nature (G.-M. Chen, 2002, pp. 
4-5).  
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6.2.2.5 Survival 
The concept of survival was raised by several informants (refer to 3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival, 3.4.1.2.4.2 
Family responsibilities, and 3.4.2.2 Rely on the collective and stay unnoticed). In the literature the 
survival instinct is described as a characteristic of millions of ethnic Chinese living in various parts 
of Asia. It is this survival instinct that helps ethnic-Chinese businesses stay afloat in stormy 
economic waters (Vatikiotis & Daorueng, 1998). ‘‘The Chinese family business format was 
designed to survive intense volatility,’’ said Gordon Redding, a Hong Kong-based expert on ethnic-
Chinese business in Asia (South China Morning Post, 15 January 1998, as quoted by Mok and 
Defranco (2000, p. 100)). Tong (2014) argues that such a survival instinct is driven by the fear of 
failure. This could be viewed as an extension of the idea of the survival instinct being regarded as 
a motivation for war stratagems, and therefore adopted in Chinese business behaviours, 
particularly in their negotiation style (Sebenius & Qian, 2008). 
6.2.2.6 Win-win 
The concept of win-win was identified by informants as one of the value systems that exist in 
China (refer to 4.3.2 Win-win). Whether it is in a political conflict, or a business negotiation, 
Chinese people see a win-win solution as the ultimate goal to strive for (Haihua Zhang & Baker, 
2008). H. Zhang and Baker (2008) give the example that if Chinese people are trying to form a 
joint venture with a Western partner to gain access to things they deem important, such as 
technology and management know-how, they would be willing to compromise and agree on 
terms that are temporarily unfavourable to them, and see this as a win-win solution, rather than 
seeing it as taking an unfavourable setback. However, while such a relationship-based win-win 
mentality prevails, a competition-based win-lose mind-set also exists among Chinese business 
negotiators, as indicated by Zhao (2000), as well as by Fang and Faure (2011), who argue that a 
win-win outcome is only strived for with a trusted partner.  
Drawing on the insights from the results chapters on how Chinese people value the commitment 
shown by their foreign business partners (refer to 4.3.3 Commitment), one can possibly 
hypothesise that placing a high value on foreign business partners’ commitment is consequential 
to a belief in a potential win-win outcome. In other words, Chinese people need to first see a 
potential for a win-win outcome with a trusted partner, then they will value such a partner’s 
commitment – without a win-win outlook, a commitment is purely foolish.  
6.2.3 What they do 
6.2.3.1 Avoid conflicts 
Conflict avoidance was identified as a trait of the Chinese people by some informants (refer to 
3.4.2.4 Conflict avoidance and 5.5.1.2 Compromise). In the literature Chinese executives are 
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described as more likely to avoid conflicts compared to Canadians, while recommending more 
negative strategies such as discontinuation of or withdrawal from negotiations (Tse, Francis, & 
Walls, 1994). Moise (2013) attributes this tendency towards conflict avoidance to Chinese 
people’s preference for harmony under the guidance of Daoist and Confucian doctrines. Within 
an organisation, Chinese tend to eliminate conflicts where possible, and if not, they pretend that 
such conflicts do not exist. “Social harmony or, at least, the appearance of it, is crucial” 
(Fernandez, 2004, p. 53). However, using the theory of co-operation and competition, Tjosvold, 
Wu, and Chen (2010) suggest a distinction between harmony-as-goal and harmony-as-technique 
in the context of conflict management, arguing that harmony-as-goal might in fact encourage 
open discussions of opposing opinions, whereas harmony-as-technique tends to shut down such 
opposing opinions for the purpose of avoiding conflicts and reinforcing hierarchy.  
6.2.3.2 Go with the flow 
‘Go with the flow’ was recommended by the informants as one of the right attitudes to adopt 
when venturing into China (refer to 5.5.1.1 Go with the flow). Going with the flow was also 
identified by the informants as the way Chinese do things, as reflected in their willingness to bend 
certain rules when it was deemed necessary in order to be reasonable (refer to 3.3.2.3 Flexibility 
in practices of the law, 3.5.2.3.7 Bribery, 3.5.2.3.8 Counterfeiting, 3.5.3.1.4 Intellectual property 
(IP) protection, and 3.5.3.2.3 Food safety concerns).  
The concept of going with the flow originates from Daoism, referring to the flow of water being an 
ideal representation of how things always develop according to their inherent natural course, just 
as water always flows from high to low (Watts, 2010), emphasising flexibility, spontaneity, and 
non-action (wuwei 无为, do nothing and leave nothing undone) (Chuang, 2002; Ip, 2009; Jullien, 
2004). Such thinking is also reflected in the way Chinese do business, with its influence reaching 
across Asia. Adamson, Chan, and Handford (2003) note that Asian entrepreneurs tend to perceive 
the external environment as a source of uncertainty and are therefore inclined to “adapt 
themselves to their environment and ‘go with the flow’” (p. 347). M-J Chen (2002) offers a 
different understanding, from the perspective of time, of the Chinese preference for going with 
the flow. Viewing time as cyclical, in which events are elastic and coexist, Chinese tend to adopt a 
long-term perspective and an expansive view of business performance and success, preferring to 
go with the flow, as opposed to having an emphasis on efficiency like many Westerners. Indeed, 
whether it is from the perspective of the external environment or time, the key concept within 
‘going with the flow’ is adaptation to suit circumstances.  
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6.2.3.3 Strive for interdependence 
Interdependence was identified by some informants as part of relationship building in China (refer 
to 5.4.3.3 Interdependence). The idea of interdependence in China can again be traced back to 
Daoist philosophy, in which the universal principle of yin and yang is described as two opposing 
forces that complement each other via an interdependent relationship (丁常云, 2012). The 
profound influence of Daoist thinking has meant that Chinese people, living in a relational, 
Confucian society, “assume the interdependence of events, and understand all social interactions 
within the context of a long-term balance sheet” (Yeung & Tung, 1996, p. 55). Chinese people 
nurture long-term mutual interests “to create an interdependence between the two parties in the 
relationship so that there will be a great cost to either side in severing such ties” (Yeung & Tung, 
1996, p. 62).  
Such a view of using interdependence to reduce costs can be found in the context of business in 
China, and is confirmed by the research of Wong, Tjosvold, and Yu (2005), who found that the co-
operatively related goals of the parties within a relationship induce interdependence as a goal for 
the relevant parties while discouraging opportunistic behaviours. In other words, in China, when 
relevant parties see their goals as having the potential to complement each other and reduce 
costs, they work towards a goal of forming an interdependent relationship. This concept of 
interdependence applies to relationships between businesses and between business and 
government agencies. As Tjosvold, Peng, Chen, and Su (2008) discovered with the assistance of 
the theory of co-operation and competition, the concept of goal interdependence can be helpful 
in understanding the collaboration between government agencies and private businesses in 
China.  
6.2.3.4 Eager for quick success 
Many informants observed that Chinese people are eager for quick success (refer to 3.5.2.3.6 
Eagerness for quick success). Wang (2008) describes Chinese people as being “eager for quick 
success and instant benefit and fixated on the idea of winning by a fluke, a single lucky roll of the 
dice”, and attributes this to “China’s pragmatism during the open and reform period, which 
established economic interests as the main goal” (p. 265). The Chinese word for ‘quick success’, 
急功近利, has long existed in the Chinese vocabulary, dating back to around 100 BCE ("急功近
利," 2015), indicating the cultural significance of this concept within China. Perhaps the tendency 
to be eager for quick success has always existed in China, but has possibly been magnified with 
the vast opportunities generated by the rapid economic development in recent years. It is also 
possible that increased migration across different parts of China in recent years has meant that 
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people can relatively easily escape the criticism and possibly even revenge from the victim of a 
quick success act, encouraging such behaviour within modern society. 
This eagerness for quick success is possibly also linked to the existence of the competition-based 
win-lose mind-set mentioned in 6.2.2.6 Win-win above. Contemplated together with the concept 
of pragmatism, one can perhaps hypothesise that it is Chinese pragmatism that sees the win-lose 
outcome as inevitable sometimes, if favourable circumstances arise, and no guilt should be felt if 
the non-trusted partner loses, or if not-so-above-board activities were engaged in to ensure such 
a win. A further extension of this hypothesis would be that the concept of quick success sits 
opposite the concept of win-win, and that while both coexist, which becomes dominant will be 
dependent on the circumstances; namely, whether the partner within a relationship is trusted or 
not, and whether there is substantial gain to be made through a quick-success exercise.  
Nevertheless, it is perhaps also true that win-win is given more importance than quick success by 
Chinese people. This is because through win-win other important aspects, including guanxi, trust, 
face, harmony, and long-term survival, can be achieved. In other words, win-win sits in 
accordance with the other social institutions that are viewed as important by the Chinese. Quick 
success, on the other hand, risks losing all of these other perspectives in the hope of substantial 
self-gain in the short term. Indeed one could perhaps hypothesise that quick success is the 
second-best option for many Chinese, when they see win-win is not worth being pursued or is 
unlikely to be achieved. 
6.2.3.5 Test everything 
Shenkar and Ronen (1987) describe the Chinese people as being uniformly cautious in requesting 
assistance from those outside their kinship groups. This is related to the low level of trust within 
Chinese society mentioned by Child (1998). Such caution was also advised by many informants in 
this study (refer to 5.4.2.5 Test everything, and to a lesser degree 3.5.2.2.2 Drinking test). The idea 
of testing everything stems from this inherent low level of trust, generating caution towards those 
outside one’s trusted circle. Very limited literature has identified this concept of testing 
everything as a self-defence mechanism adopted by the Chinese. However, the empirical 
evidence from this research would warrant future scholarly endeavour in this area. 
6.2.4 The high-context culture 
Within the themes identified in the results chapters, there are some key characteristics (such as 
hierarchy, interconnectedness, guanxi and avoid conflicts) that provide empirical evidence to 
consider Chinese culture as a high-context culture, as defined by Hall (1989). According to Hall 
(1989), within high-context cultures, people are deeply involved with each other, and as a result 
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of intimate relationships among people, a hierarchical social structure exists; whereas people in 
low-context cultures tend to be more individualised, somewhat alienated, and fragmented, and 
have relatively little involvement with the others. Also, there is a greater distinction between 
insiders and outsiders within high-context cultures than that in low-context cultures, and 
businesses tend to depend more on connections and relationships. Other scholars have also 
endeavoured to provide empirical evidence to view Chinese culture as a high-context culture. For 
example, in a comparative study conducted by Kim, Pan, and Park (1998), both Chinese and 
Korean subjects display a stronger consistency with Hall’s definition of high-context cultures, 
compared to Americans.  
6.2.5 Chinese pragmatism 
The pragmatic way of thinking of the Chinese people and their subsequent behaviours was 
discussed at length by the informants (refer to 4.2.2 Pragmatism), and this has been discussed in 
previous literature (Choy, 1987; Elkin, Cone, & Liao, 2009; P. Ho, 2009; Haina Zhang, Cone, 
Everett, & Elkin, 2011). Choy (1987) observed pragmatic behaviour among the Chinese ethnic 
businesses in Singapore in terms of adopting ‘foreign’ practices in order to thrive. Ho (2009) has 
identified two distinct features of Chinese pragmatism: credibility and gradualism: “The former 
implies shedding ideology in favour of seeking that which works, while the latter implies keeping 
an eye on the role of time” (p. 182). To explain the origins of such pragmatism, both Elkin et al. 
(2009) and Haina Zhang et al. (2011) attribute it to the relational world view held by the Chinese 
people. Their understanding of the world around them is constantly evolving, and given that all 
elements within the universe are seen as inter-related, this guides their practice of adapting the 
organisation to the environment for a better fit, because they see that whatever works is right 
(Elkin et al., 2009).  
 
6.3 Through Different Eyes 
Having reviewed the relevant literature, the focus of this chapter now moves to an interpretation 
of the origins of, and the relationships between, the key points identified from the three results 
chapters. In doing so, this exposition depicts the complex environment that New Zealand 
agribusinesses find themselves operating within when venturing into China. 
The first step on this journey towards a synthesis of these key points should be an attempt to 
understand the fundamental differences in how Westerners and Chinese see the world, starting 
with a review of the Western world view. 
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6.3.1 Western world view 
More than a billion people in the world claim an intellectual inheritance from ancient Greece 
(Nisbett, 2003; Shand, 2002). Many of these have also been heavily influenced by the 
Judaeo−Christian traditions (Shand, 2002). ‘Westerners’ in this discussion refers to people of 
European culture who have been heavily influenced by the Greek and Judaeo-Christian traditions. 
Many Westerners, influenced by the philosophical debates of Ancient Greek thinkers in the 
Classical period, have a sense of personal agency, believing that they are in charge of their own 
destiny and free to act as they choose. Ancient Greeks saw themselves as unique individuals who 
possessed distinctive attributes and goals. They also held the belief that there is a distinction 
between the external, objective world and the internal, subjective world. Their sense of personal 
agency and individuality encouraged a tradition of debate, through which their curiosity about the 
world, especially the external, objective world, was fulfilled (Nisbett, 2003).  
An important strain in ancient Greek thinking, which was incorporated into, and continues to have 
significant impact on, Western thinking today, constructed models of the world “by categorising 
objects and events and generating rules about them that were sufficiently precise for systematic 
description and explanation”, and explained their observations with underlying principles derived 
from previous observations (Nisbett, 2003, p. 4). Through meticulous categorisation and rigorous 
debates, these ancient Greeks aimed to discover the ‘truth’, which ought to apply to all things 
within a certain category, because if it didn’t, then what the ‘truth’ did not apply to did not belong 
to the category. In this rigorous debate, these Greeks used propositional logic under the principle 
of non-contradiction, in which if one proposition was seen to reflect the truth, then the contra-
proposition must be rejected (Nisbett, 2003). This logical analysis extended the Greeks’ tendency 
to de-contextualise. “Logic is applied by stripping away the meaning of statements and leaving 
only their formal structure intact. This makes it easier to see whether an argument is valid or not” 
(Nisbett, 2003, pp. 25-26).  
Many modern-day Westerners have continued this Greek tradition, and through the same 
meticulous categorisation, rigorous debate, and logical analysis they identify what falls short in 
this world and then create models of what is ideal. They then project the world onto these 
models, on which they can base plans to be executed (Jullien, 2004). As the French philosopher 
Jullien (2004, p. 1) points out, “we choose to intervene in the world and give a form to reality. And 
the closer we stick to that ideal form in the action that we take, the better our chances of 
succeeding.”  
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This idea of intervention sets the foundation for the strategic management thinking that is 
dominant in the West. Drucker saw his management by objectives as “the process in which 
decisions are made, goals are identified, priorities and posteriorities are set, and organization 
structure designed for the specific purposes of the institution” (Drucker, 1976, p. 19). Porter’s 
concept of competitive advantage builds upon a distinct winner-loser mentality that prevails in 
the West; his Five Forces Framework, which is often referred to in the literature, functions by 
identifying different kind of forces imposed upon a business operation through careful 
categorisation, from which a plan for implementation towards a long-term target is then devised 
(Porter, 2008). The resource-based view championed by Barney (2001, p. 649) works on the 
assumption that “resources and capabilities can be heterogeneously distributed across competing 
firms, that these differences can be long lasting, and that they can help explain why some firms 
consistently outperform other firms”. This reveals a perspective whereby there is a distinction 
between the external, objective world and the internal, subjective world, as a firm’s sustained 
competitive advantages come from its better utilisation of the external resources and internal 
capabilities.  
From Drucker’s management by objectives (Heller, 2001; Kiessling & Richey, 2004; Watson, 2002), 
to Porter’s thinking on competitive advantage and Five Forces Framework (Barney, 2001, 2011; 
Miller, 1998; Porter, 1996, 2008), to Barney’s resource-based view (Barney, 2001, 2011), the 
concept of intervention sits at the heart of the thinking, with one’s eyes fixed upon a target, an 
ideal model, and the steps for implementing a pre-established plan are outlined. As Stonehouse 
and Pemberton (2002) point out, strategic management “concerns the long-term success of the 
whole organisation and is a vehicle through which managers can plan for the future” (p. 853), and 
“strategic planning centres on the setting of long-term organisational objectives, and the 
development and implementation of plans designed to achieve them [Italics added] (p. 854)”. 
Among these various thoughts there is a distinction between what is inside an organisation and 
what is outside; and there is always a discrepancy between what is ideal and what is reality – a 
distinction that directs one to consider what is in control and what is not; and a discrepancy that 
motivates one to strive for the ideal through the implementation of pre-set plans. One may argue 
that the ‘system thinkers’ were one step removed from such categorisation. But whether it is the 
system dynamics advocated by Forrester (1961, 2007), soft system methodology recommended 
by Checkland (2000), or the combination of both suggested by Rodriguez-Ulloa and Paucar-
Caceres (2005), what remains crucial to these recommended processes is the construction of a 
model. Although regular evaluation and adjustment of the model are recommended, in order to 
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take changing circumstances into consideration, it is the construction of a model that allows 
reality to be compared to the ideal. 
6.3.2 Chinese world view 
Ancient Chinese, on the other hand, favoured a sense of collective agency and harmony among 
the members of the collective. Individuals were deemed to be inseparable from the various 
collectives one was a member of. This was because they “saw the world as consisting of 
continuously interacting substances, so their attempts to understand it caused them to be 
oriented toward the complexities of the entire … context or environment as a whole” (Nisbett, 
2003, p. 21). As Needham (1962) argued, the Chinese view of “the universe was a continuous 
medium or matrix within which interactions of things took place, not by the clash of atoms, but by 
radiating influences” (p. 14). Ancient Chinese intuitively saw that events always occurred in a field 
of forces, which were forever changing. For them there was no distinction between what was 
deemed subjective and what was objective, and there was no desire to understand the world for 
the sake of seeking the truth. Rather, between humans and nature, as well as between humans 
and other humans, harmony was the key word, what they strove for, and their effort in 
understanding the world was always based on practical reasons, because “thought that gave no 
guidance to action was fruitless” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 19). With this contextual view of the world, 
Chinese people have developed a culture that is distinctly high-context oriented. 
Unlike many Westerners, who strive to be rational through logic, modern Chinese people, 
retaining their high-context culture, follow the tradition of their ancestors in their endeavour to 
be reasonable – reasonable within a context, which is always part of the consideration due to the 
fundamental relatedness of all things. “Complexity and interrelation meant for the Chinese that 
an attempt to understand the object without appreciation of its context was doomed. Under the 
best of circumstances, control of outcomes was difficult” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 19). 
Looking specifically at social settings, compared to the advocated, unique, individual rights which 
Westerners insist on respecting, “individual rights in China were one’s ‘share’ of the rights of the 
community as a whole, not a license to do as one pleased” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 6). In seeking the 
best interest of the collective, harmony was emphasised, and debate and confrontation were 
discouraged and avoided wherever possible (Nisbett, 2003). The philosopher Lloyd observed that 
“the Chinese generally conceded far more readily than did the Greeks, that other opinions had 
something to be said for them”, compared to the attitude in the West, that “in philosophy, in 
medicine, and elsewhere there is criticism of other points of view” (Lloyd, 1990, p. 550).This 
preference for harmony, however, should not be confused with a desire for conformity (Nisbett, 
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2003): one chooses to actively contribute to the society by harmonising various parties, seeing 
others’ point of view, rather than passively conforming to set social rules with reluctance. 
However, an alternative perspective could be that although this was what Confucius thought a 
true gentleman should do, whether or not Chinese people find this realistic is another matter.  
6.3.2.1 Daoism 
Confucianism, Daoism (or Taoism) and Buddhism are the three mainstream philosophies that 
have shaped Chinese people’s attitude towards life. The former two are themselves the products 
of China’s own culture, while Buddhism came to China at a much later time, but gained 
considerable acceptance and influence because of its similar outlook on life to the former two 
philosophies (Nisbett, 2003).  
Daoism offers a systematic explanation of what the world is like, which is precisely a reflection of 
the Chinese world view. Chinese people see the world as constantly changing and full of 
contradictions. The opposite state of any situation exists, so that either can be identified in 
relation to the other. The Daoist symbol of yin (the feminine and dark and passive) and yang (the 
masculine and light and active) twirling into each other reflects this perception of the world. In 
the Daoist symbol, the white swirl has a black dot in it, and the black swirl has a white dot in it 
(Figure 2). “The principle of yin-yang is the expression of the relationship that exists between 
opposing but interpenetrating forces that may complete one another, make each 
comprehensible, or create the conditions for altering one into the other” (Nisbett, 2003, p. 14). 
Within this contradictory world, Daoism emphasises the harmonious coexistence of man and 
nature, with the ultimate goal being man and nature unified (丁常云, 2012). It seeks to find 
integration between individuals, society, and nature (T. Cone, 2007).  
 
Figure 2 The Daoist symbol 
(public commons) 
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Daoism has profoundly influenced the Chinese interpretation of strategic thinking. This is different 
from the traditional Western style of strategic thinking, where a goal is set and then the 
procedure to achieve the goal is worked out for implementation. The Chinese develop their 
strategic thinking around two notions: the notion of a situation or configuration (xing, 形), “as it 
develops and takes shape before our eyes as a relation of forces”; and the notion of potential (shi, 
势), “which is implied by that situation and can be made to play in one’s favour” (Aligica, 2007, p. 
331). Chinese strategic thinking relies on the inherent potential of the situation, and Chinese 
people choose to be carried along by this potential as it evolves. In other words, Chinese tend to 
‘go with the flow’, because they believe that by following ‘the Dao of things’, things are likely to 
be the most productive or profitable. As Jullien (2004, p. 16) points out: 
Rather than set up a model to serve as a norm for his actions, a Chinese sage is inclined to 
concentrate his attention on the course of things in which he finds himself involved in 
order to detect their coherence and profit from the way that they evolve.… In short, 
instead of imposing our plan upon the world, we could rely on the potential inherent in 
the situation. 
6.3.2.2 Confucianism 
Confucianism builds upon the world view embraced by Daoism and focuses on the ethics and 
morals within the relationships of a society, governed under a hierarchical structure (D. Hall & 
Ames, 1987; Rarick, 2007). Xing (1995) summarises Confucianism as follows: 
As a moral system, Confucianism focuses on the relationship between man and man, which 
is defined by five virtues: humanity/benevolence (ren 任), righteousness (yi 义), propriety (li
礼), wisdom (zhi智), and trustworthiness (xin信). Another focus is on the five hierarchical 
relationships between father and son, ruler and ruled, husband and wife, elder brother and 
younger brother, and friend and friend (this pair is equal in position). These are the virtues 
and relationships of a society where all are inherently kept in order. Society is seen as a 
hierarchical pyramid of roles which entail fairly well established norms governing how 
people should act and behave in relation to people in other roles. Social hierarchy and 
relations of subordination and superiority are considered natural and proper. Apart from 
the performance of assigned duties, filial submission, loyalty, decency, or reciprocity are 
also required. Protest, dissent, and criticism are appropriate only when the authorities have 
inadvertently deviated from the principles of good government, but questioning the pre-
defined social order is forbidden. In retaining the paternalism and emphasis on kinship, 
Confucianism requires a broad commitment to a harmonious operation and the welfare of 
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the society. Confucian principles provide the basis for Chinese organizational bureaucracy, 
respect for seniority, rituals of etiquette and ceremony, and various types of business 
relationships.  
In summary, Confucius emphasised clear obligations between the parties within each set of 
relationships, and insisted that fulfilling these obligations would ensure the thriving of the society, 
starting from the basic family unit, through to the community and the country (D. Hall & Ames, 
1987).  
The claim that “Confucianism builds upon the world view embraced by Daoism” may draw 
scholarly debates, as some believe that Daoism differs from Confucianism by its rejection of the 
necessity of social norms and hierarchy (Munro, 1969; Whitman, 1985). However, the fact that 
Confucianism promotes social norms and hierarchy reflects a pragmatic attitude that Confucians 
choose to adopt, having acknowledged that social norms and hierarchy exist regardless of one’s 
rejection or not. In other words, Confucianism does “build upon the world view embraced by 
Daoism” by its pragmatic acceptance of social normal and hierarchy, and the expression of this 
pragmatism through its emphasis on ethics and social relations as a practical way of moving a 
society forward. 
6.3.3 Chinese sociological system 
It is this distinctly different world view of the Chinese people and the influencing philosophies 
such as Daoism and Confucianism that have led to the uniquely complex environment which the 
interviewed New Zealand entrepreneurs encountered when they ventured into China. To 
understand this, the readers are invited to revisit the key points identified from the results 
chapters listed at the start of this chapter.  
Figure 3 below is a diagram that the researcher proposes as a way of interpreting how the key 
points tie in together. 
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Figure 3 Chinese sociological system 
This figure argues that Chinese people’s view of the world leads them towards a tendency to be 
pragmatic. This pragmatism is then reflected in ‘how it is’ in terms of the sociological 
environment, including hierarchy, ambiguity, flexibility, diversity, opposites coexist, and 
interconnectedness. Also reflecting this pragmatism is ‘what is important’ to the Chinese people, 
including guanxi, trust, face, harmony, survival and win-win; as well as ‘what they do’, including 
avoid conflicts, go with the flow, strive for interdependence, eager for quick success, and test 
everything. At the same time, ‘how it is’ and ‘what is important’ are also reflected in ‘what they 
do’, and what they do reinforces how it is and what is important. These three aspects, meanwhile, 
all reinforce the Chinese world view, making the entire sociological system a self-reinforcing 
organism.  
Drawing on Bourdieu’s theory, the following discussion provides a more in-depth explanation of 
this diagram. 
6.3.3.1 How it is 
The Chinese view of the world as a place where all things are interconnected and constantly 
changing within the influencing context has meant that they regard pragmatic approaches as the 
best way forward. This pragmatic attitude is reflected in their recognition of and submission to 
the hierarchical power structure within society. Their flexibility in law implementation and 
contract adherence reflects their pragmatism in acknowledging situational impacts. For an 
observer, such flexibility can be viewed as ambiguity. The magnitude of China’s geography as well 
as its extended historical influence have created diverse contexts, within which the pragmatism of 
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the Chinese people has expressed itself differently according to the specific contexts, leading to a 
diversity in behaviours and environments that foreign businessmen experience in China. These 
behaviours and environments can be so different, that opposing phenomena may seem to 
coexist. Lastly, perhaps partly due to a long history of subsistence agriculture and the competition 
for resources it created, Chinese people’s pragmatism sees them practising interconnectedness, 
creating this kind of environment, out of precisely such an interpretation of the world.  
These characteristics of the sociological environment in China are in fact descriptions of the 
‘cultural field’, as defined by Bourdieu, in China. According to Bourdieu, a ‘field’ is defined as “a 
network or a configuration of objective relations between positions” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 72). 
Webb, Schirato, and Danaher (2002) take this further and indicate that a cultural field refers to “a 
series of institutions, rules, rituals, conventions, categories, designations, appointments and titles 
which constitute an objective hierarchy, and which produce and authorise certain discourses and 
activities” (pp. 21-22). 
Cultural fields should therefore be considered as “arenas of social relationship that are 
characterised by power differentials among the actors who make them up” (Houston, 2002, p. 
157). They are made up “not simply of institutions and rules, but of the interactions between 
institutions, rules and practices” (J. Webb et al., 2002, p. 22). 
The advantage of recognising these sociological characteristics in China will be discussed in 6.3.3.4 
Thinking through Bourdieu, but it is worth recognising here that these characteristics reinforce the 
stance of the Chinese people’s world view, and influence their actions in practice (‘what they do’). 
6.3.3.2 What is important 
Chinese people’s pragmatic attitude also guides them to value guanxi, trust, and face as 
important capitals. They are referred to as capitals because they fit with how Bourdieu defines 
them in the context of sociology. Bourdieu defines a capital as “a weapon and a stake of struggle 
[which] allow the possessors of that capital to wield a power, an influence, and thus to exist in the 
field, instead of being considered a negligible quantity” (Bourdieu, 1992, p. 98). He sees capital as 
a determinant for the outcome of competition in a given field. There are four types of capital: 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic:  
Economic capital refers to wealth defined in monetary terms; cultural capital involves a 
person’s or institution’s possession of recognized knowledge; social capital is constituted 
by social ties; and symbolic capital refers to one’s status, honour or prestige. (Houston, 
2002, p. 158)  
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According to these definitions, guanxi should be regarded as cultural, social, and symbolic capital; 
face as symbolic capital; and trust as both cultural and social capital. All three, in suitable 
circumstances, can be utilised for one’s financial gain, hence translating them into economic 
capital – and therein lies the pragmatism of the Chinese people in this kind of utilisation. Within 
the three types of capital, guanxi, in particular, is being used to maintain harmony for the purpose 
of preventing institutional impediments getting in the way of self-interest, which is itself a 
reflection of Chinese people’s pragmatic thinking. 
At the same time, Chinese people’s pragmatism has led to a belief that harmony is essential for 
moving things forward in life, such that compromise is inevitable to address conflicting interests 
from various directions. Meanwhile, the harsh and competitive environment in China has meant 
that prioritising one’s own and one’s family’s survival is highly practical. A win-win outcome is the 
best way to ensure the long-term security of a business deal, hence better survivability, which 
again reflects Chinese people’s pragmatic thinking. Also, while survival and win-win do not fit the 
definitions of any of the economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capitals defined by Bourdieu, the 
ability to survive and to create win-win dispositions is directly linked with one’s attainment of all 
of these capitals. 
Harmony, as well as survival and win-win, fits in well with the concept of ‘habitus’, which is 
explained by Bourdieu (1977, pp. 72, 95): 
[Habitus is] the strategy generating principle enabling agents to cope with unforeseen and 
ever-changing situations … a system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, 
integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, 
appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified 
tasks.  
Bourdieu (1989) sees habitus as internalised social structures. It is “a second nature and so 
forgotten as history”, and “is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the product” 
(Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56). Webb et al. (2002, p. 44) explain that “habitus can be understood as value 
and dispositions gained from our cultural history that generally stay with us across context (they 
are durable and transposable)”. Chinese people’s desire for harmony, their sense of survival and 
valuing of win-win, are all products of historical development, where living conditions could be 
harsh and a harmonious relationship and a win-win disposition often offered the best chance of 
survival. 
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Whether capitals or habitus, all of these six institutions (guanxi, trust, face, harmony, survival, and 
win-win) that are deemed important by the Chinese people ultimately direct what they do, while 
at the same time reinforcing their contextual view of the world. 
6.3.3.3 What they do 
Chinese people’s pragmatism is also reflected in their actions. They avoid conflicts for the sake of 
maintaining harmony and/or reinforcing hierarchy, and they go with the flow as circumstances 
change. Chinese people also strive to create interdependence in their business dealings, to satisfy 
their desire for long-term security and hence survivability. They are often eager for quick success, 
a pragmatic attitude that possibly always existed but has been amplified by the vast opportunities 
generated by the rapid economic development in recent years. Lastly, their practice of testing 
everything is a reflection of their reluctance to trust people they don’t know, which is a pragmatic 
approach for self-protection; it is also a practical solution for wading their way through the 
ambiguity and flexibility presented to them. 
All of these characteristics of ‘what they do’ reinforce the institutions described in ‘how it is’ and 
‘what is important’ for the Chinese people, while at the same time creating a world around them 
that affirms their view of the world – a world that is full of contradictions and interconnectedness, 
making all things situation-dependent, and consequently justifying pragmatic approaches, hence 
completing the self-reinforcing system. 
6.3.3.4 Thinking through Bourdieu 
A further contemplation of the above diagram (Figure 3) using Bourdieu’s concepts of cultural 
field, capital, and habitus provides a deeper understanding of this self-reinforcing sociological 
system. Bourdieu’s thinking on cultural field, capital, and habitus has been widely commended by 
many scholars (Houston, 2002; Lynam, Browne, Reimer Kirkham, & Anderson, 2007; Moore, 2004; 
Özbilgin & Tatli, 2005; Swartz, 1997; J. Webb et al., 2002). But his contribution to sociology goes 
far beyond the field of culture. Bourdieu’s formula incorporating habitus, capital, field, and 
practice has been extensively applied in many fields, including social movements (Crossley, 2003), 
paediatric practices (McKeever & Miller, 2004) , and education (E. S.-c. Ho, 2009). This formula is 
expressed as:  
habitus x capital + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984). 
When applied in the arena of culture, the field in the formula above refers to a cultural field. This 
formula can be applied to the diagram (Figure 3) above, where the characteristics of the 
sociological environment in ‘how it is’ are descriptions of the ‘cultural field’; the institutions 
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mentioned in ‘what is important’ are capitals and a description of the habitus; and lastly, ‘what 
they do’ entails the practice as a result of the habitus, capital, and field that Chinese people 
possess or find themselves in. What is not explicit in this formula − but is clearly expressed in 
Figure 3 − is the self-reinforcing mechanism within the sociological system described by the 
diagram, where arrows of ‘reinforce’ point back to ‘how it is’, ‘what is important’, as well as 
‘Chinese world view’. 
6.3.3.5 Back to Daoism and Confucianism 
Having contemplated the overall Chinese sociological system, one may ask, ‘How then do Daoism 
and Confucianism fit in, given their profound influence on Chinese culture?’ This can be answered 
by revisiting the core values advocated by Daoism and Confucianism, which have been 
summarised above (refer to 6.3.2.1 Daoism and 6.3.2.2 Confucianism). One can see that the 
principle of yin-yang and the emphasis on harmony in Daoism precisely signify the contextual 
world view of the Chinese people, and the promotion of the hierarchical social order by 
Confucianism accurately reflects Chinese people’s recognition of the power distances that exist in 
the world, as well as their belief in continuing the way things naturally are. In other words, both 
Daoism and Confucianism are themselves the products of the Chinese world view, but also have 
functioned to reinforce such a world view over the past millennia.  
 
6.4 Some Emergent Ideas  
There are many ideas that emerged in the results chapters that are in agreement with prior 
research. For example, guanxi being recognised as a fundamental element in business operations 
in China (refer to 3.4.1.2.2.1 Fundamental to business activities) has been acknowledged by many 
scholars (Ai, 2006; Chang, 2011; X.-P. Chen & Chen, 2004; Davies et al., 1995; Fan, 2002; Gao et 
al., 2012; Lo, 2012; J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015; Y. Luo, 1997; Y. Luo et al., 2012; Park & Luo, 2001; 
Shaalan et al., 2013; Standifird & Marshall, 2000; Y. Zhang & Zhang, 2006), although the research 
focuses varied between the importance, the categorisations, and the functionalities of guanxi. 
Indeed, many of the subheadings in the research results chapters reflect concepts that have been 
discussed in the literature, and the content under those subheadings provides empirical evidence 
to support these ideas. However, due to the large span and variety of the concepts covered in 
these three results chapters, although all are related to doing agribusiness in China, it is not 
practical to go through each one of them and explain in detail how they reinforce existing theory 
in the literature. As indicated in the introduction to this chapter, the specific purpose here is to 
provide an interpretation of how the key social institutions identified from this research came 
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about from a sociological perspective, and to consider whether the context of food and 
agribusiness has an impact on how these social institutions function in business dealings. 
Beyond the sociological framework synthesised in Figure 3, there are some novel ideas that 
emerged from the findings of this research. They may illuminate and encourage future research, 
and therefore deserve a little more attention. In what follows these ideas have been grouped into 
‘how it is’ and ‘what to do’.  
6.4.1 How it is 
The emergent ideas on ‘how it is’ mostly come from Chapter 3. 
6.4.1.1 Diversity 
As indicated in 6.2.1.4 Diversity above, informants identified that there is a diverse range of 
institutional cultures in different parts of China: between different genders and generations, as 
well as in the overall business environment in China (refer to 3.4.1.1 Overall institutional 
environment and 3.5.1.2 Diversity). There is an apparent lack of research on diversity within 
China, and this warrants further research. 
6.4.1.2 Project vs. product 
The idea of having the focus of one’s work, particularly for government officials, on a project (a 
short-term achievement) instead of a product (long-term sustained profitability) was identified by 
some informants (refer to 3.3.2.4 Project vs. product). This is a concept that appears to have not 
been discussed in the literature. There could be potential links between this concept and the idea 
of many Chinese people being eager for quick success, which is widely discussed in the literature. 
Another plausible explanation could be that the promotion systems for officials in China have 
attributed to such a focus on ‘projects’. Within these promotion systems, GDP growth and social 
peace are rewarded above everything else, and achieving ‘projects’ would create perceptions of 
such growth and peace. These potential links and possible explanations may spark some interest 
for future research and shed light on practices for foreign entrepreneurs going into China. 
6.4.1.3 Circles of trust – rings of guanxi 
While previous literature has focused on the importance and roles that guanxi plays within 
business interactions in China, as well as how it functions, the description of each individual 
Chinese person’s guanxi network as ring-structured was rare. Some scholars have touched on the 
concept of ‘guanxi circles’ (Gao, Ballantyne, & Knight, 2010; Lee & Dawes, 2005; J.-D. Luo & 
Cheng, 2015; J.-D. Luo & Yeh, 2012), and the “differential modes of association” linked to them 
(Fei, 1992; J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015; J.-D. Luo & Yeh, 2012). However, these discussions focus on 
the differences between those who are in the inner circle and those who are on the periphery, 
245 
 
with the circle serving as a boundary. The insights shared by the informants of this research, on 
the other hand, revealed the onion-like ring structure of one’s layered guanxi circles, as well as 
the various degrees of trust associated with those in each ring, with a person “out in the jungle” 
deserving no trust at all (refer to 3.4.1.2.2.2 Circles of trust – rings of guanxi). There is, however, 
according to the informants, movement between the various rings, whereby a person can gain 
more trust via the introduction of a trusted person. This concurs with what has been suggested by 
several scholars (Gao et al., 2012; J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015; Y. Luo, 1997), but does not negate the 
need for future investigation of this ‘onion-like ring structure’ of the trust relationships within 
one’s guanxi network. 
6.4.1.4 Social masks 
Social masks create the sense of a barrier for some informants in their communication with 
Chinese people, particularly when it comes to dealing with government officials and when it is at 
the start of a relationship-building process (refer to 3.4.2.3 Social masks). The impression of ‘what 
you see it not what you get’ presented challenges for the interviewed New Zealand 
entrepreneurs, who prefer a more straightforward mode of communication. The concept of social 
masks therefore has direct implications for business practices in China, but has not been widely 
covered in the literature, possibly due to its own concealing nature, and therefore requires 
further research. 
6.4.1.5 Unclear boundary between work and private life 
Some informants observed the unclear boundary between work and private life for the Chinese 
people, and that the boundary is more defined in New Zealand culture (refer to 3.5.2.3.1 Unclear 
boundary between work and private life). Such a difference may cause discrepancies in 
communication between New Zealand entrepreneurs and their Chinese partners. This particular 
characteristic of the Chinese people and how it can play out in the context of business 
communication does not appear to have received attention by scholars in the past, and could be a 
point of interest for some in the future. 
6.4.2 What to do 
The emergent ideas discussed below on ‘what to do’ come from Chapter 5. 
6.4.2.1 Bigger relationships 
‘Bigger’ relationships refers to the notion discussed by some informants that one should try to 
develop relationships that go beyond the business deal, creating an association with the 
counterpart that is greater than the business deal itself, as a form of security against the business 
partner sabotaging the business deal (refer to 5.4.3.1 Bigger relationships). This is a novel idea 
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based on real-life experience that requires further research to verify its value. Could it be broadly 
applied to all business situations in China? What are its advantages and limitations?  
6.4.2.2 Guanxi harness 
‘Guanxi harness’ is another original concept raised by one of the informants during the interviews 
(refer to 5.4.3.2 Guanxi harness). It was suggested as another form of security for foreigners 
having business relationships with Chinese by having an ‘outsider’ keep an eye on the business 
partner in order to prevent the partner from diverging from or harming the business deal. This 
outsider can also be viewed as a third point within a triangular relationship, and is potentially 
more stable than a two-point relationship. While the concept of guanxi harness reinforces the 
complexity of guanxi networks in China, which many scholars have discovered (Ai, 2006; Chang, 
2011; X.-P. Chen & Chen, 2004; Davies et al., 1995; Fan, 2002; Fei, 1992; Gao et al., 2010; Gao et 
al., 2012; Lee & Dawes, 2005; J.-D. Luo & Cheng, 2015; J.-D. Luo & Yeh, 2012; Y. Luo, 1997, 2007; 
Y. Luo et al., 2012; Park & Luo, 2001), how such a ‘harness’ could be incorporated into business 
practice for foreign entrepreneurs in China may remain a practical challenge and warrants further 
investigation. 
 
6.5 Is Agribusiness Different? 
Having considered the emergent ideas that may encourage future research, readers are now 
invited to direct their attention back to this current research. One of the questions that required 
an answer at the onset of this PhD research was whether or not agribusiness is indeed different. 
Do the unique and defining characteristics introduced in Chapter 1 affect how the social 
institutions function within this context? Do these characteristics have an impact on how 
businesses in the agri-food sector are conducted in China? Do they make it more or less 
challenging for New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs to manoeuvre in the Chinese market? 
To answer these questions, a revisiting of 6.3 Through different eyes is warranted. Many 
Westerners and Chinese possess distinctively different world views, leading to very dissimilar 
strategic thinking, and consequently different approaches to business dealings, particularly 
business relationships. How do these conflicting world views play out in the context of food and 
agribusiness? According to various parts of the research in the results chapters, informants 
perceived that the contrasting world views and the resulting business approaches of New 
Zealanders and the Chinese people are magnified and reinforced within the context of food and 
agribusiness, where more uncertainties are involved due to the nature of the industries: the long 
production and investment cycles, production and price volatilities, food safety and security 
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issues, seasonality, perishability, and environmental implications, as well as the complex interplay 
between them. For example, Chinese farmers display a strong desire for survival, leading to their 
preference for engaging in producing annual crops and a reluctance to take part in agribusiness 
ventures that may require several years before break-even (refer to 3.4.1.2.4.1 Survival).  
Another example could be the particular challenges faced by New Zealand entrepreneurs when it 
comes to intellectual property protection, where the characteristics of propagation techniques 
such as grafting plants can be used for the mass production of counterfeits within a short space of 
time; as indicated by some informants, many Chinese farmers believe that cutting off the branch 
of a desirable plant variety illegally and then grafting it for their own use is a practical way of 
getting ahead quickly (refer to 3.5.3.1.4 Intellectual property (IP) protection). 
Drawing on the understanding gained through Figure 3 above, one can see that the uncertainties 
created by, and the characteristics of, the nature of agribusiness justify Chinese people’s 
pragmatic approach to things. They validate the ambiguity and flexibility perceived by them, and 
accentuate their survival instinct, and also serve to rationalise their pragmatic way of doing 
things, which in turn reinforces their distinctive view of the world, as shown in Figure 3. 
It is therefore justified to conclude that there are implications for business approaches, 
particularly those related to relationships that arise from the unique and defining characteristics 
of agribusiness, largely due to the uncertainties involved. New Zealand entrepreneurs hence need 
to not only have an appreciation of the Chinese world view and the consequential sociological and 
business environment in China, which is vastly different from that in the West, but also to 
understand the additional challenges presented by the characteristics of agribusiness when 
venturing into China. 
 
6.6 Summary 
Having revisited some of the relevant literature, this chapter has delved into the insights gained 
from the results chapters, the key points of which were synthesised in a diagram. The discussion 
also explored some ideas that emerged from the research results, with the aim of encouraging 
future research endeavours. Lastly, a consideration of whether or not the defining characteristics 
of agribusiness present particular challenges for New Zealand agribusiness ventures in China was 
undertaken. 
6.6.1 Through different eyes 
The wisdom of past scholars has enlightened the researcher on the distinctive world views of 
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many Westerners and Chinese. While many Westerners delight in categorising and seeking the 
abstract truth of the world, Chinese people take pleasure in immersing themselves in harmonious 
coexistence with the world around them. Many Western people de-contextualise in their process 
of understanding the world, while Chinese people see all things in the world as interconnected, 
such that any endeavour that does not take context into consideration is not pragmatic and is 
therefore meaningless. With this logic they have developed a high-context culture.  
Reflected in their strategic thinking, particularly in business, many Western people impose their 
ideal models upon the world, from which they work out plans for implementation in order to 
achieve set goals. Chinese people, on the other hand, prefer to rely on the inherent potential of 
the situation and be carried along by it, for this is recognised as following the way of the world 
that will lead to prosperity. Additionally, the influence of Daoism and Confucianism reinforces 
Chinese people’s perception of the world as a place filled with contradictions, and where 
hierarchy is part of the norm and should therefore be respected. 
Guided by these insights of the contrasting world views, the key points identified by the 
informants, set out in the results chapters, were summarised in the introduction to this chapter. 
Drawing on prior literature, they were then synthesised into a diagram. The categories of ‘how it 
is’, ‘what is important’ and ‘what they do’ have been placed within this diagram, along with 
‘Chinese world view’ and ‘pragmatism’, to make up the five components. The diagram displays 
the interacting relationships of reflection and reinforcement for these components, completing a 
self-reinforcing sociological system. The key points under ‘how it is’ are well suited to be 
considered as descriptions of field defined by Bourdieu; the key points under ‘what is important’ 
fit well with his concepts of capital and habitus; and those under ‘what they do’ are appropriately 
viewed as descriptions of practice as defined by Bourdieu. Together they interpret Bourdieu’s 
formula of habitus x capital + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984) within a Chinese context through 
Figure 3, with the figure adding another dimension of self-reinforcement. Lastly, it was recognised 
that Daoism and Confucianism are themselves products of the Chinese world view, but they have 
also functioned as reinforcement of this world view over the past millennia.  
6.6.2 Some emergent ideas 
While it was acknowledged that many of the ideas that emerged in the results chapters concur 
with the existing literature, there are several notions that have not be widely researched. Most of 
these ideas come from Chapter 3, focusing on ‘how it is’, and Chapter 5, concentrating on ‘what 
to do’. Under ‘how it is’, the diversity within China, the idea of project vs. product, circles of trust 
– rings of guanxi, social masks, and the unclear boundary between work and private life were 
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identified as needing more research. Meanwhile, under ‘what to do’, bigger relationships and 
guanxi harness were recognised as novel ideas that may attract the attention of further scholarly 
investigation. 
6.6.3 Is agribusiness different? 
The question ‘Is agribusiness different?’ was asked at the end of this discussion chapter. It is 
recognised that the distinctly different world view of many Chinese people compared to that of 
many Westerners creates a complex environment for the New Zealand entrepreneurs when 
venturing into China. Such complexity, reflected in Chinese business approaches and the business 
environment created by these approaches, is exacerbated by the uncertainties within the 
agribusiness sector arising from its unique and defining characteristics. These characteristics 
include long production cycles, long investment cycles, production volatility, price volatility, 
product perishability, seasonality, food safety concerns, food security concerns, and 
environmental implications, and the complex interplay between them. These uncertainties 
reinforce Chinese people’s pragmatic approach to things, leading to added challenges to New 
Zealand entrepreneurs when embarking on agribusiness ventures. 
 
Having introduced the background of this PhD enquiry, described the methodological approach 
and procedures, explained the research findings, and synthesised the research insights, it is now 
time to conclude this research endeavour and provide recommendations for future research and 
practice. This will be covered in Chapter 7 Conclusions, Reflections and Recommendations.
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Conclusions, Reflections and Recommendations 
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7.1 Conclusions 
This PhD research has investigated cross-cultural business relationships between China and New 
Zealand within the novel context of food and agribusiness, using research methodology and 
methods appropriate to theory-building. The research topic was arrived at in response to the 
importance of China as a destination market for New Zealand food products and services, the 
difficulties that New Zealand agribusinesses have encountered in their China-related dealings, the 
absence of research on the overarching sociological framework within China’s agri-food 
environment, and the apparent lack of research on cross-cultural business relationships within the 
food and agribusiness context. 
After considering the paradigm the researcher has adopted for this research, which is 
constructive-interpretive in nature, and having considered the strengths and weaknesses of both 
theory-building and theory-testing research methodologies and methods, together with the lack 
of prior research within the agri-food domain, an inductive-led theory-building case study 
research method, drawing in particular from the work of Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt, 1989, 1991; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007), was adopted. Theoretical sensitisation and theoretical sampling 
were conducted. Through 38 in-depth interviews, with each being treated as a single case study, 
rich empirical data were collected, analysed (using NVivo10), and synthesised to answer the 
research questions set out in Chapter 1. The three research questions are relisted here: 
1. What are the social institutions at play when New Zealand agribusinesses are operating in 
or exporting to China, particularly from the cross-cultural business relationship 
perspective? 
2. How have these social institutions come about, and how do they interact to form the 
sociological system in China? 
3. Are there any additional challenges imposed by the unique and defining characteristics of 
the food and agribusiness sector in the functionality of these social institutions in building 
and managing cross-cultural business relationships?  
Through examining the literature in areas that have been identified as relevant in the results 
chapters, along with undertaking an analysis of the empirical evidence collected during the 
interviews, this thesis answers the research questions set out through two components. First, a 
sociological framework is proposed, in which the important social institutions identified in the 
research results fit, and interact, to create a self-reinforcing sociological system. This first 
component essentially addresses the first two research questions set out above.  
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The social institutions identified can be categorised into ‘how it is’ (including hierarchy, ambiguity, 
flexibility, diversity, opposites that coexist, and interconnectedness), ‘what is important’ 
(including guanxi, trust, face, harmony, survival, and win-win), and ‘what they do’ (including avoid 
conflicts, go with the flow, strive for interdependence, eager for quick success, and test 
everything). Perhaps owing to their agricultural traditions in past millennia, Chinese people 
possess a distinctly different world view, seeing the world around them as a complex matrix in 
which all things, including humans, are interconnected. Consequently, the Chinese culture is a 
high-context culture, as defined by Hall (1989). Chinese people see all situations as being 
contextual, and they value the harmonious coexistence of all things. The profoundly influential 
philosophies, Daoism and Confucianism, are themselves products of this world view.  
Such a world view leads to Chinese people’s pragmatic approach to things, which is reflected in 
how it is, what is important, and what they do, with all of these reinforcing their view of the 
world. In practice, this contextual world view, along with a pragmatic attitude, guides Chinese 
people to function in their society through a hierarchical social structure with guanxi networks, in 
which family orientation is strong, and loyalty and interdependence are valued. Trust is often 
given with much caution, and a trusted relationship takes time to establish and is often 
accomplished through testing. Chinese people adapt to circumstances as a strategy to survive 
and/or succeed. While the win-win and ‘quick success’ mentalities both exist, which one is 
adopted may depend on the level of trust established and the self-interest that can potentially be 
gained. Chinese people’s value of harmony encourages them to steer away from conflicts, while 
their belief in following the natural tendencies of things via dispositions and potential motivates 
them to go with the flow. Such was the social environment that New Zealand agribusiness 
entrepreneurs who ventured into China found themselves in, within which there were certain 
social rules they had to abide by, posing challenges to establishing effective cross-cultural 
business relationships. 
Bourdieu’s formula of habitus x capital + field = practice (Bourdieu, 1984) can be used as a useful 
tool in understanding this sociological system in China, although what is being proposed in this 
thesis adds a reinforcing dimension over and above a strict interpretation of Bourdieu’s theory. 
This proposed Chinese sociological system, expressed in a diagram in its summary form in Chapter 
6, is what the researcher considers to encapsulate the key theoretical contributions from this 
thesis towards the general body of knowledge. For this reason, it is repeated below: 
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Figure 3 Chinese sociological system 
A key manifestation of this Chinese sociological system within the business management context 
is the unique way of strategic thinking, in which no defined goal nor plans to achieve such a goal 
are set prior to action, as most Western strategic thinking suggests. Rather, reliance is placed 
upon the inherent potential of the situation, and one chooses to be carried along by this potential 
as it evolves (Jullien, 1999, 2004).  
Building on the understanding provided by the proposed Chinese sociological system, the second 
component of this thesis supplies answers to the third research question set out above. It is 
concluded that the unique and defining characteristics of the food and agribusiness sector do 
indeed impose further challenges in building and managing cross-cultural business relationships. 
These further challenges derive from a combination of the specific uncertainties that exist within 
this sector, as well as Chinese people’s pragmatic approach in business dealings, which is guided 
by their contextual and situation-dependent world view. The uncertainties within the food and 
agribusiness sector are the products of its unique and defining characteristics: the long production 
and investment cycles, production and price volatilities, food safety and security issues, 
seasonality, perishability, environmental implications, and the complex interplay between these. 
These uncertainties justify Chinese people’s distinctively pragmatic way of doing things, which in 
turn reinforces their contextual and situation-dependent world view, as portrayed by the 
sociological system mentioned above. Accordingly, New Zealand entrepreneurs are 
recommended to have an appreciation of not only the Chinese world view and the consequential 
sociological and business environment in China, but also the additional challenges presented by 
the characteristics of agribusiness when venturing into China. 
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7.2 Reflections 
The purpose here is to reflect on the possible implications that the researcher’s bilingual and 
bicultural personal constructs may have had on this research, the nature of the proposed diagram 
and its formation, and the transferability of the research findings.  Lastly, the research limitations 
are considered. 
7.2.1 Implications of the bilingual and bicultural personal constructs 
The journey of this PhD endeavour has certainly had its challenges, one of which was to interpret 
the research results through the researcher’s bilingual, bicultural lenses while drawing on 
literature that has been mostly produced in the West, involving interpretations of Chinese 
phenomena written in a non-Chinese language for an audience that is potentially dominated by 
people living in the West (who could be of various ethnic backgrounds, including Chinese). In line 
with Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955), it was inevitable that the researcher’s 
upbringing until the age of 23 in China, followed by a further 13 years’ living in New Zealand, 
would influence her interpretation of the research results. Because of this bilingual and bicultural 
background, the researcher was able to empathise with both the Chinese and Western 
perspectives. Yet it is important to recognise that, like many other publications referred to within 
the various chapters, this thesis is written in English but describes and analyses Chinese 
phenomena. Additionally, the main theoretical contribution of this thesis − the proposed Chinese 
sociological system (and the diagram to depict this) − is a Western way of explaining things 
through a model-like diagram, in a simplified, abstract form; yet the system described is far from 
simple in reality, as it is dynamic and filled with complexity.  
7.2.2 On the diagram 
While on the surface the construction of this diagram seems to follow the same thinking as Soft 
Systems Methodology championed by Checkland (2000), in that a model is constructed in an 
effort to make sense of the complicated real-world situation, the ultimate world views 
underpinning these models are different. Soft Systems Methodology retains the core values that 
stem from a Western world view, in that the model must be abstract (Rodriguez-Ulloa & Paucar-
Caceres, 2005), and continued adjustment of the model is for the purpose of solving real-world 
problems and hence making improvements in the real world, leading it closer to the ideal. In 
contrast, the proposed diagram is meant to be solely for the purpose of making better sense of 
the world as it presents itself to New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs operating in China: 
there is no intention to try to make any improvement to this world. Rather, and consistent with a 
Chinese world view, the world presents itself to us as how it is, and we simply need to understand 
it better and go along with it as it evolves.  
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Although this diagram was constructed using an inductive-led theory-building process, recognition 
should also be given to the influence of theoretical sensitisation prior to the field work within this 
PhD research. This theoretical sensitisation highlighted the fragmented nature of the existing 
China-related sociological research, and revealed the absence of an overarching sociological 
framework within China’s agri-food environment. During the field work, informants were asked to 
‘tell their own stories’, with no specific prior theory communicated to them. It was a way of trying 
to make sense of the world and suggest an overarching framework through informants’ own 
experience, grounded by actual behaviours and events. Of all the theories the researcher was 
sensitised to, perhaps Bourdieu’s theory on habitus, capital, field, and practice had the deepest 
influence, and guided the formation of the diagram proposed in this thesis. This was followed by 
Nisbett’s theory on the Chinese contextual world view (Nisbett, 2003) in comparison to that in the 
West, as well as Jullien’s theory on Chinese strategic thinking, both of which had the second 
greatest influence on this research and fostered a deeper understanding of the Chinese 
sociological system, as well as how it is manifested in business management. 
Recognition should be given that other plausible explanations for the observed phenomena by 
the informants may exist, and may lead to differences in the proposed Chinese sociological 
system. Buddhism, for example, is an ideology that has existed in China since around the 2nd 
century CE (Foy, 2012). Marxism, having been advocated strongly by the Chinese Communist 
Party since its conception, as well as Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory, which 
developed over the last century and have their own significant standings in China, may also offer 
explanations to phenomena experience by the informants. For example, ‘opposites coexist’ (refer 
to 6.2.1.5 Opposites coexist) could be explained by drawing on the principle of Dialectic 
Materialism that is enshrined by Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought and Deng Xiaoping Theory 
(although the acceptance of these modern ideologies by the Chinese people may in itself reflect 
an influence of the Daoist yin and yang principle). Similarly, the propaganda on ‘social harmony’ 
by the Chinese government over the last few decades may also help to explain informants’ 
experiences of conflict avoidance by the Chinese. None of these ideologies or ideas, however, 
emerged from the interviews, hence did not receive the attention of the researcher during the 
exercise of theory development. Future research endeavours could nevertheless explore these 
areas further. 
7.2.3 Transferability of the research findings  
Although this research was conducted within the food and agribusiness context, the description 
of the Chinese sociological framework depicted in the diagram has the potential to enhance 
understanding of the Chinese social and business environment beyond agri-food. Readers who 
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have a general interest in social and business dealings in China may also find the diagram helpful, 
and may be able to transfer the knowledge gained there to a different field. The identification of 
the particular challenges that arise due to the unique and defining characteristics of agribusiness 
may, however, be limited to this particular context, although it could be helpful in a different 
context if similar characteristics are identified.  
7.2.4 Research limitations 
Through cultural lenses, and via the vehicle of cross-cultural business relationships, this research 
proposes a framework to understand the Chinese sociological system. Drawing on the 
understanding obtained within this system, as well as the unique and defining characteristics of 
food and agribusiness, conclusions are drawn regarding building and managing cross-cultural 
business relationships within the agri-food sector. While the understanding of the overall Chinese 
sociological system provides insights into the reasons why certain overarching challenges exist 
when New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs try to establish effective cross-cultural business 
relationships, there are also limitations to this ‘broad’ approach, with potential to miss some finer 
grained detail.  
For example, some informants observed differences in attitudes across different generations in 
China. While this could be explained through an understanding of Chinese people’s contextual 
world view, in that the world changes with time, leading to changes of attitude, this research has 
not explored further what dynamic elements within Chinese society at different times may have 
led to − and may still be leading to in terms of differences in attitudes. Similarly, there were some 
observations on the differences between genders and across different parts of China. Although 
these various differences fall into the broad category of ‘diversity’, this research has not looked 
further into the details of these diversities. 
A potential difference among informants was the understanding of cross-cultural business 
relationships and related issues by informants of Chinese ethnicity compared to those of 
European ethnicity. Drawing on Kelly’s Personal Construct Theory (Kelly, 1955) and the theory of 
Bourdieu (J. Webb et al., 2002), in which habitus plays a significant role in one’s interpretation of 
the world, it is likely that some contrasting ideas existed between these two different groups of 
informants. This research, however, has not attempted to analyse these differences.  
There is another point related to this possible difference that is perhaps worth pondering: 
anecdotally, why do we hear that many Westerners find doing business in China difficult, yet we 
do not hear much about Chinese people facing difficulties doing business in the Western world? Is 
it a straight language thing, where the non-Chinese speakers talk about their experiences to a 
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non-Chinese dominated audience? Or is it because, compared to Westerners, Chinese people’s 
contextual world view, as well as their pragmatic approach to things, makes them more 
adaptable? The habitus of many Westerners has determined their relatively more explicit, 
abstract, and absolute view of the world, making their encounters in China appear to be non-
explicit, specific, and situation dependent, hence causing discomfort, confusion, and frustration. 
Whether or not contrasts in habitus can help explain why Westerners are confronted with at 
times daunting Chinese experiences requires further research. 
Taking it one step further, the word ‘Westerners’ in itself is a broad term, covering populations 
from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. While in this thesis ‘New Zealanders’ has been used 
interchangeably with ‘Westerners’, leading to some broad understanding of these ‘Westerners’, 
in reality it is likely that relevant differences do exist among Westerners from different countries. 
Indeed, some informants alluded to the difference observed between Americans and New 
Zealanders (refer to 3.4.1.1.1 Differences and similarities in overall institutional cultures between 
China and New Zealand and 4.3.2 Win-win). But it is still valid to ask questions such as ‘Do the 
understandings of these different Westerners differ when it comes to cross-cultural business 
relationships in China, and doing business with Chinese in general?’; and if the answer is ‘Yes’, 
then ‘In what ways are they different?’, and ‘How does this play out in business practice?’. This 
thesis has not looked into these possible differences and their implications in business practice, 
which could be a potential interest for future researchers.  
 
7.3 Recommendations 
Having reflected on the implications of the researcher’s bilingual and bicultural personal 
constructs for this research, the nature of the proposed diagram, the transferability of the 
research findings, as well as some limitations within this research, the researcher recommends 
that readers:  
 consider the proposed theory within this research, with the limitations outlined above in 
mind 
 apply the proposed theory in practice when doing business with Chinese people, and test 
its relevance 
 ponder the possibility of furthering the current understanding of Chinese sociological and 
business environments by conducting research in the areas of limitation identified above. 
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While this research is largely conducted within the Chinese environment, equivalent to an in vivo 
study of the Chinese sociological system, future research could also look into cross-cultural 
business relationships between China and New Zealand within the food and agribusiness context 
from within the New Zealand environment, which is essentially an in vitro study of the Chinese 
sociological system. There have been a number of food- and agribusiness-related investments in 
New Zealand by Chinese investors in recent years. How are these businesses performing? Have 
the Chinese investors experienced cultural challenges? If so, how have they responded to these 
challenges? Indeed, many questions could be asked, and the answers to these questions could 
help to deepen our understanding of the Chinese sociological system, especially in terms of how it 
influences Chinese people’s business behaviours outside China. 
 
7.4 At the End 
The researcher reminds readers that although this PhD research has been a scholarly endeavour, 
it also hopes to shed light for New Zealand agribusiness entrepreneurs in their future ventures in 
China. It aspires to provide further insights into strategies of engagement that will help to lead 
New Zealand firms to success in doing business with Chinese, particularly in terms of enhancing 
the functionalities of the value chains in the food and agribusiness sector. Readers are reminded 
that this thesis also contains some practical ideas aimed at entrepreneurs. For example, it has 
looked into the reasons for failure, and gives recommendations on specific techniques to adopt 
when operating in China, including suggestions for market entry, value proposition, relationship 
building, business negotiation, agribusiness operation, and understanding the power game (refer 
to Chapter 5). 
Finally, being Chinese, the researcher believes that the observations made and experiences lived 
through by the informants of this research were not only grounded in specific behaviours and 
specific events in specific locations, but were also grounded at a specific point in time. Given the 
inherent Chinese view of the world as contextual and situation dependent, leading to their focus 
on flexibility and adaptability, one can expect to see ongoing changes in the Chinese sociological 
and business environment. These will in all likelihood occur at different times in different parts of 
China, consistent with the differing rates of economic development – yet another aspect of the 
diversity that deserves future research. 
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